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ion. It is enough to say that we feel no doubt when we read the act as a whole.

A reason for the construction adopted below was found in the omission of the word "immigrant" which had followed "alien" in the earlier acts. No doubt that may have been intended to widen the reach of the statute, but we see no reason to suppose that the omission meant to do more than to avoid the suggestion that no one was within the act who did not come here with intent to remain. It is not necessary to regard the change as a mere abbreviation, although the title of the statute is "An Act to regulate the immigration of aliens into the United States."

Upon our construction of the statute we need not go further into the particular circumstances. But we may add that even on a different reading the jury was permitted to establish a questionably high standard of conduct, if it be admitted, as it was, that shore leave might be granted. No practicable method of preventing sailors from occasionally yielding to the seductions of an unduly prolonged stay on land was suggested or occurs to our mind.

In the second case the District Judge declined to follow the decision in Taylor v. The United States, 152 Fed. Rep. 1, which we have been considering, and quashed an indictment which disclosed that the alien alleged to have been permitted unlawfully to land was a seaman. The United States brings a writ of error under the Act of March 2, 1907, c. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246, on the ground, it must be presumed, that the judgment was based upon the construction of the statute. There are other technical questions apparent on the record, but, if they are open, the Government very properly has not pressed them, but has confined itself to the question of law with which we have dealt. There is an allegation in the indictment that the alien was a stowaway under order of deportation, and there is a suggestion that this raises a doubt if he was a bona fide seaman. This is the only additional point raised.

But we perceive nothing in the fact that an alien has been refused leave to land from a British ship and has been ordered

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to be deported, to make it impossible as matter of law for the British master subsequently to accept him as a sailor on the high seas, even if bound for an American port. If the Government had wished to try the good faith of this particular transaction, and not simply to get a construction of the act, there was no need to rely on the allegation mentioned alone. Of course it is possible for a master unlawfully to permit an alien to land, even if the alien is a sailor, and it was alleged that the master did so. But we take the Government at its word.

The defendant argues that the United States cannot be allowed a writ of error in a criminal case like this. We do not perceive the difficulty. No doubt of the power of Congress is intimated in United States v. Sanges, 144 U. S. 310. If the Fifth Amendment has any bearing, the act of 1907 is directed to judgments rendered before the moment of jeopardy is reached. Kepner v. United States, 195 U. S. 100, 128. We think it unnecessary to discuss the question at length.

Judgment in No. 238 reversed.
Judgment in No. 404 affirmed.

CENTRAL OF GEORGIA RAILWAY

COMPANY v.

WRIGHT, COMPTROLLER-GENERAL OF GEORGIA. GEORGIA RAILROAD AND BANKING COMPANY v.

SAME.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA.

Nos. 85, 89. Argued October 21, 22, 23, 1907.-Decided November 18, 1907

Due process of law requires that opportunity to be heard as to the validity of the tax and the amount of the assessment be given to a taxpayer, who, without fraudulent intent and in the honest belief that it is not taxable, withholds property from tax returns; and this requirement is not satisfied where the taxpayer is allowed to attack the assessment only for fraud and corruption.

Argument for Plaintiffs in Error.

207 U.S.

The assessment of a tax is action judicial in its nature requiring for the legal exertion of the power such opportunity to appear as the circumstances of the case require, and this court, as the ultimate arbiter of rights secured by the Federal Constitution, is charged with the duty of determining whether the taxpayer has been afforded due process of law. The system provided by the Political Code of Georgia, §§ 804, 879, as construed by the highest court of that State, not allowing the taxpayer any opportunity to be heard as to the valuation of property not returned by him and honestly withheld, except as to fraud and corruption, does not afford due process of law, which adjudges upon notice and opportunity to be heard, within the meaning of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

124 Georgia, 596, 630; 125 Georgia, 589, 617, reversed.

THE facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. T. M. Cunningham, Jr., Mr. Joseph R. Lamar and Mr. Joseph B. Cumming, with whom Mr. Henry C. Cunningham, Mr. A. R. Lawton and Mr. Alex. C. King were on the briefs, for plaintiffs in error:

The statutes of the State of Georgia as construed by the Supreme Court of Georgia in the matter of back tax assessments do not provide for either notice or hearing and therefore do not provide due process of law and are contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.

The question of due process of law was dealt with by the Supreme Court of Georgia only in the first decision. That opinion greatly simplifies the issue, because there is now no question as to the character of the notice required or the notice given, since the court holds not only that the statutes do not provide for notice, but that the closing of the "door of opportunity" was intentional and the deprivation of the right to be heard was a penalty.

When the Fourteenth Amendment provided that no person shall be deprived of his property without a hearing, it also declared that he should not be deprived of a hearing as a penalty. Whatever the crime, however great the contempt, howsoever contumacious a party, he cannot be deprived of the right to be heard when his property is to be taken. Judgment

207 U.S.

Argument for Plaintiffs in Error.

of any sort must be after notice. It is contrary to the first principles of the social compact to deprive one of the right to be heard. Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U. S. 414.

A party, by his misconduct, cannot forfeit a right so that it may be taken from him without judicial proceedings, in which the forfeiture shall be declared in due form. Cooley, Con. Lim. 518; Chicago &c. R. R. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 235; Galpin v. Page, 18 Wall. 350. Where the proceedings are arbitrary, oppressive, or unjust, they are declared not to be "due process of law." Glidden v. Harrington, 189 U. S. 258.

Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the legislature is bound to provide a method for the assessment and collection of taxes that shall be in conformity with natural justice, Turpin v. Lemon, 187 U. S. 51, and notice is specially necessary where, as in Georgia, the assessment is equivalent to a judgment in personam and binds not merely the particular property assessed for taxation, but all the estate of the taxpayer. Pol. Code, 880-883.

The statute must provide an opportunity to be heard on the charge, whether that charge be an assessment for the current year or a reassessment for previous years. As long as the State can change the assessment, the citizen has a right to be heard on the question as to whether the change shall be made, and as to the amount of the new assessment. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 105.

The rule is the same whether the reassessment is by a change in the valuation, or by the addition of the property omitted. Kuntz v. Sumption, 117 Indiana, 1; Walsh v. State, 142 Indiana, 557; Cleghorn v. Postlewait, 43 Illinois, 431; Tolmon v. Solomon, 191 Illinois, 204.

The assessment of back taxes on omitted property involves the determination of value; is judicial in its nature, and notice and a statutory right to be heard in back tax assessments are essential to the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Gray on Limitations of Taxing Power, § 1295, p. 639; 27 Am. & Eng. VOL. CCVII-9

Argument for Defendant in Error.

207 U. S.

Enc. of Law, 705; The Redwood Case, 42 N. W. Rep. 713; Overing v. Foote, 65 N. Y. 269–277; Douglas v. Westchester Co., 172 N. Y. 309.

Mr. John C. Hart, Attorney General of the State of Georgia, and Mr. Boykin Wright for defendant in error:

Due process in matters of taxation means notice of suitable character, and an opportunity to be heard at some stage of the proceedings. Taylor v. Secor (State R. R. Tax Cases, 111), 92 U. S. 575; Kentucky Tax Case, 115 U. S. 321. The notice need not be personal or individual. In fact, the usual and proper notice is statutory and collective. Pittsburg v. Backus, 154 U. S. 421; Judson on Taxation, §§ 321, 329.

The process of taxation does not require the same kind of notice as is required in a suit at law, or even proceedings for taking private property under the power of eminent domain. It involves no violation of the process of law when it is executed according to the customary forms and established usages, etc. Bell's Gap &c. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232.

Opportunity to be heard at some stage of the proceedings is all that is requisite. It may be either before or after the assessment or at any time before final judgment is entered. Gallup v. Schmidt, 183 U. S. 300; Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97; Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U. S. 345; Pittsburg &c. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 421.

It is no denial of due process to withdraw the opportunity to be heard as a penalty for the taxpayer's failure or refusal to make a proper return of his property to a designated officer, in the manner and at the time required by law. Glidden v. Harrington, 189 U. S. 255, 259, 260.

The right exists to discriminate in some manner against those who fail to hand in tax lists. When the discrimination consists in merely submitting the party to the doom of the assessor and depriving him of any appeal, it would seem that there could be no valid objection to it. Cooley on Taxation (3d Ed.), 619 to 624 and notes; Board of Commissioners v. Anderson,

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