Napoleon's Maxims of War With Notes Based on the Civil War By Captain James D. Basey, U. S. Army, Retired (Continued) MAXIM XII An army ought to have only one line of operation. This should be preserved with care and never abandoned but in the last extremity. NOTE He (a) In the early part of December, 1862, Grant was marching on Vicksburg from the eastern side of the Mississippi, while Sherman, in connection with Admiral Porter, was descending the river to attack Vicksburg from the west. As Grant marched south, he found it very difficult to keep up his line of communications. At Holly Springs he established a base, leaving as a guard about 1,500 troops, and pushed on to Oxford. Pemberton was now beginning to get worried, and at once took advantage of the situation. ordered Van Dorn, therefore, with about 3,500 cavalry to break up the Federal line of communications. December 20, Van Dorn appeared suddenly at Holly Springs, captured the garrison and destroyed the stores of food, clothing, and ammunition valued at over a million dollars. As soon as Grant heard of this he was compelled to retreat, for he would not be able to live off the country. Grant was forced to suffer for not guarding sufficiently his line of communications in a hostile country. To make matters worse, he failed to notify Sherman in time, and the latter suffered a reverse at Chickasaw Bluffs in front of Vicksburg. But Grant was not discouraged. Failures On had no terror for him, and he set to work planning another campaign as soon as his armies were reassembled. (b) On September 2, 1864, Hood evacuated Atlanta, and Sherman entered in triumph. But the capture of this city did not solve Sherman's greatest problem, which was his line of communications. The latter was stretched out over 400 miles, extending through Chattanooga to Louisville. Hood, in the meanwhile, had withdrawn to Macon, where he immediately began to reorganize his army for operations against the enemy's communications. On October 3 he began an offensive against Sherman, moving on the railway north of Marietta. From that time till October 19, Sherman pursued him, but Hood kept moving north. It was now evident that he was advancing on Thomas, who was now in command at Nashville. Sherman, therefore, dispatched Schofield, Stanley, and some cavalry to his assistance. The Union commander now determined on a bold course of action. His line of communications was long and difficult of maintenance. Grant was at this time besieging Lee at Petersburg. Why not, therefore, cut loose from Atlanta, march across the country, foraging along the way, establish a new base at Savannah, and attack Lee from the rear? This plan had been suggested to Grant by Sherman several months before, and Sherman at last obtained authority to make the move. On November 12, therefore, he broke off all communication with the rest of the world, left Atlanta, and started on his famous march to the sea -a military operation which was one of the essential causes of final Union victory. The fact that it turned out successfully was due to the excellent leadership and judgment of Sherman. By this march, he proved himself to be one of the most brilliant leaders of the war. MAXIM XIII The distance permitted between corps of an army upon the march must be governed by the localities, by circumstances, and by the object in view. NOTE (a) In its march through the Carolinas, Sherman's army was divided into two wings; the right, consisting of the 14th and 20th Corps, was under the command of General Slocum; the left, consisting of the 15th and 17th Corps, under General Logan. On March 19, 1865, the left wing, on approaching Bentonville, N. C., about half way between Fayetteville and Goldsboro, ran into rather strong resistance. At first General Slocum thought that it was only cavalry, but his leading troops soon developed a strong force of infantry and was driven back. The enemy attacked vigorously, but the veteran corps of the left wing held their own. the meanwhile Slocum had communicated with Sherman, who was with the right wing, marching on a parallel road several miles to the right. The 20th was spent in intrenching, but all assaults were driven back. On the 21st the rest of the army arrived, and the Confederates retreated in the direction of Raleigh. Gen. J. E. Johnston had endeavored to mass his forces and defeat one of Sherman's wings in detail before the other could arrive. But the quality In of the Union troops was such that they were able to hold out until extricated from the dangerous position by the rest of the army. (b) On May 4, 1864, Grant started his famous movement into The Wilderness. Warren's corps, the 5th, followed by Sedgwick's 6th, crossed the Rapidan at Germanna Ford; Hancock with the 2d moving across at Ely's Ford. In this case the distance between the columns was only about five miles. This was prompted by several factors, which he took into consideration. The Wilderness of Virginia was not as well known to him as it was to the Confederates; it was a very difficult country in which to maneuver; and he did not dare separate his army corps to any great extent. Moreover, he was liable to be attacked by Lee at any time, in which event he must concentrate his army promptly. For it must be remembered that, contrary to the custom of the former commanders of the Army of the Potomac, Grant was seeking Lee's army, not the Confederate capital. (c) After the disastrous fighting at Spottsylvania, Grant determined to set a trap for Lee. Feeling that the Confederate commander would welcome the chance to attack an isolated corps, he ordered Hancock with the 2d Corps, on May 20, to withdraw from the right of the line and move off about 20 miles to Milford Station, on the Fredericksburg Railroad. Hancock was followed by Warren, Wright, and Burnside. Grant figured that Lee would most certainly attack the 2d Corps, whereupon he would fall upon the Confederate Army caught in flagrante dilectu and maul him severely. But Lee had the advantage of interior lines, and when Grant arrived with the rest of the army he found his opponent so well in trenched on the North Anna that an attack would have resulted in another Cold Harbor. Grant did the only logical thing he moved again by the left flank. MAXIM XIV Among mountains, a great number of positions are always to be found very strong in themselves and which it is dangerous to attack. The character of this mode of warfare consists in occupying camps on the flanks or in the rear of the enemy, leaving him only the alternative of abandoning his position without fighting, to take up another in the rear, or to descend from it in order to attack you. In mountain warfare, the assailant has always the disadvantage, even in offensive open warfare; the great secret consists in defensive combats, and in obliging the enemy to attack. NOTE Following the battle of Missionary Ridge, the Army of the Tennessee was concentrated at Dalton, Georgia. Bragg now was relieved and called to Richmond as military advisor to President. Davis, Gen. J. E. Johnston taking his place. Facing him in the vicinity of Chattanooga was Sherman's army of about 98,000, comprising three separate units under the command of Thomas, McPherson, and Schofield. Johnston had assumed a very strong position on Rocky Face Ridge, a range about ten miles long, running north and south in front of Dalton. Here he waited, hoping that the enemy would attack him. Sherman, however, was a great believer in maneuvering, and was unwilling to fight a decisive battle unless he was assured of success. Moreover, he had no desire to attack strongly fortified positions. He, therefore, decided to force Johnston to evacuate Dalton without fighting. Consequently, Schofield was ordered to march on Dalton via Cleveland and Red Clay, approaching Johnston from the north; Thomas was to assume a position in front of Rocky Face Ridge; while McPherson, with three corps, was to march south through Snake Creek Gap and strike the Confederate line of communications at Resaca. By May 7 the operation was well under way. For several days Thomas kept up a demonstration in his front, while awaiting news that McPherson had occupied the railway at Resaca and thereby cut off the enemy's retreat. But McPherson met with unexpected resistance, and, overestimating the number of the enemy confronting him, failed to carry out his part of the program. When Sherman began to move his center to the support of McPherson, Johnston saw that he was in a trap and acted at once. On the night of the 11th, he withdrew his entire army from Rocky Face Ridge and retreated south to Resaca before Sherman could cut him off. By relying on wide turning movements, Sherman had succeeded in forcing Johnston to retreat from a position which, if attacked, would have certainly resulted in Federal defeat. MAXIM XV The first consideration with a general who offers battle should be the glory and honor of his arms; the safety and preservation of his men is only the second; but it is in the enterprise and courage resulting from the former that the latter will most assuredly be found. In a retreat, besides the honor of the army, the loss of life is often greater than in two battles. For this reason, we should never despair while brave men are to be found with their colors. It is by this means that we obtain victory and deserve to obtain it. NOTE Lee took great chances, for a well or It is doubtful if there are any in- ganized attack by McClellan might have stances in the Civil War where a commander placed the glory and honor of his arms above the safety and preservation of his own men. Human life in both armies was too valuable. Several times, however, a demonstration of force by a defeated army was sufficient to ward off a serious pursuit and add greatly to the morale of the vanquished troops. On September 17, 1862, occurred the last stage of the battle of Sharpsburg between 87,000 Federals under McClellan and 35,000 Confederates under Lee. The latter was in a particularly unfortunate position, backed up against the Potomac, his line of retreat restricted to the Shepherdstown Ford. But Lee managed to repel the Federal attacks, due to the lack of coordination between the attacking elements and the failure of McClellan to employ Porter's corps of 24,000. As Dodge says, it was for Lee "a tactically drawn battle and a strategic defeat." To the dismay of his corps and division commanders, Lee refused to retreat on the night of the 17th. Instead, he had his lines strengthened and by remaining in position served notice on the Union commander that he was ready for another battle if he so desired. But McClellan refused to accept the challenge, and Lee withdrew across the river without molestation on the night of the 18th. This show of force and determination not only overawed the Union commander and prevented a spirited pursuit, but, also, more than anything else, rehabilitated the falling morale of Lee's army and strengthened the Confederate determination to see the thing through. 'E. P. Alexander, "Military Memoirs of a to Appomattox." destroyed his army; but he also took the personal equation into account-he knew McClellan. MAXIM XVI It is an approved maxim of war never to do what the enemy wishes you to do, for this reason alone, that he desires it. A field of battle, therefore, which he has previously studied and reconnoitered, should be avoided, and double care should be taken where he has had time to forify and intrench. One consequence deducible from the principle is, never to attack a position in front which you can gain by turning. NOTE (a) Following the disastrous rout of the 1st and 11th corps on the northwest outskirts of Gettysburg, the afternoon of July 1, 1863, General Hancock, hurried forward by Meade to take temporary command, set to work fortifying the now famous Union position on the heights southeast of the town, and arranging the available troops for the next day's battle. The desperate work of strengthening the lines was clearly visible from the Confederate lines. During the afternoon, Lee and Longstreet were discussing the situation from Seminary Ridge. Longstreet suggested a movement around the Union left flank, thereby placing the Confederate army between Meade and Washington and forcing the Union commander to fight on ground of Lee's choosing. To the chagrin of Longstreet, Lee replied, "If he is there tomorrow, I shall attack him." Longstreet answered, "If he is there tomorrow, it will be because he wants you to attack him."1 Confederate." James Longstreet, "Manassas And Meade was ready on the 2d, by dint of a remarkably successful consolidation of position and concentration of troops. As the result of the loss of this battle, Lee was forced to retreat with the remnants of his command across the Potomac, and his second and last invasion had come to an end. Lee is said to have written to Longstreet in 1864 admitting that he should have followed the advice of his second in command to turn the Union left. (b) More blood was shed unnecessarily in Grant's campaign of 1864-5 than at any other time during the war. The Wilderness and Spottsylvania Court House were bad enough; but the battle of Cold Harbor was the climax in blood letting of the entire campaign, if not for the entire war. On June 2, 1864, Grant was facing Lee in the vicinity of Cold Harbor. His army was stretched out in almost a straight line, about eight miles in length. The strength was evenly distributed from right to left. Lee had arrived there on the first and had immediately dug in, rendering his position practically impregnable. He had already repulsed several sporadic attacks and awaited confidently, even hopefully, an assault by Grant. At 4.30 a. m. on the 3d, Grant attacked all along the line. In eight minutes he had lost over 6,000, and after an hour the fighting practically stopped. Grant's losses June 1-3 were a few short of 10,000, and he had accomplished nothing. Grant himself admits that Cold Harbor was not necessary. But it established the highwater mark for rapid slaughter during the war. Even Grant hardly dared try again the patience of the Northern people by indulging in another similar inferno. That he knew better is evinced by a study of the operations which forced Pemberton back into Vicksburg the year before. We can only feel that Grant did not make use of the talents he undoubtedly possessed. MAXIM XVII In a war of march and maneuver, if you would avoid a battle with a superior cnemy, it is necessary to intrench every night and occupy a good defensive position. Those natural positions which are ordinarily met with are not sufficient to protect an army against superior numbers without recourse to art. NOTE (a) Following the battle of Missionary Ridge, the Union forces were assembled in the region of Dalton, Georgia. They consisted of the armies of the Tennessee, Cumberland, and Ohio a total of about 98,000 men, under the command of Major General W. T. Sherman. Opposed to him, barring the way to Atlanta, was General J. E. Johnston and his army of about 65,000 veterans. On May 5 Sherman's forward movement began. Thus was instituted one of the bestfought campaigns of the war. Johnston realized his great disadvantage in numbers, and depended upon his military skill to thwart the Federals-intrenching every night, fighting every step of the way, and never allowing himself to be drawn into a general or decisive battle. It is one of the most brilliant campaigns of the war, and the names of Resaca, Kenesaw Mountain, and the Chattahoochee will always remain monuments to the high military skill which the Confederate which the Confederate commander possessed. But this Fabian policy was not appreciated by the Confederate Government, and on July 17 Johnston was superseded by Hood. Although this move may have been abetted by the bitter personal relations between |