Commander commanding the communi

cation platoon.

One of the first things to be considered is will the organization above noted violate the two principles noted in the second paragraph of this article. It would seem that in the battalion and regiment the officers who might be classed as Battalion and Regimental Signal Officers are going to be primarily company commanders, and laden with other duties. Their viewpoint will be that of promotion to organization commanders and not to promotion as Brigade Signal Officer, especially since the word Battalion, Regimental, or Brigade Signal Officer does not appear in the tables. This, then, is one point, that the word Signal Officer does not appear in these tables, although the names of many other types of officers do appear. The second point is that there will be no such thing on the part of officers who have charge of communications as looking forward to being Brigade Signal Officer. In case of war expansion what will happen under such conditions? The answer seems clear that there will be under this organization no enduring personnel of officers to provide the Infantry with signal training in event of war expansion.

Another feature of importance in connection with this communication organization is the training of Infantry noncommissioned officers to a point such that they can be used as Infantry Signal Officers in time of war. Since in event of war expansion we can expect the company commanders who have charge of the signal training in Battalion and Regiment, and the Brigade aide, to leave the signal service it is of extreme importance to have a welltrained noncommissioned officer personnel.

For efficient training there should be standards set; for instance, in marksmanship a very definite accomplishment is required, but in the Infantry Signal Service there are no such standards with consequent results. The proposed issue of radio sets to battalions will give the infantry in a division sixteen radio sets to operate, for whom operators must be trained. If the infantry has well-trained operators they will be in a position to ask for efficient sets. Battalions with good radio operators and sets will have a marked effect on the tactical employment of the accompanying gun or guns, since the gun and the battalion can move independently and as often as desirable. Radio in the battalion also means well-trained code men in the battalion.

To investigate the present training conditions, assume an ideal situation, where a complete division is located in one camp, with a Division Signal Officer supplied with training schedules and texts; the Infantry Signal men of the division will have two officers, the two aides of the Commanding Generals of the two Brigades who are not burdened with other work. These officers may either conduct separate Brigade Signal Schools or they may be combined into an Infantry divisional signal school. It can scarcely be expected that they will have the services of the Division Signal Officer or of the Officers of the Divisional Signal Company, although they might. If the communication platoons are filled to peace strength they will have 225 men in each brigade to train. The order of importance of this technical and tactical training is, perhaps, radio, telephone, message center, and visual. Code work for message centers scarcely exists in practice in peace time, and since all units to include battalions will have radio this is an im

portant feature of message center training. It will probably be desirable to send one officer either to an Infantry Signal School at Camp Benning or to the Signal Corps School at Camp Vail. Continuing the ideal situation, assume that these two officers produce good results. Mobilization for war, however, will find no permanent officer personnel to take over the duties of Regimental or Brigade Signal Officer or to form a permanent training body for such officers. Nor does this organization provide for officers who can be used to form an Infantry Signal School instructor personnel at Camp Benning or elsewhere.

While it is not fair to criticize a proposed organization until it is seen what it will produce, yet it is logical to study how we can obtain competent communication platoons under the organization as now laid down. It is impossible without help to expect new officers with duties as assigned in the new tables to take over communication training in the Infantry, with one officer for 225 men, for the amount of time that can be given by the commanding officers of the platoons in the Regiments and Battalions for training is certainly limited. Assistance for these officers could be obtained from the Divisional Signal Company, but well-trained instructors. will be scarce. The best solution would seem to be to provide these officers with trained instructors from an Infantry Signal School.

There is another point about this training of instructors, and that is, for instance, in radio Signal Corps operators may not be trained to operate sets of the type used in the Infantry, nor will they in general be familiar with the conditions under which the Infantry operates, nor with the type of nets that

the Infantry must work. The minimum number of men the Infantry should train as instructors is at least one for each Brigade and Regiment, unless Brigade Signal Schools are adopted, in which case there should still be two men from the Brigade properly trained, one in radio and visual, and one in telephone and message center work.

The function of the Regimental Signal Officer, in addition to training and directing his own platoon, is to coordinate the work of the Battalion Signal Officers and carry out the Brigade Signal Plan. The function of the Brigade Signal Officer is to train and direct his own platoon and to coordinate the work of the Regimental Signal Officers, so that the Brigade carries out the Divisional Signal Plan. The nature of this work is both technical and tactical. Both the technical and tactical work require orders to insure execution. Signal Orders were practically nonexistent in the World War; Signal Officers simply told individuals to do certain things. There was not usually a welllaid plan, and certainly the question of technical and tactical orders was a sealed book.

We expect Infantry platoon leaders to exercise tactical judgment, and we give them the training for it. If we demand equivalent standards for Signal Officers we must give them a corresponding training.

As to the nature of this training for Signal Officers, it is possible, by training one officer in the Brigade on radio and visual and one on telephones and message center, to give them a course in five months such that their combined knowledge would permit excellent training to be given to all the communication platoons in a Brigade. Unless some such course of action as this is

pursued we must expect the development of Infantry Signal training to a point of real efficiency to extend over a period of at least five years, and any emergency in the meantime is very apt to find the Infantry very deficient in its communication work. The ease with which real efficiency could be secured in Infantry Signal training, and the disastrous effects possible with lack of such training, alone prompt this article. While such a solution will solve the problem of the training of present personnel, it does not provide an enduring body of Infantry Signal Officers for war expansion. Under the present tables of organization it would seem that the first problem to be attacked is that of training the officer and enlisted personnel now provided.

There are two changes in the tables

of organization which could be made which will help the signal situation materially: (a) Designate the aide who commands the brigade communication platoon in the tables as "Brigade Signal Officer"; (b) In the regiment assign the command of the Headquarters Company to one of the three regimental staff officers, Adjutant or Intelligence and Plans and Training Officer, or Supply Officer, and then assign the officer authorized as company commander as "Regimental Signal Officer, commanding the Communication Platoon." This does not increase personnel; it assigns two officers in each brigade on purely technical work in a technical service; and, furthermore, it will provide an opportunity to send one of these officers to a school for five months without taking away a company commander.

discovered Gubbins was still with the company. The change of background had made Gubbins' individuality stand out like an undershirt at a battalion review. He was forthwith attached to the mess sergeant to look after the piehangers and the macaroni-stretchers. Thus it happened that Horatio Gubbins, eager to see the world, to taste the virile cup of adventure, was left, like Cinderella, on special duty with the rolling kitchen, obliged to receive the news of of Fieldburg doings second

hand.

The accounts he heard were worth his while.

"How was the rioting last night?" asked Lance Corporal Leonard at mess.

"Pretty good," replied Private Adams. "I was on guard, and along about nine o'clock there was about a thousand come along and started rioting. I let 'em go for awhile, but when I saw women and children was getting killed, I whips out my skirmish line, like what I used to rope steers with, gives her a swing or two, and lassoes the crowd. I told 'em they would have to call the riot off as the coroner had enough work for one night."

"That rough stuff is pretty crude in these days of strategy," said Leonard. "Night before last when I was in charge, they come down on the jail like the Germans through Belgium. Instead of pulling this 'Halt or I fire' stuff, I made 'em a little speech. told 'em the soldiers had a barrel of vanilla down at the poolroom which they was willing to share either before or after the rioting. While the mob was down there, I took the nigger over to the fire station, and when they come back from not finding any vanilla, they couldn't find neither of us-though they didn't care much about the nig

ger this time. After they went home disgusted, I put the nigger back in jail. Using your head saves a lot of trouble." "Is only one man on guard at a time?" inquired Gubbins.

"Sure," said the Lance Corporal. "One K Company man can handle a town like Fieldburg. Some does it pretty raw, like Adams there; but it only takes one man if he keeps his nerve and don't let them bluff him."

"But what do the rest go down for? I see nine or ten go down every night." "Them?" said Leonard. "That's a little scheme of our own." The Lance Corporal's voice dropped to a confidential pitch. "You see, all the girls down town falls for us fellows, but the men folks don't like us because we spoil their riots every night. So while all the fathers and brothers and steadies are down town at the riots one of us takes charge of them and the rest go around and see the girls."

Leonard could see Gubbins was not impressed. Gubbins was a soldier, not a ladies' man. He would rather be the one that took charge than all those that went around to see the girls. Leonard read Gubbins' dutiful mind, and the seed of an idea was sown in his own mind. That idea sprang into full bloom the next evening when he saw Gubbins standing peering through the dusk toward Fieldburg, listening for shots and the alarms of deadly fray.

"What are you doing here, Gubbins ?" asked the Lance Corporal. "Why aren't you in town?"

Gubbins was so surprised at the suggestion that he be in town that he could

not answer.

"Didn't you know it was your night to go on guard?" pursued Leonard. "You ought to have been down there an hour ago."