go on the roads. Armored command posts, equipped with radio stations, can freely traverse the front. There will be dangers from the air, but the eagles of the air can never hope to destroy the monsters on land. So the imagination devises the mechanical army; yet it is not a wild stretch of the imagination. It is merely the army of the future, mechanically transported; it is our present goal. Of course, one can hear objections to this; it costs too much, or this or that; just as there were objections to the introduction of machinery in peaceful production. But the truth is that machinery in war will cost less, as it did in peace. Dollar for dollar, man for man, the motorized army will be cheaper than the animal army, in peace or in war; and it will be much more effective in action. Flesh and blood is the real wealth of nations, and any effective substitution of machinery for flesh will be on the credit side of the ledger. Nor will machinery detract from the moral values in war. The maneuver of the motorized army will bring back to war the romance that it lost almost entirely in the shambles of the trenches. Some think that motorization will make our tactics too complex, but really it will serve to simplify. There has been nothing in war as complex as the dreary intricacies of tactical plans during the World War. There will be nothing simpler than the application of age-old principles to a motorized army that can move rapidly over the ground. If technique is made complicated, one need only remember that the handling of technique is merely a matter of habit. Decidedly, the only objections to motorized war are those that nature herself imposes in her continual obstruction to the progress of mankind. We haven't the equipment as yet. We are only at the beginning of the path. Yet the tank has pointed the way, and the path must be followed. Once more, let us continually study the naked tank, the cross-country chassis. We must not stop at the existing machine, wasting time in attempting to coordinate its tactics with those of an immobilized infantry. We know our tactical principles as they have been so excellently taught us in the past years. We saw our tactical ideals justified during the past war. We must not let the tank confuse those ideals. We must think of it only as a motorized machine gun, a motorized accompanying gun, or merely as motorized transport carrying whatever we choose to mount. We must now go ahead with broader view to motorize our all. Every arm of the service can find use for the cross-country chassis in one of its forms. All hands must concentrate on its production. Preparation for war is a race for production. There must be fliers for the air, swimmers for the water, and cross-country transport for the land. There will be an accompanying race in weapons. But transport comes first of all. New weapons may destroy and eliminate the "tank" as we know it today. But weapons will not eliminate cross-country motorized transport. This is here to stay. For the infantry it is the "one best bet." There are those who jeer at dreams; and, in a sense, this is indeed a dream. But it is a dream that must come true if we would hope to survive in our dominant position. Across the waters. this new tank transport is being pushed feverishly. There are being developed infantry tanks, cavalry tanks, and transport tanks of all kinds. There is even an amphibious tank, with hopes for successful development—a tank that can cross rivers without bridges. We are a mechanical nation. We have played a large part in development of transport. As a nation we must lead in this new kind of transport. As an army we must be prepared to exploit every advantage that seems to offer in a military sense. As infantry we have the greatest responsibility, not only because our present tanks are all infantry tanks, but because infantry tactics determine the tactics of all. There have been frequent demonstrations of tanks during the past year. The newer tanks have not been ready for show. There were only the old, the obsolescent. Yet most spectators have carried away respect for the type. It is noteworthy, however, that most of the questions asked have not been aimed at the probable future of this new kind of transport, but rather at the details of employment of the type. "Do tanks precede or follow infantry, and at how many paces?" This danger must be avoided. It is movement, and not formation, that dominates combat. With clear objective sense and freedom of movement, the formations will take care of themselves. The tank is distinctly a movement and not a formation. Finally, therefore, let us never forget that movement is the essential in war. In peace let us study our transport. The "mechanical army" is an excellent objective. If it is a dream, then all objectives are dreams, to be accomplished in fact. Consolidating as we go, let every step be taken towards and not away from this ideal of a modernized army, powerful yet mobile. In the path are a plenty of mechanical difficulties. These should be our only obstructions. Surely there need be no human obstructionists who, placed in position to help push, balk at the ideal itself. Neither need there be any who, seeing the vision, refuse to share the exploitation with all. The army mule may balk, but the infantry, disregarding his brays, must promote our cross-country transport. Indiana National Guard The Indiana National Guard is coming strong. Practically every Infantry organization is now at full authorized strength. A live, wide-awake, and going branch of the U. S. Infantry Association is in process of organization. Maj. Albert T. Rich, Infantry, is the Inspection Instructor on duty with the State, and is responsible, in a large measure, for the success that is being attained. We congratulate him on his good work. WH By Major General George W. Read, U. S. Army HILE the military policy based on the provisions of the National Defense Act is sound and far reaching, it is obvious that the Army of the United States cannot be maintained at sufficient strength in time of peace to meet a major emergency. The man power to make the organized reserves effective can be quickly obtained only by the operation of a new act providing for obligatory service. Such an act, if not in existence at the time a major emergency arises, will require a considerable time for passage. This would result in a loss of time in mobilization. However quickly obtained, the men inducted under the provisions of such an act will be untrained unless given obligatory training preparatory to a call to service. National Defense can not be made secure with anything less than universal military training and obligatory service under a call approved by Congress. The creation of the units of the organized reserve under the existing provisions of the law will make it possible to carry out universal military training in an effective, economical, and businesslike way. Those trained each year in each corps area would complete the personnel of the reserve divisions, with a suitable margin for replacement and auxiliary troops. Upon call to service after training, the class of each year could report within designated time limits, each man going to his own unit at the place where he received his peacetime training. At the end of twenty 566 years there could be mobilized, by calling out the successive classes in any order determined upon by Congress, ten million men of military age, each one of whom could be incorporated in his proper unit within forty-eight hours after receiving his notice to report. The time to be given up to military training should be the minimum. Four months' absence from permanent residence would insure three months' intensive training. The additional month would be required for travel to and from the training center, for enrollment, classification, innoculations, and the issue of clothing and equipment. Except during the very short time. devoted to brigade and divisional training, one-half of each day of the entire training period should be set aside for the training of illiterates and specialists. In this short period vocational training can have no place. But, as shown by the results obtained at the Recruit Educational Centers, illiteracy may be entirely remedied within the time made available as above. Men who desire educational or vocational training the colors for the rest of the year. With should be encouraged to remain with the exception of seven to ten hours a week of purely military work during the additional months, such men should be given their entire working hours for the pursuit of the courses they elect. The great benefit to the country arising from the improved physique, morals, education, and ideals of citi zenship acquired in the process of Universal Military Training is sufficient to make such training worth while as a means of national improvement, without regard to the question of national security. A great bugbear seems to be the expense. By estimating the cost per capita, it may be easily shown that the expenditure would be small as compared with the good accomplished. I Universal Military Training a Specific Preventive Against War As to Universal Military Training I need no persuasion. I have always been in favor of it. It may sound a little too European or a little too militaristic, and it may be that it is not popular, but all the same it is right. This training is an absolute necessity in the case of unexpected wars, and heaven knows we have experienced enough on that line. The writer has been through three of just such wars in his lifetime, either as a participant or as a very close relative of those who were participants, and has seen the useless sacrifice of lives from lack of train boys and have practiced it on all the sons I had. Believe in it for health, for orderliness, for system, and in a great many cases from the fact that it teaches a vocation, and will make stronger, more virile and better prepared young men both for civil and military life. War is in itself horrible. We never want it. But we cannot avoid it, and it will always be necessary for us as a nation to be prepared for it. The nearest specific preventive against war is to be ready for it. I am with you in the fight for Universal Military ing, both of privates and especially of Training, and am no new convert. officers. Irrespective of this, however, I am a great believer in military training for G. GUNBY JORDAN, Pres. Third National Bank, Columbus, Ga. G By Major C. N. Sawyer ENERAL ORDER No. 29, War Department, May 18, 1920, states, "Infantry troops will install, maintain, and operate all lines of information within the Infantry Brigade." It would seem axiomatic that the army peace organization should be such that war expansion will not disrupt it. It would also seem axiomatic that any particular technical service should be so organized as to have a trained officer personnel for war expansion. Under the general order quoted above, the infantry is now charged with a technical service, for radio, telephone, and visual operation, which require specially trained operators. Nor is this all. The direction of the installation, operation, and maintenance of these lines of information require specially trained officers. While I am aware of the view held in certain quarters that Infantry Signal Officers require little training, the fallacy of this viewpoint is so easily capable of demonstration as to scarcely warrant discussion. If the lessons of the World War have any value, if peace-time demonstrations can be considered, it should be apparent that even a peace-time brigade of over 3,000 men should have communication in battle, as efficiently directed and operated as are the rifle and machine-gun companies, and if this be not the case we can again expect heavy casualties due to faulty communication. Under G. O. No. 29 and the new. tables of organization for infantry communication platoons, do we find an or ganization which will produce trained officer personnel for war expansion in the new technical service, communications, for which the Infantry is responsible? In the battalion, under the new tables of organization, we find the communication platoon commander is the Battalion Adjutant, who is also Intelligence Officer, Plans and Training Officer, and Supply Officer, and besides commands Headquarters Company, composed of company headquarters, intelligence section, and communication platoon. It would seem impossible to expect that this officer will find much time to devote to study of communications and to training his communication platoon. In the regiment we find one captain or lieutenant commanding the headquarters company, composed of: The Company Headquarters 12 men There are six officers at regimental headquarters: one colonel; one lieutenant colonel; one major or captain, machine-gun officer; three staff officers, one as Adjutant, one as Intelligence Officer and Plans and Training Officer, and one as Supply Officer. (Note: One of these staff officers acts as Regimental Gas Officer.) The headquarters company commander has four platoons, if we count the company headquarters as one. In the brigade we find in the table of organizations an aide to the Brigade |