waging of war is effective unless it can. search the terrain, delivering its blows where its man power wills. We had mechanical transport that kept to the roads and rails, but the infantry must clear the roads and fight over hills and swamps, prairies and woods. The infantryman thought of himself as a soldier on foot. He wanted no weapon that he could not transport over the terrain. His imagination failed to devise a machine that would of itself accompany him over the ground, lending greater concentration of energy than that provided by the rifle, the machine gun, or the one-pounder. Therefore, infantry entered the war unarmed.

The question arises here as to the ultimate nature of infantry. Infantry is not the rifleman. Infantry is the man. in war. Only the man and not the machine can enjoy the fruits of quantity production. Similarly, only the infantry, the man, can enjoy the fruits of success in war. Though armed with the rifle or any other engine of war, it is not the weapon that makes the branch. It is the man free to move in the zone of contact. Not her equip ment, but her position, makes infantry the queen of battles.

Infantry

Success follows pressure. acts by pressure against its resistance, followed by infiltration, penetration, at the points where resistance yields. When resistance holds, its physical grasp of the ground must be torn loose, cast aside. At such points there must be concentration of energies with tearing or crushing effect. This concentration is afforded by weapons, the engines that eliminate time. Today the rifle and even the machine gun have no great tearing effects. They act rather by pressure, pressing back the resistance or holding it close to the ground. A heavier blow than either can give is required

for the points of resistance. For these critical points, therefore, the infantry must always have the accompanying gun.

Great masters of infantry have generally been masters also of the accompanying gun. This mobile gun, dashing here or there to the critical points at the critical moments, delivers the bursts of fire, the concentration of energies, that must break the resistance. This is an infantry machine. So important a machine it is that one can always fear for infantry freedom, when the infantry fear for the success of the accompanying gun. Nineteen hundred and fourteen found the accompanying gun an outcast, remembered but scorned. Doomed by its own vulnerability, this gun bore away the hopes for an early success in the field. Reappearing in a new guise later in the war, it assured the final infantry advance.

The tank is poorly named, yet is unnameable, a technical anomaly of the war. With its harmless name it is one of the most potent agents for the quantity production of war that has yet been devised. It contains within itself the elements of great fire power, freedom of maneuver, and protection against light hits. And yet with these it is more than accompanying gun: with its great weight and mobility, it is the essence of shock effect. Its moment of inertia makes it very effective in the crushing of material obstacles. This great engine or weapon, controlled by a handful of men, presented itself to the infantry as a generous substitute for the accompanying gun. It can tear or crush. It can make the infantry supreme.

Of course, there is criticism for the tank. Is there not always criticism? Had we judged the latest locomotives by the performance of the earliest, there would be no railed transportation to

day. The tank of the World War was the earliest tank. The tank of today is a mere beginning. To those who have seen tanks wallowing in failure on the field of battle, one can but say that they have observed types. The tank is no longer a type, an individual machine. It has grown to be an established principle, not new, but rather the combination of existing principles. The tank is that of mobile, protected gun power combined with great shock effect. Its mobility will exceed that of any other element on land except the man. It will maneuver at such speed as to escape the dangers from well-aimed fire of heavy projectiles. It will be in itself a slow-moving, projecting projectile, of the heaviest type. In short, it is a concentrator, a time-saver, a saver of the currency of war.

At this time, therefore, all may unite in criticism of the tank of the past. They were slow, mechanically inefficient, and unreliable. Their powers of observation were poor. Their intercommunication was defective. They were deaf, dumb, blind, and ignorant beasts. But they stuck! Their progeny of tomorrow will be rapid and reliable. They will have the vision of men. They will communicate freely. They will be trained by their masters. They must be intelligent, alert, effective. Such is the infantry tank of the future.

We were taught before the war to avoid dispersion, yet the true nature of dispersion was not fully understood. Dispersion is relative. The effective concentration of twenty years ago proved to be dispersion in 1914. The concentration of 1918 will be a dispersion of 1922. Not soon again will the infantry fail through dispersion. the future, as the industries shorten their time by the use of machinery, the Army must keep pace by its own concentra

In

tion. Energy must be concentrated, not by the gathering of great masses of men, but by increasing the energy available per man. For each new machine of production there must be an improvement in the machines of war, not for the promotion of war, but for its shortening when inevitably produced.

The lesson of the World War for the infantry was a confirmation of its ideals. Its accompanying gun is returned and it reigns supreme. Now that the tank is here, with all it implies, it must be kept up to date. Never again shall the arm of success ignore the race for production. We must continually look for increased power of the close assault. The infantry has passed from spears and swords to rifles and machine guns without losing its nature. It must now look beyond these and train more complicated machinery, combining old and new powers together. This will not make the scheme too complex. We simplify by synthesis. In a mechanical age we must be prepared for mechanical warfare.

When

The infantry tank is a mere beginning. First we must learn to ride this new beast. Next we must train the beast, and, above all, develop his type. Infantry eyes must be torn away from visions of the past, to read the handwriting on the wall of the future. The word on the wall is-machinery! There is no convention in war. necessity calls, and it is likely to call, in a mechanical sense, at no distant date, rifles must become automatic and the machine gun infantry must be proud to become the mechanical infantry. Each arm must give increased production, having faith that the services of supply will continue to function. The infantry tank of today will be used, must be used, to develop the tank infantry of to

morrow.

Disarmament

The following is an article from the United Service Gazette, a British service journal, which reflects the attitude of that service on the question of disarmament. It is very illuminating:

Ever since the conclusion of the war there has been a cry from the pacifists that the time has now arrived when there can be universal disarmament. If it could really be accomplished so as to be truly universal, and achieved simultaneously over the world, the proposal might be considered seriously. If human nature were changed, in other words, if people and peoples were as they ought to be instead of as they are, then disarmament would be instantaneous and automatic. But either of the objections named would be in itself sufficient to show that not yet is the time for Britain to disarm. Appropriately, indeed, may be quoted "Your 'if' is the only peacemaker." In regard to this question of disarmament it is somewhat remarkable that the oft-made proposal always is that we, a small island nation, yet the center of a great empire, and obviously dependent on the command of the sea for our existence, are the nation always called upon to set the example by disbanding all our fighting forces. It may be flattering, but we view the suggestion with invariable suspicion. We wonder what is the fueling now of those among us who proffered such advice years ago. Had we been an altogether unarmed country in 1914 what would have been the result? It is needless to ask. The

fact that, at any rate for the time being, the German menace is inoperative, is not an adequate reason for advancing disarmament claims upon Great Britain. One might reasonably hope that the lead would be given by the United States. It was America that devoted so much attention to the League of Nations, and her Government must recognize that politically and geographically she is so sit

uated that she could disarm with far less risk than any other power. Yet we learn that just now the whole feeling in the States is in favor of naval expansion, and an expansion, moreover, that is to be continued until the United States Navy stands first in the world. It may fairly be argued that war between the States and ourselves is unthinkable. It is so. Nevertheless the lawyers have a saying that it is the unexpected that often happens. By this, of course, they mean the unprovided-for contingency. And thus we affirm that we should regard it as criminal folly were we to divest ourselves of the sea power which it is universally admitted saved the world in the terrible conflict from which it has so recently emerged.

An Indianapolis lawyer, who handles many divorce cases in the county courts, was approached the other day by a woman who contemplated bringing divorce proceedings against her husband.

"I want to find out if I have grounds for a divorce," she informed the attorney on entering his office.

"Are you married?" the lawyer asked. "Why, yes, of course," responded the client.

"Then you have grounds," the attorney said.-Indianapolis News.

Fire Direction of Artillery Supporting Infantry

The direction of fire of the divisional

artillery during the World War was divided into two general classes as follows:

(a) Predetermined Fire.

Artillery fire that was planned prior to an offensive or defensive action by brigade, division or corps headquarters staff.

(b) Eventual Fire.

Artillery fire that could not be determined before an engagement, the necessity for which developed with the movement and action of the troops engaged.

Fire laid down under class (a) was usually effectively planned and successfully executed, except where unforeseen difficulties or change in position of our Own or enemy troops necessitated changes in the original plan. These changes were quite common, because the plan for the artillery fire was often based on assumed positions and strength of the enemy troops, assumed rate of advance of our own troops, or inaccurate information as to the positions of our own troops. Once the original plan of fire as included in class (a) was changed for any infantry unit, the remainder of the fire during the action of that unit came under class (b).

The direction of the eventual fire (class b) was one of the big problems of the light artillery in action. To supply the needs of the infantry during an engagement necessitated:

1. Changes in the predetermined fire schedules.

2. Changing targets picked up the infantry under an immediate and effective fire, by the most opportune artillery unit for use at that moment.

3. Protection of exposed infantry ele

ments.

The direction of this eventual fire practically had to be made from front line infantry battalion or regimental headquarters. It was there that all messages from the advanced infantry elements were received, and the needs of the infantry discovered. The usual custom followed in our divisions was to authorize the infantry commander of front line battalions or regiments (with the

advice of his attached artillery liaison officer) to direct the artillery fire or changes in fire as necessity required. The artillery liaison officer on duty with the infantry battalion (or regimental) commander was detailed by the commander of the artillery unit (battalion or regiment) assigned to support that infantry battalion or regiment. This artillery liaison officer was usually a lieutenant. His duty was to advise the infantry commander of the abilities and limitations, and position and condition of the artillery he represented; and to keep his artillery commander informed of all movements and position of infantry troops, and to transmit eventual fire orders from the infantry to his artillery commander.

This method of directing the fire to supply the immediate needs of the infantry was not entirely successful for some of the following reasons:

1. Infantry commanders were inexperienced in the use of artillery.

2. During an engagement infantry commanders were too busy to devote their time to directing the artillery.

3. Artillery liaison officers were inexperienced and unable to supply the infantry commander with proper advice and information, and in some cases lacked initiative to act on their own judgment.

4. The artillery liaison officer was detailed by his own battalion or regimental commander, and had no authority to supply information or requests for fire direct to other artillery regiments in the sector, or to higher artillery commanders than his own.

5. The artillery liaison officer was not kept informed of the position and targets of other artillery units operating in his own sector.

6. The needs of the infantry often

called for fire from heavy artillery or additional support from other artillery not assigned to support that infantry unit and represented by any liaison officer.

7. The centralized control of the divisional artillery was taken from the field artillery brigade commander and distributed between the various infantry commanders and artillery officers.

In action this system worked out as follows: If the infantry commander had confidence in his artillery liaison officer, and lacked the time to supervise the direction of the artillery fire needed, he turned over this important duty entirely to the artillery liaison officer to carry on in his name. In this case, if the artillery liaison officer was experienced and possessed good judgment, he was able to successfully perform his mission in so far as the artillery he represented was concerned, but when the needs of this infantry called for fire or changes in fire from other artillery units than that which he represented, he had to exceed his authority in communicating with the artillery concerned direct, or had to use the slow avenue of approach through higher authority.

The following system is outlined to eliminate the defects as mentioned above:

1. Experienced artillery officers, in whose abilities the artillery brigade or group commander has confidence, to be attached permanently to infantry regimental, or front line battalion headquarters.

2. These officers to be charged with the direction of all fire or changes in fire, as the infantry they represent require, and to render reports direct to the division or group artillery commander.

3. Infantry officers relieved from all direction of artillery fire, and required

to supply the necessary advice and information to their artillery officers.

4. These artillery officers to be in direct communication with, and to be furnished all information of, all the artillery in their group or sector.

Note: A third class of fire direction which does not enter into this discussion is that of Observation fire, namely, fire executed on targets picked up by artillery observation parties. During the World War, observation fire was practically negligible.

GEORGE P. HAYS,

1st Lieutenant, 10th F. A.

"Look here," said the irate deacon, as he came out of the movie, and held up the manager, “didn't you tell me this was an educational film you were running today?"

"Yes," replied the movie magnate, blandly.

"But it features a vampire." "Sure, we are trying to make the world safe for married men."

*

The Soldiers' Right to Vote

The following is an extract from House Calendar 303, 66th Congress, 3d Session, concerning the right of the soldier to vote.

The question of domicile or place of residence of those in the military service of the country, either as officers or as men in the line, has been before Congress and in the courts in a number of cases, but not of very recent date so far as Congress is concerned. The subject is one of great importance and absorbing interest just at this time, not only in this case and in Alaska, but throughout the country.

The soldier has an interest in knowing what construction is going to be