tories (the machine gun by reason of its stable mount can take advantage of increased angle of fall at long ranges to search reverse slopes). They are obviously weapons for dealing with the enemy above ground and within reasonable range.

The grenades by reason of their curved trajectory can care for targets below ground and force the enemy into the open where he becomes a target for the rifle.

The light mortar by reason of its curved trajectory, can search reverse slopes or targets under cover and by reason of its radius of action is adapted to fire against targets not definitely located.

ADJUSTMENT OF FIRE

The ever present problem in practice and in service firing is to place the center of impact of the group on the center of the target, thus insuring the greatest possible

mind that a small error in range will frequently cause total misses where with a correct range a high percentage of hits would have resulted.

EFFECT OF GROUND

Figures 23 and 24 show the effect of ground on the beaten zone.

When ground slopes upward to the rear from a firing line, the supports may be placed closer without increasing danger from fire aimed at the firing line.

When the ground slopes down and to the rear from the firing line, the supports must be posted at a greater distance in rear, unless the slope affords a dead space. Making the allowable assumption that the fire is equally distributed along the crest, the column target behind the crest and invisible from the firing point will receive hits only in proportion to its width.

number of hits. Two chief elements enter into this problem, the troops and the commander. Assuming that the latter has chosen the proper target and given proper distribution, he must bring the shot group upon the center of the target. This is a question primarily of range. It must be borne in

MARCHING FIRE

In certain very restricted cases, fire can be delivered while advancing. Marching fire is, however, advisable only against a clearly defined line at ranges less than 200 yards. Such targets may be obtained in position warfare, but the use of marching fire in

"The Strategy on the Western Front (1914-1918)," by Herbert Howland Sargent, lieutenant colonel United States Army, retired, author of "Napoleon Bonaparte's First Campaign." "The Campaign of Marengo"and"The Campaign of Santiago de Cuba." Chicago, 1920. A. C. McClurg & Co. Price, $2.50. (A review by Francis. V. Greene, late major general U. S. V. Colonel Sargent's reputation as a writer on military subjects is so well established that any fresh contribution from his pen is always welcome. In this book, however, he writes not as a judicial historian, but as an ardent advocate of a certain theory-the theory of the "Easterners." Two-thirds of the book is a reproduction of a series of articles published in the North American Review from February to October, 1919, and here republished without substantial change or addition except in the last two of them. They were written in 1918, when the author was on duty at the War College. Since 1918 we have had the German books of Freytag, Hindenburg, Ludendorff, and Kluck; the Historical Summaries of the French General Staff and the French books of Mangin and others, and the London Times' Documentary History of the War and Haig's Dispatches. Nearly all of these appeared before the publication of Colonel Sargent's book, but little or no reference is made to these original sources of information. On the other hand, there is much quotation from secondary sources of fact and opinion, such as Frank H. Simonds, William L. McPherson, John Buchanan, André Chéradame, etc.

The author states that the Germans made three great inistakes, "great blunders." First, in attacking France before they had disposed of the Russians; sec

ond, in the great assault on Verdun; third, in the formidable offensive of 1918. On the other hand, the Allies were equally at fault, in his opinion, in concentrating their efforts on the Western Front instead of sending a great army north from Saloniki, to turn the left flank of the Central Powers at Budapest (which was 650 miles away, more than half of the distance through a wild, mountainous region admirably adapted for defense and containing no motor roads and only one line of single track railway).

The plan of campaign of the Germans had been prepared years before by Count Schlieffin when he was chief of the Imperial German Staff, and it was heartily and enthusiastically approved by all the German Staff. It was to overwhelm France before Russia could come to her aid; and this was to be done by enveloping movements on both flanks, one through Belgium and the other through the narrow pass at Belfort, taking the forts in the Vosges in reverse. The plan miscarried from three causes: First, it was found impracticable to break through the natural and artificial defenses of Belfort; second, in the rush through Belgium and Northern France the right wing under Von Kluck became separated from the rest of the German army; its right flank was "in the air," and the situation thus created was skilfully taken advantage of by Joffre at the battle of the Marne; third, the Russians mobilized more quickly than had been anticipated, seized the offensive in East Prussia, and compelled the withdrawal of a portion of the German army in France in order to meet this unexpected development.

By common consent of all military authorities, the Imperial German Staff

in 1914 contained the most highly trained and accomplished soldiers in all Europe. In contending that their plan was a colossal blunder, Colonel Sargent relies on the maxims of Napoleon. Well, the maxims of Napoleon are like algebra equations what you get out depends on what you put in. No one ever comprehended more accurately than Napoleon the infinite variety of circumstances that can and do arise in every war. It is important to be sure that the maxim quoted applies to the case in hand, for under different circumstances the maxim does not apply. The classic instance of quoting the wrong maxim is that of Sherman at Vicksburg. The story has been told in most of the biographies of Grant, but nowhere so well as in Grant's own memoirs, Vol. 1, page 542. When Sherman heard of Grant's plan for the final campaign against Vickeburg he came to Grant's headquarters, got him alone, and then told him that his plan was in violation of all the principles of war as laid down by the most eminent writers and would surely end in disaster. Grant, who probably had not looked at a book on military science since leaving West Point seventeen years before, and who would have been sorely put to it if called upon to quote one of Napoleon's maxims, was all unconsciously preparing to follow two of Napoleon's maxims which were the greatest factors in Napoleon's success, viz: to live off the country, and to divide the enemy's forces and beat them in detail. He was doing this by the simple application of his extraordinary common sense and capacity to appreciate a situation at its real value, which is no bad substitute for an intimate knowledge of the writings of Jomini, Hamley, and Clausewitz. He listened attentively to all that Sherman had

to say, and then admitted that there were grave dangers in his plan, but the situation of the North required him to take the chances, and he felt confident of success. "The problem for us was to move forward to a decisive victory or our cause was lost. No progress was being made in any other field, and we had to go on."

Grant made no change in his plans; as the campaign developed with a brilhancy rivaling Napoleon's campaign of 1796, Sherman became its most enthusiastic admirer, and was man enough to tell others as well as Grant himself that he had been all wrong and Grant had been all right.

Other instances of the same character in our military history could be cited if space permitted; and, therefore, we think it improbable that the "Westerners" quote as many maxims in their favor as the "Easterners."

On June 5, 1918, Colonel Sargent submitted to the Direc or of the War Plans Division of the General Staff his "Fourth Memorandum on the Strategy of the War," which is now published for the first time as Appendix A to this book. It is a document of about seven thousand words, and its argument is shown by the following quotations: "The line of least resistance to a decisive allied victory is through the Balkan way"; "the only hope of winning the war as it should be won is to annihilate or capture in battle Germany's armies, and this cannot be done on the Western Front." It quotes with approval the words of a German officer that, "The enemy will never break through the Western Front," and it advises that "if a million,or even a half-million, American soldiers could be put into the Balkans this winter to join with the half

million or more allied troops now there, great results would be sure to follow." As to this line of argument, there is one of Napoleon's maxims that should be always remembered: "The first qualification in a general-in-chief" (and it is equally desirable in a military writer) "is a cool head-that is, a head which receives just impressions, and estimates things and objects at their real value."

The controversy between the "Easterners" and the "Westerners"-like those as to the battle of Shiloh, the conduct of Fitz John Porter at Manassass, of Warren at Five Forks, of Lincoln's judgment in detaining McDowell's Corps from McClellan's army on the peninsula, and other disputed events of the Civil War-will continue for many a long year. The chief value of Colonel Sargent's book is that he has presented, in a thoroughly partisan spirit and with considerable ability, the argument of the "Easterners." It is to be hoped that it will lead some ardent student at the War College to present with equal force the arguments of the "Westerners," and that he will adequately discuss the questions of the amount of shipping available, as well as of transportation and supply through the 385 miles of narrow gorges of the Morava-Vardas corridor leading north from Saloniki. He will find no lack of facts to support his arguments, and maxims of Napoleon to reinforce his views.

Orders, Decorations and Insignia, by Colonel Robert E. Wyllie, General Staff. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. Cloth. 261 pages. Price, $9. Due to the fact that such a large number of orders and decorations have

been conferred upon Americans by their

own and foreign Governments for service during the World War, Colonel Wyllie's book is of particular and absorbing interest at this time.

Colonel Wyllie is particularly qualified for the task. He has been at the head of the Equipment Branch of the General Staff for a long time, and has made a complete and detailed study of the subject.

Going back to the days of Queen Elizabeth in 1588 to the inception of our present-day system, the author reviews the history and development of the award of medals and decorations, Military Orders, and the Nomenclature and Classification of Medals.

Colonel Wyllie then takes up the American decorations conferred for service during the World War, starting with the Medal of Honor, of which he gives the complete history dating back. to 1861, and gives a number of citations for which the decoration has been awarded. Tribute is paid to the Infantry, the members of that arm of the service receiving seventy-three out of the seventy-eight Medals of Honor awarded during the World War. The Distinguished Service Medal and the Distinguished Service Cross are next

treated in detail.

The American Campaign medals are then described and discussed.

Then follows chapters on the awards of the various other countries-Great Britain, France, Belgium, Monaco, Portugal, Italy, and the countries of Eastern Europe, Asia, and America.

The shoulder insignia of the American armies, corps, divisions, and services are fully described and illustrated in colors. A concise history of the organization is added.

Finally there is a short chapter on the subject of the insignia of rank and