labor, the enlisted man can turn out for a parade or other ceremony or for an inspection where a very smart appearance is required and be a credit to himself and to his command.

In keeping both war and drill sets of equipment in proper condition, the soldier spends much less effort than he would in trying to keep a single set into condition presentable for a smart inspection.

I have talked with a good many officers, and where the war and drill sets have been issued and used as described above, and where the spirit of paragraph 7-A has been actually carried out, both officers and enlisted men have been enthusiastic for the double set of equipment. Where "the talent has been buried" in the ground and not used there is complaint as to the second set of equipment. The infantry should not miss the opportunity the "double set" offers to appear at parades and ceremonies in the most perfect condition. A. J. DOUGHERTY, Lieut. Col., Infantry.

It was officers' mess on the transport going over and the shiny young second lieutenant was getting pointers from the grizzled old major.

"Tell me, Major," he asked anxiously, "what does it feel like when one is under fire for the first time?"

"Well," said the major, "it feels like one wanted to be a baby again-back in the States-and a girl baby at that."American Legion Weekly.

Army-Infantry; Navy-Big Ships

The report of the Navy General Board likens the "big ship" of the Navy

to the Infantry of the Army in the following terms:

"In the organization and operation of an Army main dependence is placed upon the slow moving but potentially powerful infantry. Upon it is based the activities of all subsidiary branches of the service-artillery, cavalry, engineers, aircraft-all.

"Similar conditions obtain in the organization and operations of a fleet. The battleship fleet represents the infantry masses in which reside the final and decisive fighting power. The cruisers and destroyers, the submarines and aircraft, all the various subsidiary forces, like those of the Army, base their activities upon the battle fleet which, when the time is opportune, exerts its full power upon the enemy."

Going Up-On the drill field a company of engineers was making the most gruesome possible mess out of "platoons left." A sergeant cast a sarcastic eye over the unhappy aggregation and then turned to the officer.

"Lootnant," he said, wearily, "I guess they thought you said 'balloons left, so they all went up in the air."

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"Camp Roosevelt-1921"

Camp Roosevelt Headquarters is again busy receiving applications for the summer of 1921. This camp has a special appeal to Army people. In the daily life of the camp, promptness and precision are insisted upon, and habits are formed by each boy which he will carry through life. The benefits, mental, moral, and physical, cannot well be reckoned. No one seeing even one of the evening reviews held each day can well forget the thrill occasioned

by the sight of a thousand boys standing at attention as the flag is slowly lowered and the National Anthem stirs every heart with great throbs of patriotic inspiration. No Camp Roosevelt veterans will ever forget it.

In addition to the military phase of the camp, the big opportunity for wholesale sport-boxing, swimming, hiking, baseball-is made the most of. Groups are generally found taking part in all of the activities, and a boy may enter any sport which his fancy dictates. When it is considered that the varied program offered is carefully supervised at all times by Army officers and selected. high school instructors, the wonder is that more men do not interest themselves in this project and send their boys to the camp for the outing.

The small fee which is charged renders it accessible to all. Men stationed at Army posts, who have sons, could do them no greater service than to place them in this environment, where every minute feature is carefully planned to bring out the best in each boy.

Captain F. L. Beals, Commandant, an officer in the U. S. Army, is known as the "boy builder." This camping project is his ideal and he has brought into it the gest of the knowledge that he gleaned from his Army service, and of boy psychology obtained as a result of his military and public school work. Captain Beals is at the present time Professor of Military Science and Tactics, and Supervisor of Physical Education in the Chicago Public High School, and commands Camp Roosevelt during the summer vacation months.

*

"If gasoline goes up to fifty cents a gallon, what will be the result?" asked the orator. He paused a moment as

waiting for an answer. A voice back in the crowd piped up.

"One of the results will be that there will be a lot of guys buying gasoline at fifty cents a gallon."

Let General Dawes Tell Them

The Congressional investigation of the A. E. F. and General Dawes's sensational defense of the Army in France reopens the subject of the efficiency of the manner in which we carried on the war. War is not a time in which expenses can be pared close. In a time of national crisis we cannot be concerned with what things cost; our attention must be fixed on the goal of victory and the quickest way of getting there. Money is a secondary matter. The conduct of the war itself is a matter of life and death. Supplies must be furnished, armies must be raised and moved, all the vast machinery that modern warfare requires must be set in motion, and all this in haste and without regard to expense. A few minutes' delay may be fatal. As Napoleon said, "It is easy to beat the Austrians, because they do not know the value of five minutes."

As a matter of fact no war has ever been fought without blunders. Our American wars are good examples. In the Revolution, for instance, the danger lay not in England's strength, but in American inefficiency. While Congress actually had piles of clothing on hand, Washington's men were freezing at Valley Forge. The farmers' barns were filled to overflowing, but the Army was starving. John Fiske has said on this point: "The point of the story is lost unless we realize that this misery resulted from gross mismanagement rather than from the poverty of the country.

As the soldiers marched on the 17th of December to their winter quarters, their route could be traced on the snow from the blood that oozed from bare, frostbitten feet; yet, at the same momenthogheads of shoes, stockings, and clothing were lying at different places on the route and in the woods, perishing for want of teams." The War of 1812 was little better managed. The declaration of war came too late to seriously embarrass England in her wars with Napoleon. By fighting England we arrayed ourselves on the side of despotism. Bonaparte and his allies, too, had hurt us far more than the enemy we did select. It is unnecessary to go into the sorry story of that war, a black-hued narrative relieved only by a few creditable actions. At the end of the war the country was all but bankrupt. In the Mexican War politics took the bulk of his Army from General Taylor at a critical time, and only by a miracle was he able to overcome Santa Ana. In the Civil War, as we know, the Army contracts were an abomination. Nor was this kind of thing confined to the Union side. The Confederate Congress had its troubles. The name of Spanish War instantly brings to our minds the term "embalmed beef," and the memory of the pest camps.

These words are not written as an indictment of America's making of war, but merely to show how every war has its errors. Foreign armies have had their share in this war; to mention a few, the red trousers of the Frenchman in the first period of the war; the whole sorry Gallipoli campaign; the German "unrestricted submarine warfare," and their inability to understand the attitude of neutrals.

The management of the American

Army during the war in light of these facts was wonderfully free from inefficiency and serious blunders. The chief criticism of the stay-at-home politicians is that piling up of supplies for a long period in advance. But they forget that from the very nature of the war, from the huge size of the armies concerned, we had to have enormous stocks of everything at hand. We could not trust to luck for a single thing. Again no one knew how long the war would last. As a matter of fact all this is a proof of efficiency, of adequate preparation. In future years when the historians write up our part in the war, they will emphasize not the fact that the war was costly-all wars are-but what we did, the raising and training and carrying to the battlefields of Europe millions of men, a feat that entirely eclipses England's much heralded feat of transporting her armies across the Channel; the mobilization of industry, the building of acres of factories; the feeding of our armies and our allies; the work of our Navy 3,000 miles from its base; the destroyer squadron which was ready for duty the day it arrived overseas; the historians will not forget that it was the American doughboy who stopped the Hun in the Second Battle of the Marne and saved France, who served without complaint under British and French commanders. Besides all this America has kept her balance financially and came out of the war the richest nation on earth. Is all this something to be proud of? Let General Dawes tell them. DAVID J. AARON,

2d Lt. Inf. O. R. C.

"What's the matter?" cried Mrs. Jones when Bobby came running into the house in tears, dragging his little tin

sword behind him and rubbing the seat of his trousers. "I thought you were having such a good time playing soldier."

"We were," sobbed Bobby, "and I was Sherman, and dad heard me."-American Legion Weekly.

Additional Reasons

If we agree with Colonel Heavey that the development of the National Guard has been slow, the following might be considered as a good and sufficient answer to his question as to the causes, without considering the five mentioned by him:

First, Due to a provision in the National Defense Act of June, 1916, members of the National Guard, called into Federal Service, in 1917, found themselves, at the end of the war, discharged both from Federal Service and from the National Guard. They found upon their return to their homes, not only their civilian positions closed to them, but also their military places in the National Guard and the armories filled by others, mostly by stay-at-homes. This state of affairs has fortunately been remedied by the Act of June 4, 1920, but it did exist for nearly two years and was sufficient cause for the feeling of distrust for further service under the same conditions.

Second, The breaking up of units, many of them with long and honorable service records, upon the reorganization of the National Guard Divisions under the new strength tables of 1917, added further to the confusion, when, at the end of the war, a reorganization of the National Guard was in order. Not only were its former members all discharged, but the very units had disap

peared. Units not only changed designations, but many ceased to exist entirely. The men were transferred to units of other States and some States had no units in the war, though the National Guard units of those States had been drafted into Federal Service. Was this necessary? Undoubtedly, but this circumstance accounts for much of the shyness of former service men in joining again. Many have not an existing organization to join, and are not enthusiastic in forming a new one.

This state of affairs must be corrected by a proper organization in peace that will be used in war without changing identity of units.

Third, National Guard officers generally were not available for assignment to duty except with their own National Guard Divisions. In this they were treated differently than Regular Army officers who could be assigned to any duty. This course was modified in due time, but not until it had lost the services or at least the most efficient services of many National Guard officers. In the consolidations units many officers were forced out and for those no adequate assignments were at first found, though many of them were qualified for positions and assignments that seemed closed to them.

of

This state of affairs is to be remedied by opening assignments to all officers alike. Relieved of these hindrances the development of the National Guard will no longer be delayed except by a shortness of appropriations to carry out the full program in the present Defense Act.

L. C. SCHERER, Colonel, Cavalry, In Charge National Guard Affairs, First Corps Area.

The Infantry Score Book

The Infantry Score Book for the target practice season of 1921, is now off the press and ready for distribution. The text of the book is based on "Rifle Marksmanship"-the new War Department document that replaces the Small Arms Firing Manual. It has been pronounced by a number of our leading officers as the most complete score book that has been produced in the service.

In addition to providing an ample supply of score sheets for the season's target practice, there is included in the text complete instructions for the individual soldier designed with a view to preparing him for his range firing. The system of training is that employed at the Infantry School under the direction of Colonel A. J. McNab, which has produced such wonderful results. There

are chapters on sighting and aiming; the firing positions are fully illustrated with specially prepared line pictures which bring out all the small details; the trigger squeeze; methods of rapid fire; sight adjustment and wind allowance; complete and detailed instructions on how to use the score book; the details of the examination that each soldier is required to pass before going on the range for his regular target practice; range practice with detailed tables of the several courses. The value of the Infantry Score Book is well known throughout the service. The 1921 edition is the best that has been produced. It will solve many of the problems of individual training. Company commanders are requested and urged to enter their orders for the Infantry Score Book at the earliest practicable date. This will enable us to have them when you want them. Do not wait for range

practice. The Infantry Score Book should be in the hands of every soldier when his preliminary training begins.

The Doughboy was trying to explain to the young lady by his side how he had been attracted to her. He had rehearsed the metaphor. "You were a lovely flower and I was a bee." In the excitement he said to her, "I was a little mouse and you were a piece of cheese."

The Doughboy is still wondering why his lady friend is "not at home" to him any more.

Letter from Infantry School

The following is an extract from a letter written by a student at the Infantry School to his former regimental commander. It gives an intimate light on great work that the school is accomplishing and what it means to the great body of infantry officers.

The work so far has been highly interesting and the best basic instruction I have ever received in the subjects covered. I believe that if we are permitted to keep the school running along the present lines for the next five years and each year fill it to capacity with stulent officers, it will have a tremendous uplifting effect for our arm. Especially filled with young field officers and junior officers for it is we that are in greater need for that basic training that will ultimately make of us capable and efficient officers. The older officers who have been in the service a number of years are, I believe, more or less familiar with the methods being taught here.

The student body as a whole, I think, is of the opinion that the establishment and operation of the school is one of the longest and grandest strides ever made by the infantry towards establishing itself as the paramount arm, and to insure uniformity, cooperation, and better training.

The requirements of the school are