the supported wing. In the third, where both wings are exposed, he should depend upon a central formation and never allow the different corps under his command to depart from this; for if it be difficult to contend with the disadvantage of having two flanks exposed, the inconvenience is doubled by having four, trebled if there be six-that is to say, if the army is divided into two of three corps. In the first instance, then, as above quoted, the line of operations may rest indifferently on the right or left. In the second, it should be directed on the wing in support; in the third, it should be perpendicular to the center of the army's line of march. But in all these cases it is necessary, at a distance of every five or six days' march, to have a strong post or an intrenched position upon the line of operation, in order to collect military stores and provisions, to organize convoys, to form of it a center of movement, and to establish a point of defense to shorten the line of operation of the army.

NOTE

(a) In both of his Northern invasions,

1862 and 1863, Lee chose the Shenandoah Valley as his line of operations. While on the march his flanks were thus adequately secured by the mountains on either side. Although there were numerous passes or gaps, he never failed to leave sufficient forces to protect the movements of his army. That this route of invasion was easily the best is proved by the fact that his armies on each occasion were defeated after their arrival in hostile territory, never while on the way north or on the return south. His line of communications extended in each case down the valley directly to his

rear.

(b) At the time of Grant's third attempt at Vicksburg, in May, 1863, Pcmberton had 23,000 men stretched from Haines' Bluff on the north to Grand Gulf on the south. Grant, who was on

the western bank of the Mississippi, found great difficulty in effecting a crossing. Leaving Sherman at Haines' Bluff, he ordered McClernand to New Carthage, where he soon joined him. From there he marched down the west bank of the Mississippi to a spot opposite Grand Gulf, which he found, however, too strong to attack. There was only one thing to do-move farther south. Grant therefore moved again along the west bank to Bruinsburg, below Grand Gulf, where he was able to effect a crossing without opposition. During this entire operation, Grant's task was greatly simplified by the fact that the Mississippi River protected his left flank at all times. His line of communications consisted of the river itself.

(c) Sherman, in his advance from Dalton to Atlanta in 1864 had neither flank protected. His objective, however, was Johnston's army, and as long as he was in contact with the Confederate

leader, he had no cause to worry. His

line of communications, however, was very long and, as he advanced, it was necessary to leave garrisons to defend this line. When he finally arrived at Atlanta, the difficulty of keeping up his communications was one of the most potent reasons for his march to the sea.

dered, February 16, 1862, Grant had an army of about 40,000, Buell was busy concentrating an army of about 50,000 at Nashville, and Albert Sidney Johnston had a force of Confederates at Murfreesboro. Other Confederate forces were scattered at various points. About March 1 Grant was ordered to move with 35,000 up the Tennessee to Savannah. On the 11th Halleck, who was now in command of the Union forces in the west, ordered Buell to march to the aid of Grant, for the purpose of crushing Johnston, who was now assembling an army of about 40,000 near Corinth. Grant, instead of proceeding to Savannah, went into camp at Pittsburg Landing and settled down to await Buell. But Johnston planned to defeat him before the junction could take place. He therefore attacked on the morning of April 6 and began the battle of Shiloh. By nightfall the Federals were driven from the field and the Confederates had captured the Union camp. During the night, however, part of Buell's army arrived and, attacking on the following day, Federal defeat was turned into victory. Halleck had violated the above maxim and his opponent had not hesitated to take advantage of such a gross error. But luck and the death of the Confederate leader in the hour of victory proved big assets to the Union cause, and what might have been a disastrous defeat became a costly victory.

(b) The fall of Port Hudson, July 8, 1863, left the army of General Banks free to operate against Mobile, the logical military objective. At this time, however, General Halleck was commanderin-chief and he insisted that Banks begin operations against the the Confederate forces west of the Mississippi. For political reasons the administration was

anxious to re-establish The Flag in Texas and, therefore, military considerations were made subordinate to political a state of affairs for which General Halleck was noted during his entire tenure of office. Banks felt that the conquest of Texas could best be accomplished by coastal expeditions, and hence a number of ports were seized on the Gulf. In September, however, an expedition to Sabine Pass resulted in disaster and it was soon realized that another type of campaign was necessary. On July 4 Halleck ordered Banks to move against Shreveport via the Red River. Banks conferred with Sherman at New Orleans, and the following campaign was mapped out: Sherman was to send 10,000 men to Admiral Porter at the mouth of the Red River, to be transported to Alexandria by March 17; Banks with 17,000 was to march up the Teche River and arrive at Alexandria the same date; at the same time General Steele, with about 10,000 men, was to move south from Little Rock, making a junction with Banks at Shreveport. The plan, therefore, provided for two concentrations in the face of the enemy at Alexandria and at Shreveport. In this district, General Kirby Smith commanded the Confederate forces of about 25,000 men.

In spite of many difficulties, General A. J. Smith, with the 10,000 sent by Sherman, arrived at Alexandria on March 15. Banks, who had been delayed at New Orleans, did not arrive till the 24th; but Franklin, whom he had put in command of the troops, had arrived on the 19th. The first concentration had thus been made successfully. Suddenly, however, Banks received word from Halleck to the effect that the troops under A. J. Smith must be back at Vicksburg by April 10, even if the ex

pedition had to be abandoned. In spite of the bad news, however, Banks determined to push on to Shreveport at once. At first the advance was very successful, but the lack of good roads. made marching conditions very difficult. On April 8, General Richard Taylor placed his detachment of 11,000 across the Federal route at Sabine Cross Roads, in the vicinity of Mansfield. Due to the fact that the Union column was strung out for miles along the road, the Federals were able to bring only about 8,000 men into battle-a state of affairs which resulted in an easy victory for Taylor. Banks at once ordered a general retreat in which, after great difficulties, he managed to extricate his

army.

In the meantime, Steele left Little Rock the latter part of March. He was advancing steadily till news arrived of Banks' defeat, and he realized his precarious position. He at once started to fall back, but Kirby Smith caught up with him at Sabine River on April 30. After half a day's battle, Steele succeeded in repulsing all of the attacks and returned safely to Little Rock.

MAXIM V

All wars should be governed by certain principles, for every war should have a definite object and be conducted according to the rules of art. (A war should only be undertaken with forces proportionate to the obstacles to be overcome.)

NOTE

Very few people realized the magnitude of the war precipitated by the firing on Fort Sumpter, April 12, 1861. The Southern States were determined to secede from the Union, and the Northern just as determined that the Union must be preserved. The calling

of the three-month volunteers in the North was in accordance with the popular belief that it would be a short-lived affair, resulting in the forcing of the seceded States back into the Union. But, after the battle of Manassas, the difficulty of the task was perceived, and every military resource on both sides was thrown into the balance. The Emancipation Proclamation, following the battle of Sharpsburg, brought another factor into play; but it was not until the year 1864 that the true military objectives of the war were realized by the Federal authorities-namely, the defeat of the Confederate armies, not the capture of the Southern cities. When once this was perceived, the overwhelming forces and resources of the North, under the guidance of Grant and Sherman, resulted in the defeat of the Confederate armies and, thus, the fall of the Confederacy.

MAXIM VI

At the commencement of a campaign, to advance or not to advance is a matter for great consideration; but when once the offensive has been assumed, it must be sustained to the last extremity. However, skilled the maneuvers in a retreat, it will always weaken the morale of an army because in losing the chances of success these last are transferred to the enemy. Besides, retreats always cost more men and material than the most bloody engagements; with this difference, that in a battle the enemy's loss is nearly equal to your own-whereas, in a retreat the loss is on your side only.

NOTE

(a) In the early part of June, 1862, McClellan, with an army of about 100,000, was facing about 65,000 Confederates in front of Richmond. Although victory was in his grasp, he delayed his final movement from day to day, con

tenting himself with keeping contact with the enemy. On July 26, Jackson reinforced Lee with 25,000 men from the valley and, at the battle of Mechanicsville on that date, the Confederates assumed the offensive, defeated McClellan and forced his retreat to Harrison's Landing. A display of initiative in the early part of June would probably have resulted in the defeat of Lee's 65,000 and the capture of Richmond, the Confederate capital. Although McClellan's army had suffered less casualties than Lee's, the loss of morale and prestige was so great that the Army of the Potomac was shortly afterward withdrawn north.

(b) Previous to the coming of Grant, six different campaigns had been waged in the State of Virginia against the Confederate armies-namely, First Manassass, the Peninsular, Second Manas

sas, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, and Mine Run. In each case the campaign had resulted in a defeat for the Union forces and an enforced withdrawal from the immediate theatre of operations. On May 4, 1864, Grant, with an army of about 102,000, opened the Wilderness Campaign against Lee's 53,000. Although he lost 17,000 in this battle, as compared with a Confederate loss of 7,750, Grant did not hesitate or retreat. Instead, he moved by the left flank, and the battles of Spottsylvania Court House, North Anna, and Cold Harbor followed, in which he lost three men to one of his enemy. But, in spite of these terrible losses, Grant fought on, moving always by the left flank. At last the Army of the Potomac had found a man who would advance and fight, no matter what the cost. The end of the Confederacy was now in sight.

Ο

N June 30, 1920, the board charged with the duty of forming the original promotion list submitted its first report, containing the names of those officers of the Regular Army and Philippine Scouts who were appointed prior to April 6, 1917. On January 20, 1921, the last partial report was submitted, thus completing, for practical purposes, the original promotion list; for the place of every officer was thereby established. The remaining work of the board consisted merely in the preparation of a complete list by the consolidation of the partial reports, correcting certain minor errors and omissions detected in the process of revision.

The time between the dates mentioned was devoted to the work described un

der the third, fourth, and fifth headings of section 24a, act of June 4, 1920, which read as follows:

Third. Captains and lieutenants of the Regular Army and Philippine Scouts, originally appointed since April 6, 1917, shall be arranged among themselves according to commissioned service rendered prior to November 11, 1918, and shall be placed at the foot of the list as prepared to this point.

Fourth. Persons to be appointed as captains or lieutenants under the provisions of section 24, hereof, shall be placed according to commissioned service rendered prior to November 11, 1918, among the officers referred to in the next preceding clause; and where such commissioned service is equal, officers now in the Regular Army shall precede persons to be appointed under the provisions of this act, and the latter. shall be arranged according to age.

Fifth. Persons appointed as lieuten

ant colonels or majors under the provisions of section 24, hereof, shall be placed immediately below all officers of the Regular Army, who, on July 1, 1920, are promoted to those grades respectively under the provisions of section 24, hereof Provided, That the board charged with the preparation of the promotion list may in its discretion assign to any such officer a position on the list higher than that to which he would otherwise be entitled, but not such as to place him above any officer of greater age, whose commissioned service commenced prior to April 6, 1917, and who would precede him on the list under the general provisions of this section.

So far as the company officers are concerned, the law left little discretion to the board. The task was primarily one of determination, from official records, of "commissioned service rendered

prior to November 11, 1918." An earlier portion of section 24a prescribes that the service to be credited shall be "active commissioned service in the Army performed while under appointment from the United States Government, whether in the regular, provisional, or temporary forces, except service under a reserve commission while in attendance at a school or camp for the training of candidates for commission; also commissioned service in the National Guard while in active service since April 6, 1917, under a call by the President; and also commissioned service in the Marine Corps when detached for service with the Army by order of the President."

Appointment of temporary officers to the Regular Army did not begin on any considerable scale until September. During the summer, therefore, the work