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The doctor's license to practice medicine patients often waited twenty-four hours had been rescinded.

Dr. Tutiskim, as head of the Ministry of Sanitation, removed the professor of mental diseases in the Medical School, the most eminent member of the faculty, and appointed himself to the chair. Students boycotted his lectures in indignation. As acting head of his ministry the doctor appointed a hospital orderly named Turkeltaub.

The biggest hospitals of Kharkof are the Alexandrofsky Petrenko and the Nickolaiofsky, with 1,000 and 700 beds, respectively. Dr. Tutiskim appointed the plumber of the former institution as its commissary and a hospital orderly as commissary of the latter. The commissaries of hospitals had the right to modify the menus and medication of patients if they thought them too expensive, a right freely exercised.

Nurses left their duty at will. The dressings of wounded soldiers were changed only once in three days. Typhus patients, delirious, often escaped and walked about the streets. Civilian

after admission for attention.

Drug stores were nationalized. Owners worked as clerks under the commissaries which were put in charge of each store. The commissaries made no effort to renew the stocks, and medicine soon became so scarce that it was administered to patients but once in three days. The Soviet of drug-clerks set the working day as from 10 a. m. to 3 p. m. with the stores closed all day Sunday and every evening.

The stocks of the retail stores were seized without compensation to the owners, who were declared a parasite class and the enemies of the state. A commissary entered each enterprise as its director.

A Soviet of the salespeople of each store fixed the wages and the working hours. In general, stores were open from 10 a. m. to 4 p. m. The former owner worked as an employe, and if he happened to be unpopular with his personnel, they might, and sometimes did, vote him lower wages than the janitor.

General Summerall Endorses Infantry Journal Campaign

I am thoroughly in accord with your views on the subject of universal military training. I have talked with many of our representative citizens upon this subject, and they all agree that it would be a just and wise policy. All prejudice against universal military training is due to ignorance of the Army and of what military training represents. The Military Code, the Articles of War, the Army Regulations and the standards of the customs of the service will bear the test of any religion or code of morals. In fact, the military standards represent the highest ideals of mankind. Universal military training would not only prepare our young manhood for the privilege and the obligation of serving their country in time of need, but it would make them better citizens and elevate the physical, mental and moral standards of our people.

C. P. SUMMERALL,
Major General, U. S. Army.

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Americanization in the Army

By Major Ernest J. Carr, Infantry

HE writer wishes to offer for consideration a certain phase of training so general in its nature that so far we have failed to approach it with definite positive method and as an army policy, but whose ultimate value to the nation can hardly be overestimated, namely, the thorough Americanization of the soldier, both native and alien born.

This nation endures by reason of the enduring faith of a majority of its people in its principles, its traditions, in its mission and destiny. All of our people in a greater or less degree, at present in perhaps a greater degree than ever before, need to know fully what Americanism means. And the duty of inculcating the right conceptions rests. heavily with the Government, the schools and colleges, the churches, with the Army and with every institution capable of giving utterance to the prin ciples of Americanism.

Let us not mislead ourselves into believing that birth within the continental limits of the United States guarantees the national faith of the man so born. All of our slackers were not foreign born. Some citizens go to school a while, even serve in the Army for a period, yet fail to grasp the ideas and ideals for which the United States stands; otherwise how is it we note in the press of the day such things as "Ex-soldiers in uniform took part in the rioting," etc. All of our people should know the initial premises upon which rests our national life: Why the

majority should rule; the principles underlying and the advantages of representative government; the fact that the nation has rights over the individual and why it has those rights; the justice of equality of opportunity and the justice of inequality of reward; that the particular phase of political evolution now being passed through by the Slav was completed by the Anglo-Saxon and Celt centuries ago, and that we have in our hands, if we choose to use it, the power to reach any useful end by entirely orderly and sensible procedure; that we should respect the rights of property and of individuals, and why we should; that there is a difference between liberty and license; that there must be government and obligations to the nation and the reasons therefor; that this government is the fruition of the intelligent and constructive thought of centuries, and that, while it has shortcomings, it has given more to the individual and his progress than any other yet devised.

We of the Army should see to it that such part of our people as passes through the Army are enlightened in their Americanism, that their concepts are based on explained facts, and that they return to civil life not only a mili tary asset but a national asset in the deepest and fullest sense.

With the valuable opportunities now offered with enlistments in the Army, men will come to us with no other thought than self-personal aggrandisement-the wearing of the uniform for

the few months or years necessary to gain the technical or academic training needed to go back to civil life and capture the almighty dollar. Enlistment periods are short, universal training periods (if we have them) will be shorter, and the work to be done must be done intensively with direct, positive method. If we drill a man, teach him a craft, entertain him, feed and clothe him for three years and send him back to his community without having made him American to the core, we have missed the vital duty which is ultimately greater than all else in our work.

The Army must do its share; caricaturing the bolshevik in service posters will hardly suffice. It is not presumed in the least that the general training and education of the soldier will fail to give partially, or even to a considerable extent, this education in Americanism of which I speak, but the point I especially want to make is that we should go at this particular phase of his education, avowedly, with singleness of purpose and with the 100 per cent Americanizing of the man consciously before us as a separate and definite objective.

Some particular branch of the Army should undertake this duty of inculcating and sustaining Americanism as a specialization; to me it seems logical and expedient that the Morale Branch should be charged with it. Minds more fecund of ideas than mine will see numerous ways in which to carry on the work, and the following suggestions are offered in an attempt to outline the nature of the work as I conceive it.

There should be definite periods of time allowed in schedules of theoretical

training, in vocational courses, in academic courses for the giving of short lectures on such subjects as are mentioned above. These lectures should be issued by the Morale Branch on cards, and no officer should be allowed to deviate from them to any extent unless he can give a better lecture on the subject in the time allotted than that printed for the subject by the Morale Branch. The lectures should be written in strong, plain, concise English, crisp, in the best "Leavenworth" manner of expression, should deal with one subject only, and should have the time limit printed on the card itself. Use of such printed matter will remove the possibility of the soldier not getting the information intended for him by reason of the ignorance or inarticulation of the officer

charged with the instruction. Short, forceful essays should be attractively lithographed for posting in amusement rooms, theaters, barracks, visitors' houses, classrooms, libraries, clubs, workshops, hospital wards and offices.

Full use should be made of chaplains and their means of access to the men, especially the recruits, and of military ceremonies which reverence the flag and what it represents. No moving without opening with a terse parapicture in an army station should show graphed slide setting forth some trenchant bit of Americanism. The soldier,

during the period of his enlistment, under these conditions would undergo both consciously and subconsciously an intensive course in Americanism. His faith in the United States and its gov ernment would be strengthened by reason, and in his return to civil life he would not be compelled to argue with force alone when challenged by the utterances of the radical.

In the communities whence came our conscientious objectors and draft dodg. ers and the I. W. W.'s, the presence of the fully Americanized returned soldier will be felt, and as his number increases with the years, counter influence will correspondingly disappear. From of ficial contact with and observation of some of those who avoided their duty during the late crisis, I am led to believe that, had they received the elemental truths of Americanism during the formative period of their lives, we would have had a big percentage of them doing their full duty in the hour of need.

With workmen's wages satisfactory and the mass of our people in fairly livable circumstances, we may sleep for a while, paying little attention to the Bolshevist and the radical. But let the lean years come, and this nation will realign itself as conservative and radical. And the man with nothing in his pocket or stomach will look on the man on the soap-box with new interest. If that day comes, we will be as strong as our teachings have made us, as loyal as judg ments are true in weighing where our duty lies, and the greater the mass of those who think American the less the danger for the nation.

I

UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING

Permanently Solves Problem of Defense

I believe without reservation in a system of compulsory military training for all men. I think it is the only adequate, just, and manly plan for national protection. Looked at from another standpoint, I dare to affirm that a limited period of intensive training in the Army for all young men of the country would do more for them physically and morally than a comparable period spent in any kind of education. It is the educational value of a brief but intensive period of military life that may perhaps appeal most strongly to a nation which is always indifferent to its defense. The opportunity to give the body a vigor which in many cases will be lasting, to teach habits of hygiene, of promptitude, obedience, and responsibility, together with the excellent experience involved in learning to shoot, to march, to camp, to care for property and equipment, and in the case of certain individuals, to exercise command-all of these things are, in my opinion, an indispensable part of the training of every man and citizen. If they were adopted, not only would the problem of our defense be permanently solved on a democratic basis, but the Army might become what it should be, a great educational institution, with adequate force ever at hand for every national emergency and with the finest of careers open to officers and noncommissioned personnel.

I am wholeheartedly in sympathy with proper efforts to bring such a system about and can be counted upon to do anything I can for the advancement of such purposes always.

DAVID P. BARROWS, President University of California.

A

Profiting By War Experiences
By Major George C. Marshall, General Staff

RTICLES appearing in our service magazines, discussions at the service schools or colleges and pamphlets issued by the War Department, lead to the belief that the American military student of the World War may be led astray in formulating conclusions on tactical questions and on organization, since the circumstances surrounding quoted instances of our participation in the war are not usually presented in sufficient detail to enable one to correctly judge the situation studied. Furthermore, the majority of our officers had but a brief experience in battle and were so hard-pressed before, during and immediately after engagements that it is difficult for them to make an accurate, critical analysis of the battle tactics involved, and it is well known that a single example is apt to prove a dangerous guide for future action.

FRONTAGES IN BATTLE

An excellent pamphlet has been issued on this subject by the Historical Section of the General Staff, but one phase is not touched on which has a most important bearing on the entire question-the strength of the enemy and his condition of morale. For example, the appropriate frontage for an attack in the Spring of 1918, was much less than for the Fall of the same year. In April, May and June the German army enjoyed a high state of morale, had ample reserves and was on the offensive. Any mistake or weakness displayed by

the opponents was usually taken advantage of by a crushing attack or counter-attack. For an American division to have deployed for attack during this period on the frontage employed by our Fifth Division in its crossing of the Meuse in November, 1918, would have been a direct invitation to complete disaster.

The battle fronts of American divisions employed in the St. Mihiel operation were not only adapted to the terrain and the depth of penetration desired, but were also governed by the fact that the German power of resistance had not been reduced to its level of November 1 and we were engaged in our first major operation, with the whole world as a critical audience and with Allies opposed to the organization of American combat armies. On September 26 the question of frontages was influenced by the fact that a number of the divisions were without previous battle experience. The depth of penetration desired and the rapidity with which an attack was to be pushed, the frequency with which reliefs could be effected, and a number of other points all influenced each decision as to frontage and should be included in any statement or discussion of a particular instance.

FORMATIONS FOR ATTACK AND DEFENSE

A proper study of tactical formations adopted requires a careful survey of the special conditions involved. In the occupation of the old defensive sectors

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