bring to their work certain commonsense business practices. Hence, in general terms, we have a higher command of a high order, and a lower command of a low order, but with a wide variation in quality.

Then we have the elements of fluctuation of these we may mention the influence of the enemy's organization, tactics and quality; the geographical, political, climatic and economic influences of the theater of war upon our logistics, strategy, tactics and organization. We have to consider also the effect of possible developments in weapons, or defensive devices.

After a little more than two years of war in Europe, when we came to enter the conflict, how profoundly were our organization and tactics modified! We borrowed instructors of the Allies, and, under their influence, trained our men in trench-warfare, thus losing months of precious time and doing violence to the vital principles embodied in our Field Service Regulations. It is true that we returned to the fold of orthodoxy later, but what was the effect?

After the divisions that were called upon to break the German resistance were in France an admirable order of the Commander-in-chief directed that attention be given to the study of the tactics as described in our Field Service Regulations. Officers were sent to school to learn the new doctrine. The result was, and will be in the next war if we take no steps to remedy the situation, that officers were withdrawn from their training and combat duties to become indoctrinated. Only a few were thoroughly impregnated with the new methods. How much time, how much energy, and how many lives could have been saved had these officers, while

continuing with their organizations, as well as those already there, have been able to attain the same results?

This flexibility, to a great extent, at least, can be attained by drawing conclusions from the facts presented in the articles that constitute this series. The conclusions are these:

1. That staff officers trained in the principles of organization, can be trusted to organize their own staffs in such a manner that the duties can be performed by a minimum of officers so employed as to use the peculiar powers of each to a maximum degree. 2. That a system of education can be devised capable of developing to a much higher degree the innate qualities of each officer.

3. That this system is one designed to arouse an absorbing interest in one's duties, and allied subjects, together with highly developed powers of observation, concentrated study, concentrated and habitual reflection, a sound judgment and the habit of initiative. Military character should be, above all, emphasized and developed.

4. That superimposed upon this preliminary training there should be a uniform and simple presentation of the principles of war, developed into a part of the officer's mental background.

This last mastery of principles in a uniform fashion would constitute an automatic general indoctrination and upon it as a basis all technical changes or modifications could be grafted.

There is no hallowed mystery about the art of war. The Romans intrusted their higher command to civil officials. Consuls, Pro-consuls and Tribunes were civil officers given at times the control of the necessary military forces to carry out their policies. Caesar went to Gaul, not as a soldier, but as a

Governor. Caesar was not a trained soldier; he learned the art, as did Cromwell and one of Wellington's ablest subordinates, Graham, after he had reached the age of forty-four. And yet few professional soldiers have had the grasp of the art of war as a whole that Caesar had. The two standard works on war in antiquity, the two models of modern military students, are Caesar and Xenophon. Both were civilians. Xenophon's conduct of the operations after he took command were perfect. Cyrus' leadership was hopeless, and even that of the Spartan veteran, Clearchus, was far inferior to that of the clear-headed civilian, Xenophon.

It was Carnot, and not Napoleon, who introduced modern warfare; it was the Minister of War, and not his generals who prescribed concentration, the use of masses, the decision by action and not by maneuver, and the new tactics. Carnot even supervised personally the revolutionary battle of Watignies.

In the history of combined strategy there are no military names of the luster of Themistocles, Pericles and William Pitt. This is probably because a civilian, approaching war from a distance, is more likely to see it in its entirety than a soldier, who, close at hand, is lost in the ramification of its details.

Clausewitz said that in war all is simple; but the simple is difficult. The forest cannot be seen for the trees. The hardest names to find on a map are those in bold letters sprawled across the entire face of the sheet. The obvious is the hardest thing to see and to keep in mind. So it is in the study of war: only by keeping in mind the whole can the relative value of the parts be determined. Even after years of study

the commonest mistake of an officer is to lose sight of his mission-or the vital principle of concentration.

Now, the principle of concentration may be looked upon as the one comprehensive principle of war. Whether or not this is actually the case, and whether all other so-called principles are methods of applying or modifying this one principle, is not a vital consideration. A point of view can be taken that will justify this attitude, and even if it be no more than a convention, it has the value of simplifying a presentation of the subject.

When one goes into a strange country every conspicuous feature becomes. a landmark; the wise traveler, lest he be lost, selects the one dominating feature and refers all other lesser landmarks to it, and thus fixes in his mind

coherent skeleton. Any subject is easier to comprehend if presented in a logical division of parts, each part referred to the one vital element.

With a standardized terminology, and with such a method of presenting the subject of the Art of War, there would be the advantages that all would speak the same language and have common point of view.

Carrying the idea still farther, the whole question of doctrine is one of uniformity. No more than a formal acquiescence to an imposed point of view can ever be attained unless all start from a common basis. When a change of doctrine results from every change in command, we get confusion worse confounded. And Reserve Officers, when they are called up, will they be indoctrinated-and with whose doctrine?

It seems as though this whole problem can only be resolved by the use of the same methods as we used to

secure tactical uniformity. The General Staff ought to get out a series of text-books beginning with one on the conduct of war. In this an introductory chapter could be devoted to a general discussion of principles as applied not only to strategy and tactics, but to organization, administration and discipline; to business, professions, and the general conduct of life. In this we would lay the foundation for the indoctrination of Reserve Officers. Succeeding text-books could cover subjects in detail. It should be made clear that the same principles govern the conduct of a squad and an army corps. Such a book would have saved the subaltern at Duffer's Drift a prodigious number of uncomfortable dreams. Most of our Reservists will have to learn it at the cost of American blood.

The text book on Organization, describing the principles, would solve the question of Staff flexibility and of other problems of organization; for the estimate of the situation, referred to principles, could be applied more widely than to mere tactical problems. The basis of a successful discipline lies also in uniformity. A man likes to know

The

what is required of him and what to expect. Rules cannot cover all cases. Principles can.

It cannot be too strongly emphasized that the extensive use of Reserve Officers in modern war makes such books a necessity. They cannot be required to read all the voluminous technical works now produced to keep up to date, nor if they do read many, to choose wisely. A minimum that we can require of them is a knowledge of one good book on each subject, and the point of view of this book ought to be in harmony with our doctrine. If these books are all written from one

point of view, the official viewpoint, and deal with principles and the method of their application, a mastery of them will lead to a coherent, unified and uniform conception of the art of war and its application to concrete cases.

While not a panacea for all military ills, there is no doubt but that an adoption of such a system promises to agree with the lessons of history and to provide a harmonious adaptation of means to meet the particular demands of modern warfare.