N 1914 the German infantry went into battle armed with but few different weapons: the men carried the rifle (Model '98) with bayonet; officers and a few noncommissioned officers and men had pistols; each regiment had a machine-gun company, and each "Jaeger" battalion had six machine guns, which were considered as an auxiliary arm of the infantry.

The same infantry returned from the war armed to the teeth. Light machine guns, machine pistols, grenade throwers, hand grenades, rifle grenades, and anti-tank guns had been added; light trench mortars had become an integral part of infantry armament; the number of heavy machine guns had been enormously increased; infantry cannon (accompanying guns) had been placed directly under the control of the infantry.

This phenomenon is an incontestable indication that the means which the infantry had at its disposal at the be-ginning of the war were insufficient for solving the problems which the infantry had to overcome. These means were both technical and tactical. The technical ones, i. e., the weapons, are to be discussed here. They are so closely connected with tactics that the latter must be frequently mentioned.

Every war brings surprises, in the technical as well as in the tactical field. The longer peace has prevailed, and

the more important the principles at stake in the war, the more numerous and revolutionary must be the experiences gained in that war. After unsuccessful wars they are usually exploited more quickly than after wars with a fortunate outcome; after the unfortunate war of a hundred years ago we quickly and energetically drew the correct conclusions; after the war of 1870-71 we retained the old regulations for years, in spite of the fact that many defects and much that was antiquated had been recognized in this system. The last war occupies an unusual position. In spite of our final catastrophe, it remains undecided from a military point of view. By thorough consideration we must attempt to make use of the experiences gained in this war.

The infantry is the queen of battles. The war could not wrest from it this title. Our former regulations described the infantry as the main arm of the service-the war has created a second one, the artillery, which is tactically equivalent to the infantry. Before the war the artillery was not properly developed, much to the loss of the infantry, which had to suffer for it at the beginning of the war.

Since earliest times the infantry has been destined to bear the main burden of the combat. Even in times of peace it was subjected to an exceptionally thor

ough system of training, it was trained in the use of the rifle (Model '98). Equipped with this as its chief weapon, it was expected to be equal to any task in offensive and defensive operations. Its auxiliary weapon, the machine gun, was limited in numbers; in addition, it was a weapon which had been but recently introduced, for which reason leaders and men were not sufficiently familiar with its use.

The infantry was trained, and rightly so, for the attack. This was, however, no reason for depreciating the significance of the defense. From the company up to the division and the army corps, the attack was practiced four times out of five in the course of maneuvers. The bare drill grounds and training fields, as well as the autumnal maneuver terrain, caused the infantry to carry out all its attacks over oper country.

The regulations prescribe that welltrained infantry, while attacking, will not open fire until the limits of the medium and close ranges have been reached, i. e., at a range of 800 to 1,000 meters. The next stage of the attack then consists in "advancing the fire towards the enemy." Through advancing by rushes, and with mutual fire support, for the greater part with the rifle, the approach to the enemy was to be carried out, and, after the penetration, the victory was to be clinched by means of the bayonet. The fire technique of the infantry corresponded to these tactical principles. The fire combat executed by rifles was to be carried out at ranges at which the single shot was without effect. This led to the development of "cones of fire." The execution of this kind of fire requires the combined action of a great number of rifles, firing within a narrow com

pass, and a fire control covering every detail. Close cooperation between the platoon leader, with his human and mechanical range finders and his assistants, the squad leaders, on the one hand, and numerous well-trained riflemen, on the other, may, in spite of the differing physical and mental qualities, form a kind of firing machine-but only on the range, not on the battlefield under enemy fire.

The fire results attained in peace times seemed, however, to prove the correctness of this method of fighting and firing and, with German thoroughness and admirable conscientiousness, the fire training of our infantry was carried out in accordance with this idea. The rifleman was systematically trained as a member of a detachment. Even the preliminary firing exercises required this; firing of the individual under battle conditions was no longer practiced at all. Relatively little importance was attached to firing on a single objective. The closest range used was 400 meters, and even this range was made use of only in preliminary firing exercises. In executing firing exercises under battle conditions, with the exception of preliminary exercises which were executed now and then, longer ranges were used.

The influence which the experiences gained in the Boer War, in the RussoJapanese War, and in the Balkan War exerted upon the arrangement of our drill regulations in this regard will not be discussed at this time. In any case, fire tactics developed along wrong lines, because they based their progress upon technical assumptions with regard to firing, which proved to be false when subjected to actual battle conditions.

Thus trained, our infantry entered the war, and had to acknowledge after

heavy sacrifices that a systematic and permanent employment of the rifle in this manner was impossible. The "powerful," densely-massed skirmish lines offered too vulnerable a target. When making a rather long pause for the purpose of opening fire, they were also too heavily shelled by the artillery. The cone of rifle fire which was delivered was not effective enough against the well-covered and often completely invisible enemy. If our infantry, in spite of this disadvantage, went from victory to victory in the first months of war, though suffering the heaviest losses, it did not gain these victories because it succeeded in attaining fire superiority during the attacks, but because it was superior to the enemy from the point of view of morale-this was the decisive factor.

Then trench warfare began. The infantry soon recognized the importance of fire delivered upon a single objective. The wishes of the infantry were fulfilled by supplying it with telescopic sights and auxiliary front sights. The lack of peace-time training of the infantryman as an independent individual rifleman could not be so easily equalized. Everyone who took part in the war knows how difficult it was to cause the German infantryman quickly and independently to open an effective fire upon every hostile target which appeared. He was accustomed to having the target, the range, and the opening of fire indicated to him by means of commands.

The higher military authorities soon recognized that the rifle alone was insufficient for the solution of the problems which devolved upon the infantry in offensive and defensive operations, that the support of the available machine guns was insufficient, and that

much more importance was to be attached to the artillery than had been attributed to it in peace times. Artillery and machine guns were multiplied to an extent which was hardly thought possible before; the infantry received its own "artillery" in the form of trench mortars, which were destined chiefly for trench warfare, at least for the time being.

The quiet trench warfare displaced the rifle more and more. Uncovered targets which could be combated with this weapon very seldom appeared, so, as a result, hand grenades and rifle grenades of various types, and later grenade throwers, were added to the armament of the infantry as a necessary supplement.

II

Beginning in 1915, our attacks, as well as those of the enemy, showed a method of combat on the part of the infantry essentially different from that employed before. As a rule, the infantry no longer worked its way toward the enemy with mutual fire support. The artillery and especially the machine guns, which had become increasingly numerous, took over the task of protecting the infantry from the very beginning of the attack. This method was employed by us for the first time in 1915, near Soissons, on a small scale. It was later used in the extensive penetrative operations in the East. We observed its use by the enemy for the first time during the offensive operations in the Champagne in March, 1915. The method of combat employed by our infantry-to traverse extensive areas. by advancing in rushes with mutual fire support-disappeared entirely; the consumption of infantry ammunition was greatly diminished, and artillery

and machine guns became the main reliance. The infantrymen seemed to fight almost wholly with machine guns, hand grenades, the bayonet and "with their legs." The same method of combat was also observed in defense. Even in the daily reports of the Army High Command, one spoke almost entirely of "attacks repulsed by means of artillery and machine-gun fire" or "attacks which broke up into hand-grenade combats." The fact that the infantryman still carried a rifle was almost overlooked. This fact was observed not only in the communiques, but also at the front.

It would be quite incorrect to draw the conclusion from this fact that the rifle was no longer the main weapon of the infantryman, or had even become superfluous. The reason for this was the inability of the infantryman to make full use of his rifle, because he had not learned how. This was not only so in the ranks of the later replacements which were, for the greater part, insufficiently trained, but also among the regular soldiers. The latter had soon. recognized on the battlefield that their rifles could not compete with machine. guns in the delivery of dispersion fire. At the front they rarely encountered the targets and the conditions to which they were accustomed on the range; if they observed an enemy target, this was almost always at the closest range-but no German infantryman had ever delivered a shot under battle conditions at a range of 200 to 300 meters during his whole period of training. For this reason he left the fire combat more and more to the machine guns, and made use of the hand grenade in case of need.

Only a thorough transformation in the system of training in firing with

the rifle could bring about a change in this respect; perhaps it would have brought about decisive results. Attempts were made in the field to carry out this idea, but they came too late and were not uniform in character.

In the course of time, offensive as well as defensive operations showed that machine guns, which were already available in large numbers, were not yet able to support the rifle to a sufficient extent in every phase of combat. The remarkable fire strength of the heavy machine guns was not always equaled by their mobility and fire preparedness. In addition, the difficulty of replacing men in the course of the long war, and the increased effectiveness of the enemy artillery fire, forced us more and more to replace men by machines, even in the front lines, and to attempt to equalize the fire strength of the infantry company, which had been greatly diminished by the decrease in numbers, by attaching machine guns directly to it. This might have been the most essential reason for the introduction of the light machine gun. It may well be said that it is by no means an ideal automatic weapon. In the first place, the light machine gun, because of its inaccuracy, cannot replace the marvellous fire effect of the heavy machine gun. In addition, its fire preparedness had not yet attained the essential degree of development, and its serving, supply, etc., required the employment of too many men.

The defects of the light machine gun seem to have been the main reason for the introduction of the machine pistol. Otherwise, the latter would not have become necessary. The infantry still lacked a simple, easily-manipulated automatic weapon with the greatest possible fire preparedness. The ma

chine pistol satisfies these conditions, but its fire is effective only up to a range of 200 meters. In addition its ammunition does not meet all require

ments.

It must not be overlooked that the light machine gun, as well as the machine pistol, rose in answer to an urgent need. Their manufacture on a large scale had to be carried out within the quickest possible time, and was subjected to the most severe restrictions with regard to materials and workmen. The enemy tanks, which appeared in constantly increasing numbers and in constantly improving forms, forced us at length to furnish our infantry with a special anti-tank weapon in the form of the anti-tank rifle.

The infantry gun deserves special mention. Even our old regulations said that "if the attack is accompanied by single batteries up to close ranges, the moral strength of the infantry is increased and reverses can be avoided." In the course of the war, these infantry accompanying batteries have proved themselves an absolutely necessary auxiliary arm for the infantry in all phases of combat. At first they were attached to the assault battalions as "infantry guns." After the offensive operations in the spring of 1918 they were at tached directly to the infantry. Their cooperation with the infantry frequently proved to be the deciding factor. They must be added to the armament of the infantry.

The numerous weapons of modern infantry can be divided, according to their method of employment, into "infantry long-range weapons" and "infantry close-range weapons." Infantry guns (accompanying batteries), trench mortars and heavy machine guns belong to the first-mentioned group;

while light machine guns, rifle with bayonet, machine pistols, pistols, grenade throwers, anti-tank guns, hand grenades and rifle grenades belong to the latter classification.

What forms will our infantry armament presumably take in the future? It is no easy matter to answer this question. First of all, we must consider that the policy for the development of our military resources will for some time be subject to extremely close restrictions. Political as well as economic considerations require it. A policy which aims at the development of military resources and is not subjected to such hindrances can, on the other hand, perhaps find entirely new lines for improvement, even for the weapons of the infantry. A consideration of the possibility of development must therefore be based upon the state of the armament which was brought about by the war, and must be restricted to projects, the realization of which lies within the realms of possibility.

The way to this goal may be sought in an at least partial grouping of the present large number of infantry weapons within the two main classes. In the sphere of long-range weapons, a combination of the infantry gun and the trench mortar seems to be possible if one takes into consideration the undeniable possibility of extensive development of the trench mortar. Simplification of the close-range weapons is absolutely essential. By constructing a dependable rifle grenade which could also be used as a hand grenade, it might be possible to combine the grenade thrower, the existing rifle grenade, and the egg-shaped hand grenade into one weapon. The combination of the light machine gun, the rifle, and the machine pistol, if possible,