lished precedent in order that justice might be done under the particular circumstances of the case, and I am glad to be of those who maintain that such a course is conducive to the proper administration of jurisprudence, and that so long as our Courts are filled with those who maintain their prestige and renown, and are sans peur et sans reproche, et sans approche, they will ever maintain the honor, the peace and the dignity of the Commonwealth and the prosperity of its citizens. A careful consideration of that class of cases will disclose, I am firmly convinced, that their adjudication was based upon facts that permitted justice to be done only by departing from rules of law, which, if followed, would have been to permit an injustice so gross as to shock the conscience. An illustration of this, though no doubt better could be found, is Carpenter vs. Life Insurance Co., 161 Pa., 9, and the same case 174 Pa., 639. At trial the defendant had successfully relied upon stare decisis, a long line of authority in Pennsylvania, as well as in the Federal and other Courts, that an insurable interest, clearly defined, was essential to a recovery upon a life policy; adjudications founded upon a rule of public policy that to permit such contracts would be to put a premium on human life, and that a wagering policy was but conducive to a desire for the death of the insured, a desire which in at least one reported case (Mutual Life Ins. Co. vs. Armstrong, 117 U. S., 578) had been followed by its felonious accomplishment. In the case cited as an illustration it was admitted on the trial that "the plaintiff was not a creditor of the insured, nor a relative, nor connected by ties of blood or marriage, but only a friend of the insured;" an admission of fact which under the established rule of "the knowne certaintie of the law" put the plaintiff out of Court, and the defendant was accordingly dismissed with the premium in its pockets and the policy unpaid. If on appeal the settled rule of law had been applied, and natural justice and meritorious right had been disregarded by a refusal to consider the particular facts of the case, the judgment must have been affirmed. But it was not affirmed because of those particular facts which were that the plaintiff, a poor young woman, had been befriended and educated by the insured and given an opportunity to earn her livelihood by a respectable occupation. That she might have some support after his death, and before her technical education was completed, he gave her this policy on his life, assigning it to her out and out. Every reason for the application of the rule was wanting, because in fact her interest was much greater in the preservation than in the destruction of the life of the insured; but, measured by the rule of law, she was without legal redress. Be it said to the credit of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania that the judgment was reversed, based upon the ground that the insured was to the plaintiff in loco parentis, although in point of fact she had been of full age for a number of years. We might quarrel with the reason for the reversal, but not honestly with any judgment which gave her the money to which she was rightfully entitled. We may here rest the further discussion of this question, though it will continue to be raised so long as our profession includes those who, like their prototype, the inflexible Coke, maintain that rules of law once established must ever be strictly followed, irrespective of the wrong done in the particular cause, judging solely from the head without influence from the heart, and denying the elasticity of the law to adapt itself to man's changed conditions, as well as to his environment and progress. But while there is the other school in our profession, modern though it may be, yet largely in the majority, we may rest assured that the law will be measured by what is right and just, compelling its severity to yield to justice as the basic principle of all law. The duty of the Bar is to demand purity in the Bench, and then to uphold it as part of the great brotherhood of the law to which, judge and advocate alike, we are solemnly sworn, yet none the less is it the duty of the Bar to hold the Bench to the strict observance of that obligation of Magna Charta, forever binding upon every judge: "To none will we sell, to none will we deny, to none will we delay justice." When shall come that great day bringing us all before a Judge whose justice man can but feebly imitate, we will not ask for that "certaintie of the law" under which we must all stand condemned, but rather for that justice and mercy whereby alone we may hope for an eternal reward, relying upon an assurance of salvation, "Because He hath appointed a day in the which He will judge the world in righteousness." THE PRESIDENT: The next order of business is the reading of the minutes. ISAAC HIESTER, Berks: In view of the fact that the minutes have been printed and distributed among the members, I move that the reading of the minutes be omitted, and that they be approved as printed. Duly seconded, and agreed to. THE PRESIDENT: The next order is the reading of the Treasurer's report. WM. PENN LLOYD, Treasurer: I beg to present the following as my report for the year: REPORT OF TREASURER CAMBRIDGE SPRINGS, PA., June 29, 1903. Report of William Penn Lloyd, Treasurer of the Pennsylvania Bar Association, showing the receipts and disbursements from June 30, 1902, to June 29, 1903: DR. To balance in hands of Treasurer as shown by last report. $7,570 of To dues collected for year ending July 1, 1901. To sale of Annual Reports To interest received on special deposit $5.00 185 00 1,575 00 3,140 00 4,905 00 $9.00 126 25 24 00 9 00 168 25 $12,643 26 Refunded by R. R. Co., expense for endorsing tickets . . Refunded, error Buchanan & Co. bill Total CR. By disbursements from June 30, 1902, to June 29, 1903 . . By balance in hands of Treasurer as shown by certificates from First National Bank, Mechanicsburg, and Dauphin Deposit Bank, Harrisburg, herewith submitted. $4,113 05 8,530 21 $12,643 26 Five Thousand Dollars of above balance is on special deposit, at three per cent. interest as a reserve fund. Of the appropriation of five hundred dollars made to the Legal Biography Committee at the last annual meeting of the Association, there remains in the hands of the Treasurer an unexpended balance of $214.96. Estimate of current expenses for year ending July 1, 1904. $4,200 00 |