corps upon the right flank of the assaulting column as Longstreet had feared. Lee's plan could only succeed if the officer in command of the Federal troops were so paralysed-as Hooker had been-that he could not take the proper measures to meet it.

Fitz Lee says':

Lee was bitterly disappointed at the day's results.

He was playing for big stakes and a decisive victory which would bring in its train peace to his people and success to his cause. "This had been a sad day to us," said Lee, "but we cannot always expect to win victories."

2

It was a sad day for the South, for at that time it was within a stone's throw of peace. Fate was against Lee; the high-water mark of Southern independence had been reached, and from that hour it began to ebb from the mountains of Pennsylvania until lost in the hills of Appomattox.

"It is all my fault," Lee exclaimed, and proceeded in person to rally his shattered troops. . . . With that wonderful magnanimity which Lee so fully possessed he took all the responsibility on his own broad shoulders.

Lee.

Gettysburg was the last act of a drama which began at Chancellorsville or some time before. Lee's repeated successes appear to have led him to believe that he could take great risks in dealing with the Army of the Potomac. He has been unduly praised for his success in his former campaigns, and perhaps unduly censured for his failure in this. The principles of the art of war, and the rules for its conduct, are based upon probabilities; they may perhaps be violated once or twice with impunity, but there is no surer way to fail in the end than to violate them

reinforced by Heth's divisions and two brigades of Pender's, to the command of which General Trimble was assigned."

Lee's Lee, 297.

2 Lee's Lee, 298.

frequently. Lee probably understood those principles as well as any man in either army, and perhaps better; but in balancing the benefits of success against the evils of disaster, he was apt to be swayed by his natural combativeness, his sanguine disposition, his consciousness of his own strength, his tender regard for the feelings of others, and his faith in the justice of his cause. Those of Lee's friends who regard him as infallible, and believe that his every act was prompted by his unerring sagacity, do him great injustice. Few commanders, after such a career in dealing with incompetent adversaries, could fail to take a more sanguine view of his prospects of success than he could justify by cool calculation. To suppose that, if not affected by such influences, Lee would approve of such a manœuvre as the charge of Pickett, Pettigrew, and Trimble, would be to remove him from the pedestal on which his military genius has placed him. His reputation does not depend upon such arguments. In his former campaigns, he had shown his superiority to every commander who had opposed him; and in those to come he was to show it in a manner even more creditable to his reputation as the greatest captain of his age.

Meade.

Meade was a man of great refinement, but not of as profound an intellect as Lee, not a soldier by instinct, and not original in devising brilliant plans; but his clear understanding enabled him to discriminate between the plans of others; the opinions of some of the corps commanders, he valued as his own; he had a high respect for Warren's military genius, and especially for his quick perception. While he showed excellent judgment in the conduct of this campaign, yet in some instances he might doubtless

have done better. On the second day, Buford's division should not have been withdrawn from its position on the left until replaced by other cavalry; but should have remained to keep Meade informed of the movements on Lee's right. Meade did not intend to leave this post unoccupied; but whether he or Pleasonton was responsible for Buford's orders it is hard to determine. When Meade found that Sickles's line was too far advanced, it might have been wiser to give definite orders for its withdrawal. On this point, the opinions of experts are divided. Meade surely never authorized Caldwell to advance beyond the line he was sent to support. On the night of the 2d, and morning of the 3d, and again after the great charge, Meade did not take advantage of his opportunity to throw Sykes's and Sedgwick's corps on Longstreet's exposed right flank. Such an advance, if properly supported, on the evening of the 3d, would have rolled up the right of Lee's army, and the cavalry, if properly handled, would have completed the rout and cut off the retreat. On the 4th the problem was harder; but Meade might at least have taken up a position that would prevent Lee's escape without serious loss. Lee's artillery ammunition was exhausted, his loss in killed and wounded was greater than Meade had imagined, and the morale of his army was seriously impaired. The principles of grand tactics authorized and favored such a counterstroke, which would probably have ended the war in a short time; but much is to be said in favor of the conservative course that Meade adopted; and upon this question opinions are, perhaps, equally divided.

In the dread silence which followed the result of the great charge, it was hard for the men of the Army of

the Potomac to realize that some fearful ordeal was not awaiting them. The memory of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville was fresh in their minds; the great captain had at times been checked before, but never defeated in so great a battle. It was no ordinary task to direct the movements of the Army of the Potomac, so capable, so intelligent, and so long-suffering under incompetent leaders. A false move on Meade's part, or the mistake of a single commander, might perhaps turn his victory into defeat; to attack and be repulsed as McClellan was at the Antietam would destroy the prestige and perhaps the power of the Army of the Potomac. If Lee had been victorious and had shattered Meade's army at Gettysburg, he would have had Baltimore and Philadelphia at his mercy, and it is hard to say what might have been the result. The opening of the Mississippi might have been superfluous. Louis Napoleon was preparing to extend the boundaries of Mexico to its banks. Foreign powers might interfere. The peace party at the North might declare the war a failure. It might end for a time. But it is not in the nature of the American people to submit to a defeat. Every man, woman, and child of the loyal population would prepare for another effort. A popular government, an aristocracy, and an empire could not long live side by side on this continent. The sacrifices at Gettysburg would not have been forgotten.

By holding his position, restraining his natural desire to strike back, and forcing Lee to attack again, or to retreat after so severe a repulse, Meade insured the safety of the North and the opening of the Mississippi. To accomplish so great a task within a few days from the time he was placed in command, was the work of no ordinary talent; and Meade is well worthy of

the praise he has received for turning the tide of the Rebellion.

Confederacy

The battle of Gettysburg crowned the list of victories from one side of the continent to the other which on the 4th of July of 1863, rejoiced the hearts Crisis of the of the loyal citizens of the North. It was encouraging to learn that Rosecrans had outflanked Bragg, and driven him out of Central Tennessee; that Grant, by his persistent pushing, had at last found the line of least resistance of the defences of Vicksburg, and had cleared the way for the navy to advance and hold the Mississippi; that Banks was holding Port Hudson firmly in his grasp, and was about to remove the only remaining obstacle to the free navigation of the great river; and that Confederate attacks on points of minor importance had been repulsed.

Of the three great objective points for the Federal army, Vicksburg was already gained, Chattanooga was in sight, and Richmond, by far the most important, was only defended by the shattered remnants of Lee's forces. But the ultimate objective of the Federal army was the Confederate; in this respect, tactically, the battle of Champion's Hill and the fruitless assaults on Vicksburg and Port Hudson were not to be compared with the great victory that repulsed Lee's repeated assaults, shattered his army, and drove him back to the Rappahannock. Grant had captured or dispersed the army of Pemberton; but it was a common byword that the Rebellion's lease of life was borne on the saddle-bow of Lee's charger. By a vigorous advance of Meade's army, reinforced, as it might and should be, from the garrisons of Washington and Baltimore, from the Ohio Railroad, the Peninsula, and, if required,