taking Port Hudson, he waited leisurely for a fortnight at Opelousas to reorganize the country. If Banks had known that Grant was to move on to Vicksburg instead of sending troops to Louisiana, he should at least have threatened Port Hudson, so that troops would not be sent from its garrison to reinforce Pemberton. But this he did not learn until the 10th of May. Then, as the garrison had been greatly reduced, he could besiege it with a good prospect of success; but he could not move up the Mississippi to join Grant; for if he did, the garrison of Port Hudson could and probably would join with the Confederate troops in Louisiana, Arkansas, and Alabama to recapture New Orleans.

Halleck.

But Halleck thought that he could, from his desk in Washington, coordinate the movements of these two armies hundreds of miles apart; and at the same time, he directed them to cooperate. When Grant cut loose from his communications, he must have felt a sense of security in knowing that he could receive no orders from Halleck until the campaign was decided.

On the 11th of May Halleck telegraphed to him':

If possible the forces of yourself and General Banks should be united between Vicksburg and Port Hudson, so as to attack these places separately with the combined forces. The same thing has been urged upon General Banks.

It came too late to be obeyed.

On the 19th of May, Halleck, learning from the newspapers' that Banks was in possession of Alexandria, and Grant, of Jackson, wrote to Banks:

This may be well enough so far, but these operations

' 36 R., 36.

241 R., 494.

are too eccentric to be pursued. I must again urge that you cooperate with General Grant east of the Mississippi. Your forces must be united at the earliest possible moment. Otherwise the enemy will concentrate on Grant and crush him.'

And on the 23d of May2:

If these eccentric movements with the main forces of the enemy on the east side of the Mississippi do not lead to serious disaster, it will be because the enemy does not take full advantage of his opportunity. I assure you that the Government is exceedingly disappointed that you and General Grant are not acting in conjunction.

And on the 3d of June to the same effect. Banks was before Port Hudson when this dispatch was received.3 In spite of Halleck's feeble attempts to bring these two armies together, each finally sat down before the fortress that was in its path, in no danger Comment. of attack by superior forces from without. Each army had yielded to the impulse of youthful vigor and patriotism which prompted it to take the fortification by assault. Both now realized that, to open up the Mississippi, they must sit for weeks in the broiling sun of an unhealthy climate, until the garrison of one of the fortresses should be worn out by fatigue or starvation, or until the hostile lines should be penetrated by the slow but certain process of a siege. It was pleasant, however, to know that, by perseverance and hard work, the chances were that, if properly supported, they would at last gain the object for which they had so long been working and fighting. * 41 R., 500.

1 41 R., 494.

See also 41 R., 534, and 41 R., 545.

CHAPTER IX.

OPERATIONS IN JUNE, 1863, ETC.

Situation, June, 1863.

THE military operations of June, 1863, and the next few days marked the turning point of the war. Hooker's repulse would not be a fatal blow to the North unless it should be followed by an advance of the Confederate army. The investment of Vicksburg and of Port Hudson would mean little or nothing unless these fortresses should fall. The problem of crushing the rebellion then took a definite form. Richmond could not at once be captured; no approach had been made to Chattanooga; but the Mississippi could be opened if the Federal Government would send troops enough to Grant's support. To fail to do this, would be to lose the work of the western army and navy for the past six months. On the 1st of June, on the banks of the Rappahannock, the Army of the Potomac was reduced by loss in battle, and by expiration of the terms of service, from 150,000 men to 104,600 men1; whereas the strength of the Army of North- Northeast. ern Virginia had been raised by troops then coming in from Southeast Virginia and North Carolina to 73,000. Elsewhere in the Northeast were 71,000 Federals3 and 4500 Confederates. Hooker could spare

'40 R., 574. Map XV., at end.

Situation in the

240 R., 846. 340 R., 589, 592.

no troops to send to Grant. Even if a competent commander were put in his place, it would not be safe to reduce the force that was guarding Washington and the Northeast for the prospect of recovering the extreme Southwest; for this would mean losing the head in the efforts to save the members.

Atlantic and Gulf Coasts.

2

In Southeastern Virginia were about 32,400 Federals1 and 19,000 Confederates. Some troops might be sent to the Army of the Potomac; but none could be spared for Grant. In North Carolina were 15,700 Federals3 and 15,000 Confederates. In South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, 15,700 Federals and 18,300 Confederates. 5 No Federal troops could be spared from the Atlantic coast. Along the Gulf coast and in Southern Mississippi and in Louisiana were 24,000 Federals' under Banks, 4400 Confederates at Mobile, 8000 or 90008 under Taylor in Louisiana, and 5500 under Gardner at Port Hudson.

Louisiana,

Banks could not abandon Louisiana to Gardner and Taylor for the sake of helping Grant. In Texas were 8000 Confederate troops, 10 in New Mexico Mississippi, 2300 Federals." Around Vicksburg, Grant Arkansas. had 50,50012; at Helena, Arkansas, 4300; and in Western Tennessee and Northern Mississippi 36,500. Opposed to him, Pemberton 13 had 20,100 at Vicksburg, Johnston14 had 28,000 near Canton, and 6000's were left in other parts of the State. If

9 42 R., 10, 82; allowing 400 for losses and including 1300 cavalry.

Johnston's force should be heavily increased, Pemberton might be released, and Grant's army thrown back upon the fleet. In Arkansas,1 Holmes had 14,000 white troops and 4400 Indians, guarding the State against the Federals in Missouri, Kansas, and Indian Territory. In this region and that adjoining, Schofield' had 31,000 men.

Schofield says3:

Missouri

and

Northwest.

With my views of the military situation, whether confined to my own department or extended to embrace the entire country, there was but one course to pursue, namely, to send all available force to assist in the capture of Vicksburg and the opening of the Mississippi to the Gulf. After that I could easily operate from points on the Mississippi as a base, capture Little Rock and the line of the Arkansas, and then make that river the base of future operations. This course he had urged before, and he says, “I was glad to do it when the responsibility rested upon me.' On the 3d of June, in response to Halleck's request, Schofield sent Herron with 4000 men to Grant at Vicksburg. In the Northwest, Pope had 6200 men. 5

Ohio, Kentucky,

In Kentucky, Tennessee, Ohio, etc.: in the Army of the Cumberland, Rosecrans had 87,800°; in the Department of the Ohio, Burnside had 38,000.7 These were opposed to Bragg3 in Tennessee with 50,700, Buckner in East Tennessee Tennessee. with 16,300, and Jones 1o in West Virginia with 6400. Burnside was preparing to invade East Tennessee as soon as that part of his old corps then

33 R., 832, 851.

ΤΟ

33 R., 299, 300.

4 33

R., 306, 308.

7 35 R., 379.

40 R., 844, 846.