of Champion's Hill, and then nearly due west' along its crest until the enemy's fire was so hot that he had to halt and face it. Cumming followed Lee, and placed part of his brigade on the new line facing north, part on the old line facing east, and part near the cross-roads to preserve the connection with Barton's brigade, which formed the right of Stevenson's division. Early in the day, Barton sent a regiment and a section of artillery to the bridge at Baker's Creek. advances Meanwhile, on the afternoon of the 15th," Grant went to Clinton. He then ordered McClernand to move his command early the next morning McClernand toward Edwards Depot, marching so as to feel the enemy if he encountered him; but not to bring on a general engagement unless he was confident that he was able to defeat him; and also, to order Blair to move with him. 4 against Pemberton. Early in the morning of the 16th, Grant3 sent a dispatch to Sherman to come up at once, and join the main force near Bolton. McClernand started early. At 5 A.M., A. J. Smith, followed by Blair, advanced by the Raymond road; and at 6 A.M., Osterhaus, followed by Carr, on the middle road, and Hovey by the Clinton road. McClernand went with Osterhaus and Carr. At 7.30 A.M., A. J. Smith met the enemy's skirmishers, who fell back before him; soon after, he encountered the fire of the enemy's artillery, to which he replied, while Burbridge, followed by Landram, advanced along the Raymond road, and at about II 236 R., 51. 13 Miss. Hist. Soc., 37. 3 Having obtained valuable information about Pemberton's numbers, positions, and plans, from two employees of the railroad, Northern men, who had passed through Pemberton's army the night before. $ 36 R., 149. 4 36 R., 148. A.M., took a position on a crest' along the country road about 600 yards from Loring's' line. A. K. Smith, of Blair's division followed, and G. A. Smith brought up the rear. At about 7.30 A.M.,3 Osterhaus, hearing the report of artillery on his left, pushed forward through a broad field to a point where the road entered a very broken section of timbered land. There encountering the enemy's skirmishers, he advanced Garrard slowly into the woods, driving the enemy before him and posted Lindsey on an open and commanding ridge near the point where the road entered. Carr halted half his division a mile behind Lindsey. At 9.45, McClernand wrote to Grant explaining his position, and asking whether he should bring on an engagement, adding: "General Hovey thinks the enemy has passed a large force toward Raymond, and to our rear, but an aide from General Smith knows nothing of it." At 10.15" Grant wrote: From all information gathered from citizens and prisoners, the mass of the enemy are south of Hovey's division. McPherson is now up with Hovey, and can support him at any point. Close up all your forces as expeditiously as possible, but cautiously. The enemy must not be allowed to get to our rear. If you can communicate with Blair and Ransom, do so; and direct them to come up to your support by the most expeditious route. McPherson,' with Logan's division, followed Hovey on the Clinton road, and ordered Crocker to come forward with his division as rapidly as possible. Grant joined this column. At IO A.M., Hovey arrived near Champion's McPherson follows. '37 R., 31, 32. 6 9 8 '36 R., 595. 3 36 R., 149. * 37 R., 13. 52. 937 R., 41. $ 38 R., 316. 38 R., 317. I Hill, and finding the enemy in position along the crest, deployed his division. McPherson brought up Logan's division and placed it on Hovey's right.2 At about 10.30,3 Hovey advanced up the hill, which is about seventy feet high, and by II A.M., Logan also was hotly engaged, and the battle was joined all along the line. Battle joined. The strength of the opposing forces at this hour is about as follows: On the Clinton road, about 10,500 Federals are opposed to 4100 Confederates; on the Middle road, 6700 to 3500; on the Raymond road, 8400 to 11,100. On the Clinton and Middle roads, then, the Federals have the advantage in numbers. Grant's plan is to crowd Pemberton, and cut him off, or drive him into Baker's Creek before he can cross; but his columns are separated by a broad tract of broken and wooded country, and Grant himself is not in position to co-ordinate their movements. Comment. At II A.M., Pemberton, on his march to meet Johnston, has been attacked on his flank by a heavy force probably greater than his own. Unable as he thinks to continue on his march without losing heavily, he has formed line to hold the enemy in check. He cannot expect to hold out indefinitely in the position in which this surprise has found him. Against a frontal attack, it is very strong; for the ground in his front is generally clear, and swept by the fire of his infantry and artillery, and his troops are partially sheltered from hostile fire; but neither flank rests on any obstacle, 'With McGinnis on the right and Slack on the left. 'Leggett on McGinnis's right, Smith on Leggett's right, and Stevenson in reserve. S. D. Lee in 3 Miss. Hist. Soc., 40. and there is nothing to prevent a superior enemy from outflanking him. His object is to cross Baker's Creek with as little loss as possible; and he need only retard the enemy long enough for this purpose, holding them in check with part of his troops while the others cross. If, however, in the eagerness of the pursuit, the enemy expose themselves to a counter-stroke, Pemberton can strike. His position is well adapted to such a manoeuvre; for his troops can move rapidly from one flank to the other, by the country road, and the fields behind it, while Grant's left wing is separated from his right by a dense thicket. The salient in Pemberton's line at Champion's Hill, where Lee turned off to the left, is of course a weak point; for the troops on each face will suffer from the fire directed against the other, as well as from the direct fire in their front; the shape of the ground also is such that the enemy can approach unseen' to within seventy-five yards of the summit. At about 10.30, McGinnis advanced against the point and the left face of this salient, and, supported by the enfilade fire of McPherson's artilcarries Cham-lery 3 charged and took a battery, drove Cumming down the slope to the Edwards Depot road, and then halted for a while Hovey pion's Hill. to reorganize. 4 The whole line [says McGinnis] moved forward, with bayonets fixed, slowly, cautiously, and in excellent order, and when within about seventy-five yards of the battery every gun was opened upon us, and every man went to the ground. As soon as the volley of grape and canister had passed over us, the order was given to charge, when the whole line moved forward as one man, and so sud '37 R., 105. 23 Miss. Hist. Soc., 44. 3 36 R., 640. 4 37 R., 105. |