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“below the limit of efficiency and safety," and the people "expectCongress and the Executive to make the Army worthy of a great nation."
By the present system we have a sufficient number of officers and non-commissioned officers, but there is a great necessity for an increase in the number of soldiers in the different companies.
The “skeleton theory” has been found unwise, most expensive, and least effective.
Our Army is required to be efficient in every kind of military duty, including skilled marksmanship. It must guard our coast defenses and boundary lines, public arsenals, stores, and depots; it must protect the lives and property of citizens, scattered over vast Territories; and in cases of necessity those living in the populous States.
At the same time the troops are required to perform almost every kind of laborious work, constructing military posts, building roads and telegraph lines, also performing mechanical, clerical, and difficult manual labor.
This has a demoralizing influence upon the spirit of the troops, and causes desertion and other evils of the service.
In cases of emergency the skeleton companies are suddenly gathered up from distant points at great expense, and thrown into engagements illy prepared for such .serious business, and expected to perform the work of well-organized and strong commands.
With our present facilities for the government and accommodation of troops, companies of 100 men can be easily maintained, and in every sense better fitted for the service required of them. There would prob. ably be ten per cent. added to the yearly appropriation required for pay, food, and clothing of the men ; but the efficiency of the Army would, in my judgment, be increased more than one hundred per cent.
I am satisfied that, in my own department, the yearly expenditures now made necessary by the weak condition of the companies and regi. ments could be greatly lessened..
If the companies were made of proper strength, not only would there be a large saving of the extra military expenses, but there would be greater benefit and security given to the people whose lives and property depend to a greater or less degree upon the protection guaranteed by the physical force of the general government.
I would therefore recommend that the authorized maximum number of enlisted men in the different companies be 100 per company where they are so stationed and employed that the public interest would be benefited thereby.
I would also call attention to the fact of the number of officers who are permanently absent from their respective commands through no fault of theirs, men who have become infirm through long years of hard service, or crippled or permanently disabled in the various wars in which our army has been engaged; also to the number of officers who have grown gray in the service and yet are occupying the subordinate grades of captains, first and second lieutenants. These facts have a very discouraging influence upon a zealous and faithful body of public servants.
In erery branch of business or profession in life advancement or prog. ress is absolutely essential, and the rule is no less applicable to the military service, and some system that will either promote retirements by commutation of retired pay, limiting the retired list to such number as would be suitable for our kird of service, or universal retirement at a given age, would undoubtedly improve the efficiency of the Army, and it is believed to be very generally desired by the officers of our service.
I inclose the reports of the department staff officers, and invite attention to them for matters of detail in the different branches of the service. I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
NELSON A. MILES, Brigadier-General, U. 8. A., Commanding Department. The ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Military Division of the Pacific, Presidio of San Francisco, Cal.
5 B.-REPORT OF BVT. MAJ.-GEN. 0. B. WILLCOX.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF ARIZONA,
IN THE FIELD,
Tucson, Ariz., October 12, 1881. SIR: In accordance with your telegram of the 10th instant and letter of 12th ultimo, I respectfully transmit the following as supplementary to my annual report:
On 6th of August last, Colonel Carr, commanding at Apache, telegraphed these headquarters that the chief and medicine man of a band of Indians living on Cibicu Creek, Nocky-del-klin-ne by name, had been for two months holding dances with the object of raising from the dead Indians who had been killed ; that it was now reported to him (Carr) by interpreter that medicine man was telling the Indians that the dead say they would not return because of the presence of the white people; that when the white people left, the dead would return, and the whites would be out of the country when the corn was ripe. Colonel Carr says in that dispatch, "I do not know whether this is of any consequence. I feel it my duty to report it to the department commander.” On August 11, Tiffany, agent San Carlos, says, “A number of White Mountain and San Carlos Indians congregated near A pache,and Tautos are also affected. Some medicine man of influence is moving on these Iudians for, I think, evil purposes." On the same date, immediately on receipt of Tiffany's dispatch, I telegraphed Colonel Carr, commanding Fort Apache, to hold his command in readiness to take the field, as Hatch reports approach of hostiles from New Mexico, and I added, “The department commander hopes that by your good management you will secure the best feeling among the White Mountain Apaches."
I telegraphed this information to division headquarters on the 12th of August, informing you also that Tiffany wanted additional arms, and on the 13th informed you of disposition of troops ordered by me to re-enforce Fort Apache and to guard against Indian movements from New Mexico and on reservation.
Carr was telegraphed from Whipple Barracks, August 7, as follows:
The commanding general directs that you arrest the chief and medicine man Nockydel-klin-ne, if you deem it necessary to prevent trouble, after consultation with the agent at San Carlos.
Assistant Adjutant-General. On August 13, Carr was telegraphed a dispatch of which the following is the only part bearing on the question, viz:
The two companies of cavalry at Thomas have been ordered to report without delay to you at Apache for temporary duty. The commanding general desires that you arrest the Indian doctor whom yon report as stirring up hostilities, as soon as practicable.
BENJAMIN, A88istant Adjutant-General.
Carr, in his report, says Tiffany requested him to arrest or kill the medicine man. On same day, August 13, I received the following:
Fort APACHE, August 13. It is the general impression here that the men of the Indian scouts company will go with their friends if they break out. Please give me authority to discharge them, or such of them as I may believe unreliable, and enlist reliable ones in their places.
CARR, Commanding. To which the following was sent in reply on August 14: COMMANDING OFFICER APACHE :
You are authorized to make such changes as may be necessary, but will exercise a wise discretion, and not suffer the disaffected scouts to join malcontents.
Assistant Adjutant-Genu ral. In what manner this authority and these instructions were carried out nothing was officially known, except that the scouts had been disarmed up to the time of the Cibicu massacre, Carr's report of which was telegraphed you from Phenix. Carr was telegraphed on August 13 to report the situation fully, to which he replied on 14th, “ Nothing new to report." Nothing more of importance was heard from Colonel Carr (except his report of an interview on 17th with Pedro, Santo, and other Indians, which showed that the Indians were alarmed about a report that a big gun and more troops were coming to Fort Apache; this report has been forwarded to division headquarters) until the 29th, received 31st August. Meantime the troops that had been ordered forward by ine from different points below and west of Cainp Thomas were partly halted and partly turned back on reports received from Agent Tiffany by Captain Chaffee and Major Biddle, and communicated to me that no further trouble was to be apprehended. In this condition of affairs, on the 29th August Carr telegraphed : ADJUTANT-GENERAL, Whipple Barracks :
I sent word to Nocky-llel-klin-ne that I wanted to see him. He does not seem likely to come, and I am searching for his place in Cibicu, to try to catch him.
CARR, Commanding. This proved to be the march to Cibicu Creek undertaken by Colonel Carr, without special orders from me other than to arrest the medicine man if he deemed it necessary to prevent trouble, and as soon as practicable, he being at same time notified that re-enforcements were ordered him from Camp Thomas. The move was made without waiting for re-enforcements.
August 15, Carr, commanding at Apache, was telegraphed by my orders as follows: “If your company of scouts cannot be relied on, send them out to Stevens's Ranche, Eagle Creek, and thence down the Gila to Grant and Huachuca. Bailey's company, if needed, could replace them. More than the usual cavalry force might accompany them part of the way, if you deem it best. Notify Biddle and these headquarters of your action.” But no notice was ever received of any such action. The only action I know of was by telegram from Colonel Carr to the effect that he had disarmed the scouts, and the next I hear of them was that they had turned their arms against him at Cibicu on occasion of the arrest of the medicine man.
The object of the march to Cibicu was to make said arrest and thereby put a stop to the medicine man's apparent efforts to stir up hostilities against the whites, which arrest was effected, but undoubtedly led to contrary results from those designed.
The immediate cause of the attack on Colonel Carr was the arrest of
the medicine man. The remote causes are unknown, as no grievance had ever yet been complained of by the White Mountain Indians; but it is possible that this attack and the subsequent one on Fort Apache were made under the inspiration of the medicine man's prophesying that the white men should be cleared out as soon as the corn was ripe, which time had nearly come. For the way in which the attack was made and resisted, including the subsequent attack on the fort, I refer you to Colonel Carr's report of September 6, which I desire to be attached to this report.
Notwithstanding high water in the rivers, the very limited means of transportation, and embarrassing and conflicting reports from San Carlos, the troops were moved to Cibicu country in such a manner and time as to drive the hostiles from their strongholds into the folds of the reservation without a fight, and the White Mountain Indians have not struck another blow. Many of the worst have surrendered. Those of the recreant scouts in our hands will be tried by court-martial; the rest will be disposed of according to such instructions as may be received.
The California re-enforcements have been of great service, and were sent down promptly as called for, and well equipped for the field. Part of them now are in pursuit of the Chiricahuas on the border. The outbreak of these Indians on the night of September 30 has been duly reported, and the causes of their sudden change are unknown. It is supposed to be the fear of being disarmed. If this is true, the vutbreak was likely to come at any moment, and could not have come at a better time. This because we had adequate force at hand, and it has been used to such advantage that the smallest possible damage has been suffered. This tribe is now in full flight and utterly defeated.
Major Sanford's report of the fight at Cedar Springs, and my indorsement thereon, has been forwarded, and I wish it to be included with this report. Captain Bernard's report of subsequent operations will, when received through Colonel Mackenzie, now directing in the field, be duly forwarded.
Too much stress cannot be laid upon the necessity of having cavalry horses and pack-trains always on hansl sufficient for emergencies, and that we should no longer be stripped to the bare necessities for troops in garrisons. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
O. B. WILLCOX, Brevet Major-General, Commanding Department. The ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
6.-REPORT OF MAJ. GEN. 0. 0. HOWARD.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF WEST POINT,
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY,
West Point, N. Y., October 12, 1881. SIR: I have the honor to submit my first annual report of the Military Academy :
LAW AND ORDERS; HOW COMPLIED WITH. General Orders No. 84, dated December 18, 1880, from your headquarters, paragraph I, read as follows: "Brig. Gen. 0.0. Howard is assigned to the command of the Department of West Point, and to do duty as superintendent of the United States Military Academy, according to his brevet of major-general, and will relieve Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield.”
In compliance with the above instructions, I turned over the command of the Departinent of the Columbia to the next officer in rank, and proceeded to West Point, arriving the 20th of January, 1881. The next day I assumed formal command of this department, and entered at once upon the duties of superintendent of the academy.
Having been stationed here before, as an instructor, I was already comparatively well acquainted with the systems of instruction, government, and discipline which have long prevailed at this post and institution. The law of Congress (see Revised Statutes, section 1314) which declares that the superintendent, as well as all other officers on duty at the academy, may be detailed from any arm of the service has caused scarcely any modifications in the rules and practices differing from those which prevailed before.
In General Orders No. 15, series of 1877, I find the following: Par. I. The Military Academy and the post of West Point shall constitute a separate military department, the commander of which shall report directly to the General-in-Chief of the Army. The General-in-Chief, under the War Department, shall have supervision and charge of the academy. He will watch over its administration and discipline and the instruction of the corps of cadets, and will make reports thereof to the Secretary of War.
The effect of the law was, first, to open the largest possible field of selection to the President, instead of confining it to any staff corps of the Army; and, by the orders last quoted, the effect has been virtually to advance a post to the importance of a military department. In this way the field of selection of superintendent embraces the general officers as well as those of lower grade. There has been necessarily some increase of reports to be made, and a slight increase of clerical labor. Again, a captain and regular quartermaster has replaced the former detailed lieutenant. Every change made, in fact, has rendered the general administration here more consonant with the usual administration of a department and of army posts.
Three good objects, under present arrangement, appear to be gained, with very little, if any, additional cost: First, the authority of the cainmanding officer to order general courts for the trial of all enlisted men as well as cadets; second, to enable all concerned, officers and cadets, to be constantly familiar with practical Army methods of administration and government; and, third, to keep up the interest of the General-inChief and of all other officers of the Army in the management and wel. fare of the academy.
ACTING ASSISTANT ADJUTANTGENERAL'S OFFICE.
Though the limits of the department and the post are identical, the business is now so arranged as to prevent a duplication of records and accounts. For the sake of economy I have, as did my predecessors, dispensed with the services of an adjutant-general, having my senior aidde-camp do the duty. This officer supervises the correspondence of an official kind, which now comes to us from the outside, and in the last decade has, for some evident reasons, grown to very large proportions. The present average will give about 2,000 communications a year. He also makes the post returns, receives the reports from the police, the detachments, engineer company, and general guards, and issues such