7th. Report of Capt. B. B. Keeler, A. D. C., acting judge-advocate of the department. 8th. Report of First Lieut. C. P. Miller, Fourth Artillery, acting sig. nal officer of the division and department. DEPARTMENT OF THE COLUMBIA. I submit herewith the annual report of the general commanding the Department of the Columbia, together with the papers he transmits. In a previous report the department commander submitted his views as to the proper place for the post needed to the west of Fort Cour d'Alene, and which, at one time, it was intended to establish at the foot of Lake Chelan. The funds to build this post will require Congressional action, and I ask the attention of the department to it that the necessary appropriations may be obtained. DEPARTMENT OF ARIZONA. I transmit herewith the report, with its accompanying papers, of the general commanding the Department of Arizona. His report is made while absent from his headquarters, on account of Indian hostilities, which, as he says, was the cause of its not being "more extended." Hostilities with the Apache Indians. Early in September a report came up from Arizona that Colonel Carr, Sixth Cavalry, commanding at Fort Apache-who had left his post and marched with the bulk of his command to the White Mountain Apache Indians-had been attacked, his command exterminated, and, subsequently, Fort Apache taken. While it was not believed the fort had been captured, the reports indicated the troops had met with disaster; and the case was the more serious because communication was partially cut off from the rest of the Department of Arizona. The fort is in the extreme eastern portion of the Territory, high up in the mountains, and the only road leaving to it had been damaged by recent storms which had washed out the portions going up the rocky cañons and made it impassable even for pack-mules. On September 5 word came from Fort Thomas-the post nearest to Fort Apache-that while Colonel Carr's command and the fort had been attacked, he had repulsed the Indians, with considerable loss in men and material, had regained the fort, resisted their attack upon it, and driven them from its vicinity. General Willcox immediately left his headquarters at Prescott, went to Fort Thomas and took all measures in his power to provide for suppressing the hostilities in which he so unexpectedly found himself involved. On his application the available cavalry and infantry in the Department of California were sent him, and as the means of supplying Fort Apache had, for the moment, been interrupted by the causes beforementioned, he was compelled to ask that supplies and ammunition, and, subsequently, re-enforcements might be sent to Apache from New Mexico, in the neighboring Department of the Missouri. The movement of troops ordered by General Willcox seemed, at first, to have so overawed the hostiles that many of them surrendered at Apache and the Indian Agency, and it was fast becoming more a question of punishment by power of law than of operations in the field; when for reasons not yet fully or satisfactorily explained, most of the prisoners at the Indian agency broke away and are still at large; and concurrently with their escape, if not because of it, another band, which had been in no way connected with the disturbance at Apache-the Chiricahuas-took the field and commenced hostilities, which are still maintained. The only engagements since the attack on Carr, were one with troops under Major Sanford, and one by those under Captain Bernard, First Cavalry, acting under the orders of General Willcox. The outbreak of the White Mountain Apaches was so unexpected, and the cause so obscure, that on the 12th ultimo I caused the following inquiry to be made of the department commander: The War Department and the country will want to know everything connected with the commencement of the hostilities between the White Mountain Apaches and the troops under Colonel Carr; and the division commander directs that you make a full investigation, and report at as early a day as possible, and set forth: (1) By whose order and at whose instance Colonel Cair marched from Fort Apache to the village or camp of the Apaches in question? (2) What was the object to be gained? (3) In what way was this object effected or attempted? (4) What is supposed to be the immediate, and what the remote, cause of the attack? (5) In what way was the attack made and resisted, including in this the subsequent attack on the fort? General Willcox has been so occupied and so separated from those necessary to be consulted, that he has not, at this date, been able to send the desired information. It may come before this report is mailed; if not, it will be forwarded as soon as it is received. I send herewith copies of communications to and from these headquarters, concerning these hostilities, marked A. In the absence of more detailed reports from those most immediately concerned, I feel unwilling to pass upon the events of the last few weeks in Arizona; but as I am obliged (by orders from Army headquarters) to send this annual report off before these reports come in, I venture to submit the following: 1st. As to the outbreak. I ask attention to two papers herewith from Colonel Carr, dated August 17 and September 5. The first gives an account of his "talk" with the White Mountain Indians, and the second an account of his seizing the medicine man and of the consequent attack on his command. Colonel Carr states he acted pursuant to orders "from commanding general" [of the Department of Arizona], "dated August 13, to arrest Indian doctor Nokay Delkinne as soon as practicable, and formal request from agent, dated August 14, to arrest or kill him, or both." In Colonel Carr's report to department headquarters of August 17, he says: I wish it to be observed that I did not "report the Indian doctor as stirring up hostilities" (see your telegram of August 13 ordering his arrest), but merely reported statements and the inferences of the interpreter to the department commander, to be taken for what they might be worth (see my telegram of August 1). I have, however, no doubt that it was a grave situation, and that it was incumbent upon us to take some steps. The Indian agent also is very positive on the subject. But whatever may have been the cause for asking and ordering, and however imperative may have been the necessity for the arrest of the medicine man, it is plain, from Colonel Carr's notes, that the White Mountain Apaches were taken by surprise when he marched from the fort with the bulk of his command to arrest him. Those notes show that they had been disturbed by idle, mischievous, and false reports; were apprehensive of danger from the troops; uneasy and restless, but not then hostile. The fact of the troops finding the medicine man with his people in their homes, where they had been planting corn, shows that, whatever may have been their ulterior plans, they were not then for war (see re out of Surgeon Byrne herewith, marked B). I cannot concur, therefore, in denouncing their conduct as treacherous. (I except the scouts, who, forming part of the military force and being subject to the military law, are in a different case from the other Indians.) These Indians simply made war upon the troops in retaliation for the arrest of their leader, an arrest made by military force; and they made the war openly. Whether or not they had a just cause, or, if a just one, whether a sufficient cause for war is another question, and one of which they are the judges. We have for over a century made treaties, made war, and made peace with the Indian tribes, and I see no difference whatever in the case of the war with these Indians than that made heretofore with the Sioux, Bannocks, Nez Percés, or Seminoles, &c. What we may judge best as a question of public policy to do with this tribe as their conquerors is another question; but I think they are entitled to the same treatment as other hostile Indians, both in the way the war against them shall be carried on and their treatment after their surrender or capture. Colonel Carr says, August 17: I had directed Lieutenant Cruse to take in the guns of his scouts after Sunday morning inspection, on the 14th, and to say that he would keep them in his office out of the wet. They have been kept there much of the time heretofore. The scouts do not like it, and this time considered it a sign of distrust, but I could not reconcile it to my duty to have them keep their arms when there was so much and so general belief in their disposition to treachery. It is, however, believed that they intend to hold on till after the next pay day, which will also agree with the time when the corn will be ripe. The temper of his Indian scouts being such as to make it his duty to disarm them, thus causing them to feel they were distrusted; the belief in their disposition to treachery being general, and that they could only be relied on till the next pay day; it was injudicious, as events have shown, in Colonel Carr to take them, with arms in their hands, to aid him in the arrest of one of their own leaders. 2d. As to the prosecution of the war. Colonel Carr having regained his post with the loss, in killed and wounded, of between a fifth and a sixth of his force, and the loss of most of his horses and ammunition, it was to be expected he would not feel able to cope with the Indians with less than he had when they attacked him. He was so placed, as before mentioned, that he could for the moment neither be supplied nor re-enforced from Arizona. He is a gallant and active officer, and there can be no question was most anxious to resume offensive operations. The department commander labored under the disadvantage of having this portion of his command so placed that he was obliged to ask to have it supplied and re-enforced by another department commander; and the changing character of the contest and the interruption of his communications necessarily caused him to vary in his demands; but he was active, zealous, and prompt in the discharge of his duties, and impatient at the delays which the distance he was from supplies and troops imposed on his movements. Before the special intimation from the General of the Army was received, as well as after, General Willcox was left free to act on his plans to suppress the hostilities, and subsequently, in conformity with the emphatic orders of the General of the Army, the sole conduct of active operations was devolved on Colonel McKenzie, Fourth Cavalry, who has had, for some time, exclusive command of all the forces in the field. As much unfavorable comment has been made, and impatience shown that these hostilities were not put down immediately, and this soon after they broke out, I think there is misapprehension as to the extent and character of the Territory of Arizona, and as to the habits of warfare of iss Indians, and I beg to append to this a special report made on this tubject in 1866 (herewith marked C) which, in a large degree, applies to the present case; for while the railroads have shortened the time of getting troops and supplies into Arizona, the manner of using them when there has not changed. It is not that the number of hostile Indians at any time can be great, but that their nature, and that of their country, give them great facilities for attack and escape. In justice to those who have the task of dealing with this question, I ask a comparison between this outbreak and that of the Modocs. The Modoc country was more accessible, and nearer supplies and troops than these Apaches, yet the Modoc war began December 7, 1872, and was not ended until June 1, 1873. The later dispatches indicate that the hostiles are making for Mexico, and the officer in pursuit has declared his intention of following them across the line, unless prohibited by superior authority. His dispatch was duly forwarded to Washington, but no orders have, as yet, been received with respect to it. As bearing on this question of inviolability of neutral territory, I ask attention to the following extract of a general order issued by me in 1865, in the case of certain Confederates tried for violation of the laws and usages of civilized war, in which it was discussed: It is true that publicists agree that, of all "principles of public law, there are none more sacred than those which secure the immunity of neutral territory from the exercise of acts of hostility by a foreign power," and that "the law of nations forbids all use of neutral territory for hostile purposes, and declares that the rights of war shall only be exercised within the territory of the belligerents, on the high seas, or without the jurisdiction of any other power." Yet, notwithstanding, had the act and the arrest of the prisoners been made within the limits claimed by the neutral power of New Grenada, it would have been a less departure from the rule, and more clearly an exception to it than was made by General Jackson in the invasion of the then Spanish province of Florida in 1818, or by Sir Allen McNab in the invasion of the State of New York, at Schlosser, in 1837. And General Jackson's act was defended by John Quincy Adams, sustained by our government as an act of self-defense, and acquiesced in by the Government of Spain; and the invasion of New York was approved by the British Government as having been "one in the strictest sense of self-defense, rendered absolutely necessary by the circumstances of the occasion for the safety and protection of Her Majesty's subjects, and justified by the same motives and principles which upon similar and well-known occasions have governed the conduct of illustrious officers of the United States." (Mr. Fox to Mr. Webster, December 19, 1840.) In the course of the negotiations to which this case gave rise, and before the action of Great Britain was acquiesced in by the United States, as finally it was, our minister at London, Mr. Stevenson, and two of our Secretaries of State, Forsyth and Webster, though denying the applicability of it to the case of the Caroline at Schlosser, concurred in the exception to the rule of inviolability of neutral territory claimed by Great Britain. When the Apaches pursued by our troops are, from whatever cause' suffered to enter Mexico and remain there with arms in their hands, only to return and renew their attacks on our people, the act of the officer who should follow them must, in all justice, be claimed to be "one in the strictest sense of self-defense rendered absolutely necessary by the circumstances of the occasion for the safety and protection" of our citizens. The latest dispatch received from Colonel Mackenzie, through General Willcox, is to the effect that there are no considerablé bodies of hostile Indians now in Arizona, that most of the White Mountain Apaches have surrendered, and that the Chiricahuas have gone to Mexico. I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your most obedient servant. IRVIN MCDOWELL, Major-General, Commanding Division and Department. The ADJUTANT-GENERAL OF THE ARMY, Washington, D. C. 5 a.-REPORT OF COL. E. A. CARR, SIXTH CAVALRY. [Telegram.] PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO, September 5, 1881. ADJUTANT-GENERAL, Washington, D. C. : FORT APACHE, September 2-8.30 p. m. TO ADJUTANT-GENERAL, Whipple Barracks, Ariz.: Pursuant to orders from the commanding general, dated August 13, to arrest the Indian doctor, Nockay Delklinne, as soon as practicable, and formal request from agent, dated 14th, to arrest or kill him, or both, I first hoped to arrest him when he came to hold his dances and incantation here, but he did not keep his appointment. I then sent two Indian scouts with message that I wanted to see him on Sunday, August 28. I received an evasive answer from him, and next day marched with Troops D, E, Sixth Cavalry, and Company A, Indian scouts, the command numbering 6 officers and 79 soldiers and 23 Indian scouts. I reached his village on the 13th and arrested the medicine man. He professed entire willingness to come with me, said he would not try to escape, and there would be no attempt at rescue, but as we were making camp our own scouts and many other Indians opened fire upon us, killed Captain Hentig the first fire, and ran off the animals already turned out to graze. The medicine man was killed as soon as they commenced firing, and we drove them off after a severe fight, in which we lost Captain Hentig, shot in the back by our own Indian scouts as he turned to get his gun; four privates killed, 1 sergeant and 3 privates wounded, 2 mortally. After burying the dead, I returned as rapidly as practicable, arriving on the 31st. Some of the Indians had preceded me, and had killed 8 men on the road to Thomas. Next morning they made a demonstration against post and attacked it afternoon, but were repulsed. Our total loss is: Killed, Captain E. C. Hentig, Sixth Cavalry; 7 privates troop D, Sixth Cavalry, and 1 private Troop E, Sixth Cavalry; 2 privates Company D, Twelfth Infantry. Wounded: First Lieut. C. G. Gordon, Sixth Cavalry, in the leg; 1 sergeant, Troop E, and 1 private, Troop D; and 45 horses and 10 mules killed, wounded, and missing. The command behaved with the utmost coolness and gallantry, and encountered danger, hardship, and fatigue with the greatest cheerfulness. In spite of the sudden and most traitorous nature of the attack in the midst of the camp, officers and solders sprang to their arms and defeated their plan, massacre, and subsequently held this post, and are ready for further service. We require 59 horses and 10 pack-mules. The officers here are Maj. M. A. Cochran, Twelfth Infantry; Capt. A. B. MacGowan, commanding Company D, Twelfth Infantry; First Lieut. C. G. Gordon, Sixth Cavalry, post quartermaster, wounded; William Stanton, commanding Troop E, who moved forward with skirmishers and most handsomely cleared the savages out of the bushy bottom close to camp; W. H. Carter, regimental quartermaster, Sixth Cavalry, adjutant, and commanding Troop D after Hentig's death; Second Lieut. Thomas Cruse, commanding company A scouts, and afterwards Troop D, Sixth Cavalry, on the march and battle here; Assistant Surgeon Geo. McCreery, U. S. A., who, besides skillfully performing his professional duties, used a carbine effectively. My young son, Clark M. Carr, accompanied the expedition, and deserves to have his name mentioned in the dispatch. There are 45 civilians here who are assisting in defense of the post, and I am rationing such as require it. I armed the four prisoners, two of whom belong to the Ninth Cavalry. They fought bravely, and I shall recommend that their offenses be pardoned. I received no dispatches from you later than August 14 till after my return; then came those of the 15th, which are the latest now at hand. I am confident that the Indians have been preparing for this outbreak for six months. Cooley, who is here, says so; also Phipp, whose employé was killed. There have been only a few Indians around the post to day. CARR, Commanding. While lamenting of the death, by treachery, of Hentig and the men who fell with him, I am rejoiced to report that the massacre of Carr's command is not true. MCDOWELL, |