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Section cited.—Matter of Fiske (1918), 181 App. Div. 706, 168 N. Y. Supp. 779. Art. III, § 1. Legislative powers.
Delegation of legislative powers-Legislative power is not delegated when the legislature prescribes regulations to be enforced according to legal discretion of the commissioner of agriculture. People v. Beakes Dairy Co. (1918), 222 N. Y. 416, 119 N. E. 115, affg. 179 App. Div. 942, 166 N. Y. Supp. 209.
Delegation of powers to executive. It is established law that a legislature may delegate to an executive officer the power to determine facts and conditions upon which the operation of a statute depends, without violating the constitutional prohibition against the delegation of legislative functions. So held in considering L. 1917, ch, 521, authorizing the supervision of privileges under liquor tax certificates. People ex rel. Doscher v. Sisson (1918), 222 N. Y. 387, 118 N. E. 789, affg. 180 App. Div. 464, 167 N. Y. Supp. 801.
L. 1914, ch. 444, authorizing a city of the second or third class to adopt a simplified form of government, does not violate this section. Cleveland v. City of Watertown (1917), 222 N. Y. 159, 118 N. E. 500, revg. 179 App. Div. 954, 166 N. Y. Supp. 286.
Section cited.-Bronx Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Service Comm. (1919), 190 App. Div. 13, 180 N. Y. Supp. 38; Opinion of Pub. Serv. Com., 1st Dist. (1918), 15 State Dep. Rep. 70.
Art. III, § 4. Enumerations and reapportionments.
Art. III, § 8. Persons disqualified from being members.
The 100 days is named, not as a period within which an act is to be done, but as a period during which the candidate must not have a specified official status. The hundredth day previous to the general election to be held November 6, 1917, being Sunday, the resignation on the following day of a candidate for member of assembly from a city office is too late. Matter of Bewley (1917), 101 Misc. 248, 166 N. Y. Supp. 930.
New York National Guard officers, federalized under the statute of June 3, 1916, when eligible for election to the Legislature. Opinion of Attorney General (1919), 31 State Dep. Rep. 276.
Art. III, § 9. Time of elections.
Art. III, § 10. Powers of each house.
The court has power to determine the eligibility of a candidate to the office of member of assembly, because the Election Law indicates clearly that the name of no person shall be printed upon the official party ballot' at the primary if the person is ineligible to hold the office for which he has been designated for nomination. Matter of Bewley (1917), 101 Misc. 248, 166 N. Y. Supp. 930.
Art. III, § 16. Private and local bills not to embrace more than one subject.
The purpose of this section was to prevent concealing in the body of a local statute a foreign subject not germane to that mentioned in the title and so unrelated thereto as to cause surprise upon its discovery. Vroman v. Fish (1918), 181 App. Div. 502, 170 N. Y. Supp. 421, revg. 100 Misc. 613, 166 N. Y. Supp. 539, affd. 223 N. Y. 540, 119 N. E. 1084.
Form of title of local law.-If the title of a local law expresses a general purpose or object all matters fairly and reasonably connected therewith and all measures which will or may facilitate the accomplishment of such purpose or object are properly incorporated into the act and are germane to the title. It is not necessary to set forth in the title the various details of the object or purpose to be accomplished by the bill. It is sufficient if the title expresses its general purpose. Vroman v. Fish (1918), 181 App. Div. 502, 170 N. Y. Supp. 421, revg. 100 Misc. 613, 166 N. Y. Supp. 539, affd. 223 N. Y. 540, 119 N. E. 1084.
A confirmatory act held unconstitutional because embracing subjects not expressed in its title. First Construction Co. v. State of New York (1917), 221 N. Y. 295, 116 N. E. 1020, modfg. 174 App. Div. 560, 156 N. Y. Supp. 911.
L. 1917, ch. 202, entitled "An act to amend the Election Law, in relation to commissioner of elections in the county of Niagara," is not unconstitutional upon the ground that it violates this section of article 3 or section 2 or article 12 of the Constitution. Vroman v. Fish (1918), 181 App. Div. 502, 170 N. Y. Supp. 42), revg. 100 Misc. 613, 166 N. Y. Supp. 539, affd. 223 N. Y. 540, 119 N. E. 1084.
L. 1900, ch. 683, embraces more than one subject in violation of this section. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co. v. Peck (1918), 104 Misc. 172, 171 N. Y. Supp. 1065.
L. 1918, chap. 518 adding sections 410a and 410b to the Education Law, embraces but one subject and that is expressed in the title. Ruland v. Tuthill (1919), 187 App. Div. 20, 175 N. Y. Supp. 515.
Art. III, § 18. Cases in which private and local bills shall not be passed; restrictions as to laws authorizing street railroads.
A local act is one operating only within a limited territory or specified locality. Matter of Cotte v. Gilbert (1919), 106 Misc. 553, 175 N. Y. Supp. 148.
The “Bronx Parkway Commission,” created a body politic by chapter 594 of the Laws of 1907, to preserve the waters of the Bronx river from pollution, is not within the inhibition of section 18 of article III of the Constitution of the state, which declares that the legislature shall not pass a private or local bill granting to any person, firm or corporation an exemption from taxation on real or personal property. Matter of Bronx Parkway Commission v. Common Council (1919), 106 Misc. 579, 175 N. Y. Supp. 207.
Validity of grant by municipality of authority to use its streets.-Our Constitution by requiring the consent of the local authorities to construct and operate a street railroad recognizes that our municipalities are pro tanto independent of legislative control, exercising some fragment of power otherwise legislative in character, which has thus been irrevocably transferred by the fundamental law to the locality. The grant by the municipality of authority to use its streets is not a mere privilege or gratuity, and once accepted becomes a contract which neither the state nor its agencies can impair. Matter of Quinby v. Public Service Commission (1918), 223 N. Y. 244, 119 N. E. 433.
The right to use the streets as highways is in the public at large and is controlled by the Legislature subject to the limitation under sections 18 and 20 of article 3 of the Constitution. Stanley v. Jay Street Connecting Railroad (1918), 182 App. Div. 399, 169 N. Y. Supp. 530.
Street railroad.-A railroad built wholly upon private property and across streets and engaged in interurban traffic is not a "street railroad" within the contemplation of the term as used in this section. Matter of Koehn v. Public Service Commission (1919), 107 Misc. 151, 176 N. Y. Supp. 147.
Franchise of street railroad; consent of local authorities. Since the amendment Prison labor.
of the Constitution adopted November 3, 1874, railroad franchises to occupy public streets may be granted only pursuant to general laws, and the construction or operation of a street railroad cannot be authorized except with the consent of the local authorities and the owners of one-half in value of the abutting property, or, if such property owners' consents be not given, the determination of the court that such railroad ought to be constructed and operated. Stanley v. Jay Street Connecting Railroad (1918), 182 App. Div. 399, 169 N. Y. Supp. 530.
Consent of local authorities.-Application of New York and North Shore Traction Company. Opinion of Pub. Serv. Com., 1st Dist. (1918), 15 State Dep. Rep. 70; Opinion of Pub. Serv. Com., 1st Dist. (1918), 15 State Dep. Rep. 70.
The consent required by this section may be absolute or it may be subject to a condition. The condition, if it touches the future operation of the road, has the force of a condition subsequent, and if its terms are not fulfilled, the consent may be revoked. Consent of the local authorities to the granting of franchise to street railway companies was not required under this section, as amended in 1875. Matter of International Railway Co. v. Public Service Comm. (1919), 226 N. Y. 474, 124 N. E. 123, affg. 188 App. Div. 944.
The constitutional provision was intended to confer upon the localities power to impose conditions, if at all, pertinent to the grant of such consents so far as the municipality had a city purpose to protect not inconsistent with the public interests of the State at large. The fixing of interurban rates of fare is normally a legislative function to be exercised in the interest of the general public, beyond the control of any city in the absence of clear warrant of authority therefor. It certainly was not intended to permit a city to invade the sovereignty of the state, where, as in the fixing of interurban rates, the rights of other municipalities and the inhabitants of the state generally are involved and where thus a state issue rather than a local concern is clearly indicated. Matter of Koehn v. Public Service Commission (1919), 107 Misc. 151, 176 N. Y. Supp. 147.
The provision as to local consent is a restriction upon the Legislature and forbids the enactment of any law authorizing the construction or operation of a street railroad, except upon the consent of the local authorities having control of the streets or highways upon which it is proposed to construct the road. Opinion of Pub. Serv. Com., 1st Dist. (1918), 15 State Dep. Rep. 70.
Election of supervisors.-The construction of this section, relating to election of members of boards of supervisors, must be made in connection with section 26 of the same article.
Section 588 of the Town Law permitting towns of Nassau county to hold town meetings biennially in November of odd numbered years although a local act, is not in violation of this section. People ex rel. Cotte v. Gilbert (1919), 226 N. Y. 103, 123 N. E. 79, revg. 187 App. Div. 23, 175 N. Y. Supp. 106.
Section cited.-Evans v. Carroll (1918), 223 N. Y. 546, 119 N. E. 1041, affg. 166 App. Div. 962, 154 N. Y. Supp. 933; Vroman v. Fish (1918), 223 N. Y. 540, 119 N. E. 1084, affg. 181 App. Div. 502, 170 N. Y. Supp. 421; Matter of Quinby V. Public Service Commission (1919), 227 N. Y. 601, 125 N. E. 790; Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. v. Binghamton Railway Co. (1919), 255 Fed. 378, 411; Matter of City of Niagara Falls v. Public Service Commission (1919), 108 Misc. 567; 177 N. Y. Supp. 861; International Ry. Co. v. Rann (1918), 104 Misc. 46, 52, 171 N. Y. Supp. 139, affd. 185 App. Div. 906, 908, 171 N. Y. Supp. 1088.
Art. III, § 19. Private claims not to be audited by legislature.
L. 1915, ch. 658, authorizing the Court of Claims to hear and determine a claim against the state, does not violate this section. Munro v. State (1918), 223 N. Y. 208, 119 N. E. 444, affg. 181 App. Div. 30, 168 N. Y. Supp. 61.
Art. III, $8 20, 21, 23, 26, 28; Art. V, $ 3.
Public claim.-A town being a municipal corporation of the state with certain governmental and political powers and duties, must necessarily exercise all its functions, duties and obligations in a public manner, and a claim made by it against the state must necessarily be a public one rather than a private one. Town of New Lebanon v. State (1920), 111 Misc. 310.
Art. III, $ 20. Two-thirds bills.
Application.-When act granting lands under water to upland owners invalid because lacking a two-thirds vote. First Construction Co. v. State of New York (1917), 221 N. Y. 295, 116 N. E. 1020, modfg. 174 App. Div. 560, 156 N. Y. Supp. 911.
L. 1915, c. 658, authorizing the Court of Claims to hear and determine the claim of state employee, does not appropriate public moneys for local or private purposes, within the meaning of this section. Munro v. State (1917), 181 App. Div. 30, 168 N. Y. Supp. 61, affd. 223 N. Y. 208, 119 N. E. 444.
The right to use the streets as highways is in the public at large and is controlled by the Legislature subject to the limitation under this section and section 18 of article 3. Stanley v. Jay Street Connecting R. R. (1918), 182 App. Div. 399, 169 N. Y. Supp. 530.
Section cited.-'Canavan v. City of Mechanicville (1920), 190 App. Div. 252, 180 N. Y. Supp. 62.
Art. III, § 21. Appropriation bills. Equitable claims. Equitable claims.-Although the Legislature may not make a gift of the moneys of the State nor itself audit or allow a private claim agains the State, it may recognize and legalize private claims, which, though unenforcible through the application of legal principles, are yet founded upon equity and justice, and it may empower the Court of Claims to audit and allow them. Babcock v. State (1919), 190 App. Div. 147, 180 N. Y. Supp. 3.
Section cited.-Rockaway Pacific Corporation v. Stotesbury (1917), 255 Fed. 345; Bridgeport Construction Co. v. Duffey (1919), 106 Misc. 252, 175 N. Y. Supp. 658.
Art. III, § 23. Certain sections not to apply to commission bills.
Section cited.—Matter of Cotte v: Gilbert (1919), 106 Misc. 553, 175 N. Y. Supp. 148; Matter of Koehn v. Public Service Commission (1919), 107 Misc. 151, 176 N, Y. Supp. 147.
Art. III, § 26. Boards of supervisors. The construction of section 18 of this article must be made in connection with this section. People ex rel. Cotte v. Gilbert (1919), 226 N. Y. 103, 123 N. E. 79, revg. 187 App. Div. 23, 175 N. Y. Supp. 106.
Art. III, § 28. Prison labor; contract system abolished.
Payment to an official or employee for past services at a higher rate than was prescribed at the time such services were rendered, is prohibited by this section Opinion of State Comptroller (1917), 13 State Dep. Rep. 475.
Section cited.-Evans v. Carroll (1918), 223 N. Y. 546, 119 N. E. 1041, affg. 166 App. Div. 962, 154 N. Y. Supp. 933; Opinion of Commissioner of Education (1919), 19 State Dep. Rep. 301.
Art. V, § 3. Superintendent of public works.
Art. V, $ 9; Art. VI, $f 1-3, 5, 9. City courts.
Care, custody and control of lands within the forest preserve counties taken for the purpose of the Barge Canal are under the Superintendent of Public Works, Opinion of Attorney General (1918), 17 State Dep. Rep. 495.
Art. V, § 9. Civil service appointments and promotions.
Section cited.-People ex rel. Weaver v. Rice (1920), 110 Misc. 699, 181 N. Y Supp. 144; Opinion of Attorney General (1918), 17 State Dep. Rep. 474.
Art. VI, § 1. Supreme court; how constituted.
General jurisdiction of supreme court.-The State Constitution confers upon the Supreme Court “general jurisdiction in law and equity." No broader jurisdiction could be conferred upon that court. It is not limited to the jurisdiction possessed by the Supreme Court at common law and there is no authority conferred upon the legislature to whittle down that jurisdiction by statutory enactments. The authority to alter and regulate the jurisdiction and proceedings at law and in equity is subject to the reservation "except as herein otherwise provided.” as provided in section 3 of this article. Ocorr v. Lynn (1918), 105 Misc. 489, 173 N. Y. Supp. 518.
The provision of the Greater New York charter making an award of damages by the board of revision of assessments final and conclusive, is not violative of the constitutional provision securing to the Supreme Court general jurisdiction in law and equity. People ex rel. Crane v. Hahlo (1920), 228 N. Y. 309, revg. 189 App. Div. 900.
Art. VI, § 2. Judicial departments; appellate division, how constituted; governor to designate justices; reporter; time and place of holding courts.
The Legislature cannot curtail the jurisdiction of the Appellate Division, although it may extend it. Matter of Mitchel v. Cropsey (1917), 177 App. Div. 663, 673, 164 N. Y. Supp. 336.
Section cited.—Saranac Land & Timber Co. v. Roberts (1919), 227 N. Y. 188, 125 N. E. 102, revg. 187 App. Div. 361, 175 N. Y. Supp. 545; Matter of Zittel v. Buck (1918), 183 App. Div. 448, 170 N. Y. Supp. 806.
Art. VI, § 3. Judge or justice not to sit in review; testimony in equity cases.
The authority to alter and regulate the jurisdiction and proceedings of the supreme court at law and in equity is subject to the reservation “except as herein otherwise provided." Ocorr v. Lynn (1918), 105 Misc. 489, 173 N. Y. Supp. 518.
Art. VI, § 5. City courts abolished; judges become justices of Supreme Court; salaries; jurisdiction vested in Supreme Court.
Sections 6 and 129 of the New York City Municipal Court Code are not unconstitutional on the theory that they confer greater powers on the Municipal Court than are possessed by the Supreme Court. Said sections do not extend or enlarge the powers of said court, but embody the law as it stood before the Constitution of 1895 went into effect. Bradstreets Collection Bureau v. Nagler's Brass Works, Inc. (1917), 180 App. Div. 511, 167 N. Y. Supp. 751.
Section cited.—Matter of Zittel v. Buck (1918), 183 App. Div. 448, 170 N. Y. Supp. 806.
Art. VI, § 9. Jurisdiction of court of appeals.