Opinion of the Court. 268 U.S. deprivation of their property without due process of law consequent upon the unlawful interference by appellants with the free choice of patrons, present and prospective. It declared the right to conduct schools was property and that parents and guardians, as a part of their liberty, might direct the education of children by selecting reputable teachers and places. Also, that these schools were not unfit or harmful to the public, and that enforcement of the challenged statute would unlawfully deprive them of patronage and thereby destroy their owners' business and property. Finally, that the threats to enforce the Act would continue to cause irreparable injury; and the suits were not premature. No question is raised concerning the power of the State reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require that all children of proper age attend some school, that teachers shall be of good moral character and patriotic disposition, that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare. The inevitable practical result of enforcing the Act under consideration would be destruction of appellees' primary schools, and perhaps all other private primary schools for normal children within the State of Oregon. These parties are engaged in a kind of undertaking not inherently harmful, but long regarded as useful and meritorious. Certainly there is nothing in the present records to indicate that they have failed to discharge their obligations to patrons, students or the State. And there are no peculiar circumstances or present emergencies which demand extraordinary measures relative to primary education. Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, we think it entirely plain that the Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of chil 510 Opinion of the Court. dren under their control. As often heretofore pointed out, rights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged by legislation which has no reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State. The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations. Appellees are corporations and therefore, it is said, they cannot claim for themselves the liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees. Accepted in the proper sense, this is true. Northwestern Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U. S. 243, 255; Western Turf Association v. Greenberg, 204 U. S. 359, 363. But they have business and property for which they claim protection. These are threatened with destruction through the unwarranted compulsion which appellants are exercising over present and prospective patrons of their schools. And this court has gone very far to protect against loss threatened by such action. Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33; Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312; Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197. The courts of the State have not construed the Act, and we must determine its meaning for ourselves. Evidently it was expected to have general application and cannot be construed as though merely intended to amend the charters of certain private corporations, as in Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U. S. 45. No argument in favor of such view has been advanced. Generally it is entirely true, as urged by counsel, that no person in any business has such an interest in possible customers as to enable him to restrain exercise of proper power of the State upon the ground that he will be de prived of patronage. But the injunctions here sought are not against the exercise of any proper power. Plaintiffs asked protection against arbitrary, unreasonable and unlawful interference with their patrons and the consequent destruction of their business and property. Their interest is clear and immediate, within the rule approved in Truax v. Raich, Truax v. Corrigan and Terrace v. Thompson, supra, and many other cases where injunctions have issued to protect business enterprises against interference with the freedom of patrons or customers. Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229; Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443; American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184; Nebraska District v. McKelvie, 262 U. S. 404; Truax v. Corrigan, supra, and cases there cited. The suits were not premature. The injury to appellees was present and very real, not a mere possibility in the remote future. If no relief had been possible prior to the effective date of the Act, the injury would have become irreparable. Prevention of impending injury by unlawful action is a well recognized function of courts of equity. The decrees below are MARR v. UNITED STATES. APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS. Affirmed. No. 236. Argued November 19, 1924; restored to docket for reargument January 5, 1925; reargued March 12, 1925.-Decided June 1, 1925. A Delaware corporation, organized for the purpose, took over the assets and continued the business of a New Jersey corporation, assuming its liabilities, after an exchange of stock, as follows: The New Jersey corporation had outstanding $15,000,000 of 7% preferred and $15,000,000 common stock, all shares of the par value of $100, and had accumulated a large surplus from profits, the actual value of the common stock being $842.50 per share; the Delaware corporation had an authorized capital of $20,000,000 in 6% non-voting preferred stock and $82,600,000 in common, shares all of the par value of $100, and exchanged five shares of its common stock for every like share in the New Jersey corporation, and one and one-third shares of its preferred stock for every like share in the New Jersey corporation, making payments in cash to avoid fractional certificates; and thus all the stock of the New Jersey corporation was exchanged, except a few shares of preferred stock redeemed in cash, and the Delaware corporation had $7,600,000 of authorized common stock remaining which was sold or held for sale for additional capital. Held that the new securities thus received by an old stock-holder were not in effect a stock dividend; and that their value above the cost of his exchanged securities, bought by him prior to March 1, 1913, was taxable as income under the Act of September 8, 1916, and within the power of Congress so to tax, since the corporations were essentially different, being organized in different States and with different rights and powers, and since the shares exchanged represented different interests both because of these differences in the corporations and because a 6% non-voting preferred stock differs essentially from a 7% voting preferred stock, and common stock subject to the priority of $20,000,000 preferred and a $1,200,000 annual dividend charge differs essentially from a common stock. subject only to $15,000,000 preferred and a $1,050,000 annual dividend charge. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 159, and Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U. S. 242, distinguished. P. 539. 58 Ct. Cl. 658, affirmed. APPEAL from a judgment rendered by the Court of Claims for the United States in a suit brought by the appellant to recover the amount of an additional income tax paid under protest. Mr. William L. Frierson, for appellant. The Solicitor General, with whom Messrs. Nelson T. Hartson and Chester A. Gwinn were on the brief, for the United States. Messrs. James Byrne and Arthur A. Ballantine submitted a brief as amici curiae, by special leave of Court. Opinion of the Court. 268 U.S. MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court. Prior to March 1, 1913, Marr and wife purchased 339 shares of the preferred and 425 shares of the common stock of the General Motors Company of New Jersey for $76,400. In 1916, they received in exchange for this stock 451 shares of the preferred and 2,125 shares of the common stock of the General Motors Corporation of Delaware which (including a small cash payment) had the aggregate market value of $400,866.57. The difference between the cost of their stock in the New Jersey corporation and the value of the stock in the Delaware corporation was $324,466.57. The Treasury Department ruled that this difference was gain or income under the Act of September 8, 1916, c. 463, Title I, §§ 1 and 2, 39 Stat. 756, 757; and assessed, on that account, an additional income tax for 1916 which amounted, with interest, to $24,944.12. That sum Marr paid under protest. He then appealed to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue by filing a claim for a refund; and, upon the disallowance of that claim, brought this suit in the Court of Claims to recover the amount. Judgment was entered for the United States. 58 Ct. Cl. 658. The case is here on appeal under § 242 of the Judicial Code. The exchange of securities was effected in this way. The New Jersey corporation had outstanding $15,000,000 of 7 per cent. preferred stock and $15,000,000 of the common stock, all shares being of the par value of $100. It had accumulated from profits a large surplus. The actual value of the common stock was then $842.50 a share. Its officers caused to be organized the Delaware corporation, with an authorized capital of $20,000,000 in 6 per cent. non-voting preferred stock and $82,600,000 in common stock, all shares being of the par value of $100. The Delaware corporation made to stockholders in the New |