cure any of the claims now under consideration. The fund derived from conversion of all the property is insufficient fully to satisfy taxes due the United States and the City and County of San Francisco, and the allowed claims for preferred wages. Which of these must be paid first is the question for decision. The referee ruled in favor of the wages, and the District Court approved; but the Circuit Court of Appeals held to the contrary and directed that priority should be given the taxes.

The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 544, 563, provides

"Sec. 64. Debts which have priority.-a. The court shall order the trustee to pay all taxes legally due and owing by the bankrupt to the United States, State, county, district, or municipality in advance of the payment of dividends to creditors, and upon filing the receipts of the proper public officers for such payment he shall be credited with the amount thereof, and in case any question arises as to the amount or legality of any such tax the same shall be heard and determined by the court.

"b. The debts to have priority, except as herein provided, and to be paid in full out of bankrupt estates, and the order of payment shall be (1) the actual and necessary cost of preserving the estate subsequent to filing the petition; (2) the filing fees paid by creditors in involuntary cases; (3) the cost of administration, including the fees and mileage payable to witnesses as now or hereafter provided by the laws of the United States, and one reasonable attorney's fee, for the professional services actually rendered, irrespective of the number of attorneys employed, to the petitioning creditors in involuntary cases, to the bankrupt in involuntary cases while performing the duties herein prescribed, and to the bankrupt in voluntary cases, as the court may allow; (4) wages due to workmen, clerks, or servants which have been earned within three months before the date of the com

mencement of proceedings not to exceed three hundred dollars to each claimant; and (5) debts owing to any person who by the laws of the States or the United States is entitled to priority."

Guarantee Co. v. Title Guaranty Co., 224 U. S. 152, 159, 160, held that under § 64 wages were entitled to priority over the claim of the United States for damages occasioned by the bankrupt's failure to comply with a construction contract. It was there said

"By the statute of 1797 (now Sec. 3466) and Sec. 5101 of the Revised Statutes all debts due to the United States were expressly given priority to the wages due any operative, clerk, or house servant. A different order is prescribed by the Act of 1898, and something more. Labor claims are given priority, and it is provided that debts having priority shall be paid in full. The only exception is taxes legally due and owing by the bankrupt to the United States, State, county, district or municipality.' These were civil obligations, not personal conventions, and preference was given to them, but as to debts we must assume a change of purpose in the change of order. And we cannot say that it was inadvertent. The Act takes into consideration, we think, the whole range of indebtedness of the bankrupt-national, State and individual— and assigns the order of. payment. The policy which it dictated was beneficent and well might induce a postponement of the claims, even of the sovereign, in favor of those who necessarily depended upon their daily labor. And to give such claims priority could in no case seriously affect the sovereign. To deny them priority would in all cases seriously affect the claimants."

In City of Richmond v. Bird, 249 U. S. 174, 177, past due taxes were denied priority of payment over a debt secured by a lien which the state law recognized as superior to the city's claims for such taxes. We said—

Respondents therefore must prevail unless priority over their lien is given by Sec. 64a to claim for taxes

which, under State law, occupied no better position than one held by a general creditor. Section 67d, Bankruptcy Act, quoted supra, declares that liens given or accepted in good faith and not in contemplation of or in fraud upon this Act, shall not be affected by it. Other provisions must, of course, be construed in view of this positive one. Section 64a directs that taxes be paid in advance of dividends to creditors; and 'dividend,' as commonly used throughout the Act, means partial payment to general creditors. In Sec. 65b, for example, the word occurs in contrast to payment of debts which have priority. And as the local laws gave no superior right to the City's unsecured claim for taxes we are unable to conclude that Congress intended by Sec. 64a to place it ahead of valid lien holders."

Of course, this opinion must be read in the light of the question under consideration-Does § 64 require that taxes shall be paid in advance of debts secured by liens which under the local law are superior to claims for such taxes? We pointed out that § 67d preserves valid liens and is not qualified by the direction of § 64a to discharge taxes "in advance of the payment of dividends to creditors," since "dividend', as commonly used throughout the Act, means partial payment to general creditors." We did not undertake to decide in what order, as among themselves, taxes and the debts specified by § 64 should be satisfied; that point was not presented.

The language of § 64 has caused much uncertainty; and widely different views of its true meaning may be found in the opinions of District Courts and Circuit Courts of Appeals.

Paragraph "a" directs that "the court shall order the trustee to pay all taxes legally due and owing

in

advance of [not next preceding] the payment of dividends to creditors"—that is, partial payments to general creditors. City of Richmond v. Bird, supra. It does not un

dertake otherwise to fix the precise position which shall be accorded to them. This, we think, must be determined upon consideration of the circumstances of each case and the provisions of relevant federal and local laws-e. g., those which prescribe liens to secure or special priority for tax claims. It also appears, plainly enough, that all debts mentioned in Paragraph "b" must be satisfied before any payment to general creditors.

Guarantee Co. v. Title Guaranty Co., supra, declares that the taxes of Paragraph "a" a" are "civil obligations, not personal conventions, and preference was given to them" over the wages specified by Clause (4), Paragraph "b". We adhere to this as a correct statement of the general rule to be followed whenever it does not clearly appear that the particular tax has been subordinated to claims for wages by some relevant law.

We find no error in the action of the court below. The cause will be remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

LINDER v. UNITED STATES.

Affirmed.

CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.

No. 183. Submitted March 9, 1925.-Decided April 13, 1925.

1. Any provision of an act of Congress ostensibly enacted under power granted by the Constitution, not naturally and reasonably adapted to the effective exercise of such power but solely to the achievement of something plainly within the power reserved to the States, is invalid and can not be enforced. P. 17.

2. Direct control of medical practice in the States is obviously beyond the power of Congress. P. 18.

3. Incidental regulation of such practice by Congress through a taxing act, like the Narcotic Law, can not extend to matters plainly inappropriate and unnecessary to reasonable enforcement of a revenue measure. P. 18.

Argument for Petitioner.

268 U.S.

4. An act of Congress must be construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional but also grave doubts upon that score. P. 17.

5. Section 2 of the Narcotic Law, declares it unlawful for any person to sell, give away etc., any of the drugs mentioned in the act except in pursuance of an order of the person to whom the article is sold, etc., written on an official blank, but does not apply "to the dispensing or distribution of the aforesaid drugs to a patient by a physician. . . . registered under this Act in the course of his professional practice only." Held inapplicable to a case where a physician, acting bona fide and according to fair medical standards, gives an addict moderate amounts of the drugs for self-administration in order to relieve conditions incident to addiction. P. 16. 6. What constitutes bona fide medical practice, consistent with the statute, depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case. P. 18.

290 Fed. 173, reversed.

CERTIORARI to a judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals affirming a conviction under the Narcotic Law.

Mr. George Turner, for petitioner.

Sub-section (a) of § 2 excepts "the dispensing or distribution of any of the aforesaid drugs to a patient by a physician, dentist, or veterinary surgeon registered under the Act in the course of his professional practice only." The lower courts have engrafted on this exception without any sufficient reason the further requirement that the dispensing or distribution must not only have been in the course of the professional practice of the physician, but that the drugs must have been dispensed or distributed in good faith as medicine, and not to satisfy the cravings of an addict. Other cases holding the same doctrine are Manning v. United States, 287 Fed. 800; Melanson v. United States, 356 Fed. 783; Thompson v. United States, 258 Fed. 196. The term "addict" is not used in the entire Narcotic Act, and the only mention of "good faith" is found in § 8, where, after making it unlawful for any person not registered to have in pos