ploy his pen upon the topics which enlist the minds of the great thinkers of the world. He did not consider it his mission to battle any of the great evils which afflict mankind, or to espouse the cause of the lofty virtues which adorn and dignify human nature. He had a great horror of hobbies, and no patience with philanthropy adopted as a profession; he was consequently too careful to avoid the advocacy of reforms.

He loved his country; he was thoroughly American, and did much to make American literature respectable before the world; and yet succeeding ages will be left to wonder, as they search his writings, why he left not a word behind him to aid his country in ridding herself of the most gigantic of all the evils which threatened her destruction.

He had no taste for politics, and yet it was his fortune to be patronized by politicians whose capital in trade was jointstock with the slave oligarchy of the South. If he would maintain agreeable relations with them, the least he could do was to say no word which could be construed against "the sum of all villainies." So far as would be indicated by his words on this, or any other practical topic of the time, like a character in one of his own romances, "he might have lived a century ago, or a thousand years, or before the Christian epoch.'

ART. V.-DIVINE PASSION.

THAT the Divine Being possesses an emotional nature, is generally admitted in the theological world; but the application and illustration of the doctrine has often been attended with much difficulty, if not with absolute confusion and contradiction of statement. We form our conceptions of infinite understanding from the finite understanding of the human mind, the former differing from the latter in being unlimited and free from error; but, we are told the emotional nature of man is essentially different from that of the Deity, in that the latter is incapable both of grief and of variations in degrees of happiness. It is difficult to conceive how such a nature could have any

active relation to human conduct and character, since nothing that man can do or be can either enhance or detract from infinite and unvaried happiness. It may be doubted if the term emotion can properly be applied to a nature of that kind. The common sentiment of Christian believers may perhaps be expressed in these words, "God is so happy in himself that nothing which man can do can make him more happy." And yet it is generally acknowledged that in some inexplicable manner God is pleased with the virtues and displeased with the vices of his creatures. These two sentiments, apparently so contradictory, are alike adopted in unquestioning faith, and with strange unanimity. Neither proposition is ever a subject of much discussion in the pulpit, in the study, or in the Christian household. Both are received in silent assent, the one from Scripture and the instinctive teachings of the heart, the other from the dicta of metaphysics and the deductions of logic. If both sentiments cannot be true, which shall we adopt? "If God were capable of grief he would not be a perfect being." That is founded upon the assumption that nothing which is inconsistent with happiness can be an element of perfection. For, it may be argued, infinite happiness must be in itself desirable, and a being of infinite power can possess whatever is desirable, therefore he possesses infinite happiness. The same conclusion may be reached by the argument that nothing exists to limit the happiness of a self-existent, independent being. The logic is short, and to many, perfectly conclusive.

It seems remarkable, in opposition to all this, that the doctrine of the infinite happiness of God is nowhere asserted in the Bible. It is purely a deduction of metaphysical reasoning. The whole subject of divine infinity is somewhat indefinitely revealed. Distinct attributes are revealed as infinite. Absolute infinity is more inferred than revealed. Even infinity may have its qualifications. An infinity in one direction does not imply its existence in all other supposable directions; nor, according to mathematics, are all infinities absolutely equal. We consider it no detraction from Omnipotence to say, it cannot perform a contradiction, nor change an axiomatic truth. As Arminians we say it would be a contradiction for the Deity to bestow a necessitated holiness upon a free moral agent.

Some of the attributes of God are in their very nature limited. There can be no such thing as a holiness that is infinite in all directions, though there can be perfect holiness. There are boundaries to right. The decalogue is a series of limitations. Justice, for instance, is represented by the even balances. Here there can be no infinity. Temperance is restraint; meekness is calm endurance and freedom from passion. Even love is limited to the proper objects of love, for some things are to be hated and not loved; and, in regard to the proper objects, some are loved in a higher degree than others, both by God and man. If, then, divine holiness has its limitations, may not also divine happiness!

We may well pause before pronouncing positive judgments as to the ways and attributes of the Unsearchable. Even to celestial minds his nature must ever remain mysterious; how much more to the infirm capacities of earth? It is asserted that happiness and perfection are inseparable. May it not be possible that, in the divine mind, absolute and unvarying happiness may be associated with imperfection? The griefs of humanity have beneficent objects other than the disciplining of the sufferers; may not grief in the Deity have its great ends to reach in the beneficent system of the universe? Qualities undesirable to selfishness may be intimately associated with beneficence. The sorrows of Jesus of Nazareth, even if they be considered as belonging to his human nature alone, are an exhibition of how closely sorrow and virtue can be allied; and the effect produced upon all Christian generations by the exhibition of such sorrows, shows the beneficent mission of sorrow. The sorrows of the Redeemer seemed to flow spontaneously from his exalted, virtuous manhood, and therefore may not be supposed to have been borne for no other purpose than that of atonement. If then sorrow be not inconsistent with the highest style of humanity which was ever made manifest, can we positively assert that it is inconsistent with Divinity? We venture to take the ground that it is not.

When we speak of sorrow as associated with the Divine Mind, we do not mean that degree of it which implies the deprivation of happiness and the existence of positive misery in its place. That which mars the happiness of a sentient existence may be said to sadden and grieve, though it may

not utterly deprive of happiness. The effect is the same in kind as though all enjoyment were banished and pain were substituted. A "joy unspeakable and full of glory" may exist in the soul of the believer while yet he is saddened by the contemplation of sin and ruin. The joy far exceeds the sadness, but the latter is not therefore powerless. We imagine that while Jesus "rejoiced in spirit," even then his spirit was chastened with sorrow. A sad event grieves a happy being as much as it grieves one who is already plunged in sadness, though the former may not thereby be brought even to the beginning of actual misery. So God is grieved, though supremely blessed. There is no more mystery in an infinity of emotions than there is in an infinity of perceptions, which is implied in omniscience. Every perception has its corresponding emotion. If consciousness be one, and if the conscious powers, according to Butler, be "indiscerpible," it is difficult to conceive of a multitude of perceptions and feelings entering the conscious existence all in the same moment. Some metaphysicians deny that more than one impression enters the mind at once. If this law is essential to mind as mind, we see not how to reconcile it with the doctrine of omniscience. In opposition to this theory, therefore, and in accordance with the apparent teaching of certain mental phenomena, we are led to believe that the human mind is capable of more than one act or feeling at the same time; or, at least, that omniscience is capable of an infinite number of such acts and feelings, while still possessing unity of consciousness. The Omnipresent Mind may be considered as a living map on which every divine thought and emotion make their impress; there is room for an infinite diversity of impressions, but all are connected by the one universal consciousness. God's interest in each feature of an individual's life is not lessened by his general interest in the events of a universe. Love, pity, grief, approval, pleasure, flow into or out of the living spirit of the great Father of all in contemplating the least of his moral creatures, just as much as though in all the worlds there existed only that one moral creature. This is the God our faith pictures and our heart adores.

As to the argument above referred to respecting infinite power to possess whatever is desirable, we are able, from an

Arminian standpoint, to furnish the answer that there is a power which may array itself in opposition to the Almighty, and thwart even his desires. That power is free-will. Who will assert that sin is desirable to the Divine Being? Free moral power is desirable, but sin is not. The former is directly constituted by infinite power, and is in perfect accordance with the divine will and holiness; the latter is the indirect result of creative power exerted to constitute a free moral nature, springing directly from that free nature, with the permission, but not by the agency of God, and rearing its rebellious front against the all-holy Creator. Free-will obeys or rebels, perpetrates good or evil acts, pleases or displeases God. The Deity is on the side of virtue, free-will may be also. But, on the other hand, it may oppose the benevolent designs of God, and grieve his Holy Spirit.

In presenting the positive side of the argument, we begin with the testimony of Scripture. Here the evidence would seem very decided were it not for the metaphysical difficulties which have turned aside the natural and obvious interpretation of Bible teaching. We need but refer to a few of a class of passages bearing upon the subject of this article. "With such sacrifices God is well pleased." Heb. xiii, 16. "I was grieved with that generation." Heb. iii, 10. "Grieve not the Holy Spirit of God." Eph. iv, 30. "Whether ye eat or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God." 1 Cor. x, 31. "The Lord taketh pleasure in them that fear him." Psa. cxlvii, 2. "God is angry with the wicked." Psa. vii, 2. Such passages are generally supposed to indicate a very different kind of passion from that which agitates the human breast. No one can doubt that it is different in being perfectly holy, but we are not authorized, from such apparently plain statements of truth, to infer any difference that would imply a passion of another essence or nature than human. For if so, then these words, "pleasure," "anger," "grief," etc., would seem to be words without meaning, in what was designed to be a revelation to man. God is revealed as having preferences: "I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked; but that the wicked turn and live." We understand, at least, that the turning and living would give greater.pleasure than the dying of the wicked, and hence that divine passion is in some way