ant H. cut the string of one bow, and caught a second man by the throat and gave him two cuts over the face with his sabre: he was, however, too weak to do him much injury. About this time the rear men came up, and the Indians commenced running, the soldiers following them; but as Lieutenant H. and his only non-commissioned officer were too severely wounded to continue the fight, the men were recalled. From what I can learn, three or four Indians must have been badly wounded. Two or three rifles, three horses, the saddle and saddle-bags belonging to the Corpus Christi mail-rider, with a few of the letters and papers, were taken from this party. Lieutenant H. lost his horse and sixshooter, and three of the company horses also made their escape. The party returned to water, and an express was sent to me that I might be informed of their condition. Assistant Surgeon Perin immediately left with an ambulance and wagon to go to their assistance, and found their camp the next morning. These were the Indians Lieutenants Viele and Holabird had been sent to follow; but as they scattered at every hill, there was great difficulty in keeping the trail. This party, however, arrived at Lieutenant H.'s camp the next morning, being one day behind the Indians. Lieutenant Hudson has four wounds; two of them make his recovery very doubtful. The general is aware of my anxiety to have the mounted men under my command furnished with six-shooters, and I hope he will consent to equip a few of them (if not all) with this arm. All of the animals (except three or four) have been claimed by the citizens, and turned over to them. Lieutenant Viele will leave in a few days for New York, and I find it necessary to apply to you for an additional officer, as it will be very difficult for Lieutenant Holabird to command the mounted company and perform the duties of acting assistant quartermaster and acting assistant commissary of subsistence. I send enclosed the requisition of Lieutenant Viele for additional horses to cover deficiencies. I am, respectfully, your obedient servant, Major GEORGE DEAS, Assistant Adjutant General. JNO. H. KING, Captain 1st Infantry, commanding. P. S.-It is almost impossible for Lieutenant H. to recover, as the arrow-head is buried in his chest; and the wound in his side is also very dangerous. He was mounted on my horse, and had my six-shooter. HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH DEPARTMENT, San Antonio, May 29, 1850.GENERAL: I have the honor to forward herewith copy of my letter to the general-in-chief, dated the 28th inst., with its enclosures, numbered from 1 to 4, in reference to our Indian relations within this department. I am, very respectfully, your most obedient servant, GEO. M. BROOKE, Brevet Major General. [For the information of the Adjutant General.] HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH MILITARY DEPARTMENT, GENERAL: I have the honor to forward copies of reports lately received at these headquarters, numbered from 1 to 4, inclusive, from Captain Ford, volunteers, and Captain King and Lieutenant Holabird, first infantry, in relation to scouts and the general appearance of Indian hostilities. You will perceive that the Indian parties are becoming more frequent and in increased strength. The same may be said of this whole frontier. It is impossible to bring these deluded people to a sense of their weakness, compared with the power of the United States, unless by severe chastisement, and which cannot be effected without carrying the war into their homes and fastnesses; and for the same reasons we are unable to comply with the 11th article of the treaty with Mexico, guarantying protection from Indian attack and depredation. the The force in this country is inadequate to a general war promising success; depots and posts would have to be advanced, whilst, at the same time, you would be compelled to keep up the present chain of posts to prevent the enemy from getting into our rear-exposing the present frontier settlements to Indian massacre and destruction. We are certainly a nation powerful enough-possessing a complete superiority in point of num. bers and all necessary supplies. To place ourselves on an equality with these people, whilst we have such advantages, does not appear to me to be a good policy, when we look at the great number of valuable lives, both in the settlements and in the army, which are risked and jeoparded by a want of means to force in every event perfect success. The preda. tory war now going on will be continued forever, unless we exercise the strength we possess to put it down at once. I presume the delay in taking proper steps to effect this most desirable object may be traced to the desire of the government of effecting some agreement with the State of Texas regarding a proper boundary, and placing these Indian tribes on the same footing as those to the north and northwest, now under the protection and sovereignty of the United States. Allow even this to be effected, it will be a long period before it can be completed, and then probably not as to Mexico. In the latter case, the number of posts must be increased on the Rio Grande. There should be strong point on this river in the great bend opposite San Carlos, which is the key to the country called on Disturnell's map "Bolson de Mapimi." Indians passing at this place go to Chihuahua, Monclova, Paras, and Durango-laying the whole country waste. Another point is the Presidio del Norte, equally important. I am not informed as to the precise disposition which is intended to be made of the troops ordered from the 7th to this department-whether to establish new posts on the Rio Grande or to pursue the Indians to their villages who are depredating on the American settlements on the frontier extending from the Rio Grande to the Red river. at a In the event of a boundary being established for the Comanches and other tribes of Indians on the borders of Texas, I have no idea such a line will be respected, unless these Indians are subsidized, receiving annuities as the northern tribes; because they actually have not the means of subsistence, unless they follow the mustangs-wild droves of horses— which are to them what the buffalo is to the Black feet, Crows, and Paw. Major General W. SCOTT, HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH MILITARY DEPARTMENT, True copy. Sun Antonio, May 28, 1850. GEO. DEAS, Assistant Adjutant General. FORT MERRILL, May 21, 1850. MAJOR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of an order from Major General Brooke, directing me to take position in rear of Loredo with one-half of my command. Previous to that time, I had placed a detachment of twenty-nine in readiness to move in the direction of Loredo, make a reconnaissance in the country between the Rio Grande and the Nueces, and proceed to Fort Merrill to draw pistols. On the 7th instant I made a forward movement from Loredo parallel with the Rio Grande, up that stream 35 miles; I then turned to the right. On the 10th, my guide discovered fresh Indian signs. The command was halted, and the country scoured in every direction by small parties, with orders to report the presence of any party of Indians they might meet with too large for them to engage. The Indian camp was found: from the indications, they were a small hunting party, which had seen us, and scattered to avoid pursuit. On the morning of the 10th, I directed Lieutenant Walker, with ten men, to return to Loredo, by way of a large water-hole, called the Pato, lying 15 miles below the San Antonio road. The object was to deceive the Indians into the belief that the whole command had returned; to place Lieutenant Walker in the rear of any party going up, while I was in front of them, with a fine opportunity to head off and surprise them. On the 11th I encamped near the Nueces, on the Arroyo San Boque; remained in camp on the 12th, and sent small parties of reconnaissance. Breaking up camp on the 13th, and moving a little south of east, at noon I came upon a large trail, which had the appearance of a regular Indian thoroughfare. Its general course is north of west. A party of Indians had passed along it late on the preceding evening. I directed my advance guard to move silently and cautiously about 400 yards in advance of the command. After marching five miles, the Nueces was reached; the neighing of horses was heard; I ordered twelve men to dismount, and move through the chaparral to the right in the direction of the crossing. With the remaining seven I marched to the left. I found the Indians had crossed. The pack mules were placed in a bend, in charge of a guard. The command passed the river by swimming, and was on the trail at a brisk gallop within twenty minutes after reaching the west bank. Eight miles from the crossing, I discovered the Indians just as they were turning the crest of a hill. By dashing forward with four men, I induced them to think our party was small. The chief ordered them to stand and fight. By the time they had formed their line, my men had come up and commenced firing. I directed them not all to discharge their pieces at once, as the Indians evidently intended to draw our fire and then charge us. A ball struck the chief on the arm; he wheeled his horse. I then saw there was no chance to get a standing fight, and ordered a charge. The command was obeyed promptly and eagerly. The Indians fled yelling; the men followed shouting. Our balls soon began to tell, and the yell sunk into a moan. The chief was a brave fellow, and endeavored to halt his warriors: they were too closely pressed to make a stand. At intervals they would halt for a few moments, and let fly a volley of arrows. After running upwards of three miles, the Indians made a chaparral; my horses were quite fatigued, and I saw no method of effecting anything further, and ordered a halt. The Indians were fifteen in number. I had sixteen men engaged. The loss of the Indians was eight killed and wounded. But one of the dead was left on the field; the others were packed off, as is their custom. Four others died very shortly after the skirmish, I have no doubt, as they received mortal wounds: threw away shields, cow-tails, whistles, and other articles they are never known to part with while there is any hope of living. Of my command, private David Steele was wounded very slightly. My horse received a wound from a poisoned arrow, of which he died in three days. I regret very much that my men had not been able to draw their pistols before this engagement; with the advantage of a pistol, in addition to the Mississippi rifle, I do not think a single Indian would have escaped. In a running fight with the rifle alone, it is very hard, almost impossible, to keep within gunshot of the enemy, because of the time lost in holding up to load. Three of the Indians had on Mexican hats; one was taken and recognised as belonging to a Mexican who was killed about the 5th or 6th instant, 15 miles below Loredo. The party consisted of Comanches, commanded by a brother of the late chief Santa Anna. These particulars I derived from Roque. The Indians lost eleven Mexican horses and one mule, which are in camp, subject to the order of Major General Brooke, though, I presume, the most of them will be claimed by Mexicans, citizens of Texas. Late in the evening, I crossed the Nueces and encamped near the crossing, with the intention of intercepting any other party of Indians that might be passing I should have completely succeeded in this, but for an unfortunate accident-the breaking loose of two horses after daylight on the morning of the 14th. They followed the trail back, and, when something over a mile from camp, were discovered by a party of nine Indians. So soon as the Indians ascertained the horses were American, they left at full speed. In a short while I was in pursuit with twelve men. They used every artifice to elude us; however, all their devious windings could not deceive Roque, who hung on the trail from 11 to 4 o'clock-a great part of the time at full gallop. I found my horses failing fast, and drew off, satisfied I could not come up with them without a relay of horses. I found it necessary to use great circumspection to avoid surprise, and to keep my horses from being stolen. I make my encampments in the form of a circle-the men sleeping outside the horses. My men have behaved throughout the scout orderly and gallantly. I recommend Roque to your favorable notice as a good guide and a brave Indian-fighter. My pistols are here, but no cartridges. I have the honor to be your obedient servant, JOHN S. FORD, Captain, commanding company Texas Mounted Volunteers. Major GEORGE DEAS, Assistant Adjutant General 8th Military Department. San Antonio, Texas. MAJOR: [For the information of the Adjutant General.-Extract.] FORT MERRILL, May 21, 1850. I have directed that a bow and arrows taken be given to General Brooke. The arrows are poisoned-the poison of two kinds, animal (rattlesnake) and vegetable; that of the snake is beneath the wood, upon the spike where it is received into the split of the arrow: the vegetable is upon the integuments which are used to hold the spike to its place. A bluish tinge is discoverable. These arrows are never used except in war; they are unfit to kill game. Roque is of opinion the Indians will be down in large numbers during the succeeding full moon. I shall endeavor to meet them. I shall remain here four days, to recruit my horses-also, to purchase one for myself— and then move for San Antonio Viejo. If the Indians have already come down, I shall cross their trails. Should I not be able to fall upon them below, I shall make a three-weeks campaign in the vicinity of the Comanchet crossing. Keep pickets on both sides of the river, so as to cut off any party going either way. Respectfully, yours, True copy. JOHN S. FORD. HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH MILITARY DEPARTMENT, San Antonio, May 26, 1850. GEO. DEAS, Assistant Adjutant General. * A guide who has lived some time with the Comanches-a prisoner. † Above Lomas Blancas, Nueces river. |