No. 7.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE MARINE Corps, Washington, November 19, 1850. SIR: Your letter of the 9th instant, directing me to increase the guar of the receiving-ships at Boston, New York, and Norfolk, has been ceived.

The present distribution of the corps, as exhibited in the general retu which accompanies this, shows that it is not in my power to increase t guards of the receiving-ships, without prejudice to other equally importa requisitions on it

The general return shows, in the first place, that the corps is very lit within its legal strength. In the second place, it exhibits its distributi into guards or detachments on board the ships-of-war, and at the respe ive marine barracks.

In the ships-of-war of all classes there were, on the 31st ultimo, a captains, 11 first lieutenants, 12 second lieutenants, 51 sergeants, 70 co porals, 22 drummers, 21 fifers, and 652 privates; leaving for duty on lar 45 sergeants, 22 corporals, 14 drummers, 10 fifers, and 277 private The force on shore is nearly equally distributed among the several station reserving at headquarters just men enough to attend to police duty, wit out having a single sentinel on post, and, consequently, without bein able to afford instruction in the drill, or even impart to the soldier t knowledge of the duty of a sentinel on post-so essential in active servic on land or in the ships-of war. If the strength of the corps would admi of it, I believe it would be of great advantage to make this station the d pot for drilling the men.

By reference to the strength of the guards at each one of the station on shore, and at headquarters, the department will readily observe that n detail can be made properly from a force already so small and inadequate I believe that even a stronger guard than that required in your letter the 9th instant is necessary on board the receiving-ships, where so man newly shipped men are sent for distribution throughout the service. sincerely regret that I am compelled to report to the department my in ability to comply with its order, without, as before mentioned, doing a injury to the public service on shore.

This being the condition of the corps, the department must see the ne cessity of its enlargement to enable it to meet the demands now making on it, even without a reference to the crisis brought on by the abolition corporal punishment in the navy. Previous to this enactment, the guard on board the ships-of-war were so small as to impose on each soldier ver arduous duty as a sentinel. To explain in detail the severity of this dut would be tedious to the department, but its character is such as to entitl it to that relief which can only be furnished by an addition of at leas one-third to the strength of each guard. Besides which, when not on post, the marine has his regular watch on deck, and for every additiona private sent on board ship, one landsman can be dispensed with, withou prejudice to the efficiency of a man-of war.

During the last war with England, and previous to that, our vessels had a private marine to each gun. This would now give 90 for a line of battle ship, from 50 to 60 for each frigate, and in that proportion for the other classes of vessels. The present table will show how much smaller these guards now are. It may be here allowed to contrast the guards of

Their line-of-battle

marines in the English service with those of ours. ships bare 150 privates, ours 52. In that service marines are found more usefilthan landsmen, or even ordinary seamen. Is there any reason why itsd be otherwise in our service? Is not the American sailor in charuch like the English? Indeed, have we not many English, Irish dutchmen in our navy, and are not the habits of sailors of AngloSorigin pretty much alike? The guard of marines in each service is servative of good order and discipline. In the English navy, either for racy in war or for the preservation of discipline in time of peace, they have three marines to one in our navy. In that service corporal panishment has always existed, and still a large conservative force of soldiers is found necessary.

This is a most important crisis in our naval service, and urgently calls for serious examination and reflection. The great increase of our national steam marine, and the prospect of its still further extension to keep pace with other aval powers, creates another consideration, and naturally leads to the inquiry, what is the best force to place on board steamships of war? I beg leave now to say that the opinion expressed in a letter to the department of the 11th May, 1841, (an extract from which accompanies this) remains unchanged. I fully believe that a body of well drilled soldiers is the most efficient crew that can be placed in a war steamer. With these considerations in view, I am compelled to recommend a considerable increase of the rank and file of the corps. We have no desire to increase the officers either in rank or number, but simply to imbody with the four captains, four first and four second lieutenants, now provisionally in the service by the action of Congress.

the

corps

In support of my own views on the subject of the necessity of an increase of the corps, I beg leave to refer the department to a letter from Commodore William B. Shubrick, dated 29th August, 1839, enclosing a communication of all the commanders in the West India squadron; also an extract of a letter from the same officer while in command of the Pacific squadron, dated the 12th May, 1848. I might also refer the department to letters of Commodores Stewart, Perry, and Thos. Ap C. Jones, with many others, strongly urging the necessity of an increase of the marine corps. All these letters, together with the great increase not only of our vessels-of-war but our commercial marine in every sea, seem to establish beyond a question the urgent necessity that now exists of a considerable enlargement of the marine corps.

The increase of marines on board the ships of war may justify a decrease of landsmen, and even ordinary seamen; thus creating no additional expense. This increase may also render irresponsible and inefficient watchmen unnecessary; their places to be supplied by sentinels amenable at all times to the laws and discipline of the service.

That the necessity for an increase of the corps has existed and does ex ist, will, I am sure, be admitted by all naval men; and I feel assured that it will only be necessary for you, sir, to examine into the subject to recommend strongly the propriety of its being done, not only to insure greater efficiency in our ships-of war, but for a better and more economical protection of the large amount of public property in our navy yards. I have the honor to remain, with great respect, your obedient servant, ARCH. HENDERSON, Brigadier General Commandant.

Hon. Wм. A. GRAHAM, Secretary of the Navy.

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