'Justice is the common concern of mankind.'-BURKE, vol. v. p. 275, Thoughts on the French 'Recté a viris doctis inter desiderata relatum est, jus Naturæ et Gentium, traditum secundum BUTTERWORTHS, 7 FLEET STREET, Law Publishers to the Queen's Most Excellent Majesty; HODGES, FOSTER, & CO., GRAFTON STREET, DUBLIN. PREFACE ΤΟ THE THIRD EDITION. THE SECOND EDITION of this volume was published in 1871. In the Preface to that edition I gave a summary of the principal historical events which had affected International Law during the period between the publication of the First and Second Editions. The notice of these events, as well as of those of a more subsequent date, has been incorporated in the text of the present edition. Among these events may especially be enumerated : (1.) The Civil War in the United States, which gave rise to questions as to the inviolability of an envoy on board a neutral ship on the high seas; as to the Law relating to blockade, contraband privateering, and generally the responsibility of a State for the acts of its citizens. (2.) The temporary opening of the River St. Lawrence. (3.) The permanent opening of the Danube. (4.) The Sound dues, and the claims of Denmark with respect to them. (5.) The Protocol to the Treaty of Paris, 1856, as to invoking the arbitration of Friendly States previously to a Declaration of War. (6.) The abolition of Domestic Slavery in the United States (1862.) (7.) The change effected in the relations of Turkey to Europe. (8.) Negotiations relative to the Isthmus of Suez. I repeat here, however, some portions of the former Preface, which relates to general principles of International Jurisprudence. These events have not induced me to change the opinions which I have expressed as to the cardinal principles of International Law. On the contrary, I venture to think that they furnish a strong corroboration of them. The "violence, oppression, and sword-law," which have prevailed in part of Europe, ought not to shake conviction in the truth of these principles, while on the other hand they are confirmed by the consideration of events which, unconnected with the late war, have happened during the interval mentioned. There always have been, and always will be, a class of persons who deride the notion of International Law, who delight in scoffing at the jurisprudence which supports it, and who hold in supreme contempt the position that a moral principle lies at its root. The proposition that, in their mutual intercourse, States are bound to recognize the eternal obligations of justice apart from considerations of immediate expediency, they deem stupid and ridiculous pedantry. They point triumphantly to the instances in which the law has been broken (a), in which might has been (a) "Sed nimirum historiæ non tantum quæ juste, sed et quæ inique, iracunde, impotenter facta sunt memorant."-Grotius, De J. B. 1. 2, c. xviii. s. 7. substituted for right, and ask if Providence is not always on the side of the strongest battalions. "Let "our strength," they say, "be the law of justice, for "that which is feeble is found to be nothing worth" (b). But in truth these objections are as old as they are shallow; they leave untouched the fact that there is, after all, a law to which States, in peace and war, appeal for the justification of their acts; that there are writers whose exposition of that law has been stamped as impartial and just by the great family of States, that they are only slighted by those upon whose crimes they have by anticipation passed sentence; that Municipal as well as International Law is often evaded and trampled down, but exists nevertheless, and that States cannot, without danger as well as disgrace, depart in practice from doctrines which they have professed in theory to be the guide of their relations with the Commonwealth of Christendom. The axiom, "populus jura naturæ gentiumque "violans suæ quoque tranquillitatis in posterum re"scindit munimenta," remains as true to-day as when it was written by its great author two centuries ago. The precedents of crime no more disprove the existence of International than of Civil Law (c). The necessity of justice to the existence of society is not denied; but it is not more obvious than the necessity of justice to the intercourse of States, the society of societies. Rulhière, speaking of the Russian and Austrian (b) Wisdom of Solomon, c. ii. v. 11. (c) See, also, concluding remarks of the Third Volume. |