CHAPTER XXI.

RENVOI.-EXTRADITION.

CCCLXIII. THE subject of this chapter seems to require a threefold division; for we have to consider

1. The Right of a State to dismiss foreigners commorant in her territories-sometimes called the right of Renvoi (a). 2. The Obligation of a State, ander the general law, to surrender foreign subjects—or the Law of Extradition.

3. The Obligation of a State to surrender foreign subjects, in compliance with the provisions of Treaties of Extradition.

CCCLXIV. Every State is held to lie under an obligation to take charge of its natural subjects; it cannot therefore refuse to receive back citizens who have migrated in quest of food or employment into foreign countries. Correspondent with this obligation on the part of the State of the citizen, is the right of the State into which he has migrated to send the foreign citizen back to his own home.

This right is usually known in Law by the term Droit du Renvoi (b). At the same time it must be observed, that it

(a) Ante, chap. x.

(b) Kent's Comment. vol. i. p. 36, and note.

Sir L. Jenkins, speaking of the demand made by the French Crown on behalf of a French subject, charged in an English port with having committed piracy on the high seas, says: "The matter of Renvoy being a thing quite disused among princes, and as every man by the usage of our European nations is justiciable in the place where the crime is committed, so are pyrates, being reputed out of the protection of all laws and privileges, and to be tried in what ports soever they are taken.”— Vol. ii. p. 714.

Martens, 1. iii. c. iii. s. 91.

This right is now seldom exercised but in time of war. During the

ceases, where the citizen has been naturalized, by express law, in the foreign country. And the right can hardly be held to exist where the naturalization has been effected by tacit permission. Martens thinks it would be desirable to define, by the terms of a positive treaty negotiated with every country, the cases in which the tie between the citizen and his native Government shall be held to be so severed as to destroy the obligation of receiving him again; and he observes, that the Law does not consider the character of the native subject, in this sense and for this purpose, as indelible.

This suggestion of Martens is founded upon the practice of many of the German States, who appear also to have considered the question with respect to the transmission, through intermediate States, of persons from the country in which they have been sojourning to the country of their birth (c).

CCCLXV. The right of a State to dismiss foreigners from its territories having been discussed, the obligation of a State to deliver up or surrender the subject of a foreign State on the demand of that State, is next to be considered (d).

Franco-German war (1870) the French Government expelled resident Germans.

Wharton's Conflict of Laws, s. 123.

(c) Martens, 1. iii. c. iii. s. 91.

"En effet, le gouvernement de chaque Etat a toujours le droit de contraindre les étrangers qui se trouvent sur son territoire à en sortir, en les faisant conduire jusqu'aux frontières. Ce droit est fondé sur ce que l'étranger ne faisant pas partie de la nation, sa réception individuelle sur le territoire est de pure faculté, de simple tolérance, et nullement d'obligation. L'exercice de ce droit peut être soumis, sans doute, à certaines formes par les lois intérieures de chaque pays; mais le droit n'en existe pas moins, universellement reconnu et pratiqué. En France, aucune forme spéciale n'est prescrite aujourd'hui en cette matière; l'exercice de ce droit d'expulsion est totalement abandonné au pouvoir exécutif.”— Ortolan, Diplom. de la Mer, 1. ii. c. xiv. p. 323.

(d) Dissertatio de Deditione Profugorum: Henricus Prová Kluit, Utrecht, 1829.

The Law of Extradition, by Charles Egan: London, 1846.

1 Kent's Comment. 36, note.

Ortolan, Dipl. de la Mer, 1. i. c. xiv.

Wharton's Conflict of Laws, s. 940 et seq.

With respect to citizens, not being fugitives from justice, but who are needed for the exigencies of their original country, it has been already stated that International Law affords no pretext for their delivery.

With respect to fugitives from justice, the doctrine of the Roman Law was explicit on this point, ordering that every criminal should be remitted to his forum criminis: but the reason is given by Paul Voet:

"Jure tamen civili notandum, remissionibus locum fuisse "de necessitate, ut reus ad locum ubi deliquit, sic petente "judice, fuerit mittendus, quod omnes judices uni subessent "imperatori. Et omnes provinciæ Romanæ unitæ essent "accessorie, non principaliter” (e). . . . "Moribus "nihilominus (non tamen Saxonicis) totius fere Christi"anismi, nisi ex humanitate, non sunt admissæ remissiones, quo casu, remittenti magistratui cavendum per lit"teras reversoriales, ne actus jurisdictioni remittentis ullum pariat præjudicium. Id quod etiam in nostris Provinciis "Unitis est receptum. Neque enim Provinciæ Fœderatæ "uni supremo parent" (ƒ).

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CCCLXVI. Though the reason for this remission of criminals arose from the peculiar condition of universality incident to the Roman Empire, there is not wanting the authority of great jurists (g) to support as maxims of

(e) P. Voet, De Stat. s. xi. c. i. p. 297 (ed. 1715).

Id. p. 358.

(f) Ib. s. xi. c. i. n. 6, p. 297 (ed. 1715).

Id. p. 358 (ed. 1661).

(g) Grotius, 1. ii. c. xxi. s. 3, 4, 5: "Veniamus ad quæstionem alteram de receptu adversus poenas. Poenas, ut ante diximus, naturaliter cuivis, cui nihil simile objici potest, exigere licet. Institutis civitatibus id quidem convenit, ut singulorum delicta, quæ ipsorum cœtum proprie spectant, ipsis ipsarumque rectoribus pro arbitrio punienda aut dissimulanda relinquerentur..

"At non etiam jus tam plenum illis concessum est in delictis, quæ ad societatem humanam aliquo modo pertinent, quæ persequi ita civitatibus aliis earumve rectoribus jus est, quomodo in civitatibus singulis de quibusdam delictis actio datur popularis: multoque minus illud plenum arbitrium habent in delictis, quibus alia civitas aut ejus rector pecu

International Law, both the following propositions upon this question of Extradition :

1. That States are under an obligation to refuse an asylum to fugitive criminals.

2. That they are bound, if satisfied by examination of the prima facie guilt of the fugitive, to surrender him for trial to the country in which he committed the crime.

CCCLXVII. Nevertheless, the usage of nations has not accepted these propositions; nor is the opposite view without the support of eminent jurists, such as Puffendorf (h), John Voet (i), Martens (j), and others (k).

liariter læsus est, et quo proinde nomine ille illave ob dignitatem aut securitatem suam jus habent pœnæ exigendæ, secundum ea quæ ante diximus. Hoc ergo jus civitas, apud quam nocens degit, ejusve rector impedire non debet.

"Cum vero non soleant civitates permittere ut civitas altera armata intra fines suos poenæ expetendæ nomine veniat, neque id expediat, sequitur ut civitas, apud quam degit qui culpæ est compertus, alterum facere debeat, aut ut ipsa interpellata pro merito puniat nocentem, aut ut eum permittat arbitrio interpellantis; hoc enim illud est dedere, quod in historiis sæpissime occurrit. Neque obstant illa adeo prædicata supplicum jure et asylorum exempla. Hæc enim illis prosunt qui immerito odio laborant, non qui commiserunt quod societati humanæ aut hominibus aliis sit injuriosum."

Rutherforth follows Grotius's opinion, 1. ii. c. ix. s. 12. So also Heineccius in his Prælectiones.

Vattel, 1. ii. c. vii. pp. 75–6–7.

Burlamaqui, pt. iv. c. iii. ss. 23–29.

(h) Puffendorf, 1. viii. c. iii. ss. 23–4.

(i) Voet, De Statutis, 297. So too Klüber, t. i. c. ii. s. 66.

(j) Martens, 1. iii. ch. iii. s. 101. De l'Extradition d'un Criminel.

Story, Conflict of Laws, ss. 626, 627, 628, pp. 878-9-80.

As to the opinion of American lawyers, most of the reasoning on each side will be found very fully collected in the case of In the matter of Washburn, 4 John. Ch. R. 106; that of Commonwealth v. Deacon, 10 Serg. & Rawl. 123; Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Peter's R. 540–598; and that of Rex v. Ball, 1 Amer. Jurist, 997. The latter case is the decision of Mr. Chief Justice Reid of Canada. See also 1 Amer. State Papers, 175; Commonwealth v. De Longchamps, 1 Dall. 111, 115; U. States v. Davis, 2 Summer R. 482, 486.

1 Kent, Comment. pp. 35-38.

Merlin, Questions du Droit, tit. ETRANGER; Répert. du Droit, tit. SOUVERAINETÉ.

(k) "Profecto populum cogere ut hunc illumve prehendat nobisque

France, Russia, England, and the United States of North America, have constantly, either by diplomatic acts or decisions of their tribunals, expressed their opinion, that upon principles of International Law, irrespective of Treaty, the surrender of a foreign criminal cannot be demanded (1).

Mr. Chancellor Kent, however, expresses himself very strongly upon this subject; and, according to him, "It is the "duty of Government to surrender up fugitives on demand, "after the civil magistrate shall have ascertained the existence "of reasonable ground for the charge, and sufficient to put the "accused on his trial. For the guilty party cannot be tried "and punished by any other jurisdiction than the one whose "laws have been violated; therefore the duty of surrendering "him applies as well to the case of the subjects of the State "surrendering as to the case of the subjects of the Power de"manding the fugitive" (m); and it must be admitted that the English courts, even before the Treaties and Statutes hereinafter mentioned, appear to have held the doctrine that International Comity was sufficiently stringent to compel the surrender of the criminal. In the 29th year of Charles II., we find the following decision in the King v. Hutchinson:

remittat, nihil aliud est, nisi illum cogere, ut faciat aliquid, ad quod jure obstringi non potest.

"Si quæritur, quid peragatur a civitate, quæ consentit in deditionem profugi, respondemus eam tantum alteri auxilium ferre in exercitio juris quod in profugum habet. Auxilium ferre est actus benevolentiæ et comitatis, ad quem præstandum nemo perfecte est obligatus."--Kluit, de Deditione Profugorum, c. i. s. 1.

Tittman, in Strafrechtspf. p. 27: "Wenn das dieser Person schuldgegebene Verbrechen mehr aus einer Verletzung des politischen Systemes, als des Rechtes jenes Staates besteht, denn ist in solchen Fällen das Strafrecht an sich selbst noch zweifelhaft.”—Ib. c. ii. s. 10, p. 81, note. (1) Kluit, de Deditione Profugorum, c. iv. ss. 1, 3.

Heffler, 1. i. lxiii. p. 119. Recht der Auslieferungen.

Felix, 1. ii. t. ix. c. 7.

Coke's Institutes, iii. 180.

See Wharton's Conflict of Laws, ss. 940–945.

(m) 1 Kent's Commentaries, p. 37. But see Story on the Constitution of the United States, s. 1808, and note 2 thereon; Story on the Conflict of Laws, s. 628, and Coke's 3rd Inst. 380.