form, but out of the fact that by tyranny and oppression the historical authority has lost its legitimacy. The American congress of 1776 did not set forth that George III. was a king, and they wanted a republican government; they did not declare the colonies absolved from their allegiance to the crown of Great Britain, on the ground that republicanism is the natural right of every people, and no people can ever owe allegiance to a monarchy. The moral sense of the colonies and of the whole world would have been outraged by such a declaration. Even Mr. Jefferson adopted for his motto, not "Resistance to kings," but "Resistance to tyrants, is obedience to God." The congress, in setting forth to the world their reasons for dissolving the connection of the colonies with the mother country, did not draw up a list of facts which go to prove that George III. was a king, but a list of grievances which, in their judgment, proved him a tyrant; and it is not on the ground that he is a king, but that he is a tyrant, that they conclude the colonies are absolved from their allegiance to him, and are, and of right ought to be, free and independent states, on the principle, as they imply, but do not expressly state, that the tyranny of the prince absolves the subject from his allegiance.

Even on genuine American principles, the fact that the Magyars were rebels, or even rebels against monarchy in favor of democracy, was not enough to render them worthy of American sympathy. The defence of the American revolution is not that it resisted the king, but that it resisted the tyrant; not that it was a struggle for republicanism, but a struggle for liberty. Its glory is not that it resisted authority, but that it resisted tyranny, or an authority which had by its own conduct forfeited its rights; and that glory is neither enhanced nor diminished by the fact that it eventuated in the establishment of a republican form of government. The Magyars, therefore, whether they proposed to establish a popular form of government or not, before they could, on American principles, have any claim to the sympathy of Americans, or of anybody except rebels, cutthroats, and assassins, must prove that they were not resist ing legitimate authority, received as such by the laws and historical rights of the empire, but simply tyranny and oppression; that the emperor of Austria and king of Hun gary had by his long-continued misrule forfeited the alle giance of his subjects, and that only by casting him off

and taking up arms against him, could they shelter themselves from grievous oppression, and secure the enjoyment of the inalienable or natural rights of man. This they did not do, and this they, it is well known, could not do; for they were themselves the aggressors, the party that oppressed, or sought to oppress, both their sovereign and their Sclavic dependents.

It is precisely in its overlooking the doctrine we have here asserted, and in assuming the lawfulness of any rebellion against monarchy in favor of popular government, that we are obliged to except to Mr. Secretary Webster's defence of the sympathy manifested by the American government and people with the Magyar rebellion, in answer to Mr. Hülsemann's protest against it in the name of the Austrian government. We are not competent to enter into the intrinsic merits of the controversy between Austria and the United States. It may be that Austria had no just cause of complaint, but we may say, that Mr. Webster, in attempting to prove it, takes a stand which strikes us as extraordinary, indefensible, and extremely dangerous.

The facts in the case, as we understand them, are, that our government, sympathizing itself with the Magyar rebellion, and importuned by Magyar agents and a portion of our own people, pending the struggle of Austria to reduce the rebellious Magyars to their allegiance, sent a Mr. Dudley Mann as an agent, authorized, if after inquiry he judged it proper, to recognize the revolutionary government of Hungary, and to conclude a commercial treaty with it. Mr. Mann's instructions, drawn up in terms highly complimentary to the Magyar rebels, and any thing, to say the least, but respectful to Austria and her Russian ally, were subsequently communicated by the president to the senate, printed by its order, and as a matter of course published to the world. On their being published, Austria complains that sending such an agent with such instructions, drawn up in terms offensive to the imperial cabinet, was a violation of the policy of non-intervention, which our government professed; that the explanation given by Mr. Clayton, Mr. Webster's predecessor, that the agent was sent merely for the purpose of making inquiries, did not accord with the fact, for he was sent, as appears from the instructions themselves, with authority to recognize, if he saw proper, the Hungarian republic, and conclude with it a commercial treaty; and that even if it were so, it does not sufficiently

explain the cause of the anxiety that was felt to ascertain the chances of the revolutionists.

Mr. Webster replies, that, admitting the facts to be as alleged, they are no just ground of complaint, and says, that he "asserts to Mr. Hülsemann and the imperial cabinet, in presence of the world, that the steps taken by President Taylor, now protested against by the Austrian government, were warranted by the law of nations, and agreeable to the usages of civilized states." It must be so, we suppose, or Mr. Webster would not so solemnly assert it; but he must pardon us for telling him, that, if we take it to be so, it is on his authority, and not on his reasoning. We do not claim to be very familiar with the law of nations or the usages of civilized states; but it strikes us that Mr. Webster argues, instead of the case before him, another somewhat analogous to it. He speaks of our neutral duties, and contends that we did nothing not permitted to neutral nations. This may be so, but he cannot be unaware, it is presumed, that the law of neutrals does not strictly apply to the case of a struggle on the part of a sovereign to put down a rebellion against his authority. A nation is regarded as neutral when it does not intervene in a war between two belligerents, each of whom has the right of war and peace. It is neutral, because it sides with neither party in the war; but though not free as a neutral nation to side with either party in the war, it is free to recognize both parties in all other respects, and to maintain amicable relations with both, without giving offence to either. But in the case of a sovereign engaged in putting down a rebellion, there is for the nonintervening nation only one party, and neutrality requires at least two parties besides the neutral party. Independent nations are known, and in fact exist to each other, only through their respective governments. The nation is only in its sovereign authority, and relation can be had with its provinces or departments only in and through that authority. The fact that these provinces or departments are in a state of rebellion does not at all relax this rule, but, so far as it affects it at all, renders it more stringent and violations of it less pardonable. The presumption in all cases is, that the authority is in the right, and its rights are as sacred and inviolable when engaged in putting down a rebellion as at any other time, and it is for us the entire nation then, as much as when all its subjects are faithful to their allegiance. The nation, in view of the non-intervening power, is still

one nation, however rent by internal divisions, and is still in the sovereign authority. There is then no neutrality in the case, because the nation presents to the recognition of the non-intervening state only one party, and as long as this state chooses to abide by the policy of non-intervention, it must ignore the rebels, and maintain no sort of relations with them, because the recognition of them would be itself an act of intervention. There is, then, an obvious difference between the law of neutrals, and the law applicable to the conduct of non-intervening states towards a friendly power engaged in suppressing a rebellion among its subjects. Neutral nations may recognize and hold friendly intercourse with both belligerents, save in what directly relates to the war raging between them; but non-intervening states in a civil war can know and hold intercourse only with one party, the authority engaged in suppressing the rebellion. Even if we did nothing in the late Hungarian rebellion not permitted to neutrals in a war between two independent sovereigns, it does not therefore necessarily follow that we did nothing not permitted to a non-intervening state in a war waged by a sovereign to suppress a rebellion, or reduce his subjects to their allegiance.

The fallacy in the reasoning of many on this subject arises from their allowing themselves to consider the war only from the point of view of the rebels, and to look upon it as a resistance to aggression, in defence of acknowledged rights. Even conceding that there may be cases where this is so, the presumption always is that it is not so; for the presumption is always in favor of authority. The non-intervening state must always look at the war as a war legitimately waged by the sovereign to suppress rebellion, to assert his rights, and maintain peace and good order in his dominions. To go beyond this, to judge the sovereign, and to decide against him, and in favor of his revolted subjects, is itself an act of intervention, of which he has the right to complain, even though it is followed by no other act of intervention. Doubtless one nation may form and express a judgment on the conduct of another nation, and nay even go so far as to acknowledge the right and the independence of the rebel government, but not if it professes to remain on friendly terms with the authority rebelled against, and to take no part in its disputes with its subjects.

Mr. Webster says,-" If the United States had gone so far

as formally to acknowledge the independence of Hungary, although, as the event has proved, it would have been a precipitate step, and from which no good could have resulted to either party, it would not, nevertheless, have been an act against the law of nations, provided they took no part in her contest with Austria." But such recognition is itself a taking part in the contest, and a very grave part; for often the bare recognition by a powerful state of the independence of a revolutionary government may be decisive of the contest, the weight thrown into the revolutionary scale that causes it to preponderate, and without which it would not have preponderated. "It is not required of neutral powers," Mr. Webster adds, "that they await the recognition of the new government by the parent state. No principle of public law has been more frequently acted upon within the last thirty years by the great powers of the world than this. Within that period eight or ten new states have established independent governments within the limits of the colonial dominions of Spain, and in Europe the same thing has been done by Belgium and Greece. The existence of these states was recognized by some of the leading powers of Europe, as well as by the United States, before it was acknowledged by the states from which they had separated themselves." Conceding the facts here alleged, Mr. Webster's conclusion is not inevitable. The facts he cites hardly sustain him. What the United States may have done, as they are the party accused, must for the present be put out of the question, for no nation can say, when accused of violating the law of nations, I did formerly an act of the same nature as that of which I am now accused, therefore the act for which you arraign me is lawful. No one nation makes the law of nations, and the fact that one, two, or three nations, even though leading nations, have done this or that, is not sufficient to establish a precedent. No usage can be cited as a precedent, unless it has in its favor the general consent of Christian nations.

The instances Mr. Webster cites are either not in point, or at best doubtful as precedents. Belgium and Greece are not to his purpose. Belgium, for certain public considerations, was attached to the dominions of the king of the Netherlands by the allied sovereigns on the general pacification of Europe, after the defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo, and her independence, after her revolution, excited by that of France, in 1830, was acknowledged by the joint action of