Cambridge University Press, 1993 M01 29 - 204 páginas
This provocative book takes up and develops the themes of rationality and irrationality in Jon Elster's earlier work. Its purposes are threefold. First, Elster shows how belief and preference formation in the realm of politics are shaped by social and political institutions. Second, he argues for an important distinction in the social sciences between mechanisms and theories. Third, he illustrates those general principles of political psychology through readings of three outstanding political psychologists: the French classical historian, Paul Veyne; the Soviet dissident writer, Alexander Zinoviev; the great French political theorist, Alexis de Tocqueville.
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According achieve action American analysis argued argument asserts authority become behavior believe causal cause Chapter citizens common consider constitution contradiction create democracy democratic desires discussion distinction effect Elster equality example existence explain external negation fact finally function future give given habits hand human idea important individual instance interest internal kind lack later laws less limited logic means mechanisms mind motivations natural never object observation offers once opinion opportunities opposite passage passions person political positive possible preferences present principle psychology rational reason regime relation religion rule seems self-interest sense similar social society sometimes suggest taste tends theory things thought Tocqueville Tocqueville's true turn Veyne Zinoviev
Página 32 - Had the members committed themselves publicly at first, they would have afterwards supposed consistency required them to maintain their ground, whereas by secret discussion no man felt himself obliged to retain his opinions any longer than he was satisfied of their propriety and truth, and was open to the force of argument.
Página 33 - That combination obviously may be undesirable. A main task of a constituent assembly is to strike the proper balance of power between the legislative and the executive branches of government. To assign that task to an assembly that also serves as a legislative body would be to ask it to act as judge in its own cause. A constitution written by a legislative assembly might be expected to give excessive powers to the legislature.
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