our own ships, and we shall become the carriers of Europe. Heavy duties will be paid on all foreign articles which can be manufactured in this country, and bounties will be granted on the exportation (?) of our commodities; the manufactories will lift up their heads and rise to opulence and wealth."

RATIFICATION OF THE SHIPPING COMPACT.

James Madison has been called the "Father of the Constitution." He kept a private record of the debates of the Convention. With Alexander Hamilton, he shaped and arranged the provisions of the Constitution; and as leader in the House of Representatives, he offered the original measure for ship encouragement and protection-a heavy discriminating tonnage duty, calculated to favor the upbuilding of an American marine. The very first revenue act contained tariff discriminations in aid of tonnage duties, and a complete protective system was evolved in the course of time, thus ratifying and honoring the work of the Constitutional Convention. By the close of Washington's administration, the percentage of our carriage in our own commerce had risen from less than 25 per cent. to over 90. It became the talk of the country, that our successful navigation was the "child of protection."

In a pro-tariff speech in 1828, James Buchanan declared that “no interest belonging to this or any other country ever received a more continued or a more efficient protection than the navigation of the United States. I heartily approve this policy. I would not, if I could, withdraw from it an atom of the protection which it now enjoys.” . . "What, Sir, was the object of this legislative protection upon our tonnage and navigation? Let Mr. Pitkin and Dr. Seybert answer this question. Mr. Pitkin, in his View, declares that 'these extra charges on navigation and commerce of foreign nations, were sufficient to drive from our ports the greatest proportion of the for

eign tonnage. All foreign nations were affected by the system we had adopted in favor of the shipowners in the United States. The diminution of the foreign tonnage employed in our trade was, with very few exceptions, rapid, regular, and permanent.' Dr. Seybert, in his Statistical Annals, bears the same testimony. He states that, our discriminations operated powerfully in favor of our shipping.

All foreign nations were affected by the system we had adoptedit seemed to operate like magic in favor of the shipowners of the United States."" (1817-19.)

VIOLATION OF THE SHIPPING COMPACT.

As previously stated, the ports of the British West Indies were closed to our shipping. In 1818, our ports were closed to all vessels coming from ports or places not open to ours. By this regulation Congress intended to cause the British to respect our rights-if they received our products, to allow our vessels to take them. In 1820, a supplementary act was passed to meet a dodge of our adversary. The contest went into diplomacy, and into Parliament. In 1823, Norway passed an ordinance, and proposed, if we would meet it, to permit our vessels to enter Norwegian ports with cargoes from all the ports of the worldNorwegian vessels to be conceded a reciprocal privilege. Congress refused, it being then the law that foreign vessels could come from home ports only, this being found an essential protection. The British borrowed the idea of reciprocation and applied it to the West India dispute. Parliament enacted, in 1825, if we would admit British vessels with cargoes from all the ports of the world, then the King would open to our vessels certain ports of the West Indies, in direct trade. This proposition, so unfair as to be unvalued, was refused by Congress. Imagining that, if Congress would enact a measure honestly and fully reciprocal, the British ministry would accept it, and close the

controversy, the President, John Quincy Adams, urged Congress strongly to pass a bill, which became law in May, 1828, offering complete reciprocity to any country that would accept the principle of an open trade for vessels and cargoes from all parts of the world, no protective duties of tonnage or of tariff to exist on either side-nothing said about protective devices. It was an offer to all nations, but in particular to Great Britain, to suspend or do away with ship protection. It was argued that our vessels no longer needed protection, while Great Britain had so much advantage in her commercial relations everywhere, it was thought she would jump at the proposition, and Mr. Adams would go down in history as a masterly statesman-with Henry Clay. But Britain kept out of the trap for twenty one years, and until it was certain that the new policy suited her exactly, and was damaging, and would ultimately ruin the marine of the United States.

At this time, 1849, eighteen countries had made reciprocity conventions, and our percentage of carriage in our own commerce had fallen as follows:

66

In four years our loss of import carriage was ten per cent.; in twelve years (before the war) it was over twenty-one per cent. Some uninformed people say: Oh, yes, British iron tonnage played the mischief with our wooden ships." But any one can see, it was no merit of iron or demerit of wood that won or lost the contest. It was the senseless statesmanship of the Act of May, 1828, on the one hand, and the shrewd generalship of men like Ricardo, on the other, that held our government up for the world's derision. And now, the suffering of forty years finds the brains of legislators so dense that no one can feel assured that a thorough cure for our shipping malady will ever be administered. For, notwithstanding the tentative character of our act suspending not repealing—our original policy, it is proposed by the party in power to abandon constitutional principles, old land-marks, solemn compacts,

1849,

64

66

81.4;

66

66

68.9

BRITISH STATESMEN TAKE ADVANTAGE.

From these figures any one could see that the loss of our carrying trade was plainly indicated. David Ricardo pointed out in Parliament that the indirect voyages of ships paid the best, and England was losing much profitable business by not accepting the principle of our act of 1828. British merchants were established in every port of the world, and, if they made shipments to the United States from non-British ports, they were obliged to freight American vessels. So the British "navigation act" was navigation act" was reformed," we reciprocated, and with the following immediate results to our carriage in our own commerce:

unrepublican and un-American measures -a policy of gift and graft.

Our maritime reciprocity" conventions-(we have none with Great Britain for indirect trade)—provide for termination on a year's notice by either party. We are the only nation continuing these conventions at a sacrifice of its marine. We are the only nation honestly observing their spirit as well as letter. No nation is openly asking us to continue the "reciprocity" system for its benefit. An unmistakable reason for wanting the new-fangled policy is private interest, not the public good; selfish considerations, not the national welfare. In plain words, the Republican platforms of 1896 and the work of its candidate, favored returning to regulations of commerce, but after the election an influence ap

peared that dictated a "subsidy" policy in lieu of the discriminating-duty plan, publicly promised before election. Ten years of delay-precious time taken from our own people and given to foreignershave supervened, Congress trying meanwhile to please, not the convention delegates and voters of the country, but the appreciated people that furnished campaign contributions for the defeating of Bryan and silver." A policy thus introduced cannot be good.

SUBVENTION AND ITS COSTLINESS.

It is pretended that a "subvention" or gift system will bring forth and maintain an adequate marine in a way quite pleasing to our rivals. If it will make good, will it not cost more than our taxpayers will consent to spend? It is no answer to allege that our country is rich and our people can afford the expense. The maritime States of our Union were promised a special sort of ship protection, which history proves was satisfactorily effective, and which cost nothing. Besides this, that promise and agreement are the only grounds for the action of Congress; for the shipping trade cannot say to all other occupations: "Put your hands into your pockets, and support me," and have the country pay attention to it. The "Hanna-Payne" bill, 1898, did thus lift up its voice, but its day soon passed. It mattered not to its sponsors and expectant beneficiaries that the will of the people was adverse; they wanted "aid" from the Treasury by fair means or foul. They pointed to the ability of the country to stand the drain as sufficient answer to all objections, while this fact should cut no figure at all. The prospect of expenditure killed the bill.

Let us now inquire the cost of the pending plan. Taking Taking an adequate marine at 7,000,000 tons, at $5 per ton, the "subvention" would be $35,000,000 annually. Adding for mail lines, we might have about forty millions annually for entire marine in foreign trade. In two

and a half years this would amount to $100,000,000; in twenty-five years, to $1,000,000,000; in a century, to four billions of dollars! Ship protection must be perpetual. An end to the system at any time will put an end to growth; decline will come, and ruin follow. Would there be any wisdom in establishing this system, for a while, even if it worked admirably? The first war of any consequence with a rival would cause suspension of the subvention for years, and make an end of it, with ruin to the shipping interest, and waste of millions to the Government.

But, say the advocates of this scheme, less than $10,000,000 will be required for subvention in any year. This sum would pay owners of 2,000,000 tons only. We had over that registered as in foreign trade in 1854. In 1860, we had 2,379,396 tons-requiring $11,896,980-engaged in carrying an export and import commerce of $507,247,757. In 1905, our foreign commerce amounted to 2,636,074,349 tons. Two millions of tons would carry less than 20 per cent. of it. Any one may note, that subvention advocates are either underestimating the efficiency of their system, or calculating that it will ease the passage of the bill to hoodwink Congress and the country as to annual expenditure; or acknowledging that the method will not make good to the extent of a proportionate carriage of 70 to 80 per cent. of our own commerce, and a consequent expenditure of thirtyfive to forty millions of dollars. If it is to prove of little efficacy, then it will not be worth enacting. On the other hand, if the system operates effectually, its cost alone should prevent its adoption-as a source of evil, without a justification under the Constitution.

THE CHARACTER OF THE SCHEME.

There is no denying the fact that the character of the scheme is plutocratic, whereas the constitutional plan is democratic. The President says, we are not

to be ruled by "plutocrats," but he should have a care, for he seems partly converted to their shipping remedy, notwithstanding its unconstitutionality; its irrelation to the cause of disablement; its want of adaptation and of power; its cost if successful; and in spite of the fact that its adoption would make permanent a pernicious change in our Constitution; would endorse and ratify its violation in 1828; and virtually says to foreign nations, "You may have and enjoy our commerce and navigation if you please -all we will do about it is to operate a gift policy, and let it go at that. No regulations shall incommode you, we will cut out that part of our Constitution for the love of liberal government."

Is this a proper attitude for the head of the Government of the United States? We can imagine the people of the maritime States responding: "Mr. President, we ask for upright dealing on the part of the Federal Government; we entered the Union under a compact for ship protection by the regulation of commerce; we have observed our part of this compact, by surrendering our right to make regulations for ourselves and turning the matter over to the nation; but in violation of this compact and of our sacred right, the Government, in 1828, suspended our lawful ship protection, and has since allowed our marine to be ruined for want of it, our carrying trade going to our rivals. Take notice, Mr. President, that now, and henceforth, we demand our constitutional rights; we insist on navigation laws,' proper and effectual. The proposal to pay subvention money is a snare and delusion, and an imposition upon the taxpayers. Do us justice, Mr. President, or resign the chair of Washington." Does any one think the people will not say "Amen!" to this accusation?

THE INUTILITY OF SHIP SUBVENTION.

The theory of a subvention system is that the freights of the world go to the

lowest bidders. This is now far from being true. It is nearer the truth to say that preference rules engagements. Suppose the subvention enables an American ship to compete in rates as low as any other, then, unless she have the preference, the owner or underwriter of cargo, controls the choice of vessel. A British owner of cargo, or a British underwriter, prefers the British ship; and so of other nationalities. All the subvention can accomplish in such a case is to put the American ship on the freight market. But she cannot exist on subvention, and must have work to do. Nor can she use her subvention to underbid her rivals, for she must have that to compensate her economic disability, according to theory.

Suppose, on the other hand, an American ship was in an Argentine or Brazilian port, and our commerce was regulated, as prior to 1828, so that only Argentine, Brazilian or American ships could bring cargoes from those countries; or we had a protection by tonnage duties so that British and other foreign ships would be limited in their competition with ours in such cases; then, practically, all foreign competition would be with the vessels of Argentine or Brazil, as the case might be. Our ship, thus having a fair chance, would then get work, as of old, without cost to the people.

As the world's freighting stands to-day, in every port there is a "combine" or "ring" that has secured all the business, either by rebate, or "chartered ahead," or long-time contracts; and outsiders of whatever flag have no chance to compete. What can subvention do in such cases? Really, the freight market is only nominally open. Proper regulations of trade would break up all combinations and rings formed to control transportation, by closing these markets. Subvention with prayers can do nothing towards this work. Indeed, these be the days of contracts in the commercial world. All the exports of any country may be contracted for by merchants-British

mainly-owning the tonnage to carry the merchandise to its various markets. What chance will there be in a struggle for freights under these conditions by the subventioned American ship? About as much chance as a hawk has to subsist by picking the talons of an eagle.

If the freights belonging to our vessels shall not be regulated into them, as in our coastwise, lake, and river service, we have now nearly as much of a seagoing marine as we shall ever obtain. Concerns like the Standard Oil, or the Sugar-Trust, or a few transcontinental railroads, will be the principal beneficiaries of a subvention system, as they are situated to furnish or command employment for their vessels. But it is not for concerns like these that the Government should go out of its way to "aid” from the Treasury. A sufficiency of postal lines should form a part of the marine, but with the foregoing we would not have one-fifth of an adequate capacity.

THE SUPREME QUESTION.

So it comes to this, there will be no adequate marine until the Government of the United States takes up again the specific performance of its compact with the people. Foreign shipping is now carrying 93 per cent. of our commercelast year amounting to $2,636,074,349. A high British authority, M. G. Mulhall, estimates average sea-freights at 8

our

per cent. of value of goods. This would make our freight-bill $210,885,951, and the amount paid foreign shipping $196,123,934. The subvention bill would not reduce this drain to any extent. Talk about "reduction of the tariff "-until we have an adequate marine, only the tariff maintains our balance of commerce, by keeping out the flood of imports, that would quickly destroy all our boasted "prosperity." While we carried more than two-thirds of our commerce, we could import beyond our export mark, now we cannot with safety. It takes over four hundred millions annually to balance commerce-in exports or money. This measures the penalty that our country must pay for the disgraceful dependency induced by bad faith on the part of our Government-violating its solemn compact to protect our shipping and continuing a ruinous unprotective policyin the interest of foreign nations. Ever since the Civil war, we have stood where we stand to-day, in dependency and peril, knowing not the time when a movement of the nations may bring disaster and dismay, solely for the want of a merchant marine of our own, and held to this hazard simply because our servants of the House and Senate will not repair a breach of compact with their own people. Americans! the supreme question is, WHAT SHALL WE DO ABOUT IT?

Denver, Colo.

WILLIAM W. BATES.

railroad corporations are the natural results of rulership by a small coterie of stock-gamblers, who by operations in Wall street have become the holders of controlling interests in the companies.

in the art of stock-gambling. Their vast wealth has not come to them as a reward for meritorious service in managing the transportation of the country. but through ability to forecast the fluctuations in the