preservation of public tranquility, her Majesty's Government are desirous of withdrawing it as soon as the state of the country and the organization of proper means for the maintenance of the Khedive's authority will admit of it. In the mean time, the position in which her Majesty's Government are placed towards his Highness, imposes upon them the duty of giving advice with the object of securing that the order of things to be established shall be of a satisfactory character, and possess the elements of stability and progress." And in a letter to Sir Evelyn Baring on the following day Lord Granville shows what he meant by "giving advice" (a "charming euphemism," according to Lord Milner). He says that he "hardly needs to point out” that in all important matters it is "indispensable" that the "advice" given "should be followed," and that recalcitrant native ministers should be removed. In other words, when he used the term "advice" he did not mean it, and the phrase "desirous of withdrawing" was employed in the same Pickwickian sense, and frequently repeated with like intent by succeeding statesmen. Why is it that a nation cannot behave like a gentleman? Lord Cromer's explanation of the change of front made by Great Britain in her recent admission of her intention to hold Egypt permanently is rather difficult to follow. He admits that "a policy of immediate evacuation was possible," if all efforts at reform were abandoned (Blue Book of 1905, page 3). But should a man, or a nation, break its word, whenever it sees a chance of reform" involved in the breach? Perhaps an attempt to reform itself on the score of veracity would have a happier effect on the world at large than any self-imposed task of reforming another people. "The British Government, being at the time imperfectly acquainted with the nature of the task which they had undertaken, had given an engagement that their occupation of Egypt should be of short duration," he continues. But since when has an im

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perfect knowledge of the nature of a task justified a breach of contract, except in the case of non-competents? This is what we call in America pleading the baby-act. England had every possible opportunity for understanding the situation, and nothing has happened which was unexpected. No. She gave her word and she broke it. There was no excuse for it, and it has always been believed by the most intelligent people in Egypt that she never meant to keep it. But to proceed. What is the arrangement under which England has seen fit to announce her intention to remain in possession, and upon which Lord Cromer congratulates all concerned. It is the agreement made between Great Britain and France on April 8, 1904, by which the permanent occupation of Egypt was admitted. At the same time France received a quid pro quo elsewhere, and later a consent of the same kind was given by the other great European Powers. How far France was indemnified for her consent, it is impossible to state, but she was in the position of knowing that the party with whom she was dealing would remain in Egypt whether she consented or not. Presumably she signed the agreement to "save her face," and accepted a hopeless situation with as good a grace as she could. But however this may be as to France, how is it with regard to Egypt? Lord Cromer admits that France was not the only party concerned. The original engagement to withdraw was not made expressly with France." But whomsoever it was made with, it was of supreme interest to one country and to one country alone, and that country, Egypt, was never consulted. The engagement was modified by "mutual consent," says Lord Cromer. "Mutual consent" is another "charming euphemism."

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Such, then, were the reasons for the entry of Great Britain into Egypt and such her excuses for remaining there. Has it been a chapter of history which justifies boasting of an imperial "race,"

as Lord Cromer does in his last report? This boast, by the way, invites attention to the fact that in this story of successful finance the chief names, Baring, D'Israeli, Goschen, Wolff, are not English, and that Lord Milner is said to have been born a German subject. But English or non-English, does the story invite emulation and is it a model for other ambitious nations to adopt? There are many careers which a nation, like an individual, may follow, but that of collecting fraudulent and usurious debts cannot take a high rank among them. We despise such dirty work in a man, why not, then, in a nation? Signs are not wanting that some of our American statesmen are anxious to. embark upon similar missions. Let them understand the character of such work clearly before they commit our government to it. The people who are most active in endeavoring to "develop" backward countries by obtaining concessions and franchises are almost always adventurers. "Avoid ... the solicitors of concessions and the shady financiers thirsting for gold," says Lord Cromer in an interview in Gil Blas, forgetting that his own chief work has been the enforcing of claims which have just such an origin. These "shady financiers," whether it be in

Africa or South America secure their foothold by bribery and usury and make their terms with the authorities upon the express recognition of a great risk of loss. Then, when this risk which they took with their eyes open promises to turn against them, they are clamorous for their government or some other government to step in in the mixed character of deputy-sheriff and pawnbroker, foreclose their dubious securities, and in the name of patriotism, tax the unfortunate laboring-classes of these countries to the very limit of their endurance. It is degrading work, and a strong protest should go forth before the American people assume such functions. Let it once be clearly understood that the recovery of foreign debts is no part of the duty of our government, or of any government, and all of this speculative exploiting of feeble peoples will cease, and capital will come to them when they are ready for it. Legitimate commerce can embrace the whole world without necessitating the subjugation of any race, but the following up of speculators with battleships and armies is a new and debasing exercise of the power of government. Let us avoid the rôle of "bailiff in possession." ERNEST CROSBY. Rhinebeck, N. Y.

THE

HE LICENSE system, as applied to the liquor traffic, has had a long, fair trial. It has been tried with the modifications of high license, low license, medium license, heavy restrictions and light restrictions. It has been administered through excise boards and through courts. It has been supported by two powerful political parties for a long time in full control of every function of State

and Federal Government, a support rarely accorded to any system or policy. The license system, in a word, has had the fairest trial that need be accorded to any system to determine its value or its effect upon government. Whatever benefits, therefore, are to be claimed for the licensed saloon ought now to be apparent. But there are no benefits to individual, collective or national life in that

system, to offset the widespread social disorder, criminality, pauperism, increased taxes and decreased security to life and property, directly traceable to the licensed liquor traffic. Even the political supporters of the license system impliedly admit its failure by frequent changes in the license laws of states where the system is still maintained.

Shall prohibition be given a fair trial? If so, several things must come to pass. In addition to the majority demanding prohibition, the experiment must be supported at the hands of political friends. As high-tariff advocates would not be content to place the execution of their tariff laws in the hands of free-trade advocates, regardless of the strength of tariff sentiment, or the overwhelming vote in its favor, so it is not unreasonable to ask that prohibition be placed in the hands of its political friends in order to be able to properly judge of its final merits as a system and its effect upon the collective and individual life of our people.

Not only this, but the functions of government, both State and Federal, must be brought to support the experiment. No correct conparison of the relative merits of prohibition, compared with the license system, can be made, until all the governmental powers which supported the former system support the latter.

It therefore becomes important to inquire to what extent prohibition has had a fair trial. In scarcely any particular has it been accorded even a fighting chance. It is difficult for advancing civilization to break through the incrustations of traditions and customs of ages past, and it becomes a double task when the enemies of reform are allowed the control of the functions of government, established upon the triumphs of earlier movements, to oppose further progress. As monarchical influences hampered and impeded a fair trial of a republican form of government in Europe, and every beneficiary of a throne was quick to aid in the sup

pression of the rising spirit of freedom, so the avowed license policy generally prevailing, and maintained heretofore with but few exceptions, by those politically in control of all branches of our government, has impeded and prevented a fair trial of prohibition in any State, much less portions of States. At no time and in no place have all the powers of government, State and Federal, been turned to the support of prohibitory laws. Until this is done and a reasonable time has elapsed to permit of results growing out of the changed conditions, final judgment as to the best method of reducing to a minimum point, the widespread evils of intemperance now generally prevailing, is not to be considered. Two features need to be particularly noted in this connection, the first dealing with interstate commerce powers, and the second with the taxing powers of the Federal Government as related to internal revenue.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE.

The States have the right, under their reserved police powers, each State acting only for its own territory, to prohibit the liquor traffic, so far as State powers extend. But the power to regulate interstate commerce was vested in Congress exclusively by the adoption of the Federal Constitution. Therefore, until Congress passes a law permitting the States to legislate to affect intoxicating liquors as soon as they reach prohibited territory, such liquors may be shipped from any license State into any portion of the prohibited territory of another State, and the receiving State is powerless to legislate to affect such shipments until after they reach the "original consignee," as was decided in the Original Package decision. The present condition of the law relating to intoxicating liquors, as affected by interstate commerce, therefore is that:

If every State of the Union but one should pass prohibitory laws, and that one should remain a license State, in

toxicating liquors could be shipped legally from that one license State into all prohibition territory, as is now almost universally done to the extent that prohibition area prevails.

The passage by Congress of the Hepburn-Dolliver measure, or some similar measure, relating to the shipment of intoxicating liquors from one State to another, is necessary, for one thing, to permit of a fair trial of prohibition in the States.

The refusal of Congress thus far to pass such a measure has had a two-fold effect.

1. It permits the "nullifiers" of State law, both inside and outside of prohibited territory to connive to use the interstate commerce powers to prevent a fair trial of prohibition, whereby the will of the people is defeated.

2. It discourages each State, having part local-option area and part license area, from enacting anti-jug laws to prevent the shipment of intoxicating liquors from license counties of a State into localoption counties of the same State. Members of State legislatures argue that they are not called on to cripple the brewing and distilling interests in the license portions of their own States to favor similar interests in adjoining States.

The result of all this is that while existing prohibition area cannot, through governmental functions, interfere with license area, license area is allowed, through interstate commerce, to annul prohibitory laws. The friends of law and order in prohibition area are not only required to contend with the lawless within the prohibited area, but with "outside nullifiers" as well.

Take for illustration of this matter the situation in Maryland. More than half of the counties of the State are under local-option. That is to say, more than half of the voters in those local-option counties have constitutionally declared after a long trial of the license system, that they want prohibition and do not want liquor sold in such counties. But

Baltimore city brewers and distillers supply a large jug-trade in the localoption counties, shipping by railroads and steamboats. While the condition is much improved in such local-option counties by the abolishment of the open saloon, the people realize they have not given a fair trial to prohibition and cannot do so as long as the jug-trade from Baltimore is maintained. The desire of the voters in these counties to get rid of this jug-trade is stronger than the original sentiment which resulted in voting out the open saloon through the referendum. Maryland has the legal right to pass a law prohibiting shipments of intoxicating liquors from Baltimore city into the localoption area of the State, as such shipments, arising within the State and ending within the State, do not fall within the interstate commerce powers vested in Congress. But the lawmakers of the Maryland legislature argue they are not called on to hamper the brewing and distilling interests of license portions of their own State to favor the liquor interests in adjoining States. When Congress gives Maryland and other States the right to protect their prohibition territory from shipments originating in other States, they will be encouraged to protect their local-option counties from shipments arising in license portions of the same State.

TAX-RECEIPT QUESTION.

Congress was given the power, under Section 8 of Article 1 of the Constitution, along with other powers, to raise internal revenue "To pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States." It is clear by the very terms under which that power was vested in Congress that to merely raise money to "pay the debts" of the Government was not the only object to be considered. In the exercise of the taxing power Congress was to hold in view also "the common defence and general welfare of the United States."

Under this constitutional provision

Congress has passed, at various times, three internal-revenue measures taxing the liquor interests. The first exercise of the power, as applied to retail liquordealers, was the Act of June 5, 1794, in which, in addition to certain taxes on production, it was provided that retailers of wines and foreign spirits be "licensed." Eight years thereafter the law was repealed.

On August 2, 1813, another internalrevenue measure was passed affecting retailers of wines, spirituous liquors and foreign merchandise. That law was repealed a few years later. No further exercise was made of the taxing power vested in Congress, as affecting the liquor interests, until the period of the Civil war, when the present internal-revenue act (since amended several times), was passed on July 1, 1862. It required all retail dealers in liquors, including distilled spirits, fermented liquors, and wines of every description, to pay a a "tax" of $20 yearly (by amendment later raised to $25) and receive therefor a "license" (by amendment in 1866 named Tax Receipt) to show that such "taxes" had been paid.

The Act of 1794, recognizing the police powers reserved in the States, contained the following provision: "Provided always, that no license shall be granted to any person to sell wines or foreign distilled spirituous liquors, who is prohibited to sell the same by the laws of any State." The Act of 1813 contained the following provision: "Provided always, that no license shall be granted to any person to sell wines, distilled spirituous liquors, or merchandise as aforesaid who is prohibited to sell the same by any State."

Twice, therefore, before the passage of the Act of 1862, did Congress clearly recognize that, in addition to the right to raise revenue to "pay the debts" of the Government, its taxing power should be exercised in a manner to promote "the common defence and general welfare of the United States." Congress refused to give countenance to outlawry

in the States or encourage it in any way. The provisions contained in those measures clearly show that the Senators and Representatives who had been given place and power by the States, felt they should do nothing to interfere with the powers which the States had clearly reserved. Therefore they provided that if the applicant for a Federal "license" could not show he had complied with the liquor laws of his own State, he could. receive no encouragement in his lawlessness by the Federal Government.

The Act of 1862 also recognized the police powers of the States in the following words: "No such license shall be construed to authorize the commencement or continuance of any trade, business, occupation or employment therein mentioned, within any state or territory of the United States in which it is or shall be specially prohibited by the laws thereof, or in violation of the laws of any State.

While the provisions of this Act differ from the prohibiting clauses contained in the two previous interna-lrevenue Acts of 1794 and 1818, it would do great injustice to the memory and motives of those who passed the latter Act, as well as to the memory of President Lincoln who approved it, to say they meant to reverse the constitutional precedents contained in previous acts, in which the action of the Federal Government, under its taxing powers, was made to conform to the action of the States. They certainly never contemplated that the Act of 1862 would be retained in times of peace and long after the necessities which produced it had disappeared, and interpreted in a manner to give "aid and comfort" to the enemies of State law.

But the Treasury Department, contrary to all precedent and all analogy, has interpreted the War-Revenue Measure of 1862 to mean that it must treat the violators of State liquor laws, whether in license or prohibition territory, with the same consideration and protection as those who are conducting a legal business.