you describe the history of a Minute before it is submitted to the House of Commons?-It would usually arise from either an apparent need of a greater measure of assistance to schools, or from the need of settling some question which had provoked a great deal of correspondence. A certain number of letters would probably be received from private correspondents, or the official correspondence might raise the question. The Lord President, after a certain length of time, would give instructions, probably to the Secretary, to draw up the draft of a Minute, which would be confidentially printed and circulated among the members of the Committee, and very often remarks would be made upon it, and when finally settled a Committee would be called at which that Minute would be passed, and then laid upon the table of the House of Commons." SUPPLEMENTARY RULES. "86. We have heard a good deal of late of supplementary rules; when did the practice of making supplementary rules first commence in the Education Office?—The supplementary rules were really in the nature of instructions and directions; a Minute is framed as concisely as may be, and the details are left to be supplied in practice; those Minutes circulate all over the country, and it is necessary, in order to transact business with precision, that there should be directions to the persons who have to act under those Minutes, as to much that is not expressed in the Minutes themselves; that is done sometimes by letters of instructions to the inspectors; but, in the particular case of the Code, it was done by what were called supplementary rules, which might, however, equally well have been called instructions to the inspectors. "87. But you have not answered my question as to when that practice of supplementary rules first began?-The actual words 'supplementary rules' were used I think about twelve months ago, with reference to certain rules which were printed in explanation of the Revised Code, but the term was a simple accident; the practice of instructions to the inspectors dates as far back as the Minutes date back; there never was a Minute in which there were not instructions to the inspectors upon it explaining to them the scope of the Minute, and the mode of administering it. rules assumed very much the importance of Minutes, and have they not had as much influence in the mode of carrying out the education of the country as some of the Minutes themselves? The process of administration undoubtedly is that of a judge-made law; you pass a Minute, and a practice arises under it; that practice becomes generalised, and those generalisations become subordinate rules, but very often of equal importance with the primary ones. It is under every Minute as it is under an Act of Parliament. "90. Is it not a fact that some of the supplementary rules which have been issued have been inconsistent with the Minutes to which they referred?—I should say not. "91. How were those supplementary rules decided on; was the process the same as with the Minutes? The supplementary rules were decided upon chiefly between the Secretary and the VicePresident; in the working of the Revised Code, they represent really the generalisation of decisions which arose in the daily practice of the office. "92. Then I infer from that answer that, with regard to those supplementary rules, the Lord President was not consulted?—I really cannot answer that question for certain, but in the main I should say that he was not consulted. "93. And therefore, of course, the Committee were not consulted?-Certainly not the Committee." Official Correspondence. "143. Referring to one of the earlier questions, may I ask you in whose name is the correspondence conducted with the managers of schools relating to annual grants on the part of the office? In the name of the Committee of Council. "144. You have stated, have you not, that the annual grants pass only through your hands, and not through the hands of the Lord President?— All the ordinary cases would pass through my hands, or the hands of officers serving under me, only; but, with regard to any case that raised any unusual question, it would rest with myself to carry it to the Lord President or the VicePresident, according to the date of which we may be speaking. "145. Then would the form of correspondence with the school managers at that time, and with reference to that subject, be in your own name or in the name of 'My Lords?'-Always in the name of 'My Lords.' "88. Were those instructions to the inspectors similar in principle and in form to the supplementary rules which have been issued of late?— They are not similar in form; but they are in "146. So that the managers of schools who principle. might be in correspondence with the office would "89. Have not several of those supplementary have nothing to lead them to suppose that they were not in communication with the Committee of Council as a body, instead of with yourself personally as Secretary?-No; they would have nothing to lead them to that inference. 1856, I should think that I might have done so, but not on letters of any importance, certainly. "249. You have never done it since?-To the best of my recollection, I have not; but, again, I should wish to put in the limitation as to questions of any importance. There is no doubt that in the mode of filling up any particular form, or in the mere details of administration, I may have done it. "250. You have stated that the supplementary rules were generalisations from questions of prac tice that had arisen in the office. Were those questions of practice individually decided by yourself, or were they individually decided with the assistance of the Vice-President?—I should imagine that in cases where the question was in the least degree new, I took them to the VicePresident. "147. They would be under the impression, when they received an answer to a letter saying, 'My Lords decided so and so,' that the question upon which they were in correspondence had been submitted to the Committee, or to the Lord President, or to the Vice-President, or to some members of the Committee, and not to yourself only?—The general question would always have had some superior authority to my own upon it. The given Minute under which the case fell, or the given rule which disposed of the case, would always have been sanctioned by the superiors of the office, but it would have rested with me to judge whether or not the given case fell under the rule or the Minute. If I felt no doubt, I "251. For instance, Rule 7 states, that 'a dehave always considered (and I believe the prac-duction of at least one-tenth will be made from tice is the same in other Departments) that for the grant to a school (not being one for infants the purposes of daily business the permanent only), if no class be represented above Standard officer is trusted with the name of the Depart-III.' Did that condition originate with yourseli, ment, as he might be with a common seal. He uses it on his own responsibility, and, if he misuses it, the appeal lies to his chiefs; but in the great mass of daily business, it is impossible in every given case to carry each letter to the head of the Department. "148. Then with regard to school managers who conceived that they were not fairly dealt with, what means would they have of satisfying themselves that their case had not been submitted to the Committee of Council, because they would be under the impression, receiving the communication in that language, that it meant what it expressed, and that their case had been decided by the Committee of Council?-In every Department I imagine the same thing would happen; that practically their case had been decided by the Committee of Council in this sense, that the Secretary, who had not actually referred it, felt certain that if he did refer it, it would be decided in that way; but I never (to the best of my belief) in my life received a letter in which a correspondent said, 'I wish you would take this to the Lord President of the Council,' which I did not at once take, however trivial I might think it, and however certain I might be of the answer." SECRETARY'S POWERS. "248. With reference to your own personal part in the government of the office, have you ever decided alone upon letters of instructions, or upon supplementary rules of any kind?-Upon letters of instructions in former years before or with the Vice-President, or with the Lord President, or with the Committee of Council?— Those supplementery rules were discussed between myself and the Vice-President; they grew up by degrees. "252. That is to say, they grew up out of individual cases which were presented to you for decision?-They grew up out of the reports of the inspectors, shewing that the children had been presented either under Standard I., or under Standards I. and II. "253. Surely that cannot be with respect to Rule 7, for it says, 'A deduction of at least onetenth will be made from the grant to a school (not being one for infants only), if no class be presented above Standard III.'-Yes; but the cases which suggested the necessity of a rule were those cases in which whole schools had been presented under the lowest standards of all. The point to be settled was, what should be the minimum that should satisfy the Committee of Council in the examination of a school, and it was settled that managers ought to present at least one class above a certain minimum; but the cases that had raised that question were cases where all the children had been presented either under the lowest or the two lowest standards. "254. Had it never occurred to yourself, or to the Vice-President to your knowledge, at the time that the Revised Code was under discussion, that such a question must of necessity arise?—I should not have expected that any one would have presented a whole school under the lowest standard.” Diminution of Grants. "271. With respect to diminution of grants, is that always done by the Vice-President ?-The inspector, in his report, says whether he recommends the grant to be paid in full, and if his recommendation is that it should not be paid in full, his report, after being looked to by the Examiner, or by the Assistant Secretary, or by myself, as it passed through our hands, would not necessarily be referred to the Vice-President. "272. You would settle the amount of diminution without reference to the Vice-President?If the inspector recommended it; and if, looking to his report, it seemed to be prima facie justifiable, I should sign that letter without reference to the Vice-President. the earlier examinations under the Revised Code; I really do not know for certain that I did not take this St Michael's case to him, but I was in daily communication with him about the class of questions which it raised, and if I had not taken this individual case it was not at all that I alone was directing generally the mode in which such cases was to be treated. "280. But that reduction, when it was made, you communicated to the managers as the decision of 'My Lords?'-Yes; every decision is communicated in that form, by whomsoever it may be made. "281. Supposing a case to be decided by yourself on your own responsibility, and communicated to the managers as the decision of 'My Lords,' and supposing that the managers protested or remonstrated, do you invariably take remonstrance to the Vice-President, or do you sometimes reply that 'My Lords adhere to their decision?'--I should consider that I had discretion to give that answer that 'My Lords' adhered to the decision, if I felt perfectly certain what the "274. Have you never done so?-I may have decision would be, and that it was in conformity done so. "273. Supposing that the inspector did not recommend it, or only recommended it in a less degree, would you still, if the facts seem to justify such a course on your part, refuse the grant without reference to the Vice-President?— I do not think that I should. "275. Do you remember the case at St Michael's, Coventry, of Mr Morell, the Roman Catholic inspector, who was dismissed?—Yes. "276. In that case, was not the grant reduced against or without any justifiable report on the inspector's part?-1 should not admit that; it was reduced without his recommendation, but his report shewed, if I recollect rightly, that the whole of the children, some of whom were 16 or 17 years of age, with the exception of a very few, had been passed under the Standard I.; and on those facts, I believe, that the grant was in the first instance refused. "277. It was refused by you without reference to the Vice-President, was it not?-It was refused by me, I believe, without reference to the VicePresident. "278. But did you not afterwards withdraw that refusal ?—On further correspondence, a number of statements were made as to the new state of the school, and the refusal was withdrawn or modified; I do not recollect at this moment what was the precise decision, but at any rate some grant was made. "279. And was that done by you without reference to the Vice-President?-The later steps were taken after reference both to the Lord President and the Vice-President. This particular grant was at first refused, if I recollect rightly, by myself. I should mention that I was in daily communication with the Vice-President about VOL. II. | with precedent. "282. Supposing that the managers remonstrated again and again, would the decision of the case still be conducted by you, and would the complaints never be made to my Lords at all?— I believe that, in any case, I should take a continued remonstrance to the Vice-President; but, in a case in which I felt no sort of doubt and which had been decided several times over in the same way, in all the earlier stages of the remonstrance, I should make that answer on my own responsibility. "283. And you would give no intimation to the managers that it was you, and not my Lords, who were deciding the matter?—No. "284. Practically, therefore, you would shut them out by their own ignorance from any appeal from your decision to that of my Lords?-Of course it will always be in their power to write to the Lord President or the Vice-President; and I am, of course, speaking of the exercise of that discretion under which I hold my office, and for exercising which rightly I am responsible; but I can conceive cases in which I should exercise that discretion without referring the matter further, although the point might be a reduction or refusal of the grant, if I felt no doubt of it. "285. And yet, upon the face of your letter, there would be no kind of indication to lead the managers to believe either that the decision was not that of my Lords, or that a remonstrance coming back from them would not proceed U so made by you, the responsibility which the heads of the departments are said to have to Parliament would be simply fictitious and illusive ?-No, I think not; because Parliament would call upon them, and upon them only. If beyond the Secretary's hands?—There would be nothing on the face of the letter to shew that. "286. As a matter of fact, are you not aware that managers in the country generally believe that all decisions which are stated to be made by my Lords are the decisions of my Lords?-II have taken the responsibility of deciding cases. should not think that any one who is familiar with the dispatch of public business in very large departments could ever imagine that the greater part of it goes to the head of the office. without coming to them, I am answerable to them, and on their proving that I have decided alone, I should, of course, if they were dissatisfied with my decision, remain open to any punishment or censure which they might think right under the circumstances to inflict. I do not fictitious, by any act which a permanent officer may have done in that way. "287. Should you think that country clergymen generally are familiar with the dispatch of public business in very large departments?-No. | think that their responsibility is rendered at all "288. Then country clergymen generally, and managers of that class, would be under the impression, would they not, that the decision that you sent to them as the decision of my Lord's was the decision of my Lords?—Yes, very often, perhaps, that might be so; but, qui facit per alium facit per se, in that sense, it would be, really, the decision of my Lords. "289. If they wrote on the covers direct to the Lord President, thinking that would not be opened at the office, such a remedy would not occur to them, because they would naturally believe that anything like that would come to the eyes of the great Officers of State, of whom the Secretary was ostensibly only the instrument? Yes, I can conceive that they might form that opinion. I think that the degree in which they would form it would very much depend upon the knowledge of the world which they possessed. "290. Do you not think that, considering who the managers of schools are, and the sacrifices which they have often made, it would be fair that they should have, in a case so nearly concerning their own interests, a direct appeal from your decision to that of the officers who are responsible to Parliament for the conduct of the office ?-I think that, in every instance where the case fairly admitted of doubt, it would be my duty, and I believe that I have always discharged that duty, to carry the case to my superior officers. "291. Still, would it not be a matter wholly for your discretion, and for your judgment, whether the case did admit of the doubt which should give to the managers this species of appeal to which I have referred?—I think that it must always rest in the judgment of the chief executive officer to exercise that discretion, as regards a large number of cases, where the current business of the office is large. "292. And of course for the decision which is "293. At all events there might be very conceivably a strong difference of opinion between the managers on the one side and yourself on the other, as to whether a decision refusing them a grant was a right interpretation of the Minutes which have been laid before Parliament; might not that be the case?—Yes. "294. And if it was the case, would it not be decided against them entirely by you, without the intervention of any other officer whatever, if you had no doubt upon the subject ?—My freedom from doubt ought to be expressed in this way: if I had no doubt as to the mode in which my chiefs would decide it. "295. But at all events they would be entirely in your hands, and would be entirely subject to the soundness of the certainty which you entertained upon the intentions and wishes of your chiefs ?-Again, I cannot admit that conclusion. They have many remedies; they have their own Members of Parliament, and they can write directly to the heads of the office. Supposing that they took none of those means whatever, and that they accepted my letters, so far they would be in my hands. "296. You state that they could write directly to the heads of the office, but I think that you answered the Honourable Member for Bradford. that according to the headings of your letter, they are required to write to you?—Yes, to the Secretary. "297. Has it never happened that letters have been addressed to your office, complaining of acts of administration, and that those letters have not been answered, and that then letters of complaint have been addressed to the Lord President or to the Vice-President?-Yes." ד ON THE INUTILITY OF LOGIC. F the subjects which now form the curriculum of arts in our University system, there is one, we think, which, without loss or detriment to education, might be well struck out of the list, and this is Logic. Various definitions have been given of logic, some of them of a very highsounding, pretentious character; let us take the common one, viz., that logic is the "art of reasoning," founded, no doubt, on some considerations called the theory or the science of reasoning. Now, an art consists of a system of rules calculated to lead to the performance of that process correctly to which the art refers; in the present case to reasoning. Admitting, then, that the rules of reasoning have been well laid down by logicians as in rigid conformity with soundness in that process, still our position is that these rules are wholly and entirely unnecessary, inasmuch as we do that by our very nature which these rules would profess to enable us to do by art. By the constitution of our physical being, we are, it will be admitted, walking creatures, just as we are, by the constitution of our mental being, reasoning creatures. Now, as in the former case we get the use of our legs, or learn to walk by exercise in walking, without reference to rule, so in the latter case we get the use of our minds, or learn to reason, by exercise in reasoning, without reference to rule. If an accomplished anatomist were equal to the task of assigning the precise action and tension of every muscle in the body connected with the exercise of walking, that would, no doubt, be regarded as a very clever performance; and so it would certainly be, as a display of anatomical talent. It would, notwithstanding, be a very useless one, as regards the act of walking, inasmuch as it would contribute in no degree to our walking more gracefully, or with greater stability, than we naturally do under a total ignorance of all such knowledge. The same, we maintain, holds good in the act of reasoning. Though an accomplished metaphysician, if such there be. could give an analysis of the intellectual process of reasoning with as much correctness and precision as a mechanician could determine the parts and analyse the action of a complex machine, yet no one who has ever attentively considered the working of his own mind in the act of reasoning, will for a moment affirm that such knowledge would have the least control over him in that process by which, under the simple con duct of Nature's own guidance, he arrives at clear and certain conclusions, from sound premises, through the unfettered, unruled exercise of those mental endowments by which he thinks and reasons, remembers and judges. In perfect conformity with these views, we find it admitted, in the Introduction to the Port-Royal Logic, that "All these operations are performed naturally, and oftentimes better, by those who are unacquainted with the rules of logic, than by those who know them." Hence it is that logic as a study makes so feeble an impression upon the mind, as having any value in its maxims worthy of being remembered. In the same work, as above referred to, we have accordingly this admission : "For experience shews, that of a thousand young men who learn logic, there are not ten who remember anything of it six months after they have finished their course." Seeing, then, that the rules of logic, though fully got up, are so soon forgotten, and that by following the guidance of our rational nature we reason as well without them as with them, it would seem to follow, that though the study of logic were given up, education would lose nothing whatever affecting its essential elements, or suffer in any degree in the philosophical soundness of its general structure. Believing, then, as we most firmly do, that the study of logic serves little or no purpose in the way of improving the powers of the understanding, or in guiding them in their search after truth, its place in the curriculum, as it appears to us, would be very advantageously filled up if given to modern literature. What a field for high culture here, and plentiful exercise too for improvement in reasoning; and this not by rules, through which the power of reasoning can never be acquired, but through the guiding influence of examples or models of the thing itself. Just as we could never acquire the power of mathematical reasoning by any system of rules, however well concocted, but can very easily, naturally, and thoroughly acquire it by giving due attention to the beautiful models which we have of it in Euclid's Elements of Geometry. It would be impossible to estimate the immense advantages which an able man might confer on a class of young men, having the grand subject of modern literature as the text for study. What models and opportunities for high intellectual and moral culture! What a field abounding in every variety of human attainment, rich in every phase |