a secure base for reasoning. To compare the value to the individual of different classes of pleasures and pains, we must understand something of the nature and relations of the faculties affected. To understand their importance to the community, we must have a clear view of the nature of the social organisation. Otherwise our attempts at calculating the consequences of action leave out the only element by which unity can be given to the resulting system. We may roughly sum up the evil consequences produced by a murder to its victim, and the people more indirectly affected. But we cannot treat the question scientifically till we can analyse the nature of the moral disease of which the murderous impulse is a symptom, and of the morbid social conditions which generate murderers. Thus the method is as crude as, in some cases, the results are unworthy. With Bentham the altruistic impulses are still scarcely admitted, as he contemplates society as a mere aggregate of jostling individuals. Virtue is scarcely intelligible, for he identifies the moral with the 'popular' sanction, and says that 'popular' is the best name as most indicative of the constituent causes.' That is, virtue means simply the average belief of mankind as to what will produce the greatest quantity of happiness. Though the doctrine may be, in a sense, true, it is but a rough approximation to any tenable theory upon the subject. 140. The attempt to found a scientific system of morality was thus doomed-not indeed to failure, for it stimulated further enquiries—but to remain in the stage of crude empiricism. That it produced so vast an impression is due to the fact that it was in reality a first step towards a more systematic and satisfactory conception, and to the other fact, that the doctrines which it opposed were not really better founded, though put forward with higher pretensions, with pretensions which were becoming rapidly untenable. Bentham's influence on morality was destructive of many phantoms which were still going about in spite of Hume's more searching scepticism, and if its constructive efficacy was not great in the sphere of speculation, it encouraged the adoption of profounder methods. Mr. Mill describes in his 'Autobiography' See vol. i.' Principles of Morals,' &c., p. 14, and Table of Springs of Action,' p. 195. the immense effect which the perusal of one of Bentham's treatises produced upon his mind, by holding out prospects of useful effort in the cause of mankind. With all Bentham's faults, he gave a vast stimulus, if only through his disciples, to others who were wearied of the old effete assumptions, and longing for more fruitful methods of enquiry. But here, again, I must pause on the threshold of a new era. To discuss the relations of Benthamism to the scientific morality of which we may hope that later thinkers have at least laid the foundations, is a task not here to be attempted. NOTE TO CHAPTER IX. The principal authorities for the above chapter and the editions cited are as follows: BALGUY, John (1686-1748), 'Letter to a Deist,' 1726. 'Foundation of BENTHAM, Jeremy (1747-1832), ' Principles of Morals and Legislation,' BROWN, John (1715-1766), 'Essay on Characteristics,' 1751. Third BUTLER, Joseph (1695-1752), 'Sermons on Human Nature,' 1726. Works. CLARKE, Samuel (1675-1729), 'Demonstration of Being and Attributes 6 COCKBURN, Catherine (1679-1749), 'Remarks on Foundation of Mo- FORDYCE, James (1711-1751), 'Elements of Moral Philosophy,' 1754. HARTLEY, David (1705-1757), 'Observations on Man,' 1749. 1791. London: HOME, Henry (Lord Kames), (1691-1782), 'Essay on Principles of HUME, David (1711–1776), ' Treatise of Human Nature,' 1740, vol. iii. LAW, William (1686 1761), 'Remarks on Fable of the Bees.' Works. PALEY, William (1743-1805), Moral Philosophy,' 1785. Works. Lon- PRICE, Richard (1723-1791), ' Review of Principal Questions on Morals,' 1758. Second edition. London : 1769. RUTHERFORTH, Thomas (1712-1771), 'Nature of Obligations,' 1744. 'Institutes of Natural Law,' 1754. SHAFTESBURY, Lord (1671-1713), 'Characteristics,' 1708, &c. Edition of 1723. SMITH, Adam (1723-1790), ' Moral Sentiments,' 1759. Tenth edition : 1804. TUCKER, Abraham (1705-1774), Light of Nature,' 1768-78. London : 1834. WATERLAND, Daniel (1683-1740). WOLLASTON, William (1659-1724), 'Religion of Nature delineated,' 1722. Sixth edition : 1738. * UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA. 130 CHAPTER X POLITICAL THEORIES. 1. INTRODUCTORY. I. AT some future day, if the aspirations of philosophers are justified, there will be a science of sociology. We shall unravel the laws of growth of the social organism, and determine the conditions of its health or disease. Then, and not till then, it will be possible to present political science as a coherent body of doctrines, deduced from certain axioms of universal validity, but leading to different conclusions according to the varying conditions of human society. We shall be able to say what form of government is most favourable to the happiness of a nation at any given period of its development. Then we shall have at once a firm base for our speculations, and the utmost possible flexibility in their application. We shall see how to reconcile justice and expediency; and establish the rights of man, not as conflicting with considerations of utility, but as logical consequences of the laws of social health. Hitherto, reasoning has been alternately purely empirical and purely abstract. Political machinery, of a more or less satisfactory kind, has evolved itself out of the blind conflict of selfish or patriotic passions. Institutions which enable men to secure the main objects of life have been slowly established; and a few empirical principles have come to be widely accepted, though not yet combined into any satisfactory system. But we are still so far from possessing anything like a science of politics, that most of the current maxims involve conceptions which could hardly find place in a scientific system. Fragments of the old theories by which men endeavoured to explain the origin of government, or to show how it might be best administered, still perplex our discussions, and hinder the attempt to lay a sound foundation of theory. 2. The difficulty of discovering anything approaching to an historical development of political theory is the greater, inasmuch as theories have followed, more than they have guided, events. Happy is the nation which has no political philosophy, for such a philosophy is generally the offspring of a recent, or the symptom of an approaching, revolution. During the quieter hours of the eighteenth century Englishmen rather played with political theories than seriously discussed them. The interest in politics was chiefly personal. References to general principles are introduced in rhetorical flourishes, but do not form the basis of serious argument. In the mass of pamphlets and speeches which fill our library shelves it is rare to find even a show of political philosophy. The Tory argument is that De Foe has been put in the pillory; the Whig argument is that the French wear wooden shoes. Walpole's friends rail at the Pope and the Pretender; and Bolingbroke's friends abuse the Excise and the Hanoverian subsidies. Generalities about liberty, corruption, and luxury are equally convenient for filling the interstices of either set of arguments. To discover from such materials what are the real political views of the writer would be a difficult task; and the investigation belongs rather to the historian of facts than to the historian of thought. In the earlier part of the century there are but one or two books which fairly belong to the speculative order; and even in the more stirring times which preceded the French Revolution the political philosophy of the time is generally imbedded in discussions of concrete facts. A brief account of the few writers who refer most distinctly to general principles will sufficiently indicate the general set of the currents of political thought. 3. In the absence not only of a science of sociology, but of a belief that such a science was possible, men might fall back upon the old theological synthesis. Here, as in ethical speculations, the hypothesis of a divine interference simplified all questions. If the king was the representative of the Deity in secular as the priest in ecclesiastical matters, all discussion was at an end. In a sense higher than the technical the king could do no wrong; his right to rule could never be |