why restrictions have been placed in a few mines. Wherever restrictions were placed for any other purpose our organization has always taken a stand against it and compelled the men to wipe it off their books if passed by their locals.

In regard to the number of men after a machine, I will say that rule was established when there was no union in the state of Illinois. That system is as old as machine mining is in the state of Illinois, and the operators have not protested against it in any other district or state conventions. I cannot understand why they should come here and enter a protest against something that has been going on in the state of Illinois for over twenty years to my knowledge.

In the foregoing sections, treating of the machine question, it appears that the equalization of turns is one of the means by which the output of machines is restricted, though not designed for that purpose. Since, however, equalization of turns prevails in pick mines as well as machine mines, the treatment of the subject and its bearing on output will be taken up apart from the treatment of machines. The Illinois agreement contains the following sections:

Twenty-eighth. The operator shall see that an equal turn is offered each miner, and that he be given a fair chance to obtain the same. The checkweighman shall keep a turn bulletin for the turnkeeper's guidance. The drivers shall be subject to whomever the mine manager shall designate as turn-keeper in pursuance hereof.

In mines where there is both hand and machine mining an equal turn shall mean approximately the same turn to each man in the machine part of the mine, and approximately the same turn to each man doing hand work; but not necessarily the same to each hand miner as to each man working with the machine.

The subdistrict agreements are as a rule silent upon the subject, as most of the Illinois mines have free turns, or an unlimited-turn system. That is to say, where each man can get all the cars he wants to load he has no objection to other men's wanting and getting more. The third-vein subagreement in Illinois says:

Except in the case of a closed room or room driven for air, or when an unlimited turn prevails, no miner shall have a "free turn,” either day or night, or more than his share of cars.

The equality of opportunity in the mines, or of "turn,". which means number of cars brought to the face of a miner's working-place in a given time, is one of the sticking points with a miner. His

education upon this point dates from years ago when, under a system of "truck stores" or "company houses," it is claimed the miner who did not live in a company house or deal at the company store, or some store where the company got a commission on sales, did not get enough cars to fill during the day to pay him for going into the mine. There have been times in Illinois, and elsewhere, when a miner would stay all day in a mine and never get a pit car to load. Discrimination against individuals in the matter of "turns" was used to drive men who had been active in strikes, or organizations, out of the mines. It was more subtle, more effective, and less likely to become public than a blacklist. Moreover, the pit boss could use it to get even with men personally distasteful to him. One acquainted with the abuses of "turns" practiced upon miners in former years cannot wonder that those abuses have had the effect of making the miners very uncompromising on this point. Overcrowding of mines and the advent of the "tonnage-getter," added to the old objections to free turns, make it difficult for the average miner to see that he is not surrendering his opportunity to live to the mere whim or like or dislike of a mine manager or a pit boss when he surrenders his right to equal turns of pit cars in a mine.

UNITED STATES DEFARTMENT OF LABOR,

BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS

ETHELBERT STEWART

XXXV

THE HART SCHAFFNER & MARX LABOR

AGREEMENT1

THE are

HE parties whose names are signed hereto purpose entering into

an agreement for collective bargaining with the intention of agreeing on wage and working conditions and to provide a method for adjusting any differences that may arise during the term of this contract.

In order that those who have to interpret this instrument may have some guide as to the intentions and expectations of the parties when entering into this compact, they herewith make record of their spirit and purpose, their hope and expectations, so far as they are now able to forecast or state them.

On the part of the employer it is the intention and expectation that this compact of peace will result in the establishment and maintenance of a high order of discipline and efficiency by the willing coöperation of union and workers rather than by the old method of surveillance and coercion; that by the exercise of this discipline all stoppages and interruptions of work and all willful violations of rules will cease; that good standards of workmanship and conduct will be maintained and a proper quantity, quality, and cost of production will be assured; and that out of its operation will issue such coöperation and good will between employers, foremen, union, and workers as will prevent misunderstanding and friction and make for good team work, good business, mutual advantage, and mutual respect.

On the part of the union it is the intention and expectation that this compact will, with the coöperation of the employer, operate in such a way as to maintain, strengthen, and solidify its organization, so that it may be made strong enough, and efficient enough, to

1 Published by the company, 1916. J. E. Williams, Chairman of the Board of Arbitration. See Earl Dean Howard, "The Development of Government in Industry," Illinois Law Review, Vol. X (1916), pp. 567–573.

coöperate as contemplated in the preceding paragraph; and also that it may be strong enough to command the respect of the employer without being forced to resort to militant or unfriendly measures.

On the part of the workers it is the intention and expectation that they pass from the status of wage servants, with no claim on the employer save his economic need, to that of self-respecting parties to an agreement which they have had an equal part with him. in making; that this status gives them an assurance of fair and just treatment and protects them against injustice or oppression of those who may have been placed in authority over them; that they will have recourse to a court, in the creation of which their votes were equally potent with that of the employer, in which all their grievances may be heard and all their claims adjudicated; that all changes during the life of the pact shall be subject to the approval of an impartial tribunal, and that wages and working conditions shall not fall below the level provided for in the agreement.

The parties to this pact realize that the interests sought to be reconciled herein will tend to pull apart, but they enter it in the faith that by the exercise of the coöperative and constructive spirit it will be possible to bring and keep them together. This will involve as an indispensable prerequisite the total suppression of the militant spirit by both parties and the development of reason instead of force as the rule of action. It will require also mutual consideration and concession, a willingness on the part of each party to regard and serve the interests of the other, so far as it can be done without too great a sacrifice of principle or interest. With this attitude assured it is believed no differences can arise which the joint tribunal cannot mediate and resolve in the interest of coöperation and harmony.

SECTION I. ADMINISTRATION

This agreement is entered into between Hart Schaffner & Marx, a corporation, and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, and is effective from May 1, 1916, to April 30, 1919.

OFFICERS OF THE AGREEMENT

The administration of this agreement is vested in a Board of Arbitration and a Trade Board, together with such deputies, officials,

and representatives of the parties hereto as are now or hereafter may be appointed for that purpose, whose duties and powers are hereinafter described.

BOARD OF ARBITRATION

The Board of Arbitration shall have full and final jurisdiction over all matters arising under this agreement, and its decisions thereupon shall be conclusive.

It shall consist of three members, one of whom shall be chosen by the union, one by the company, and the third shall be the mutual choice of both parties hereto and shall be the chairman of the Board. It is agreed that the Board as constituted under the old agreement shall be continued during the present agreement, William O. Thompson being the choice of the union, Carl Meyer the choice of the company, and J. E. Williams, chairman, being chosen by agreement of both parties.

It shall be the duty of the Board to investigate, and to mediate or adjudicate, all matters that are brought before it and to do all in its power to insure the successful working of the agreement. In reaching its decisions the Board is expected to have regard to the general principles of the agreement; the spirit and intent, expressed or implied, of the parties thereto; and, especially, the necessity of making the instrument workable, and adaptable to varying needs and conditions, while conserving as fully as possible the essential interests of the parties involved.

The line of practice already developed by the Board shall be continued. This contemplates that questions of fact and testimony shall in the main be considered by the Trade Board, while the Board of Arbitration will concern itself mainly with questions of principle and the application of the agreement to new issues as they arise. But this is not to be construed as limiting the power of the Board, which is broad enough to make it the judge of facts as well as principle when necessary and to deal with any question that may arise whose disposition is essential to the successful working, of the agreement,

By agreement between the chief deputies cases may be heard and decided by the chairman of the Board alone.