conferred the power of borrowing money on the government, and, by making that government supreme, have shielded its action in the exercise of that power from the action of the local governments. The grant of the power, and the declaration of supremacy, is a declaration that no such distraining or controlling power shall be exercised.

III. THE UNITED STATES vs. GRATIOT.

Reported in Peters' Reports, Vol. XIV., year 1840.

It has been held by this court to give the widest scope to the action of Congress. M'CULLON VS. THE STATE OF MARYLAND, 4 Wheaton, 422; AMERICAN INS. Co. vs. CANTER, 1 Peters, 542. Under it, territorial governments of vast expense and complicated political powers have been formed; the whole management of the public domain rests upon these few words; lands have been ceded for special purposes; limitations have been fixed. on the sovereign powers of the States; school lands are set aside; timber and salt springs are kept for public use; and the spots on which many of our fortifications and public buildings are placed are permanently secured. All this has been done, in repeated instances, for nearly sixty years. To confine the language of the Constitution, therefore, to a mere delegation to Congress of a power to sell the territory, or to examine and prepare it for sale, is evidently an unwarranted restriction upon it. If a wider authority be conferred, none would seem more legitimate than this limited and restricted power of leasing, for short periods, the mines that might from time to time be discovered. The inference that it would lead to the establishment of a numerous tenantry within the States is less an argument on the language of the Constitution than a supposition that Congress might wantonly abuse a delegated trust: it might be used with equal force against all the clauses of the Constitution which give power to that body.

IV. THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND VS. MASSACHUSETTS.

Reported in Peters' Reports, Vol. XII., year 1838.

In the construction of the Constitution we must look to the history of the times, and examine the state of things existing when it was framed and adopted, to ascertain the old law, the mischief and the remedy.

This court exists by a direct grant from the people of their judicial power; it is exercised by their authority, as their agent, selected by themselves, for the purposes specified. The people of the States, as they respectively become parties to the Constitution, gave to the judicial power of the United States jurisdiction over themselves, controversies between States, between citizens of the same or different States, claiming lands under their conflicting grants, within disputed territory.

The Supreme Court has jurisdiction of a bill filed by the State of Rhode Island against the State of Massachusetts, to ascertain and establish the northern boundary between the States, that the rights of sovereignty and jurisdiction be restored and confirmed to the plaintiffs; and they be quieted in the enjoyment thereof, and their title, and for other and further relief.

Jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine the subject matter in controversy between parties to a suit; to adjudicate or exercise any judicial power over them.

V. SEARIGHT vs. STOCKTON AND STOKES.

Reported in Howard's Reports, Vol. III., year 1845.

Under the acts of Congress ceding to Pennsylvania that part of the Cumberland road which is within that State, and the acts of Pennsylvania accepting the surrender, a carriage, whenever it is carrying the mail, must be held to be laden with the property of the United States, within the true meaning of the compact, and consequently exempted from the payment of tolls.

But this exemption does not apply to any other property conveyed in the same vehicle, nor to any person travelling in it, unless he is in the service of the United States, and passing along in pursuance of orders from the proper authority.

Nor can the United States claim an exemption for more carriages than are necessary for the safe, speedy and convenient conveyance of the mail.

VI. THURLOW vs. COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS.

Reported in Howard's Reports, Vol. V., year 1847.

Laws of Massachusetts, providing that no person shall presume to be a retailer or seller of wine, brandy, rum or other spirituous liquors, in a less quantity than twenty-eight gallons, and that delivered and carried away all at one time, unless he is first licensed as a retailer of wine and spirits, and that nothing in the law should be so construed as to require the county commissioners to grant any licenses, when, in their opinion, the public good does not require them to be granted.

Of Rhode Island, forbidding the sale of rum, gin, brandy, &c., in a less quantity than ten gallons, although in this case the brandy which was sold was duly imported from France into the United States, and purchased by the party indicted from the original importer.

Of New-Hampshire, imposing similar restrictions to the foregoing upon licenses, although in this case the article sold was a barrel of American gin, purchased in Boston and carried coastwise to the landing at Piscataqua Bridge, and there sold in the same barrel.

All adjudged to be not inconsistent with any of the provisions of the Constitution of the United States or acts of Congress under it.

VII. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

OSBORN AND OTHERS, Appellants, vs. THE PRESIDENT, DIRECTORS AND COMPANY OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES.

Reported in Wheaton's Reports, Vol. IX., year 1824.

The act of incorporation of the Bank of the United States gives the Circuit Courts of the United States jurisdiction of suits by and against the bank.

This provision in the charter is warranted by the third article of the Constitution, which declares that "the judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made under their authority."

The Circuit Courts of the United States have jurisdiction of a bill brought by the United States, for the purpose of protecting the bank in the exercise of its franchises, which are threatened to be invaded under the unconstitutional laws of a State; and as the State itself cannot, according to the eleventh amendment of the Constitution, be made a party defendant to the suit, it may be maintained against the officers and agents of the State, who are entrusted with the execution of such laws.

A State cannot tax the Bank of the United States; and any attempt on the part of its agents and officers to enforce the collection of such tax against the property of the bank, may be restrained by injunction from the Circuit Court.

The bill filed in this cause was exhibited in the court below, at September Term, 1819, in the name of the respondents, and signed by solicitors of the court, praying an injunction to restrain RALPH OSBORN, Auditor of the State of Ohio, from proceeding against the complainants, under an act of the legislature of that State, passed February 8th, 1819, entitled "An act to levy and collect a tax from all banks and individuals and companies, and associations of individuals that may transact banking business in this State, without being allowed to do so by the laws thereof." This act, after reciting that the Bank of the United States pursued its operations contrary to a law of the State, enacted, that if, after the 1st day of the following September, the said bank, or any other, should cortinue to transact business in the State, it should be liable to an annual tax of 50,000 dollars on each office of discount and deposit.

VIII. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

BROWN AND OTHERS, Plaintiffs in Error, against THE STATE OF MARYLAND, Defendant in Error.

12 Wheaton's Supreme Court Reports, 419.

Error to the Court of Appeals of Maryland.

This was an indictment in the City Court of Baltimore against the plaintiffs in error, upon the second section of an act of the legislature of the State of Maryland, passed in 1821, entitled "An act supplementary to the act laying duties on licenses to retailers of dry goods, and for other purposes. The second section of the act provides, "that all importers of foreign articles or commodities, of dry goods, wares or merchandises, by bale or package, or of wine, rum, brandy, whiskey, and other distilled spirituous liquors, &c., and other persons selling the same by wholesale, bale or package, hogshead, barrel or tierce, shall, before they are authorized to sell, take out a license, as by the original act is directed, for which they shall pay fifty dollars; and in case of neglect or refusal to take out such license, shall be subject to the same penalties and forfeitures as are prescribed by the original act, to which this is a supplement." The penalties and forfeitures prescribed by the original act, which was passed in 1819, were a forfeiture of the amount of the license tax, and a fine of one hundred dollars, to be recovered by indictment.

The defendants having demurred to the indictment, a judgment was rendered upon the demurrer against them, in the City Court, which was affirmed in the Court of Appeals, and the case was brought, by writ of error, to this court.

An act of a State legislature requiring all importers of foreign goods by the bale or package, &c., and all other persons selling the same by wholesale, bale or package, &c., to take out a license, for which they shall pay fifty dollars, and in case of neglect or refusal to take out such license, subjecting them to certain forfeitures and penalties, is repugnant to that provision of the Constitution of the United States, which declares that "no State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any impost or duty on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws;" and to that which declares that Congress shall have power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, and with the Indian tribes."

IX. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

WESTOVER BRIDGE Co. vs. ToWN OF BRATTLEBORO, &c.

Reported in Howard's Reports, Vol. VI., year 1848.

A bridge, held by an incorporated company, may be condemned and taken as part of a public road, under the laws of that State. This charter was a contract between the State and the company, but, like all private rights, it is subject to the right of eminent domain in the State.

The Constitution of the United States cannot be so construed as to take away the right from the States.

Nor does the exercise of the right of eminent domain interfere with the inviolability of contracts. All property is held by tenure from the State, and all contracts are made subject to the right of eminent domain. The Constitution is, therefore, not violated by the exercise of the right.

The Constitution of the United States intended to prohibit all such laws impairing the obligation of contracts as interpolate some new term or condition, foreign to the original agreement.

Property held by an incorporated company stands upon the same footing with that held by an individual, and a franchise cannot be distinguished from other property.

Mr. WEBSTER and Mr. COLLAMER, for the plaintiffs in error, remarked: This court is never called to decide a State law unconstitutional in the abstract. It must have a case before it, and the question is, is it constitutional as construed and applied in the case by the State court? If it were not so, the State courts have but to take a State law, good on its face, and construe it to cover cases, however grossly unconstitutional, and there would be no redress, as it might be said. The law is good, but the decision is bad, but that is not within the jurisdiction of this court. The only way is to treat the statute as the State court has treated and applied it in the case, and then to consider whether, for such a purpose, it is constitutional. Such has been the course in this court. A law may be constitutional for some purposes, and not for others. (GOLDEN vs. PRINCE, 3 Wash. C. C. R. 313.) The statute of Maryland, levying a tax on any bank put in operation in that State without the consent of its legislature, was not decided as unconstitutional in the abstract. It was undoubtedly good as to private banks, or those of other States; but when it was applied by the State courts to a branch of the United States Bank, then this court decided that, for that purpose, it was bad, being unconstitutional. (M'CULLOH vs. MARYLAND, 4 Wheaton, 235.) The statute of New-York, granting the exclusive navigation of its waters by steam vessels, was, by this court, holden as unconstitutional, as applied to vessels coming from without the State. (GIBBONS vs. OGDEN, 9 Wheaton, 209.) Indeed, the words of the United States statute are carefully adapted to such an object. It provides not merely that this court is to pass on the constitutionality of the State law, but on any authority excrcised under any State. If, then, it appears that, in this case, the plaintiffs' rights have been invaded by any authority under the State, or by any law of the State repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, the decision of the State court must be reversed.