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1. A contract in writing, by which a mining company agrees to sell and
deliver lead ore from time to time at the smelting works of a partner-
ship, to become its property upon delivery, and to be paid for after a
subsequent assay of the ore and ascertainment of the price, cannot be
assigned by the partnership, without the assent of the mining com-
pany, so far as regards future deliveries of ore. Nor is the mining
company, by continuing to deliver ore to one of the partners after the
partnership has been dissolved and has sold and assigned to him the
contract, with its business and smelting works, estopped to deny the
validity of a subsequent assignment by him to a stranger. Arkansas
Valley Smelting Co. v. Belden Mining Co., 379.
2. A proposition to pave streets in a municipality, made in writing by a
contractor to the head of a board consisting of several members which
by law was charged with the care and paving of the streets, although
considered and agreed to by the head of the board, and although by
his directions the secretary of the board wrote under it that it was
" accepted by order of the board" and affixed his signature as secre-
tary thereto, is not a “contract in writing signed by the parties
making the same,” if the action of the secretary was made without
official acceptance of the proposition by the board, and without
authority from them to write it. Brown v. District of Columbia, 579.
3. On the facts in this case the court holds : (1) that the alleged contract
with the board of public works was not a valid contract; (2) that it
was never ratified by the board ; (3) that, it was never ratified by
Congress ; (4) that the portion of the plaintiff's claim which was for
work performed was rejected by the board of audit, and that the
Court of Claims was therefore without jurisdiction to entertain it. Ib.
4. Analyzing the contract which is the subject of litigation, and which is
set forth at length in the opinion, this court holds that the court below
was in error in sustaining and allowing against Robbins, Rollins's
claim for the payment of the two mortgages or deeds of trust, and
subrogating him to the rights of the mortgagees Low, and the Mutual
Benefit Life Insurance Company; and that the deed of subrogation
from the latter company to the German-American Savings Bank was
wrong and unauthorized, and should be vacated and declared void
without the necessity of the intervention of a cross-bill for that pur-
pose. Robbins v. Rollins, 622.
5. On the proof in this case the court holds that the plaintiff has failed to
show such an agreement as can be made the basis of a decree in her
behalf. Nickerson v. Nickerson, 668.
See ATTORNEY'S LIEN;
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA;
RAILROAD, 1, 2.
1. A bill in equity filed in the Circuit Court of the United States in 1882
by a stockholder in a New York corporation, whose corporate term,
expired in 1878, to correct a deed of land in North Carolina made to
the corporation in 1853, is barred by the statute of limitations in North
Carolina, and by the general principles of courts of equity with regard
to laches, unless a better reason for not instituting the suit earlier is
given than the one given in this suit. Taylor v. Holmes, 489.
2. A stockholder in a corporation which has passed the term of its corpo-
rate existence, and has long ceased to exercise its corporate franchises,
who desires to obtain equitable relief for it, must, in order to maintain
an action therefor in his own name, show that he has endeavored in
vain to secure action on the part of the directors, if there are any, or
to have the stockholders elect a new board of directors, and must dis-
close when he acquired his interest in the corporation. 16.
3. If a corporation by negligence cancels a person's stock, and issues cer-
tificates therefor to a third party, the true owner may proceed against
the corporation to obtain the replacement of his stock, or its value,
without pursuing the purchaser or those who hold under him. St.
Romes v. Levee Steam Cotton Press Co., 614.
See ConstiTUTIONAL LAW, A, 2.
This court has power, and it is its duty, to issue writs of attachment, for
costs here against persons who intervene in this court by leave of
court, and also against their sureties, in bonds for costs furnished by
them by order of court on intervening. Craig v. Leitensdorfer, 764.
See JURISDICTION, B, 4.
COURT AND JURY.
1. In this case, which was an action for damages for a death caused, in a
collision, by the alleged negligence of the owner of a vessel on which
it was claimed the deceased was a passenger, the judgment below is
reversed for error in refusing to direct a verdict for the defendant on
the ground that there was no evidence that the deceased lost his life
by reason of the collision, or by the negligence of the defendant, and
in refusing to grant the request of the defendant to go to the jury on
the question whether the deceased lost his life by reason of the col- ·
lision. Providence and Stonington Steamship Co. v. Clare, 45.
2. In the courts of the United States the presiding judge may, in submit-
ting a case to the jury, express his opinion on the facts; and when no
rule of law is incorrectly stated, and all matters of fact are ultimately
submitted to the jury, such expression is not reviewable on writ of
error. Rucker v. Wheeler, 85.
3. In this case there was no error in the charge of the court to the jury. Ib.
1. Tissue paper, mainly if not exclusively used for making letter-press
copies of letters or written matter, when imported into the United
States, is not subject to duty as “printing paper,” under Schedule M,
§ 2504 Rev. Stat., but as “other paper not otherwise provided for."
Lawrence v. Merritt, 113.
2. Goods made of calf hair and cotton were imported in November, 1876.
The collector assessed duties on them at 50 cents a pound, and 35 per
cent ad valorem, as upon goods made of wool, hair, and cotton, under
Schedule L of $ 2504 of the Revised Statutes, p. 471, 2d ed. The
goods contained no wool. The importer protested that the goods were
liable to less duty under other provisions. In an action to recover
back the alleged excess paid, the defendant, at the trial, sought to
support the exaction of the duties under the first clause of $ 2499,
commonly called the “siinilitude" clause. Held, that this was a proper
proceeding under the pleadings in the case. Herrman v. Arthur, 363.
3. The court below having directed a verdict for the defendant, this court
reversed the judgment, on the ground that the question of similitude
was one of fact, which should have been submitted to the jury, as it
appeared that the imported goods were of inferior value and material
as compared with the goods to which it was claimed they bore simili-
4. The case of Arthur v. Fox, 108 U. S. 125, commented on. 16.
5. Hosiery, composed of wool and cotton, was imported in 1873. The col-
lector assessed the duties at 35 per cent ad valorem, and 50 cents a
pound, less 10 per cent, under § 2 of the act of March 2d, 1867, c. 197,
14 Stat. 561, as manufactures made in part of wool, “not herein other.
wise provided for." The importer claimed that the goods were duti-
able under § 22 of the act of March 2, 1861, c. 68, 12 Stat. 191, and
§ 13 of the act of July 14,1862, c. 163, 12 Stat. 556, as stockings
made on frames, worn by men, women, and children, at 35 per cent ad
valorem, less 10 per cent. In a suit to recover back the excess of
duties, the court directed a verdict for the importer: Held, that this
was error, because the hosiery was not otherwise provided for in the
act of 1867, and was a manufacture made in part of wool. Arthur v.
6. The case of Vietor v. Arthur, 104 U. S. 498, commented on, and ex-
plained, and distinguished. Ib.
7. Under Rev. Stat. § 2907, and the act of June 22, 1874, c. 391, 18 Stat.
186, $ 14, p. 189, as construed by the Treasury Department for many
years without any attempt to change it or until now to question its
correctness, goods imported into the United States from one country
which, in transportation to the port of shipment pass through another
country, are not subject to have the transportation charges in passing
through that other country added to their original cost in order to
determine their dutiable value. Robertson v. Downing, 607.
8. When after duties have been liquidated a reliquidation takes place, the
date of the reliquidation is the final liquidation for the purpose of pro-
9. The Treasury Department not having objected that an appeal was too
early, this court must assume that there was good reason for its action.
See EVIDENCE, 4.
Under the statutes of Virginia, which were in force in September, 1837,
and equally under the statutes of Ohio, which were in force at that
time, a deed by husband and wife conveying land of the wife, was
inoperative to pass her title, unless the husband, she having duly
acknowledged the deed, signified his assent to the conveyance in her
lifetime by an acknowledgment in the form prescribed by law. Sewall
v. Haymaker, 719.
See EVIDENCE, 1, 2.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
Plaintiff and the Board of Public Works of the defendant entered into a
contract by which plaintiff was to do certain work on a street in the
city of Washington and receive payment therefor at the rate of 30 cents
per cubic yard for grading, and 40 cents per cubic yard for excavation
and refilling, to be measured by excavation only. The Board had be-
fore then entered in its record and notified its engineer, auditor and
contract-clerk that for rock excavation contractors should be paid $1.50
per cubic yard in ditches and sewers, and $1.00 per cubic yard in street
grading, etc Plaintiff did his work, was paid the contract price,
and brought this action to recover for rock excavation, claiming that
it was outside of the contract. Held: (1) That it was not outside of
the contract. (2) That the act of February 21, 1871, 16 Stat. 419, c.
62, forbade the Board to contract except in writing, and foi bade the
allowance of extra compensation for work done under a written con-
tract. (3) That the entry in the journal of the Board could not affect
plaintiff's contract. Barnard v. District of Columbia, 409.
See ConstitUTIONAL LAW, A, 10, 12;
CONTRACT, 2, 3;
1. In an action of ejectment the description of the land claimed was as fol-
lows: “commencing at the base of said mountain east of Bear
Creek and running southeast and parallel with Coley tunnel through
said mountain five thousand feet from the mouth or starting point of
said tunnel at a stake marked and in or at the mouth of said Silver
Gate tunnel and two hundred and fifty feet northeast and two hun-
dred and fifty feet southwest from said stake or tunnel to its termina-
tion." Held, that it was a sufficient description. Glacier Mountain
Silver Mining Co. v. Willis, 471.
2. In ejectment for the possession of a mine in Colorado, the complaint,
after describing the land and a tunnel claim therein, averred that
“the said tunnel claim so located embraces many valuable lodes or
veins which have been discovered, worked, and mined by the plaintiff
and its grantors.” Held, that this was a sufficient description of the
lodes for which recovery was asked. Ib.
3. A complaint in ejectment in Colorado, for a mine, which alleges a valid
and legal location by those under whom the plaintiff claims, and pos-
session and occupation by the plaintiff for more than five consecutive
years prior to the ouster, and payment of taxes by him during that
time, sets up a sufficient claim to title as against everybody except the
United States. Ib.
See JUDGMENT, 1;
LOCAL LAW, 1, 5.
ELECTION OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS.
See ConsTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 25.
1. The complainant's bill alleged that he was a judgment creditor of a
railroad company; that the Board of Commissioners of Bourbon
County had subscribed to the stock of the railroad company, and had
voted upon it at the meetings of the corporation, and had thereby
become bound to the company to issue to it bonds of the county equal
to the par value of the stock; that the bonds had not been issued;
and that the obligation was still outstanding. The remedies sought
for were, (1) that the company should be ordered to assign to the com-
plainant its claim against the county; and (2) a decree against the
county ordering it to issue the bonds, and to deliver them to the com-
plainant, to be credited upon his judgment at their face value. Held,
(1) That the right to proceed against the county and its officers to
compel the issue of the bonds was a purely legal right, to be prose-
cuted at law, in mandamus, whether the proceeding was in the name
of the railroad company or of its privy by assignment; (2) that the
equitable nature of the complainant's rights against the company
furnished no ground for the support of such a bill in equity against
the county; and (3) that the bill should be dismissed as to the county
without prejudice to the complainant's right to proceed at law to ob-