Opinion of the Court. included, from the place of growth, production, or manufacture, whether by land or water, to the vessel in which shipment is made to the United States; the value of the sack, box, or covering of any kind in which such merchandise is contained; commission at the usual rates, but in no case less than two and a half per centum; and brokerage, export duty, and all other actual or usual charges for putting up, preparing and packing for transportation or shipment." Section 14 of the act of June 22, 1874, 18 Stat. 189, provides "that wherever any statute requires that, to the cost or market value of any goods, wares, and merchandise imported into the United States, there shall be added to the invoice thereof, or, upon the entry of such goods, wares and merchandise, charges for inland transportation, commissions, port duties, expenses of shipment, export duties, cost of packages, boxes, or other articles containing such goods, wares, and merchandise, or any other incidental expenses attending the packing, shipping, or exportation thereof from the country or place. where purchased or manufactured, the omission, without intent thereby to defraud the revenue, to add and state the same on such invoice or entry shall not be cause of a forfeiture of such goods, wares, and merchandise, or of the value thereof; but in all cases where the same, or any part thereof, are omitted, it shall be the duty of the collector or appraiser to add the same, for the purposes of duty, to such invoice or entry, either in items or in gross, at such price or amount as he shall deem just and reasonable, (which price or amount shall, in the absence of protest, be conclusive,) and to impose and add thereto the further sum of one hundred per centum of the price or amount so added; which addition shall constitute a part of the dutiable value of such goods, wares, and merchandise, and shall be collectible as provided by law in respect to duties on imports." In the execution of these statutes the Treasury Department has heretofore uniformly construed them to apply, so far as inland transportation is concerned, only to such transportation where the place of the growth, production, or manufacture of the article is in the same country as the port from which Opinion of the Court. the vessel sails on which the shipment is made, and not where such transportation is through other countries to reach a place of shipment. Thus, in a decision rendered September 12, 1882, where goods were forwarded from Brodenbach, in Austria, to Hamburg, transshipped to Hull, and then placed on the import vessel, the journey to the United States being continuous, the appellants claimed that no charges accruing after the goods left Austria should be added to make dutiable value, and the Treasury Department sustained the claim, observing as follows: "This claim seems to be well founded, in view of the long established practice in such cases, and of articles 434-444 of the Regulations of 1874, which provide in substance that in the case of merchandise imported from an interior country through the ports of another country, or from the country of its production, manufacture, or procurement via another country, no charges shall be added for transportation accruing after the departure of the merchandise from the country of production, if the collector shall be satisfied that the merchandise was exported from such country with a bona fide intention of having it transported to the United States." A decision by the department, made some years before, also illustrates the construction when the two places, that of production and that of shipment, though separated from each other by water, belong to the same country. The charges for railroad and steamboat transportation of goods from Dundee, in Scotland, to Liverpool, in England, were added to the invoice price to make the dutiable value of the articles imported into this country. The importers objected to these charges, and cited article 441 of the Regulations of 1874, referred to in the above decision, in support of their claim; but the Treasury Department held that the regulation was applicable only where the goods were transported to some port of another country from the country of production for shipment to the United States, by a practically continuous voyage, and was not applicable to shipments from Scotland through England, which are, to all intents and purposes, the same country. This construction of the Treasury Department we think a Opinion of the Court. sound one. It places articles which are the growth, product, or manufacture of countries whose ports of easy shipment are found in other countries through which the goods must be carried, on a basis of equality with the products of those countries which have convenient ports of shipment. To preserve this equality the shippers are not obliged to confine their shipments to their own ports, when ports of other countries would be equally or more convenient to them. This construction of the department has been followed for many years, without any attempt of Congress to change it, and without any attempt, as far as we are advised, of any other department of the government to question its correctness, except in the present instance. The regulation of a department of the government is not of course to control the construction of an act of Congress when its meaning is plain. But when there has been a long acquiescence in a regulation, and by it rights of parties for many years have been determined and adjusted, it is not to be disregarded without the most cogent and persuasive reasons. United States v. Hill, 120 U. S. 169, 182; United States v. Philbrick, 120 U. S. 52, 59; Brown v. United States, 113 U. S. 568, 571. The technical objections taken by the government counsel we do not think tenable. The duties were not finally liquidated until the 24th of May, 1882. The time to protest did not begin to run until then. The previous liquidation on the 5th of May was necessarily abandoned by the corrections subsequently made. The letters of the Acting Secretary were sufficient evidence of the appeal from the decision of the collector. The question was not as to the contents of the appeal, but whether any appeal was taken. The acknowledgment of the Acting Secretary, who decided the matter appealed, was sufficient for that purpose, and also of the affirmance of the decision of the collector. The bill of exceptions also states when the decision of the Secretary was made. Of course that presupposes the receipt by him of the appeal. The date of "May 25th," in the letter of August 12, 1882, was evidently a misprint for "May 27th." But, if it were not so, the Treasury Department not having seen fit to place its decision upon the Opinion of the Court. ground that the appeal was too early, we must assume that there was good reason for its action. Judgment affirmed. ST. ROMES v. LEVEE STEAM COTTON PRESS COMPANY. APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA. No. 139. Argued January 20, 1888. - Decided May 14, 1888. If, after transfer by the plaintiff of the subject of controversy in a litigation in Louisiana, the court, on being informed of the transfer, refuses to permit the suit to be discontinued by the plaintiff, a judgment does not make it res judicata as to the assignee. Dismissal of a suit for want of parties does not make the subject of it res judicata. If a corporation by negligence cancels a person's stock, and issues certiflcates therefor to a third party, the true owner may proceed against the corporation to obtain the replacement of his stock, or its value, without pursuing the purchaser or those who hold under him. In a suit in Louisiana against a corporation for damages for refusal to permit a transfer of shares on its books, the prescription of ten years applies: but that prescription is not available in this case. IN EQUITY. Decree dismissing the bill. pealed. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Charles Louque for appellant. Complainant ap Mr. Assistant Attorney General Maury for appellee. This is a suit in equity instituted in the court below on the 9th of December, 1882, by the appellant, as heir of her mother and brothers, against the appellee, to compel the latter to issue to the appellant a certificate for sixty-six shares of its capital stock, which are charged to have been unlawfully cancelled and transferred to other parties without Opinion of the Court. authority; and to recover the dividends on said stock since the year 1853. The bill states that in 1845 the complainant's mother, widow de St. Romes, became the owner of said sixtysix shares of stock, and received two certificates therefor, one for 43 shares and the other for 23 shares; but that on the 29th of July, 1853, the defendant, without authority from the widow de St. Romes, by mistake and in fraud of her rights, cancelled said certificates, and has ever since refused to recognize her, her heirs or assigns, as the owners thereof; that in 1861 Madame de St. Romes sued the company for the dividends accruing on said stock, and, by judgment rendered in June, 1868, recovered the dividends for 1848, 1849, 1852, and 1853; that in April, 1876, the present complainant, as owner of said shares, instituted a suit in the Superior District Court of New Orleans against the appellee, which was ended by a nonsuit in 1882. The bill then states the amount of dividends declared by the defendant since 1853, and prays relief as above stated. The defendant, in its answer, admits that the widow de St. Romes was owner of stock from 1845 to 1853; but that she transferred the same through her agent on the 29th of July, 1853, and has never owned them since; that her agent was Pierre Deverges, who acted as her attorney in fact in the management of her business for many years, being held out by her to the community as such, with power to dispose of her property; that the stock in question was sold by Deverges, as the widow's agent and attorney in fact, to one Cohen on the day mentioned, and transferred to him on the books of the company; and from that time Cohen and those claiming under him have been in possession of said stock, with right to all dividends; that to effect the sale of the stock the widow de St. Romes delivered her certificates of stock to her said agent, and he surrendered them to the defendant, and new certificates were issued to the purchaser. The answer further states that the books and papers of the defendant were destroyed by fire in 1859, and that its secretary, who superintended the transfer of its stock, and Deverges, have both been dead many years, and that the widow never assumed to assert any claim to the |