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Opinion of the Court.

on account of certain duties originally paid by claimants but subsequently refunded to them by the United States. The claimants having received the sum specifically awarded to them by the commission, and having been refused the sum retained by the United States, on account of the duties aforesaid, by the Secretary of the Treasury, brought an action in the Court of Claims to recover the amount of said duties. This court held that the Court of Claims had no jurisdiction to entertain such a suit, and ordered the dismissal of the petition, because the claim was founded on and grew out of the treaty with Mexico and was therefore clearly within the provisions of § 1066, Rev. Stat. The reason of the ruling by this court in that decision is plain. The claim there in controversy was expressly recognized as a specific claim by the commission organized under the provisions of the treaty with Mexico, and was, therefore, dependent upon the treaty, and grew directly out of it...

In this case the reverse is true. The treaty of Washington did not recognize this claim as a specific claim. The award of $15,500,000, directed to be paid by Great Britain, was to the United States as a nation. The text of the treaty itself speaks of the "claims on the part of the United States," and in Article 7 the gross sum was "to be paid by Great Britain to the United States." It is not necessary to discuss whether, in the absence of any action by Congress as to the distribution of this fund, there could have been any legal or equitable right in any person or corporation to any portion of it. The fact that the Congress of the United States undertook to dispose of this fund, and to administer upon it, in accordance with its own conceptions of justice and equality, precludes, at least for the purposes of this decision, judicial inquiry into such questions. The claimants had to rely upon the justice of the government, in some of its departments, for compensation in satisfaction of their respective claims; and this compensation the various acts of Congress, heretofore mentioned, provided. The claimant in this case does not seek to recover upon any supposed obligation created by the treaty of Washington, but upon the specific appropriation made in the act of

Opinion of the Court.

June 2, 1886. It is under this act that a means of satisfaction of this claim was provided. The claim may, therefore, be said to be "founded upon a law of Congress" within the meaning of § 1059, Rev. Stat., and therefore clearly one of which the Court of Claims could take jurisdiction.

It may be said, in opposition to this view of the case, that, had there been no treaty of Washington, there would have been no fund of $15,500,000 to distribute, the act of June 5, 1882, would never have been passed, and therefore, that the treaty is the basis of all the subsequent legislation, and consequently the basis of this claim; in other words, that, therefore, this claim is "dependent upon and grows out of" the treaty of Washington.

We are of opinion, however, that such a dependency upon or growing out of, is too remote to come within the meaning of 1066, Rev. Stat. In our view of the case, the statute contemplates a direct and proximate connection between the treaty and the claim, in order to bring such claim within the class excluded from the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims by § 1066, Rev. Stat. In order to make the claim one arising out of a treaty within the meaning of § 1066, Rev. Stat., the right itself, which the petition makes to be the foundation of the claim, must have its origin-derive its life and existencefrom some treaty stipulation. This ruling is analogous to that of the ancient and universal rule relating to damages in common-law actions; namely, that a wrongdoer shall be held responsible only for the proximate, and not for the remote, consequences of his action.

This disposition of this question renders it unnecessary to consider whether § 1066 has been repealed by the subsequent act of Congress, approved March 3, 1887, (supra,) since, if there has been such repeal, it is admitted, on all hands, that the Court of Claims would have jurisdiction of the case.

On the merits of the case, we think there can be no doubt that the accounting officers of the Treasury Department were in error in charging to, and deducting from, the fund the expenses of the Tribunal of Arbitration at Geneva. The payment of those expenses had already been provided for by

Statement of the Case.

Congress by the act of December 21, 1871, 17 Stat. 24, and was never chargeable to this fund.

In the language of the court below: "Section five of the act of June 2, 1886, (supra,) fixes the amount of the fund and specifies exactly what shall be deducted from it, and provides that the balance shall be distributed to the judgment creditors. The item thus deducted was not among those thus specified."

We are of the opinion that the claimants are entitled to their share of the amount thus improperly deducted, and the decision of the Court of Claims is therefore

ROBARDS v. LAMB.

Affirmed.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI.

No. 1088. Submitted March 20, 1888. — Decided April 16, 1888.

The Statute of Missouri which, as construed by the Supreme Court of that State, authorizes a special administrator, having charge of the estate of a testator pending a contest as to the validity of his will, to have a final settlement of his accounts, conclusive against distributees, without giving notice to them, is not repugnant to the clause of the Constitution of the United States which forbids a State to deprive any person of his property without due process of law.

THIS case was brought before the court on the following motions made by defendant in error's counsel.

The court is moved to dismiss the writ of error or to affirm the judgment herein on the following grounds:

1. This court is without jurisdiction under § 709 of the Revised Statutes.

2. If any question cognizable under that section was in fact decided, such decision was not necessary, and the judgment rendered is supported on grounds which this court has no jurisdiction to review.

G. G. VEST,

For Defendant in Error.

Statement of the Case.

The case, as stated by the court, was as follows:

By the statutes of Missouri, relating to the granting of letters testamentary and of administration, it is provided: “If the validity of a will be contested, or the executor be a minor or absent from the State, letters of administration shall be granted, during the time of such contest, minority or absence, to some other person, [other or different from the one charged with the execution of the will, 56 Missouri, 432,] who shall take charge of the property and administer the same, according to law, under the direction of the court, and account for and pay and deliver all the money and property of the estate to the executor or regular administrator, when qualified to act." Gen. Stat. Missouri, 1865, c. 120, § 13; Rev. Stat. Missouri, 1879, c. 1, art 1, § 14.

The present suit was brought in behalf of distributees to falsify a final settlement, made in one of the probate courts of Missouri, of the accounts of a special administrator, who was appointed, under the authority of the above statute, to take charge of and administer the property of a testator pending a contest as to the validity of his will. The plaintiff claims that at that settlement the distributees were not represented, and did not have actual or constructive notice thereof. After the contest as to the will ended, the probate court passed an order stating the balance in the hands of the special administrator, directing him to turn the same over to the executors of the estate, and providing for the discharge of himself and sureties, upon his filing in that court the receipt of the executors for such balance. The executors having given their receipt for all the property held by him, as shown by his final settlement, and the same having been filed, an order was passed by the probate court for the final discharge of the special administrator.

The Supreme Court of Missouri held, in the present case, that while the laws of that State (Gen. Stat. 1865, c. 124, § 16,to 19; Rev. Stat. 1879, § 238 to 241,) required notice by publication of the final settlement of executors and administrators, notice was not required in respect to settlements of special

Statement of the Case.

administrators in whose hands the property of a testator is placed pending a contest as to the validity of his will. Its language was:

"As was said in Lamb, Adm'r, v. Helm, Adm'x, 56 Missouri, 433, 'such special administrators occupy more nearly the position of a receiver who acts under the direction of the court than they do the position of a general administrator.' The special administrator is appointed for temporary purposes only, (Hawkins v. Cunningham, 67 Missouri, 415,) and when the contest as to the will is over and the nominated executor qualified, his functions are at an end, and he must settle his accounts and turn over the property in his hands to the regular executor or administrator. This accounting is his final accounting, it is true, but it is not a final settlement of the estate contemplated when notice is required to be given. There is no need of any notice, for there is then a regular representative of the estate with whom the settlement is made under the direction of the probate court. The statute which provides for notice on final settlements therefore has no application to settlements made by an administrator pendente lite, and notice is not required.

"As to § 47, c. 120, which provides that if any administrator die, resign, or his letters be revoked, he or his legal representatives shall account to the successor, &c., it is sufficient to say the section has no applicatio. to this case, for here the special administrator neither resigned nor were his letters revoked, but his powers ceased by operation of law and the express terms of the appointment. We do not intimate that in these cases notice of the settlement must be given, though when an administrator desires to resign, notice of his intention to make application to that end must be given.

"It follows that the judgment of the probate court discharging the special administrator is final and conclusive even as against the plaintiff, for there is no saving clause as to minors or married women. The petition does not seek relief on the ground of fraud." RoBards v. Lamb, 89 Missouri, 303, 311, 312.

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