and tenant, though the contractor occupies the farm buildings while so employed.-Gray v. Reynolds, N. J., 50 Atl. Rep. 670.

95. LANDLORD AND TENANT-Right of Tenant to Farm Crops. The tenant of a farm in general, is the owner of the crops, and has authority to sell or mortgage them.-Kelley v. Goodwin, Me., 50 Atl. Rep. 711.

96. LICENSES-Legal Classification.-In assessing a license tax on classes into which trades and profession are divided, the tax is not unconstitutional, if the classification be equal and uniform on ail persons in the same class.-Browne v. Selser, La., 31 South. Rep. 290.

97. LICENSES - Money Loaning.-A person opening an office, and advertising that he has money to loan, and making daily loans, held to carry on the business of money loaning, and to be subject to a license, though the money loaned be his own.-State v. Tolman, La., 31 South. Rep. 320.

98. LIFE ESTATES-Taxes.-A life tenant is liable for taxes accruing during the continuance of his estate.Jeffers v. Sydnam, Mich., 89 N. W. Rep. 42.

99. LIFE INSURANCE Cancellation.- Contention by insured that the policy is not renewed, and that therefore he does not owe the premium, does not cancel it. -Tucker v. Dairy Mut. Ins. Co., Iowa, 89 N. W. Rep. 37. 100. LIFE INSURANCE Surrender by Infant.-Personal representatives of an infant held not entitled to recover on a life insurance policy which the infant insured had surrendered to the company.-Pippen v. Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co., N. Car., 40 S. E. Rep. 822.

102. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS Guardian's Plea.Guardian's plea of limitation held not to relate back to the filing of an account, so as to prevent it from interrupting the running of limitations, under Code § 3456.-Blakeney v. Wyland, Iowa, 89 N. W. Rep. 16.

103. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-Wife's Right of Action for Trespass.-Under Code § 163, a wife's right of action or trespass on land held by herself and husband by entirety is not barred until the statutory period after her husband's death.-Spruill v. Branning Mfg. Co., N. Car., 40 N. E. Rep. 824.

104. MARRIAGE-Annulment for Fraud.-A marriage cannot be annulled for fraud, where the parties, after the commencement of the action, live together with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud.Steimer v. Steimer, 71 N. Y. Supp. 714.

105. MASTER AND SERVANT - Assumption of Risk.-A workman repairing an elevator, who is injured while needlessly working under the elevator by the elevator boy's failure to obey the workman's direction, cannot recover of the owners of the building.- Hall v. Poole, Md., 50 Atl. Rep. 703.

106. MONOPOLIES-Restraint of Trade.-That purchaser of a fish business, under contract prohibiting vendor from further prosecuting the business, made similar contracts with other fish dealers, held not to make original contract invalid as in restraint of trade. A. Booth & Co. v. Seibold, 74 N. Y. Supp. 776.

107. MORTGAGES - Assignment.-The assignment of a mortgage containing a power of sale to a corporation incapable of exercising the power held not to prevent the exercise of such power by an assignee of the cor. poration.-Maslin v. Marshall, Md., 51 Atl. Rep. 85. 108. MORTGAGES Parol Variation.-The plain terms of a mortgage held not susceptible of variation by a parol contemporaneous agreement, in the absence of facts warranting a reformation of the instrument.Holmes v. Holmes, Mich., 89 N. W. Rep. 47.

109. MORTGAGES

Other acts of a similar character occurring about the same time as the execution of a mortgage held admis. sible as showing fraudulent intent, in an action to set aside the mortgage.-Kelliher v. Sutton, Iowa, 89 N. W. Rep. 26.

110. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS Construction of Cross Walk.-Where a city constructs a cross walk, and leaves an open ditch alongside, without any bar. rier, and a person in the night falls into the ditch, the question of the city's negligence is for the jury.Goucher v. City of Sioux City, Iowa, 89 N. W. Rep. 24. 111. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - Defective Sidewalk. -Judgment against a city for injury resulting from a defective sidewalk held not conclusive of the liability of the owners of property adjoining such walk, in a suit by the city against them.-City of Lansing v. Detroit, L. & N. R. Co., Mich., 67 Pac. Rep. 54. 112. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS Enforcing Police Regulations.-Under Const. art. 12, § 2, authorizing municipalities to make and enforce police regulations, a city may punish a misdemeanor, notwithstanding there is a general law defining and punishing the same offense.-State v. Quong, Idaho, 67 Pac. Rep. 491.

113. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - Limiting Municipal Indebtedness.-City's liability to paving contractor for loss resulting from an erroneous assessment on property not liable therefor held not within the prohibition of Const. art. 11, § 3, limiting municipal indebtedness.- Ft. Dodge Electric Light & Power Co. v. City of Ft. Dodge, Iowa, 89 N. W. Rep. 7.

114. NEGLIGENCE -Negligence of Parents.-Negli. gence of parents in allowing child of four years old to play around engine house held not im¬utable to child. -Fink v. City of Des Moines, Iowa, 89 N. W. Rep. 28.

115. NEGLIGENCE Presumption of Negligence.Where a pedestrian was struck by an iron guard, which fell from one of defendant's windows, negli gence will be presumed on defendant's part.-Mentz v. Schieren, 74 N. Y. Supp. 889.

116. NEGLIGENCE-Waiver of Rules. In an action for Injury occurring while riding on an elevator erected to hoist materials for a building during construction, held, that there was no waiver of the rule against rid ing enunciated by a postal notice, but that one riding took the risk.-Ball v. Hauser, Mich., 89 N. W. Rep. 49.

117. NEGLIGENCE-What is an "Act of God."-A flood, which might have been expected from the climatic or geographical conditions, held not an act of God, in action for injury from floating logs.-Gulf Red Cedar Co. v. Walker, Ala., 31 South. Rep. 374.

118. NEW TRIAL-Refusal to Hear Demurrer. - Refusal to hear a demurrer or motion to dismiss cannot be made the subject of a complaint in a motion for new trial.-Waldrop v. Wolff, Ga., 40 S. E. Rep. 830.

119. OFFICERS-Damages Against Usurper.-It is no defense, in an action by one entitled to a public office against a usurper for his salary, that plaintiff earned more than the amount of the same in another employ. ment while possession of the office was withheld.Fenn v. Beeler, Kan., 67 Pac. Rep. 461. 120. PAYMENT - Right to Discount.-A debtor n titled to a discount held not entitled to such discount on his failure to make the payment in full, though due to a dispute as to a set off claimed.-Perin v. Cathcart, Iowa, 89 N. W. Rep. 12.

121. PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS-Malpractice.-In an action for negligence in treating plaintiff's eye, where experts testified that defendant followed the estab lished practice and no gross error is shown, he is not liable for injuries caused by the treatment.-Stern v. Lanng, La., 31 South. Rep. 303.

122. PLEADING-Effect of Demurrer. - Where plaintiff demurs to answer because of failure to state facts constituting the defense, the demurrer should be car. ried back to the petition, where its allegations are insufficient to constitute a cause of action.- Johnson v. Wynne, Kan., 67 Pac. Rep. 549.

123. PLEDGES-Forged Certificate of Stock.-Pledges of certificates of stock forged by a husband after his wife's pledge of the genuine certificate held entitled to share in the surplus after payment to pledgee of the valid certificate.-First Nat. Bank v. Jones, 74 N. Y. Supp. 692.

124. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY-Defense of Principal.That execution on a judgment rendered against several, some as principals and some as sureties, did not state that fact, as required by statute, could not avail a principal.-Walker v. Columbus State Bank, Kan., 67 Pac. Rep. 552.

125. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY-Eventual Condemnation Bond.-Where defendants in trover gave an eventual condemnation money bond with a surety, though judgment is not obtained against one of the defendants, he is liable as co-surety on the bond.Waldrop v. Wolf, Ga., 40 S. E. Rep. 830.

126. PUBLIC LANDS-Adjudication in Land Office.-A contest in the land office over conflicting homestead entries is adjudicated and closed when the motion for review is denied and overruled by the secretary of the interior.-Cope v. Braden, Okl., 67 Pac. Rep. 475.

127. RAILROADS-Crossing in Front of Engine.-The attempt of a traveler to cross in front of an engine standing near the crossing is not so inherently dan. gerous as to prevent a recovery of damages, if the engine is unexpectedly started forward upon her.-St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Dawson, Kan., 67 Pac. Rep. 521.

128. RAILROADS-Failure to Look and Listen.-Where there is evidence that a traveler, injured at a railroad crossing, might have assured his safety by stopping to look and listen, an instruction submitting the question of his obligation so to do was improperly refused.-St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Brock, Kan., 67 Pac. Rep. 538.

129. REFORMATION OF INSTRUMENTS-Mistake.-An Instrument will not be reformed for mistake, in the absence of fraud, unless the mistake was mutual.-. Whelen v. Osgoodby, N. J., 50 Atl. Rep. 692.

130. REFORMATION OF INSTRUMENTS-Mistake in Description.-A mistake in the description of property in a fire insurance policy held properly rectified in a suit on such policy after the property has been destroyed by fire.-German Ins. Co. v. Kirkendall, Kan., 67 Pac. Rep. 443.

131. Replevin-Ownership.-In replevin, averments, additional to the general denial, that defendant is the owner of the property and that it had been delivered to him by an officer, who seized it in replevin between the same parties, does not enlarge the issues raised by the general denial.-Street v. Morgan, Kan., Pac. Rep. 448.

132. STATUTES-Journal of Senate as Evidence.-The Journals of the senate and house are the only com. petent evidence of legislative proceedings in reference to the amendments of a bill in the course of its passage.-Jackson v. State, Ala., 31 South. Rep. 380.

133. STATUTES-Pleading Foreign Statute.-In a pleading of a foreign statute, a reference to the page and volume of the foreign laws and an averment of the substance of the statute is sufficient.-Showalter v. Richert, Kan., 67 Pac. Rep. 454.

134. STATUTES-Unreasonableness.-Though a statute is unreasonable, it will not be held void, unless some of its provisions are in conflict with the constitution. -State v. Bolden, La., 31 South. Rep. 393.

135. SUBROGATION-Partners.-Creditor partner, pay. ing a firm debt, held subrogated to the firm creditors' rights in mortgages given by the debtor partner to secure the debt.-Schuyler v. Booth, 74 N. Y. Supp 733. 136. TAXATION-Property Brought in After Date of Assessment.-Laws 1899, ch. 248, providing for assess. ment and taxation of property in certain cases, does not apply to property brought into a county after the 1st of March, where the owner has listed all his prop

erty for taxation under the general laws.-Hull v. Johnston, Kas., 67 Pac. Rep. 548.

137. TAXATION-Purchaser at Tax Sale.-Where pur. chaser of property at a tax sale is admittedly in good faith up to citation upon him in a petitory action, prescription runs in his favor and those holding un. der him from the date of the tax sale.-Gauthier v. Cason, La., 31 South. Rep. 386.

138. TAXATION-Tax Sale.-Where property sold at execution is afterwards sold at tax sale on an assessment against the purchaser at execution sale, the original owner can purchase the property from the latter and possess it for himself.-Gauthier v. Cason, La., 31 South. Rep. 386.

139. TRADE-MARKS AND TRADE-NAMES-Fancy Desig. nation of Food.-A term deemed a fancy designation as applied to certain food, though food of a similar nature and of a similar name had been long in use in the far east.-Dr. Dadirrian & Sons Co. v. Hauenstein, 74 N. Y. Supp. 709.

140. TRESPASS-Right of Action by Tenant in Com. mon.-In an action by a tenant in common to recover for the cutting of timber upon the estate, plaintiff is only entitled to recover a portion of the entire damage equivalent to the part of the estate owned by him. -Winborne v. Elizabeth City Lumber Co., N. Car., 40 S. E. Rep. 825.

141. USURY-National Banks.-Where an action to recover illegal interest charged by a national bank was barred by limitation, and defendant collected a judgment against plaintiff for costs, such collection was not a usurious transaction, extending the period of limitation.-Talbot v. First Nat. Bank, Iowa, 89 N. W. Rep. 15.

142. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-Breach of Contract.— On breach of contract of sale of land by vendee, held not necessary that vender should make the second sale by auction.—McKiernan v. Valleau, R. I., 51 Atl. Rep. 102.

143. WATERS AND WATER COURSES The Thread of a Stream.-The thread of a stream is the line midway between the banks at the ordinary stage of water, without regard to the channel, or the lowest and deepest part of the stream -State v. Burton, La., 31 South. Rep. 291.

144. WILLS-Devise for Life. - Where realty is devised to one for life, and no further testamentary disposition thereof is made, the reversionary interest vests Immediately on testator's death in his heirs at law, with the right of possess'on postponed.-Oliver v. Powell, Ga., 40 S. E. Rep. 826.

145. WITNESSES-Conversations With Deceased Pergons. As to conversations which occurred with a decedent in the presence of a third person, such third person is the only competent witness.-Michels v. Western Underwriters' Assn., Mich., 89 N. W. Rep. 56. 146. WITNESSES Cross Examination.-Where defendant on cross examination admitted the probabil. ity of having made contradictory statements, crossexamination of the person to whom the statement was said to have been made, and who was a witness for his co-defendant, as to whether such statement had been made, held not reversible error.- State v. Edwards, La., 31 South. Rep. 308.

147. WITNESSES-Transactions With Deceased Persons.-Defendant, in an action for lands by an heir of a deceased intestate, is competent to testify as to transactions between himself and the decedent with respect to the premises in question.-Oliver v. Powell, Ga., 40 S. E. Rep. 826.

148. WORK AND LABOR-Contractor Prevented from Completing Contract.-Where a contractor is prevented by the other party from completing the contract, and elects to rescind, and sues in general assumpsit, he cannot recover damages for the breach, but merely the value of his services.-North v. Mallory, Md., 51 Atl. Rep. 89.

Central Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, MO., JUNE 6, 1902.

REVOCATION OF CHECK BY DEATH OF DRAWER.

On the interesting question of the revocation of a check by the death of the drawer the authorities are very meager. We are therefore inclined to give special prominence to the recent case of Weiand's Administrator v. State National Bank, 65 S. W. Rep. 618, where the Court of Appeals of Kentucky distinctly held that the death of the drawer operates as a revocation of a check, so that if the bank pays it after notice of that fact, it does so at its peril. The only direct authority for this holding is to be found in the position assumed by several prominent text writers, principally Morse on Banking, who lays down the rule as follows: "If the drawer has revoked the order before the bank has made payment or bound itself to pay, it must not pay; nor if the drawer is insane, nor if the drawer is dead, not being a corporation or firm." Of course, in cases of the death or insanity of the drawer, knowledge of that fact must be brought home to the bank before it has paid the check or has become bound for it. This same statement of the law is made in 2 Edw. Bills & Notes, § 739. The only case which seems to sustain the law as thus announced is that of Tate v. Hilbert, 2 Ves. Jr. 118.

We cannot say that we approve the rule thus announced. It injects an element of too much uncertainty into one of the most common transactions of modern business life. It has been estimated that three-fourths of the credit transactions of the United States are represented by commercial paper in the form of checks. They have certainly become a very popular medium of exchange, and deserve to have added to them every element of certainty that is possible to attribute to them. If the uncertainty of the maker's death is to be permitted to invalidate obligations of this character, their usefulness as a medium of exchange will be seriously impaired. If such is the rule at common law, the more quickly it is changed by statute the better it will be for the business interests of the country.

RIGHT TO INJUNCTION IN CASE OF BREACH. OF CONTRACT FOR PERSONAL SERVICES.

Whether a prohibitory injunction can be invoked to prevent the breaking of a contract for personal services or to assist in its negative enforcement is one of the most interesting questions in modern jurisprudence. Ever since the celebrated English case of Lumley v. Wagner, the rule has been stated to be that in contracts for personal services where special and extraordinary skill or ability is involved, as, for instance, in cases of authors or opera singers of great renown, & court of equity, while powerless to compel perform

ance, will, in case of an attempted breach of such contract, prevent the defaulting party from profiting by his perfidy and close every avenue of usefulness in that particular direction against him until he has honorably performed or been released from his obligation. It is of course true that in this country at least the courts have not been anxious to extend the operation of this rule, but it has been only in a recent class of cases that a new argument has been advanced against the operation of the rule at all in this country,-the constitutional objection that it enforces involuntarily servitude. The cases referred to arose in the recent litigation between certain clubs of the National Base Ball League and certain players of that association who broke their contracts for the season of 1902 and attempted to hire their services to a rival organization. The first of these cases arose in Philadelphia, the outcome being unfavorable to the contention of the players sought to be enjoined. Philadelphia Ball Club v. La Joie, reported on page 446 of this number of the JOURNAL. Following this case, similar litigation involving identically the same contracts arose in the circuit court of St. Louis in the case of American Base Ball and Athletic Co. v. Harper. The opinion in this case by Talty J., we also publish in this issue immediately following the Pennsylvania case. In this latter case, for the first time, the question of involuntary servitude is considered as a coustitutional defense to the issuance of an injunction in this class of cases. Considering the great importance of this question we are fortunate in being favored with an exhaustive analysis and annotation of both these cases by

Prof. John D. Lawson of the Missouri State University, and in view of the high practical value and interest that attaches to this question, it will be quite unnecessary to urge upon any discerning lawyer or jurist its most careful consideration.

NOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS.

NUISANCES-RIGHT OF MUNICIPALITY TO DECLARE THE KEEPING OF A JACKASS A NUISANCE.-Every day adds constantly increasing testimony to the fact that in the cities the liberties of the people are being rapidly curtailed. We cannot say, however, that this is not one of the necessities of city life as it exists to-day in all its complexity. In regard to nuisances, the rules has been and is to-day well settled that the authority to prevent and abate nuisances conferred upon municipality does not permit it to declare that a nuisance which is not so in fact. The difficulty, however, lies in the fact that the courts hesitate to disturb the discretion of municipal assemblies in branding certain things as nuisances. Many kinds of business, for instance, might easily be considered a nuisance in a large city which would be perfectly legitimate in more rural districts. On this principle the court rested its decision in the recent case of Ex parte Foote, 65 S. W. Rep. 706 in which the the Supreme Court of Arkansas held that under a statute which invests municipal corporations with power to prevent annoyance within their limits, to abate nuisances, and to enact ordinances to carry into effect such power, and "to improve the morals, order, comfort and convenience of their inhabitants," a town may enact an ordinance prohibiting the keeping of a jackass within its limits in hearing distance of its populace, and declaring such keeping to be a nuisance. The court says: "As a rule, a jack is kept for one purpose only, and that is propagation of his own species and mules. He has a loud, discordant bray, and, as counsel say, frequently "makes himself heard regardless of hearers, occasions, or solemnities. He is not a desirable neighbor. The purpose for which he is kept, his frequent and discordant brays, and the associations connected with him, bring the keeping of him in a populous city or town within the legal notion of a nuisance."

STREET RAILROADS-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF PASSENGER RIDING IN A PLACE OF DANGER.-The electric street railway may be the juggernaut of modern times, but it is not always ruthless in the injuries which it occasions nor indeed always at fault. The prejudices of the injured passenger often blinds him to the fact that his own gross negligence has contributed most proximately to his injury. In the recent case of Neiboer v. Detroit Electric Railway, 87 N. W. Rep. 626, the Supreme Court of Michigan held

that a person riding on the bumper of a street car after being warned by the conductor of bis dangerous position is guilty of contributory negligence, as a matter of law, so as to prevent recovery for injuries occasioned by being struck from the rear by another car.

The court is clear and emphatic in its statement of the law on this question: "Plaintiff involuntarily, and without invitation or permission, chose to ride in a dangerous place, rather than attempt to get inside or to wait a few minutes for another car. His negligent act was a continuing one, and directly contributed to the injury. When a place is one not provided or intended for passengers to ride upon, and is in itself dangerous, the employee who assumes to permit a passenger to ride in such a place acts without authority, unless such authority be shown expressly or by common custom."

This case comes within the principle established by the following authorities: Chamberlain v. Railroad Co., 11 Wis. 238; Jackson v. Crilly, 16 Colo. 103, 26 Pac. Rep. 331; Railroad Co. v. Miles, 40 Ark. 298, 48 Am. Rep. 10; Carroll v. Transit Co., 107 Mo. 653, 17 S. W. Rep. 889; Railroad Co. v. Jones, 95 U. S. 439, 24 L. Ed. 506; Bard v. Traction Co., 176 Pa. 97, 34 Atl. Rep. 954, 53 Am. St. Rep. 672. The last case is the parallel of this in its facts, except that the conductor in that case did not know that the plaintiff was standing upon the bumper.

WILLS-EFFECT OF MARRIED WOMEN'S ACTS ON RULE REVOKING WILL OF UNMARRIED FEMALE ON HER MARRIAGE.-Is the rule that a will of an unmarried female is deemed revoked by her subsequent marriage, affected by legislation removing the disabilities of married women? One phase of this interesting question is considered in the recent case of In re Booth's Will, 66 Pac. Rep. 710. In this case it appeared that the statutes of Oregon provided that the will of an unmarried woman should be deemed revoked by her subsequent marriage. The exact holding of the court was that this statute was not repealed by a subsequent enactment, removing the common-law disabilities of married women, and vesting them with complete control of their property.

This question has become highly important because of the fact that recent legislation of a similar character has been adopted in many states in this country. In regard to the particular question here involved, however, it has been generally held that the effect of such legislation is to abrogate and annul the common-law rule, because it removes the reason upon which it was founded, and substitutes an entirely new principle and policy. Chapman v. Dismer, 14 App. D. C. 446; Appeal of Emery, 81 Me. 275, 17 Atl. Rep. 68; Noyes v. Southworth, 55 Mich. 173, 20 N. W. Rep. 891, 54 Am. Rep. 359; Fellows v. AL len, 60 N. H. 439, 49 Am. Rep. 328; In re Ward's Will, 70 Wis. 251, 35 N. W. Rep. 731, 5 Am. St.

Rep. 174; Roane v. Hollingshead, 76 Md. 369, 25 Atl. Rep. 307, 17 L. R. A. 592, 35 Am. St. Rep. 438; Webb v. Jones, 36 N. J. Eq. 163; In re Tuller's Will, 79 Ill. 99, 22 Am. Rep. 164.

The court in the present case, however, while recognizing the above rule insists that such legislation cannot be held to repeal a positive statute declaring that a will made by an unmarried woman shall be deemed revoked by her subsequent marriage. The court is upheld in this contention by the following authorities: Loomis v. Loomis, 51 Barb. (N. Y.) 257; In re McLarney's Will, 153 N. Y. 416, 47 N. E. Rep. 817, 60 Am. St. Rep. 664; Swan v. Hammond, 138 Mass. 45, 52 Am. Rep. 255; In re Fransen's Will, 26 Pa. 202; In re Craft's Estate, 164 Pa. 520, 30 Atl. Rep. 493. The reason for the rule announced in this case is well stated in the case of Brown v. Clark, 77 N. Y. 369, where Mr. Justice Andrews, in discussing the identical question here involved, says: "It is quite consistent that the legislature should have intended to leave the former statute in force, although the new statutes took away the reason upon which it was based. The legislature may have deemed it proper to continue it for the reason that the new relation created by the marriage would be likely to induce a change of testamentary intention, and that a disposition by a married woman of her property by will should depend upon a new testamentary act after the marriage."

SHERIFFS AND Constables-CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF SHERIFFS TO CUSTODY OF PRISONERS.—A recent statute of New Jersey provided that the charge and keeping of county jails and custody of the prisoners therein should be transferred from the sheriffs to certain board of chosen freeholders. Although the statute providing for the election of sheriff did not specify his duties, it will be observed that such a statute practically releases that officer of his most important duties as generally understood. The Supreme Court of New Jersey had occasion to pass upon this statute in the recent case of Virtue v. Board of Freeholders, 50 Atl. Rep. 360. It was held contrary to the constitution on the ground that the framers of the constitutions of 1776 (article 13) and of 1844, providing that the inhabitants of each county should "annually elect one sheriff," without prescribing in express words the duties which should attach to the office, must be presumed to have known the duties which had theretofore appertained to the office, and to have intended that the designation of the office eo nomine should carry such duties with it; and the office of sheriff, with its common-law duties, having been continued by the colonial and state constitutions, and a part of such duties being the custody of the county jail and of the prisioners confined therein, the statute interfered with the constitutional rights of that officer. The court said in part:

"Can the legislature detach from the office of sheriff the custody of the county jail and of the

prisoners confined in that institution, and commit such custody to some other officer, to be selected by that body? We think this question must be answered in the negative. As was said by Cole, J., in State v. Burnst, 26 Wis. 412, 7 Am. Rep. 84, if the legislature can do this, no reason can be perceived why it may not also strip the office of every other power, duty, or function which pertains to it, and leave to the electors of the state only the privilege of choosing an officer who would be sheriff in name, but with no power to perform any of the duties or exercise any of the functions belonging to that office. The case cited, as well as Warner v. People, 2 Denio, 272, 43 Am. Dec. 740, People v. Keeler, 29 Hun, 175, and Allor v. Wayne Co., 43 Mich. 76, 4 N. W. Rep. 492, support the conclusion which we have reached upon this point. The only case to which we have been referred, or which we have found, supporting an opposite conclusion, is State v. Dews, R. M. Charlt. 443, which holds that a sheriff is entirely a ministerial officer, whose province is to execute duties prescribed by law, and which duties may be contracted, enlarged, or transferred at the will of the legislature. It is enough to say, with respect to this case, that the reasoning of the opinion does not commend itself to us. We conclude, therefore, that the various statutes which have been referred to, so far as they deprive the sheriffs of the custody as the common jail of their respective counties and of the prisoners confined therein, and place it in the hands of board of freeholders, are inoperative and void."

CONFLICT OF LAW AS TO SALE OF LIVE STOCK IN ONE STATE HELD UNDER CHATTEL MORTGAGE IN ANOTHER.

From an early stage of civilization chattel mortgages have been an important medium of security for the payment of money, and they are at the present day the most available means whereby very large and very valuable classes of personal property may be pledged for a present or future debt or turned to secure one about to be lost. The genius of these instruments, and the rules of law and common sense pertaining to them, are neither occult nor esoteric, not hidden and mysterious, nor unintelligible to any business man who will give them some attention. The whole subject cannot be covered, of course, in the limits of a paper like this. I shall confine this paper, therefore, largely to matters growing out of the live stock industry, though most of what I shall say applies with equal force to other species of personal property.