65. INTOXICATING LIQUORS-Irregularities in Election as Defense. Where an election has been held, and the result declared and recorded, as provided by law, the county "has voted against the sale" of liquors, within the meaning of Act June 2, 1889, § 1; and in prosecu. tions for offense thereunder mere irregularities in the election are no defense.-Barton v. State, Fla., 31 South. Rep. 361.

66. JUDGMENT-Conclusiveness of Decree of Fore. closure. Where a mortgagee sues to foreclose, and the title in an action to which she was not a party had been found to be in one other than the mortgagor, the decree of foreclosure was not binding on such other; he not being a party.-Slack v. John, N. J., 51 Atl. Rep. 151.

67. JUDGMENT-Opening Default Judgment.-A court at a statutory term held to have jurisdiction to open a default judgment made at a preceding term and by order continued to the next term.-Ward v. Western Union Tel. Co., S. Car., 40 S. E. Rep. 769.

68. JUSTICES OF THE PEACE Cases Tried at Same Time. That a magistrate tried three cases against the same defendant at the same time, where evidence was taken in each case and and separate judgments entered, held no ground for reversal.-Baker v. Irvine, S. Car., 40 S. E. Rep. 672.

69. LANDLORD AND TENANT-Eviction by Landlord.— Where a landlord wrongfully evicts the tenant from an appreciable, material, or substantial part of the demised premises, the landlord's right to recover rent is thereby defeated.-New York Dry Goods Store v. Pabst Brewing Co., U. S. C. C. of App., Seventh Circuit, 112 Fed. Rep. 381.

70. LANDLORD AND TENANT-Right of Tenant to Dis. pute Landlord's Title.-A tenant cannot set up title in himself, or an outstanding title, to defeat the landlord's recovery of possession, unless the tenant has acquired the landlord's title, or it has expired.-Ham· mond v. Blue, Ala., 31 South. Rep. 357.

71. LICENSES-License Tax on Street Railway.-To entitle a city to levy a license tax on a street railway, it is not necessary that the right so to do be reserved in the ordinance granting the company's franchise.Newport News & O. P. Ry. & Electric Co. v. City of Newport News, Va., 40 S. E. Rep. 645.

72. LIMITATIONS-Final Report of an Administrator.A final report of an administrator starts the running of limitation in his favor as against the heir, whether a discharge has been granted or not.-Jennings v. Parr, S. Car., 40 S. E. Rep. 693.

73. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-Payments Under Con tract of Compromise. - Payments under a contract of compromise do not take the case out of the statute of limitations, not being made in part payment of the original debt, and not therefore to be regarded as an acknowledgment that it was due.-Price's Admx. v. Price's Admx., Ky., 66 8. W. Rep. 529.

74. MANDAMUS-To Compel Criminal Clerk to Enter Sentence.-A mandamus will not issue from the court of criminal appeals to compel the clerk of the court below to enter the sentence in a criminal case on the record.-Jones v. State, Tex., 66 S. W. Rep. 559.

75. MASTER AND SERVANT - Assumption of Risk.Where a certain risk of an employment is plainly ob. servable to an employee, and he continues to work where such risk is constantly encountered, he as. sumes the risk as a matter of law, and the question is not for the jury.-Lindsay v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., U. S. C. C. of App., Second Circuit, 112 Fed. Rep. 384. 76. MASTER AND SERVANT Defective Machinery.Receiver of electric light company held guilty of neg. ligence in permitting rods supporting lamps to become rusted, so that they broke while a trimmer was caring for the lamp.-Dupree v. Tamborilla, Tex., 66 S. W Rep. 595.

77. MASTER AND SERVANT-Liability to Volunteer Servant. Where plaintiff, a boy about 16 years old,

in Oil

79. MINES AND MINERALS-Consideration Lease. Where, in a lease of oil lands, the lessee agrees to complete a second well within 90 days after the completion of the first well, but does not agree to complete, or even to commence, the first well, such agreement as to the second well is no consideration for the contract.-Federal 01 Co. v. Western Oil Co., U. S. C. C., D. Ind., 112 Fed. Rep. 373.

80. MORTGAGES-Assignment.-Where a mortgagee assigned the mortgage partly to himself as administrator and partly to a third party, claims against the mortgagee personally accruing after such assignment could not be set off against the amount due under the mortgage.-Hopper v. Williams, Md., 51 Atl. Rep. 167. 81. MORTGAGES-Merger of Surety With Subsequent Conveyance.-The lien of a trust deed given to indem nify a surety does not merge in the title conveyed by a subsequent deed absolute in form given to such surety to secure him against a different liabil Ity. Swift & Co. v. Kortrecht, U. S. C. C. of App., Sixth Circuit, 112 Fed. Rep. 709.

82. MOTIONS - Redocketing.-A motion in a cause already upon the calendar should not be docketed anew.- Ward y. Western Union Tel. Co., S. Car., 40 S. E. Rep. 970.

83. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Authority to Purchase Land for Reservoirs.-Under 17 Del. Laws,ch. 205, §§ 1, 4, 7, the board of water commissioners of the city of Wilmington held to have authority to purchase lands for reservoirs with funds derived from water revenue.Weldin v. City of Wilmington, Del., 51 Atl. Rep. 157.

84. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Ordinances as Evi. dence of Negligence.-Municipal ordinance held admissible in evidence, without pleading, to show neg. ligence of railroad company in violating it.-Brasington v. South Bound R. Co., S. Car., 40 S. E. Rep. 665. 85. NEGLIGENCE-Definition of Gross Negligence.Gross negligence was properly defined in an instruction as the failure to exercise slight care.-Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Dodge, Ky., 66 S. W. Rep. 606.

86. NEGLIGENCE-Evidence as to Elements Not Pleaded. In action against street railway company for injuries, testimony that the accident was due to the rough condition of the track beld not admissible, where not averred.-Richmond Ry. & Electric Co. v. West, Va., 40 S. E. Rep. 643.

87. NOTICE-Loss of Wife's Society as an Element of Damages.-A husband, in an action for a nuisance causing the sickness of his wife, may recover for the loss of the society and the comfort of the wife.-Nev. ille v. Mitchell, Tex., 66 S. W. Rep. 579.

88. OFFICERS-Length of Term.-Where a statute fixing the duration of an official term is ambiguous, it must be construed so as to limit the term to the short. est period.-Smith v. Bryan, Va., 40 S. E. Rep. 652.

89. OFFICERS-Police Officer as State Official.-A police officer is an official of the state, and not of the municipality, and is therefore not within Const. art. 6, § 20, relating to the removal of city officers.-Smith v. Bryan, Va., 40 S. E. Rep. 652.

90. PARTNERSHIP-Excluding Partner From Busi ness.-One partner has no right to exclude another from the business against the latter's will.-Harris v. Harris, Ala., 31 South. Rep. 355.

91. PATENTS-Extension by Reissue.- The claims of a patent, which has been in existence for 10 years and

sustained as valid by the courts, cannot be broadened by reissue to cover structures which had been previ ously held not to infringe.-Troy Laundry Machinery Co. v. Adams Laundry Machinery Co., U. S. C. C., N. D. N. Y., 112 Fed. Rep. 437.

92. PAYMENT-Presumption from Receipt of Interest.-Receipts for payment of interest on a bond held to prevent the presumption of payment attaching to the bond.-Jennings v. Parr, S. Car., 40 S. E. Rep. 683. 93. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-Implied Powers.-The Implied powers and authority of an agent employed for a particular service depend largely upon the cir cumstances in each case, and upon what is necessary or reasonable to enable him to effect the purpose of his agency.-National Bank of the Republic v. Old Town Bank, U. S. C. C. of App., Seventh Circuit, 112 Fed. Rep. 726.

94. PRINCIPAL ARD SURETY-Subrogation of Lender to Rights of Surety.-Where a borrower gives to his surety on the note to the lender a trust deed to indemnify such surety against loss, the lender is entitled to subrogation to the rights of such surety under such deed, and to a lien on the premises conveyed thereby superior to that of a subsequent judgment creditor.Swift & Co. v. Kortrecht, U. S. C. C. of App., Sixth Cir. cuit, 112 Fed. Rep. 709.

95. PUBLIC LANDS-Bona Fide Purchaser-One purchasing from a grantee of the Southern Pacific Railroad Company land apparently within the scope of its grant, not conveyed to or for the use of such company, so as to be protected by Act March 3, 1887, and paying nothing therefor, except by giving his legal services, held not a bona fide purchaser.-United States v. Southern l'ac. R. Co., U. S. S. C., 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 285.

96. RAILROADS-Cattle Guards.-The line of fence which must be protected by a cattle guard means a fence as near the railroad track as it can be built.Burnett v. Southern Ry. Co., S. Car., 40 S. E. Rep. 679. 97. REMOVAL OF CAUSES-Forfeiture of School Lands. -Suit by the state against a citizen to enforce a forfeiture of school land patented held not originally cognizable by federal courts or removable thereto.State of West Virginia v. King, U. S. C. C., S. D. W. Va.. 112 Fed Rep. 369.

98. SALES-Time as Essence.-If time appears, from a fair construction of the language of a contract of sale and under the circumstances, to be of its essence, stipulations in regard to the time of performance will be held conditions precedent.- Henderson v. McFadden, U. S. C. C. of App., Fifth Circuit, 112 Fed. Rep. 389. 99. SEAMEN-Discharge in Distant Port.-The fact that a mariner is found, after trial, to be incompetent to perform the service for which he shipped in a satis. factory manner, will not justify the master in discharging him in a distant part before the expiration of his term of service.-Capillo v. Bristol Packing Co., U. S. D. C., N. D. Cal., 112 Fed. Rep. 439.

100. STATUTES-Construction by Practice. The construction put upon a statute of doubtful import, when It first came into operation, will, after lapse of time, and where it has not been changed by the legislature or judicial decision, be regarded as correct.-Smith v. Bryan, Va., 40 S. E. Rep. 652.

101. STREET RAILROADS-Liability of Injury to Work. man. In an action against a street railway for injuries to one working between the tracks, a charge that the defendant should "do all in its power to see to it that no injury happens to any of the workmen" held not error, as modified on request.-Third Ave. Ry. Co. v. Krausz, U. S. C. C. of App., Second Circuit, 112 Fed. Rep. 379.

102. SUBROGATION-Holders Under Defective Power of Sale.- Persons holding under a deed executed under a defective power of sale in a mortgage held entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the mortgage.-Sims v. Steadman, S. Car., 60 S. E. Rep. 677.

103. TAXATION-Liability of Collectors De Facto.-In an action against the sureties on a bond of a tax collector, held immaterial whether he was collector de jure or only de facto.-Town of Seabrook v. Brown, N. H., 51 Atl. Rep. 175.

104. TAXATION-Vessels Engaged in Interstate Com. merce.-Registered vessels engaged in interstate commerce, having the name of their home port, in the state of the domicile of their owner, painted thereon, as required by Rev. St. § 4178, have, their situs, for the purposes of taxation, at such home port, and cannot be taxed as property in another state.-Yost v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., U. S. C. C. of App., Sixth Circuit, 112 Fed. Rep. 746.

105. TELEGRAPHS AND TELEPHONES-Delivery on Sunday. Telegraph company held not liable for delay in delivering message on Sunday.-Western Union Tel. Co. v. McConnico, Tex., 66 S. W. Rep. 592.

106. TRIAL-Conviviality Between Juror and Party to the Suit.-Conviviality and conversation between juror and brother of one of the parties to the action held sufficient cause for setting aside a verdict.-Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Matthews, Tex., 66 S. W. Rep. 588. 107. TRIAL-Right to Direct Verdict.-On a motion by a plaintiff to instruct the jury to find a verdict in his favor, the court should consider, not only all the facts which the evidence tends to establish, but all such fair and reasonable inferences of fact as the jury might lawfully draw from the evidence.-New York Dry Goods Store v. Pabst Brewing Co., U. S. C. C. of App., Seventh Circuit, 112 Fed. Rep. 581.

108. TROVER AND CONVERSION-Refusal of Carrier to Deliver Freight.-The refusal of a carrier's agent to deliver freight, claiming to hold it for charges on previous shipments until he could consult his superiors, held not sufficient evidence of conversion.-Stahl v. Boston & M. R. R., N. H., 51 Atl. Rep. 176.

109. TRUSTS-Validity of Exemption of Liability for Debts.-A provision in a trust deed conveying real and personal property to a trustee, which declares that the property rights of the beneficiary shall not be liable for his debts, is void, especially in view of Code 1887, § 2428.-Hutchinson v. Maxwell, Va., 40 S. E. Rep. 655.

110. USURY-Annuity for Release of Debt.-A contract which was in substance an undertaking to pay an an. nulty of $250 a year in quarterly installments, in con sideration of the release of a debt of $4,000, held not usurious.-Price's Admx. v. Price's Admx., Ky., 66 S. W. Rep. 529.

111. WATERS AND WATER COURSES Diversion of Surface Water. -The diversion of surface water,caused by the erection of a building on land over which it is accustomed to flow, gives no ground of action to one suffering injury thereby.-Jessup v. Bamford Bros. Silk Mfg. Co., N. J., 51 Atl. Rep. 147.

112. WATERS AND WATER COURSES-Enjoining Main tenance of City Pumping Station. A landowner whose lands are injured by a city pumping station, may maintain successive actions for trespass, or may enjoin the maintenance of the plant, and is not required to institute proceedings for its condemnation. -Reisert v. City of New York, 74 N. Y. Sup. 673.

113. WATERS AND WATER COURSES Irrigating Ditches. Use of an irrigating ditch held not in subordination to the owner of the land over which it ran. Stufflebeem v. Adelsbach, Cal., 67 Pac. Rep. 140.

114. WITNESSES-Competent to Prove His Own Sanity.-Plaintiff was a competent witness as to his mental condition at the time he entered into a com. promise.-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Carter, Ky., 66 S. W. Rep. 508.

115. WITNESSES - Grand Juror's Testimony as to What Happened in Jury Room.-A grand juror held not competent to testify in suit for libel as to testi. mony of a witness before the grand jury.-Pritchett v. Frisby, Ky., 66 S. W. Rep. 503.

Central Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, MO., MAY 23, 1902.

THE EXTENT TO WHICH DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE MAY BE ADMITTED AND IS EFFECTIVE.

A three-cornered contest recently took place between one lay and two legal periodicals over the question stated in the subject of this editorial. Harper's Weekly started the controversy by a rather harsh criticism of the action of a certain nisi prius judge in a trial for murder, who permitted the exhibition before the jury of a man stripped to the waist with pieces of court plaster upon him to show the places where the deceased had been shot. The purpose of the introduction of the human exhibit appears to have been to convince the jury that a man alleged to have been murdered could not have shot himself in the places shown. The editor of Harper's Weekly speaks of the admission of this evidence as a "piece of degrading sensationalism" and as a "brutalizing of public feeling." Our learned contemporary, Case and Comment, takes up the cudgel in behalf of the trial court in an equally unconciliatory spirit, and speaks of the editor's criticism as a "rather smart comment on something which he evidently failed to understand." It then attempts to justify the action of the trial court by showing the appropriateness and superiority of ocular demonstration. "Each juror," says our contemporary, "might try to see whether he could hold a pistol so that it would reach a certain place, but he might not be able to tell within an inch or two whether he had reached it or not.

The exhibit before his eyes of a person on whom the exact spot is located might convince his mind in a moment so that no elaborate and ingenious argument of counsel could afterwards shake his certain knowledge on that question. The ingenuity of counsel would have a far better chance of confusing a jury when dealing with measurements of distances and inferences therefrom. Actual demonstration, in other words, is much more certain and safe in many instances than mere descriptions given by witnesses."

At this stage of the conflict the New York Law Journal entered its appearance and

attempted the role of the peacemaker. It agreed with neither of the parties, but endeavored to conciliate both. It expressed a lack of sympathy with the sweeping criticism of Harpers Weekly as to the value of demonstrative evidence in general. "The method of ocular demonstration," says our worthy contemporary, "which was aimed at in the trial referred to, is generally to be commended, and the mere fact that incidentally a gaping crowd may be drawn into the court room is no reason for dispensing with an efficient aid in the administration of justice." The value, however, of this character of evidence as proof of the peculiar fact in issue in the case referred to was gravely doubted. "The fact that the exhibit,' our contemporary goes on to say, "or a member of the jury, could not have shot himself in any of the places indicated by the court plaster, is certainly not conclusive, nor even strongly presumptive that the deceased person did not shoot himself in corresponding parts of his body. Some men are not able to lace their own shoes, and from this extreme physical incapacity there is a gradually ascending scale of muscular strength and flexibility until we come to the professional contortionist. Evidence of the character in question should be resorted to only in cases of some doubt, and the capacity for self inflicted wounds would necessarily depend upon the individual."

We have no desire to enter this controversy except to discover, if possible, what, if any, has been the attitude of courts of last resort on the legal questions here involved. Real or demonstrative evidence, and by that we mean evidence addressed directly to the senses of the court or jury without the intervention of testimony, is, as a rule, always admissible. Thus, wounds or other injuries can always be proven by ocular demonstration. City of Lanark v. Dougherty, 153 Ill. 163, 38 N. E. Rep. 892; Citizens' R. R. v. Willoeby, 134 Ind. 563, 33 N. E. Rep. 627; Edwards v. Common Council, 96 Mich. 625, 55 N. W. Rep. 1003; Carrico v. R. R., 39 W. Va. 86, 19 S. E. Rep. 571. Also weapons or missiles of assault or injury. Von Reeden v. Evans, 52 Ill. App. 209; Hornsby v. State, 94 Ala. 55. On these points there is no controversy. As to the uncovering of the human body, however,

some courts have set a limit in attempting to distinguish between decent and indecent exposures. In Brown v. Swineford, 44 Wis. 282, 28 Am. Rep. 582, the witness was permitted to expose his private parts to the jury. The court said: "No such indecency is ever necessary, or should be tolerated in court. If the condition of any private part of the body of any party, male or female, is material on any trial, it should be privately examined by experts out of court and expert testimony be given of it."

As to the appropriateness of the introduction of models or of actual experiments in court, as in the incident under discussion, the cases evidence a favorable attitude of the courts respecting their introduction. Thus, in an action for damages for injuries to plaintiff's eye, the use of a skull to explain to the jury the nature of such injury is not objectionable. McNaier v. Railroad, 51 Hun(N. Y.), 644. Small models of defective machinery causing injury are, of course, good evidence to show how the accident could have occurred. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Kelly, 156 Ill. 9, 40 N. E. Rep. 938. In the case of Leonard v. Railroad, 21 Oreg. 555, 28 Pac. Rep. 887, defendant claimed that the wreck in which plaintiff was injured was due to a rail thrown across the track by some third party, and introduced a rail in court which showed a scar which defendant claimed was made in the manner stated. The court held that it was not error to allow the plaintiff in rebuttal to produce a wheel and an iron rail of the same dimensions as the rail produced by defendant, and allow witness to demonstrate to the jury that the scar on the rail was not caused in the manner

contended. See also Osborne v. City of Detroit, 32 Fed. Rep. 36.

We do not believe it can be disputed that ocular demonstration of a fact or a condition is by far the most convincing evidence. The senses of sight and touch are the most accurate senses of the human mind. Its perceptions and conceptions of fact through these avenues can very seldom be shaken by the most plausible and convincing of arguments. Neither the fact that the exposure of a person's injury or deformity would tend to arouse the sympathy or passions of the jury, nor that a feeling of supersensitive delicacy might shrink from permitting the

public exposure of the human form, should be allowed to stand in the way of the introduction of such evidence when important issues are hanging in the balance. Of course, in cases of injury or deformity, this should not be permitted unless it has been proved by evidence aliunde that the character of the injury or deformity has not been aggravated or otherwise changed for the worse. In such case the exhibit would convey a false impression on the mind of the jury as to the extent of the injury which subsequent oral testimony as to its original character might not be sufficient to rebut.

NOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS.

ELECTRICITY-NEGLIGENCE PER SE IN PERMITTING WIRES TO BE UNINSULATED CONTRARY TO ORDINANCE.-The deadly effect of electricity and the increasing mortality from its careless use are leading legislatures and courts to demand most extraordinary care from those who handle it. In the recent case of Mitchell v. Raleigh Electric Co., 39 S. E. Rep. 801, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that where a city ordinance provided that all electric wires should be insulated, any absence of such insulation by abrasion or otherwise, resulting in injury is prima facie [evidence of negligence. The court said in part:

"The defendant company was engaged in the business of manufacturing, producing, leasing, and selling light made from the use of electricity, which is the most deadly and dangerous power recognized as a necessary agency in developing our civilization and promoting our comfort and business affairs. It differs from all other dangerous utilities. Its association is with the most inoffensive and harmless piece of mechanism-if wire can be classified as such-in common use. In adhering to wire, it gives no warning or knowledge of its deadly presence. Vision cannot detect it. It is without color, motion, or body. Latently, and without sound, it exists, and, being odorless, the only means of its discovery lies in the sense of feeling, communicated through the touch, which, as soon as done, becomes its victim. In behalf of human life and the safety of mankind generally, it behooves those who would profit by the use of this subtle and violent element of nature to exercise the greatest degree of care and constant vigilance in inspecting and maintaining the wires in perfect condition. Recognizing this peril to those in its use, or who, in the exercise of their liberty, in passing along the streets of the city, might accidentally come in touch or contact with electric wires, or who, in the management of their buseness affairs, would have other wires suspended over the streets in close proximity to

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-VALIDITY OF ORDINANCES DEFINING AND PUNISHING CRIME.Does a charter power in a municipality to "suppress" a crime give it the right to define and punish it? That was the interesting question discussed in the recent case of Ogden v. City of Madison, 87 N. W. Rep. 568, where the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that under a charter provision to suppress vice and immorality, the city of Madison had ample authority to declare all homes of ill-fame to be public nuisances and to punish the keepers of such places by fine and imprisonment. The argument of the appellant in this case was that the charter provisions gave the city council no power to enact an ordinance punishing a person for keeping a disorderly house or house of ill-fame; that its power was limited to suppression and restriction. This contention is borne out by some of the early cases. Thus in the case of In re Lee Tong, 18 Fed. Rep. 253, the power granted was "to suppress gaming and gambling houses." The ordinance prohibited the playing of certain games of chance and provided that any person violating the ordinance should be punished by fine or imprisonment or both. The court held that the city's charter power "to suppress gaming" did not carry with it the power to define and punish the crime of gaming. So also in City of Mt. Pleasant v. Breeze, 11 Iowa, 399; City of Chariton V. Barber, 54 Iowa, 360, 6 N. W. Rep. 528, 37 Am. Rep. 209. In commenting on the rule announced by these cases the court, in the principal case, said: "It is based upon narrow and technical grounds. It leaves but a mere shadow where substance was necessary. It takes the spirit and the life from the law, and leaves but a feeble and flickering remnant. It must be assumed that the legislature intended that the words of the charter should have their usual and ordinary signification. The following definition of the words 'suppress' and 'restrain' are instructive in this connection: Bouvier: 'Suppress: To put a stop to when actually existing.' Anderson: To prevent; never, therefore, to li

cense or sanction.' As to the word 'restrain,' the lexicographers all agree that it means 'to curb; to check; to repress; to debar; to prevent; to hinder.' If these words are to be understood to have the meaning here ascribed to them, then it would seem clear that, when the power to suppress and restrain an act is given, the power to adopt such measures as are essential and incident to such express grant of power must follow. Without it the grant would be barren and futile. If the grant of power to suppress and restrain mean that the corporation may overpower, crush, subdue, and prevent the evil aimed at, then certainly it may affix reasonable penalties for the commission of such act. As suggested by the Iowa court, we know of no better or more effective way of suppressing a disorderly house, or preventing or crushing them out, than to provide a penalty against the keeper. The power to restrain houses of ill-fame would be barren indeed if no means of punishment could be prescribed and enforced." This view of the case is supported by the weight of modern authority: City of St. Louis v. Shoenbusch, 95 Mo. 618, 8 S. W. Rep. 791; Schwehow v. City of Chicago, 68 Ill. 444; Wong v. Astoria, 13 Oreg. 538, 11 Pac. Rep. 295.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-VALIDITY OF CITY ORDINANCE PROHIBITING PUBLIC SPEAKING ON STREETS.-Freedom of speech is one of the most fundamental of our constitutional liberities. In England its inviolability has been more than once declared by the courts. In the Sommersett case, 20 How. St. Tr. 1, Lord Mansfield declared that no man could breath the air of Great Britain but his shackles fell from him instantaneously; that he was no longer bound, but free. This decision has been said to be the particular glory of Lord Manfield's judicial diadem. Gradually and insidiously, however, encroachments have been made upon this great essential of all true freedom. Great cities and the tendency toward congestion of population in certain places have made its full enjoyment impossible. Limitations have become necessary in order to give others a share in the same right or in order not to interfere with the rights of others in certain other directions. In the recent case of Love v. Phalen, 87 N. W. Rep. 785, the Supreme Court of Michigan held that an ordinance of the city council of Detroit forbidding the making of any public address in any public place within a half-mile circle of the city hall, without first obtaining permission from the mayor, was a valid exercise of the city's charter right to control and regulate the use of the streets. The court said: "It is said the ordinance is directed against freedom of speech, but this is a mistake. It is simply directed to the method of using a public space, and is no more a curtailment of the right of free speech than would be an ordinance that prohibited the making of public addresses in the corridors of the city hall."

A case similar to this one arose in controversy