Debtor to Wife.-Money given by a debtor to his wife after plaintiff's debt was created still belonged to him, and therefore real estate purchased with the money in the wife's name may be subjected to plaintiff's debt.-Beatty [v. Thompson's Admr., Ky., 66 S. W. Rep. 384.

63. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES Title Under Foreclosure Without Consideration. -Title under foreclosure of mortgage, paid and assigned without con sideration to hinder and delay creditors of mortgagor, held void against title under sale on execution against the mortgagor. — Milliman v. Eddie, Iowa, 88 N. W. Rep. 964.

65. GUARDIAN AND WARD – Authority of Guardian to Employ Physician.-Guardian held to have authority, without order of court, to contract for the payment of physician's charges from the corpus of the ward's es tate.-Williams v. Bonner, Miss., 31 South. Rep. 207.

66. HABEAS CORPUS-Erroneous Judgments.- Where a judgment under which a person is held is merely er. roneous, but the court had jurisdiction, the party aggrieved can have relief by writ of error or other process of review, but not by habeas corpus.-Bronk v. State, Fla., 31 South. Rep. 248.

67. HAWKERS AND PEDDLERS-Agent of Wholesaler. -Agent of wholesale dealer in supplies, making periodical visits to a city and selling and delivering goods to dealers, held not a peddlar. City of St. Paul v. Briggs, Minn., 88 N. W. Rep. 984.

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68. HIGHWAYS Ownership of Soil in Street. - In the absence of evidence to the contrary, an abutting lot owner is presumed to own the soil to the center of the street. Rawls v. Tallahassee Hotel Co., Fla., 31 South. Rep. 237.

69. INFANTS - Duty of Pleading Waiver. Where minors are defendants in a suit to enforce a vendor's lien, they may show waiver without pleading it.Lucas v. Wade, Fla., 31 South. Rep. 231.

70. INTERNAL REVENUE-Stamp on Sheriff's Certificate on Foreclosure.-It is not necessary to attach an internal revenue stamp to a copy of the sheriff's certifi cate on foreclosure showing that the appraisers were resident freeholders.-Sanborne v. Lindsey, Neb., 88 N. W. Rep. 869.

71. JUDGMENT-Filing Amended Complaint.-Where plaintiff on demurrer files an amended declaration, a copy thereof must be served on defendant before a default can be entered for failure to plead to such amended declaration.-Southern Ins. Co. of New Or leans v. Smith-Tyler, Fla., 31 South. Rep. 247.

72. JUDGMENT-Res Judicata.-A judgment in an ac tion brought by a real estate agent to recover a con. tingent fee for finding a purchaser held a bar to a subsequent action in equity for accounting as to such fee.-Kilham v. Wilson, U. S. C. C. of App., Eighth Cir. cuit, 112 Fed. Rep. 565.

73. JUDGMENT-Set Off.-A judgment debtor, obtain. ing judgment against his creditor after payment of the judgment in favor of the latter to the agent of the latter, cannot have his judgment set off against the sum paid the agent.-Selinas v. Lee, Vt., 51 Atl Rep. 5. 74. JUDGMENT - Transcript of United States District Court Judgment as Evidence.-Transcript of a judg. ment of a United States district court, duly certified, is competent evidence, though it fails to show that the presiding judge signed the journal record.-Stacks v. Crawford, Neb., 88 N. W. Rep. 852.

75. JURY- Peremptory Challenges.-After a trial juror is sworn in chief, it is too late to challenge peremptorily.-Myers v. State, Fla, 31 South. Rep. 275.

76. JURY-Qualifications.-Where a juror has formed an opinion, from reading newspapers, as to the crime charged, he may be required to serve, if he declares on oath that he will base his verdict exclusively on the law and the evidence.-Rottman v. State, Neb., 85 N. W. Rep. 857.

77. JUSTICES OF THE PEACE-Trial De Novo on Appeal. Trial de novo on appeal from a justice cannot be bad, on subsequent filing nunc pro tunc of affidavit required to be filed at time of appeal.-Gruetzmacher v. Wanninger, Wis., 88 N. W. Rep. 929.

78. LANDLORD AND TENANT- Lien. A waiver by a landlord of the priority of his lien over a mortgage for crop advances given by his tenant held not to inure to the benefit of an assignee of the mortgage.-Neeley v. Phillips, Ark., 66 S. W. Rep. 349.

79. LARCENY-Property of Unknown Owner.-On a prosecution for the theft of cattle belonging to an unknown owner, it is not necessary to prove that prior to the alleged theft the cattle were known as the propefty of an unknown owner.-Clements v. State, Tex., 66 S. W. Rep. 301.

82. LIFE INSURANCE-Defense Under "Incontestable" Clause. An incontestable clause in a life policy held not to prevent the company from setting up a partial defense arising from an assignment of the policy under a condition contained therein. -McQuillan v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Assn., Wis., 88 N. W. Rep. 925.

83. LIFE INSURANCE-Release by Beneficiary.-Release by beneficiary in a life policy of her interest therein under an agreement to change beneficiaries held an equitable assignment of such interest.-Cockrell v. Cockrell, Miss., 31 South. Rep. 203.

84. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-Changing Prayer of Bill. -The granting of an amendment changing the prayer of a bill from a request to quiet title to a request for a mortgage foreclosure, after limitations had expired against an original foreclosure bill, held not erroneous.-Easter v. Riley, Miss, 31 South. Rep. 210.

85. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-Tolling by Filing Peti tion. The filing of petition and issuing of summons against defendant stopped the running of the statute, though defendant was a non resident; plaintiff city and its attorney being ignorant of that fact.-Walston v. City of Louisville, Ky., 66 S. W. Rep. 385.

86. MARRIAGE-Alimony on Annulment of Marriage. -Where, in a suit to annul a marriage, both parties admit that no marriage ever existed, alimony cannot be allowed.-Knott v. Knott, N. J., 51 Atl. Rep. 15. 87. MASTER AND SERVANT Scope of Employment.Employee of railroad company held not to have been acting outside the scope of his employment, so as to preclude recovery for injury inflicted by his negligence on a fellow-servant.- Jensen v. Omaha & St. L. R. Co., Iowa, 88 N. W. Rep. 952.

88. MORTGAGES-Notice of Foreclosure. - Notice of foreclosure is not invalid because the newspaper, though published in the proper county, was partly printed outside of such county.-Etna Life Ins. Co. v. Wortasewski, Neb., 88 N. W. Rep. 855.

89. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Defective Sidewalks. -Under city charter of Fond du Lac, held, that the abutting lot owner was primarily liable for injuries resulting from the mere lack of repair of defective sidewalks.-Devine v. City of Fond du Lac, Wis., 88 N. W. Rep. 913.

90. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Right of Taxpayer to

Enforce Rights of City.-Where municipal corpora. tion refuses to institute legal proceedings, a taxpayer may be permitted to sue in behalf of himself and others to enforce the right of the city.-In re Min. neapolis Police Department Relief Assn., Minn., 88 N. W. Rep. 977.

91. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Taxpayer's Right to Prevent Illegal Contract.-The motive of a taxpayer in instituting a suit to prevent the city from entering into an illegal contract involving the expenditure of municipal funds does not affect his right to maintain such action.-Packard v. Hayes, Md., 51 Atl. Rep. 32.

92. NE EXEAT-When Issued.-A writ of ne exeat may be issued by a court of equity in a suit by a wife for maintenance before a decree is rendered fixing the amount to be paid.-Bronk v. State, Fla., 31 South. Rep. 248.

93. PARTNERSHIP-Attaching Individual Property of Non-Resident Partner.-Individual property of a nonresident partner may be attached in suit against the co-partners, and will be subject to a sale under exeution under a valid judgment.-First Nat. Bank v. Greig, Fla., 31 South. Rep. 239.

94. PLEADING-Leave to Amend After Motion for Nonsuit.-Leave to amend a declaration in a law action will not be granted after a motion for nonsuit has been argued and the court has pronounced judgment thereon, or is about to do so.-Higgins v. City of Wilmington, Del., 5i Atl. Rep. 1.

95. PLEADING-Liberal Construction of Demurrer.Where a petition is assailed for the first time at the close of the testimony by a demurrer ore tenus, it will be liberally construed.-National Fire Ins. Co. v. Eastern Building & Loan Assn., Neb., 88 N. E. Rep. 863.

96. PRESUMPTION-Where Defendant Does Not Testify. Where defendant in a civil case can by his own testimony throw light on his defense as to matters within his own knowledge, and does not testify, the presumption is that the facts as he would have them do not exist.-Bastrop v. Levy, La., 31 South. Rep. 164. 97. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-Presumption of General Agency. Where authority as general agent is once shown to exist, it will be presumed to continue, unless shown to be revoked.- Cheshire Provident Inst. v. Fuesner, Neb., 88 N. W. Rep. 849.

98. PRISONS

Indeterminate Parole.-The granting of a parole to a convict sentenced for an indeterminate time under Laws 1898, No. 127, held beyond the power of the board of prison commissioners.-In re Conditional Discharge of Convicts, Vt., 51 Atl. Rep. 10. 99. PROBATE COURT-Conclusiveness of Decrees.The judgment of a probate court on the allowance of a claim cannot be attacked on an application to sell lands of the estate to pay debts.-Jackson v. Gorman, Ark., 66 S. W. Rep. 346.

100. PUBLIC LANDS - Cancellation of Patents.-A patent regularly issued by the United States to the as signee of a military bounty land warrant could not be canceled seven years later by the commissioner of the land office without notice or opportunity to be heard. -Long v. Olson, Iowa, 88 N. W. Rep. 933.

101. RAILROADS-Ultra Vires Stipulations.-A railroad company, entering into a stipulation to do a certain act in consideration of a grant in aid thereof, is estopped to set up that the stipulation is ultra vires.— Atkins v. Shreveport & R. R. V. Ry. Co., La., 31 South. Кер. 166.

102. RELEASE- By Next of Kin.-A contract whereby the next of kin of an employee released the railroad from all damages that might accrue to the employee by the railroad's negligence is void, as against public policy. Tarbell v. Rutland R. Co., Vt., 51 Atl. Rep. 6. 103. REPLEVIN - Pursuing Proceeds.-Defendant in replevin may pursue proceeds of sale of property.— Ross v. Morse, Mich., 88 N. W. Rep. 881.

104. SALES-On Approval.-A sale on approval after condition performed by the seller does not become

complete until such approval by the buyer, though he is given custody of the goods before that time.-Davis Gasoline Engine Works Co. v. McHugh, Iowa, 88 N. W. Rep. 948.

105. SALES-Purchaser's Lien.-A purchaser's option to accept or reject machinery sent to him under a contract of sale did not give him a lien entitling him to possession.-James Smith Woolen Mach. Co. v. Holden, Vt., 51 Atl. Rep. 2.

106. SET-OFF AND COUNTERCLAIM-Requisites.-A setoff, to be available, must exist in favor of the defendant in the same right in which it is sued.-Lucas v. Wade, Fla., 31 South. Rep. 231.

107. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE - To Compel Wife to Convey Inchoate Dower.-Where a contract for the sale of land is made by the husband only, a decree for specific performance cannot compel the wife to con. vey her inchoate dower in the land.-Camden & T. Ry. Co. v. Adams, N. J., 51 Atl. Rep. 24.

108. STATUTES-Repealing by Implication.-A statute is not repealed by implication, unless it appears that there is a positive repugnancy between the first and the latter statute, or that the last was intended to prescribe the only rule which had governed the case provided for.-Florida E. C. Ry. Co. v. Hazel, Fla., 31 South. Rep. 272.

109. STATUTES Special Legislation.-The provision of the charter of cities of the first class requiring the payment of interest on taxes past due held not void as special legislation.-Walston v. City of Louisville, Ky., 66 S. W. Rep. 385.

110. SUBSCRIPTIONS Requisite Amount Not Collected. A subscriber to a building subscription held to have no cause to complain on the ground that the requisite amount was not collected in a reasonable time.-Hodges v. O'Brien, Wis., 88 N. W. Rep. 901.

111. TAXATION-Setting Aside Assessment.-A circuit court has no authority to set aside an assessment be cause it considers that the board placed the valuation of certain personalty at too high a figure.-Marsh v. Town of Richwood, Wis., 88 N. W. Rep. 916.

112. TAXATION-Solvent Credits.-The solvent credits arising from a mercantile business held taxable as such in years subsequent to that in which the debts upon which they are based were contracted.-Adams v. Clarke, Miss., 31 South. Rep. 216.

113. TAXATION - Standing Trees.-Standing trees, forming part of a plantation on the 1st of January, are included in the taxation of the plantation for that year; and payment of taxes on the plantation carries with it payment of taxes on the trees.-Palfrey v. Con. nelly, La., 31 South. Rep. 148.

114. TELEGRAPHS AND TELEPHONES-Incorrect Transmission.-Code, § 4326, providing penalty for incorrect transmission of telegram, does not apply to delay in transmission.-Western Union Tel. Co. v. Hall, Miss., 31 South. Rep. 202.

115. TRIAL-Improper Remarks of Trial Judge.-A statement by the court to the jury, emphasizing the cost of the trial to the county, and asking them to struggle with the case until they came to an agree. ment, held prejudicial.-Hodges v. O'Brien, Wis., 88 N. W. Rep. 901.

116. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-Waiver of Vendor's Lien.-Waiver of a vendor's lien is defensive matter, which defendant must allege and prove.-Lucas v. Wade, Fla., 31 South. Rep. 231.

117. WITNESSES Competency of Wife.-Objection that a witness was incompetent because her husband was particeps criminis cannot be sustained, where the husband was not indicted.-Burns v. State, Tex., 66 8. W. Rep. 303..

118. WITNESSES-Impeachment.-In order to admit proof under Rev. St. § 1102, as to former contradictory statements, they must be inconsistent with the pres ent testimony and relate to material matters.-Myers v. State, Fla., 31 South. Rep. 275.

he entered into no express contract to sell his influence or his vote.

Municipal corruption in this country has become a by-word. Prof. Bryce, in his American Commonwealth, says that it is prevalent to such an extent that the American peop'e have become indifferent to it. Certain it is that members of municipal assemblies all over the country seem to regard certain favors of the kind disclosed in the St. Louis bribery investigation to be among the ordinary prequisites of the office. The successful issue of the trials now under way in St. Louis will be awaited with interest all over the country as sounding a higher note of civic morality.

NOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS.

TRIAL AND PROCEDURE-ACTIONS OF PLAINTIFF AROUSING THE JURY'S SYMPATHY.-Opportunities for influencing the jury by appeals to their sympathy are not often allowed to slip by unimproved. How far, however, such appeals are ground for new trial is well illustrated by the recent case of Galveston, etc. Ry. Co. v. Hitzfelder, 66 S. W. Rep. 707. This was an action for injury to plaintiff which had resulted in producing epilepsy with its attendant violent convulsions. While defendant was testifying plaintiff fell down in the court room in an epileptic convulsion, and caused some excitement, in the presence of the jury. The court held that this was not ground for setting aside a verdict in his favor on the ground that his condition had aroused the jury's sympathy and prejudiced defendant's case, where only $10,000 was awarded him.

JURISDICTION OF THE U. S. SUPREME COURT IN THE RAILROAD MERGER CASE.-The suit of the State of Minnesota v. Northern Securities Company, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 308, is attracting considerable attention, more because of the importance of the litigation than upon any novelty in the decision. In this case, the state of Minnesota, being apprehensive that the majority of the - stockholders of the Great Northern and Northern Pacific railway systems have combined in a new organization, known as the Northern Securities Company, thus operating to defeat and overrule the policy of the state in prohibiting the consolidation of parallel and competing lines of railway, the court found that the Northern Securities Company controlled only a majority of the stock, and that certain minority stockholders, residents of Minnesota, were not joined nor before the court. The court held that the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States cannot be exercised in a suit between a state and

a citizen of another state, when, with the latter, citizens of the complainant state must necessarily be joined as parties.

WITNESS-WHO IS QUALIFIED TO GIVE ExPERT TESTIMONY ON THE SUBJECT OF ELECTRICITY.-Expert witnesses have fallen into great disrepute owing to the fact that they are too sensitive to the highest bidder,and for the further reason that persons of only moderate attainments too often fail to show any great reluctance in claiming the knowledge and experience that properly belongs only to "experts." It is therefore very refreshing to observe the frank confession of a physician of want of expert knowledge of a subject properly within the purview of his professional equipment. We refer to the recent case of Wehner v. Lagerfelt, 66 S. W. Rep. 221, which was an action for injury caused by an electric shock. To prove the effect of electricity on the human body, the testimony of a physician of thirty-five years' practice was offered in evidence. Witness testified that he had read the best of authorities on the subject and knew what they said as to the result of electricity on the human system, but that he had had no personal experience, was not what you would call an "expert," and did not feel perfectly qualified in giving an opinion. The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, before whom the question arose, held that an objection to his testifying should be sustained. The court said:

"An 'expert,' as the word imports, is one having had experience. Lawson, Exp. Ev. (2d Ed.) 230. Rule 36, which follows the definition by the same author, is thus stated: "Therefore, to render the opinion of a witness admissible on the ground that it is the opinion of an expert, the witress must have special skill in the subject concerning which bis opinion is sought to be given.' Then, quoting from Carr v. Northern Liberties, 35 Pa. 324, 78 Am. Dec. 342, he says: 'Matter of opinion is entitled to no weight with a court or jury, unless it comes from persons who first gave satisfactory evidence that they are possessed of such experience, skill, or science in such matters as entitle their opinions to pass for scientific truth.' Of all others the witness was best qualified to know whether he was an expert on the subject concerning which his opinion was sought to be given. To his credit, learning, and candor, be it said, he knew himself well enough to know that he was not an expert, and did not feel qualified to give an opinion on the subject of inquiry. Frankly expressing to the court this knowledge and opinion of himself, it became apparent that, if he gave any opinion, it could not be such as would be 'entitled to pass for a scientific truth.' When a witness states he knows nothing about the subject of inquiry, and that he is not qualified to give an opinion, he should not be permitted to express any; for, in order to say something concerning a matter, the witness should know something. Wheeler v. Blandin, 22

N. H. 167, and Id., 24 N. H. 168. In the case before us the witness had no experience, and did not consider himself either an expert or qualified

this thesis is confined to the latter of the three methods enumerated above, i. e., the

books said upon the subject. It was not sought to be shown that he had formed an opinion from the books, or, if he had, what such opinion was. While an expert may testify to an opinion of his own derived from books, for one to do so he must be an expert, and have an opinion of his own upon the subject of inquiry. Books of science and art are not admissible in evidence to prove the opinions contained therein. Lawson, Exp. Ev. 202. If they are not, how can one who knows their contents, but has formed no opinion of his own upon the subject under consideration, be allowed to testify to what the books say? The books themselves would be the best evidence, and they are no evidence at all. The witness testified to everything he knew about the effect of the electric shock upon the child, and the court did not err in refusing to permit appellants to prove anything more by him."

1. Introduction Statement of the Proposition-Division of Authority Indicated.It is a familiar principle of the law of evidence that after a witness has been examined in chief, the testimony of that witness may be impeached. This may be done in various modes. The methods mentioned by the text-writers, other than by cross-examination, are: (1) By disproving facts stated by the witness in court, by the testimony of other witnesses; (2) By proof of contradictory statements made out of court by the same witness; (3) By general evidence affecting the character of the witness, thereby enabling the jury to more adequately and justly pass on the weight of such evidence. The investigation-the subject-of

Thomson on Trials, 521 523; Taylor on Evidence, soc. 1470; Philips on Evidence, vol. 2, p. 799; Starkie

the character of the impeached, whose credibility is thereby attacked. Among the different states there has been considerable difference of opinion as to the term "character;" some holding that the proper inquiry is, as to the general moral character of the witness sought to be impeached; while others adhere strictly to the rule that such inquiry should be confined to the reputation of the witness for truth and veracity among those among whom he has lived,-his neighbors.2 This thesis is, however, concerned only with the latter, i. e, the impeachment of a witness by proof of his bad reputation for truth and veracity; and it is an effort to ascertain to what period of time such testimony, as to the character of the witness for truth and veracity, will be limited. It will be the effort of the writer to confine this treatise strictly to these points, and to make it exhaustive on this line.

It is generally agreed among the cases that when, at the trial of a cause, impeaching testimony is introduced, the question in issue is the character of the impeached at the time of trial. The material object of the inquiry is the character of the witness at the time he testifies; and that when, at the trial of a cause, the character of a witness is shown, in order to affect his credibility, the question is whether he then, at the time of the trial, tells the truth. It is his character at the time he testifies that is under investigation. The object of the inquiry is to aid the jury in ascertaining the degree of credit due to the witness in question, so far as it may depend on his character for truth.5 But while there seems to be quite a general concensus of opinion upon this proposition, the authorities seem far from an agreement as to how this issue shall on Evidence, 236; Wharton on Evidence, 549: Rice on Evidence, 613; Greenleaf on Evidence, 461; Jones on Evidence, 860 863.

2 For an exhaustive treatise on this phase of the subject, see Thesis by Mr. Emerson Ela, Law 1901, University of Wisconsin.

3 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, vol. 29, p. 802.

+ Smith v. Hine, 179 Pa. 203.

5 Brown v. Leuhrs, 1 Ill. App. 74; Walker v. State, 6 Blackf.; Aurora v. Cobb, 21 Ind. 468; Willard v. Goodenough, 30 Vt. 393; Teese v. Huntington, 23 How. 2; Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 79 Ky. 219; Norwood v. Andrews, 71 Miss. 641, 16 South. Rep. 262.