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absent from the state. 62 But the sentimental reason that because the mortgagee had just died, the mortgagor felt delicate about taking up the matter of payment to the former's husband, will afford no legal excuse for the default.68

The Same Continued.- Acceptance of payment from a receiver of the mortgagor or payment into court65 will not preclude the maintenance of a suit already instituted. Nor will the mortgagee, by accepting interest after one default, necessarily waive a future one,66 though he is generally held to have waived the delinquency as to the amount accepted. In Illinois the question of waiver in such cases has been treated as one of fact, but mere delay in suing will not, as a rule, constitute a waiver.69

CHARLES SUMNER LOBINGIER.

Omaha, Neb.

would be harsh and unjust, and contrary to all well settled equitable principles."

62 Hale v. Patton, 60 N. Y. 233.

63 Mobray v. Leckie, 42 Md. 474.

64 American Loan & Trust Co. v. Union Depot Co.. 80 Fed. Rep. 36.

65 Mobray v. Leckie, 42 Md. 474.

66 Indiana: Moore v. Sargent, 112 Ind. 484. Iowa: Swearingen v. Lahmer (Iowa), 61 N. W. Rep. 431. Nebraska: Baldwin Investment Co. v. Bailey, 45 Neb. 580. New Jersey: Post v. Industrial Land Development Co. (N. J. Eq.), 34 Atl. Rep. 137. New York: Hale v. Gouvenneur, 4 Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 207; Rubens v. Prindle, 44 Barb. (N. Y.) 336; Malcolm v. Allen, 49 N. Y. 448; Valentine v. Van Wagner, 37 Barb. (N. Y.) 60.

Langridge v. Payne, 2 John. & Hem. 423; Law. son v. Barron, 18 Hun (N. Y.), 414.

65 Van Vlissingen v. Lenz, 171 Ill. 162. In this case, the court refused to disturb a finding of fact by the jury to the effect that the breach had been waived, notwithstanding the following statement of facts in the opinion: "On the 20th day of July Joseph Lenz went to the office of the plaintiff and paid him the coupon interest note, but Van Vlissingen, after payment but before delivering this interest note to Joseph Lenz, wrote thereon in red ink as follows: 'Paid July 20th, 1896, upon the understanding that principal remains past due, as per notice. Peter Van Vlissingen.' Lenz testified he did not look at this indorsement until he had left the office, but supposed the note was simply marked paid. This indorsement was excluded by the court and not permitted to go to the jury, the plaintiff himself having testified that he did not make it until after he had received the money and the note was paid."

69 Fletcher v. Dennison, 101 Cal. 292; Kansas L. & T. Co. v. Gill, 2 Kan. App. 488, 43 Pac. Rep. 488.

CARRIERS BY WATER- WHAT LAW GOV. ERNS STIPULATION FOR EXEMPTION FROM LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE.

THE NEW ENGLAND.

District Court, D. Massachusetts, July 15, 1901. A provision in a ticket, issued by an English steamship company to a passenger in the United States, for passage from an American to an English port, that the contract shall be governed by the English law, is ineffectual to render valid a stipulation exempting the company from liability for the negligence of its servants in respect to the passenger's baggage, which is contrary to the public policy of the United States.

LOWELL, D. J.: In this case, the libelant, a passenger, delivered to the Dominion Steamship Company, at its dock in Boston, alongside the steamship New England, a trunk containing suitable wearing apparel for herself only. When she arrived at Liverpool the trunk was not to be found, but several days later was forwarded to the address she had left with the company's agent at Liverpool. At the time she received the trunk its lock had been tampered with, and when that was forced the trunk was found empty. The steamship company, though pressed in correspondence by the libelant, and though challenged in open court, failed to explain the delay in delivery, or to introduce any evidence concerning the treatment of the trunk while detained in its hands. This failure of the libelee to introduce evidence within its sole possession justifies the court in finding that the trunk was broken open and rifled by the company's servants, and that this fact became known to the managers. Whether the conversion occurred in Boston, at sea, or in the British dominions does not appear. The inference regarding the conversion is strengthened by the discourteous letters written by the company's managers in Liverpool to the libelant, a woman traveling alone, when she pressed them with inconvenient questions.

The passenger ticket stated on its face, and above the signature of the company's agent: "The company will use all reasonable means to insure the ship being sent to sea in a seaworthy state and well found, but it is not otherwise liable for loss of, or injury to, the passenger or his luggage, or delay in the voyage, whether arising from act of God, queen's enemies, perils of the sea, rivers, or navigation, barratry or negligence of the company's servants (whether on board the steamer or on shore), defect in the steamer, her machinery, gear, or fittings, or from any other cause o whatsoever nature. The passenger shall not be liable, in respect of his luggage or personal effects, to pay, or to be entitled to receive, any general average contribution. It is further agreed that the company shall not be held liable in excess of fifty dollars for loss or injury to specie, money, jewelry, bullion, precious stones or other valuables (unless they are given to the purser, and a special receipt given therefor), or loss of or injury to baggage, unless the value o

the same be declared before shipment, and freight paid accordingly. It is further agreed that passengers shall see that baggage required during the voyage shall be distinctly labeled, and, in the event of neglecting so to do, the company shall in no manner be held liable for its loss or delay in delivery. It is further agreed that all question arising on this contract shall be decided according to English law."

According to the English law, common carriers may exempt themselves by express contract from responsibility for losses occasioned by the negligence of their servants. By the law of this country, as laid down in the opinions of the supreme court, such an express contract is contrary to public policy, and consequently void. "It may therefore be assumed that the stipulation now in question [a stipulation similar to that contained in the clause of the ticket first above quoted], though invalid by our law, would be valid according to the law of Great Britain." Liverpool & G. W. S. Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U. S. 397, 447, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 469, 474, 32 L. Ed. 788, 794.

This court has therefore first to determine whether the question of public policy is to be answered according to English opinion or that prevalent in the federal courts. In spite of the clause of the ticket last quoted, Judge Nelson held in this district that the English law did not govern, and that the attempt to exempt the company from liability for the negligence of its servants had failed. The Iowa (D. C.), 50 Fed. Rep. 561. The matter has not been determined by the supreme court, though discussed by that court more than once. In Liverpool & G. W. S. Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U. S. 397, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 469, 32 L. Ed. 788, much stress was laid upon the intention of the parties in determining what law was to govern; but on page 462, 129 U. S., page 479, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep., and page 799, 32 L. Ed., it was expressly stated that "the present case does not require us to determine what effect the courts of the United States should give to this contract if it had expressly provided that any question arising under it should be governed by the law of England." In Compania de Navigacion la Flecha v. Brauer, 168 U. S. 104, 118, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 12, 42 L. Ed. 398, the supreme court again expressly declined to pass on the question, while citing several cases which support Judge Nelson's decision in The Iowa. In Knott v. Worsted Botany Mills, 179 U. S. 69, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 30, 45 L. Ed., a stipulation that the law of England should govern was held ineffective against the provisions of the Harter act; and in Calderon v. Steamship Co., 170 U. S. 272. 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 588, 42 L. Ed. 1033, the public policy of this country expressed in the Harter act was likened to the general public policy which prevents a carrier from exempting himself from liability for his servant's negligence. In the inferior federal courts the weight of authority is with Judge Nelson. The Iowa was expressly approved in Worsted Mills v. Knott, 27 C. C. A. 326, S2 Fed.

Rep. 471, by the circuit court of appeals for the second circuit. A like provision inserted in a passenger's ticket between Belgium and New York, the steamer being American, was held void by the same court in The Kensington, 36 C. C. A. 533, 94 Fed. Rep. 885. See, also, The Energia (D. C.), 56 Fed. Rep. 124; Lewisohn v. Steamship Co. (D. C.), 56 Fed. Rep. 602; The Hugo (D. C.), 57 Fed. Rep. 403; The Glenmavis (D. C.), 69 Fed. Rep. 472. The authority of these cases outweighs that of The Oranmore (D. C.), 24 Fed. Rep. 922, which was affirmed in the circuit court, without any statement of reasons, by Judge Bond. 92 Fed. Rep. 396. The opinion of Judge Morris in the last-mentioned case treats the matter as one to be determined by the intention of the parties; but, as was said by Judge Butler in The Glenmavis:

"The intent of the parties in this regard as thus expressed is therefore immaterial. In every instance where the courts have declared such stipu lations void, it has, of course, been against the express agreement of the parties. We have determined that such contracts are harmful and wrong; that they tend to encourage negligence. and justify oppression; that they affect injuriously, not only the immediate parties, but the public at large; and that they are therefore unlawful." 69 Fed. Rep. 476.

It is true that in The Majestic, 9 C. C. A. 161, 60 Fed. Rep. 624, it was held that where the steamer was English, and the contract made in England, the English law governed, and was enforceable in the federal courts, in spite of the public policy of the United States; and this even in the absence of a clause expressly providing for the applica tion of the English law. The supreme court, in reversing the decision of the circuit court of appeals for the second circuit, treated the question as an open one by holding that the English and American law was the same when applied to the facts of the particular case. The Majestic, 166 U. S. 375, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 597, 41 L. Ed. 1039. The supreme court has not decided that the English law ever can be made to govern in an action brought in a federal court, so as to exempt a carrier from liability for his servant's negligence. And it has implied the contrary in The Queen of the Pacific, 180 U. S. 49, 56, 57, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 278, 45 L. Ed.-. The circuit court of appeals for the second circuit, which decided Knott v. Botany Mills and The Kensington after deciding The Majestic, did not determine in the earlier case that, if the contract be made in this country, it is possible to override the public policy of this country by a stipulation that the contract shall be governed by the law of England. The court merely agreed with the remark of Judge Brown: "It is no part of the law or poliey of this country to invalidate the contracts of parties lawfully made abroad, so far as respects performance there, the acts being neither criminal by our law nor mala in se." The Trinacria (D. C.), 42 Fed. Rep. 863, 864. Upon the whole,

the weight, both of authority and of sound reasoning, renders ineffectual the stipulation referred to, and the United States law governs this case. Following The Rosedale (D. C.), 88 Fed. Rep. 324, affirmed 92 Fed. Rep. 1021, and The Kensington, 94 Fed. Rep. 887, the court holds that the Harter act is inapplicable to this case.

NOTE.-What Law Governs Contracts by Carriers Limiting Their Common Law Liability.—In a recent annotation in the CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL (53 Cent. L. J. 253), we called attention to the difficulty and uncertainty of the law relating to the carrier's right to limit its liability. We found as a result of our investigation that the authorities were in irreconcilable conflict; one line holding that a common carrier cannot lawfully stipulate for exemption from responsibility for the negligence of himself or servants, and the other, following the New York decisions, holding that a common carrier may make a valid con. tract exonerating itself from all liability not caused by the fraud or willful wrong of the company. We now inject into this already difficult question, the further inquiry whether a contract by a carrier in limitation of liability, valid where made, can be enforced in a jurisdiction denying the validity of such agreements; and, if this latter inquiry can be answered affirmatively, whether a stipulation for the construction of the contract according to the laws of a foreign jurisdiction will have the same effect.

The subject of private international law or the con. flict of laws, as it is sometimes called, is rapidly be. coming one of more pre-eminent importance as year after year intercourse between the states and between the citizens of foreign nations become more intimate and vital. Isolation for nations or states is forever a thing of the past. This tendency has, of course, greatly exercised and extended the principles of comity which have heretofore controlled the business relations of foreign nations and their citi zens with each other. These principles have to day become necessarily exceedingly liberal and generous. One rule is universally recognized and undisputed, that contracts are to be construed according to the laws of the state where made, unless it can be presumed from their tenor that they were entered into with a view to the laws of some other state. Another rule, however, just as important and as well settled as the other, is that comity does not require that a contract valid in one state be enforced in another if it is condemned by positive law or is inconsistent with the public policy of the latter state. Faulkner v. Hyman, 142 Mass. 53; State Bank v. Plainfield Bank, 34 N. J. Eq. 450; Thompson v. Taylor, 51 Cent. L. J. 111, and note. This rule, while perfectly definite in its terms, casts much uncertainty over the whole subject in the shape of that vague indefinable phrase, "public policy." Nothing is more difficult than to find out just what is meant by the public policy of a state, and how far that policy should in. terfere with the comity of the state in recognizing and enforcing the laws of a foreign jurisdiction. The position of a state on any important question, either by legislative enactment or judicial decision, may be said to be the expression of the state's policy on that question. And yet we cannot entertain for a moment the wisdom of such narrow exclusiveness on the part of a state in refusing to recognize the laws of a foreign state where such laws offend neither morals nor - religion nor violate the rights of its citizens. There is another rule of private international law, however,

which we recognize as justly applicable to this question, and which we believe has sometimes been confused with the rule as to public policy. The rule to which reference is here made is that denying the enforcement of contracts which are in evasion or fraud of the laws of a country. This rule is vital to the stability of any government and to the proper en. forcement of its laws.

With these considerations in mind let us examine the authorities. Probably the earliest and most im portant authority on this question, and the one on which the subsequent cases rest so largely for their support, is the case of The Brantford City, 29 Fed. Rep. 373. In this case the libelants, at Boston, shipped on board the British steamer, Brantford City, 260 cattle to be carried to England. The bill of lading excepted "death, however caused," and loss from "stowage, or from perils of the sea, arising from negligence." The cattle died on the voyage by reason of the carrier's negligence. The court held that the stipulation as respects negligent stowage and negligent navigation was invalid in our courts, and that the law of England which upholds such stipulations was not controlling, first, because there was no sufficient evidence that the parties intended a purely English contract; and, second, because our national policy, which disallow such stipulations in favor of our own carriers, cannot permit the adoption of the foreign law, in favor of foreign carriers, by comity. It is apparent that the reason of the court's decision was that to apply the law of England to this contract, which was made in this country, and, therefore, presumably to be governed by the laws of this country, would be a clear evasion of our laws. The court said: "Contracts though designed to be performed elsewhere, are void, if criminal or illegal where made, i. e., if the very promise or condition which is the consideration of the contract, as distinguished from the thing to be done by the other party, be illegal where made, the only exceptions being cases arising under the laws against usury; and a foreign law is never adopted by comity where it would be against the public policy of the forum, and prejudicial to its citizens." It is evident that the facts of this case did not necessitate any decision of the question of the extraterritorial validity of the English law on contracts made in England or where by direct stipulations the law of a foreign jurisdic. tion is adopted. In fact the court quotes approv ingly the words of Mr. Justice Iredell, in Searight v. Calbraith, 4 Dall. 327: "Every man is bound to know the laws of his own country, but no man is bound to know the laws of foreign coun. tries. In two cases, indeed (and, I believe, only in two cases), can foreign laws affect the contracts of American citizens: (1) Where they reside or trade in a foreign country; and (2) where the contracts, plainly referring to a foreign contract for their execution, adopt and recognize that as the lex loci." The case of The Iowa, 50 Fed. Rep. 561, was probably the first case on the validity of stipulations as to foreign laws. In this case the facts were practically identical with the preceding case. The contract was made in Boston for the shipment of cattle to Eng. land on a British steamer. The contract had, in addition, however, a stipulation that the contract should be governed by the law of England. The court declared this latter stipulation void and also the exemption from liability. The court said: "The libelant is entitled to recover in spite of the clause providing that all questions arising under the contract shall be decided according to British law. This

seems to be an attempt, in an indirect way, to stipu late that the shipowner shall be exempt from responsibility for the negligence of his servants, since the British law is supposed to uphold such exemptions. The form of the stipulation is immaterial, and as its purpose is plainly to impose, upon a contract made here, a construction which our law rejects as contrary to public policy, it must be held to be as much a nullity as the other clauses, which in express terms limit the liability of the owner." This argument is undoubtedly the soundest on principle of any that have been advanced in support of the right to nullify stipulations fixing the lex loci contractus in such cases. Such stipulation in contracts made in this country are a clear evasion and violation of its laws, and therefore cannot be countenanced by the courts of this country. To same effect: The Energia, 56 Fed. Rep. 124; Lewisohn v. Steamship Co., 56 Fed. Rep. 602; Brauer v. Compania Navigacion La Flecha, 57 Fed. Rep. 403. The Supreme Court of the United States has not yet passed on this question. The nearest it has come to it is in the case of Liver. pool Steam Co. v. Phenix Insurance Co., 129 U. S. 397, where it was held that a contract of affreight. ment, made in an American port by an American shipper with an English steamship company doing business there, for the shipment of goods there and their carriage to England, is an American contract and governed by American law, so far as regards the effect of a stipulation exempting the company from responsibility for negligence. An important phase of the court's opinion is the extraordinary length to which it goes to prove that the intention of the parties in making the contract was to be governed by the American law; and that, under the facts in this case, the place of contract was in America, no contrary intention to be bound by the law elsewhere being shown. This leads to the inference that if the contract had been made in England, or if it had contained a stipulation to be bound by the law of England, the result would have been different.

There are two decisions on the other side of this question. In the case of The Oranmore, 24 Fed. Rep. 922, the libelant made a contract with a British steamer to carry cattle from Baltimore to Liverpool. By a clause in the contract it was agreed that any question arising under the contract or the bill of lading against the steamer should be determined by the law of England. There was the ordinary exemp tion from liability for negligence. The court held that the parties to the contract, having expressly declared their intention that the contract should be governed by the law of England, that law must gov. ern as to its validity, obligation and interpretation, and that, therefore, the exemption being good under the English law was enforceable here. In the recent case of Wupperman v. The Carib Prince, 68 Fed. Rep. 284, it was held that a bill of lading of goods to be carried in an English ship, signed in an English port, must be construed according to the law of England; and that, therefore, the exemption from liability contracted for being valid under the English law is enforceable in our courts. This case was reversed in the supreme court (170 U. S. 655), on another point, however, that the injury did not come within the exceptions stipulated for, thus impliedly affirming the validity of the stipulations.

We are inclined to favor the following conclusions on this question: Where the contract is made in this country, the law of this country must control, and that any stipulation to be bound by the laws of any other country should be held to be invalid

wherever it is evident that such stipulation is merely an evasion of our law and only another method contracting for exemption from liability. But in every case where such fact is not apparent, or where the contract was made in the foreign jurisdiction, the law of the latter place should control.

HUMORS OF THE LAW.

A witness, who was quite blind, testified in detail as to a quarrel between the two.

"Then Lew grabbed up a chair and broke it over Jim's head," he said.

"How do you know that?" asked the lawyer who was conducting the cross-examination.

"I was an eyewitness to it," remarked the blind

man.

"An eyewitness?" repeated the lawyer doubtingly. "Yes," said the blind man, "I was. A piece of the leg hit me in the right eye. I certainly was an eyewitness."

Marshall R. E. See, of the Missouri supreme court was taking a convict to the state penitentiary. A man on the train asked him what time it was. The marshal replied by a shake of the head, as he did not know. The man then asked the same question to the convict, who was thoughtfully gazing out of the car window as the train whirled along, and did not as first understand the question.

"I say, what time have you?" the man repeated. "Oh, two years," was the modest reply, which paralyzed the stranger, until the conductor came along and told him the time of day.

WEEKLY DIGEST.

Weekly Digest of ALL the Current Opinions of ALL the State and Territorial Courts of Last Resort, and of all the Federal Courts

ARKANSAS....
CONNECTIcut.

DELAWARE.........
ILLINOIS......

.122, 132, 138, 162, 193 100, 108. 172 .......185

...17, 32, 45, 104, 106, 118, 135, 148

INDIANA, 6, 9, 10, 11, 36, 59, 71, 82, 102, 110, 114, 115, 125, 141, 142, 154, 155, 166, 169, 181, 195

KENTUCKY, 3, 8, 28, 34, 38, 43, 67, 68, 72, 77, 81, 97, 103, 112, 123, 127, 145, 165, 167, 198, 199, 207, 208 MAINE......

.30

[blocks in formation]

UNITED STATES D. C.......19, 20, 21, 22, 26, 89, 168, 182, 185 UNITED STATES S. C......... ..47, 189, 191

1. ACCOUNT, ACTION ON- Bookkeeper's Affidavit.Under Shannon's Code, § 5561, a bookkeeper's affidavit to the correctness of an account presented by a firm is insufficient to establish it.-Foster v. Scott County, Tenn., 65 S. W. Rep. 22.

2. ACTIONS-Stayed Pending Construction of Will.Where executor is garnished pending construction of will in probate court, all proceedings should be stayed pending such construction.-Duxbury v. Shanahan, Minn., 87 N. W. Rep. 944.

3. ADVERSE POSSESSION-Constructive Possession.If plaintiffs, by their agents or tenants, lived upon a part of the land embraced by their deed, they had constructive possession of all of the land embraced therein that was not in the actual possession of de fendants.-Krauth v. Hahn, Ky., 65 S. W. Rep. 18.

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4. ANIMALS-Impounding Live Stock Running Large. Where stock running at large entered the inclosed field of defendant, he was authorized to impound and hold them for damages under Gen. Laws 1899, ch. 128, § 14.-Graves v. Rudd, Tex., 65 S. W. Rep. 63.

5. APPEAL AND ERROR-Amount in Controversy Determining Jurisdiction.-On error by plaintiff below, the difference between the amount claimed and the amount recovered determines the jurisdiction of the supreme court under Rev. St. § 6710, as amended April 25, 1898. People's Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Zimmerman, Ohio, 61 N. E. Rep. 706.

6. APPEAL AND ERROR-Assignment of Errors.Conclusions of law stated by the court on special findings of fact must be questioned by an assignment of errors, and not presented as reasons for a new trial.King v. Wright, Ind., 61 N. E. Rep. 796.

7. APPEAL AND ERROR-Decree in Partition Final.— A decree in a suit for partition directing the sale of land, where its sale or division was the only question in issue between the parties, is final for the purpose of appeal.-East Coast Cedar Co. v. People's Bank, U. S. C. C. of App., Fourth Circuit, 111 Fed. Rep. 446. 8. APPEAL AND ERROR Defendant Not Filing Answer Not Entitled to Appeal.-A defendant who has not filed an answer cannot prosecute an appeal as against a co-defendant from a judgment dismissing the petition against both.-City of Lexington v. Home Const. Co., Ky., 65 S. W. Rep. 1.

9. APPEAL AND ERROR-Error in First Instance on Appeal.-A party cannot test the sufficiency of an answer in the first instance on appeal by direct assignment of error for that purpose.-Stephens v. Smith, Ind., 61 N. E. Rep. 745.

10. APPEAL AND ERROR-Failure to Assess Nominal Damages. Where a judgment is erroneous only because of failure to assess nominal damages, It should not be reversed.-Rauh v. Waterman, Ind., 61 N. E. Rep. 743.

11. APPEAL And Error-Joint Assignment of Error. -A joint assignment of error in conclusions of law is unavailing where appellants did not join in exceptions to such conclusions.-Davis v. Seybold, Ind., 61 N. E. Rep. 743.

12. APPEAL AND ERROR Submission on Agreed Statement of Facts.-Where a case has been submitted on an agreed statement of facts, and a plea stating a good defense has been interposed, the supreme court cannot determine whether the facts sustain the plea.-Robey v. State, Md., 50 Atl. Rep. 411. 13. APPEARANCE-Filing Petition for Removal.-The filing of a petition and bond for removal is not such an appearance as precludes the defendant from moving to set aside the service of process after removal.Tortat v. Hardin Min. & Mfg. Co., U. S. C. C., D. S. Dak., 111 Fed. Rep. 426.

14. ARREST-Held for Second Grand Jury.-A person

may be arrested and held to await the action of a grand jury, though a former grand jury failed to indict him.-Ex parte Baker, Tex., 65 S. W. Rep. 91.

15. ASSAULT AND BATTERY-Failure to Find Degree of Offense.-Failure of the jury to find degree of the offense, where the Indictment charged only a simple assault, held not erroneous.-McCulloch v. State, Tex., 65 S. W. Rep. 94.

16. ATTACHMENT-Debtor's Equity of Redemption.Judgment creditor held entitled to attach a debtor's equity of redemption without pursuing the statutory remedy by redemption.-Templeton y. Mason, Tenn., 65 8. W. Rep. 25.

17. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-Fraud in Consenting to Judgment Against Client.-Attorney, who had fraudu lently consented to an allowance against a corporation of claims against which he was employed to defend it, held not entitled to offset his claim for services against a claim in favor of the corporation's receiver for his share of the proceeds of such fraud.— Harding v. Helmer, Ill., 61 N. E. Rep. 838.

18. AUCTIONS AND AUCTIONEERS - Unreasonable License Fee.-$2,500 license fee for auctioneers held unreasonable.-Margolies v. City of Atlantic City, N. J., 50 Atl. Rep. 367.

19. BANKRUPTCY-Compensation of Assignees Under Previous Assignment.-Assignees under a general assignment constructively fraudulent under the bank. ruptcy act are not entitled to compensation from the estate for services rendered prior to the filing of peti. tion in bankruptcy against the assignor.- Wilbur v. Watson, U. S. D. C., D. R. I., 111 Fed. Rep. 493.

20. BANKRUPTCY — Deducting New Credits.-Bankr. Act 1898, § 60c, entitles a creditor to deduct the amount of new credits from the preferences he would otherwise be required to surrender before proving his claim, and is not limited in its application to cases where the trustee sues to recover such preferences.In re Southern Overalls Mfg. Co., U. S. D. C., N. d. Ga., 111 Fed Rep. 518.

21. BANKRUPTCY Deduction of New Credits.Bankr. Act 1898, § 60c, entitles any preferred creditor to a deduction of new credits from preferences which he is required to surrender before proving his claim, and is not limited to cases where the trustee sues to recover the preferences.- In re Soldosky, U. S. D. C., D. Minn., 111 Fed. Rep. 511.

22. BANKRUPTCY-Referee's Fees.-Where objections to a bankrupt's discharge are referred to a referee for hearing, he is entitled to a reasonable allowance for his services, in addition to the fees allowed him by the bankruptcy law.-In re Grossman, U. S. D. C., E. D. Mich., 111 Fed. Rep. 507.

23. BANKRUPTCY-Right of Trustee to Sue in His Own Name.-Bankr. Act 1898, ch. 541, §§ 21e, 23b, 26, 468, 70a (5), held to impliedly grant a trustee in bankruptcy power to sue in his own name on a demand due the bankrupt before commencement of bankruptcy proceedings.-Pease v. McQuillin, Mass., 61 N. E. Rep. 819. 24. BANKRUPTCY-Right to Present Subsequent Petition for Discharge.-A bankrupt, who has been refused a discharge, is not debarred from filing a second petition and obtaining a discharge thereunder; its effect being a matter to be determined whenever occasion may arise.-In re Claff, U. S. D. C., D. Mass., 111 Fed. Rep. 506.

25. BANKRUPTCY - Suit by Trustee to Annul Convey. ance. In a suit by a trustee in bankruptcy to annul a conveyance by the bankrupt to defendant, an issue whether the bankrupt had held the land merely as trustee for defendant's mother held properly submitted to the jury.-Dutton v. Cloar, Tex., 65 S. W. Rep. 70.

26. BANKRUPTCY-Vacating Adjudication of Bank. ruptcy.-A court of bankruptcy is without jurisdic. tion to vacate an adjudication of bankruptcy on a petition which was not filed until several terms had

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