causing injuries which could not reasonably have been anticipated, held not to render the owner thereof llable for resulting injury.-Carter v. Cape Fear Lum. bel Co., N. Car., 39 S. E. Rep. 828.

110. MINES AND MINING - Removal of Fixtures.Lessees in a mining lease held to have the right to remove fixtures placed on the premises by them.Couch Welsh, Utah, 66 Pac. Rep. 600.

111. MONOPOLIES-Exclusive Right to Use Switch Track:-A oon tract whereby defendant railroad com. pany undertook to grant te a coal company the exclusive right to the use of a certain switch track held void as against public policy.-Louisville & N. R. Co. V. Pittsburg & K. Coal Co., Ky., 64 8. W. Rep. 969.

113. MORTGAGES Adverse Possession - Between Mortgagor and Mortgagee.-The possession of a mortgagor cannot become adverse as to the mortgagee without notice that his claim is hostile.-Bentley v. Callaghan, Miss., 80 South. Rep. 709.

113. MORTGAGES-Foreclosing Property Set Aside to Heirs.-Order setting aside property to heirs as a homestead held not to bar an action to foreclose a trust deed thereon.-Leslie v. Elliott, Tex., 64 8. W. Rep. 1037.

114. MORTGAGES-Payment to Payee After Assign. ment of Mortgage is Recorded.-Where assignment of mortgage has been recorded as required by statute, payment to original payee or his agent thereafter held at the risk of the maker.-Detwilder v. Heckenlaible, Kan., 66 Pac. Rep. 653.

115. MOTIONS-Failure to Give Notice of Motion.An order on a motion is not irregular, because no notice of the motion was given, if the parties voluntarily appeared.-Blyth v. People, Colo., 66 Pac. Rep.680.

116. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Contributory Negli. gence in Walking on Slippery Sidewalk.-One is not necessarily guilty of contributory negligence, though he could have seen the slippery place on the sidewalk, had he looked.-Dean v. City of Newcastle, Pa., 50 Atl. Rep. 310.

117. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Enforcing Judgment Against a City.-The fact that the holder of a claim agaist a municipal corporation has reduced the same to judgment gives him no new right in respect to the means of enforcing payment, in the absence of a stat ute making special provisions for the payment of judgments.-Weaver v. City of Ogden City, U. 8. C. C., D. Utah, 111 Fed. Rep. 323.

118. MUNICIPAL CorporatIONS-Failing to Require. Public Contractor to Give Bond.-That city officers. neglected to require contractor for public improve. ment to give the bond required under Gen. St. 1983, §§ 4747, 4748, held not to render city liable to one injured by such failure.—Freeman v. City of Chanute, Kan., 66 Pac. Rep. 647.

119. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS- Oral Agreement of Mayor and Aldermen to Return Money Ultra Vires.Oral agreement of beard of mayor and aldermen to return money forfeited to the city by non-perform. ance of contract held ultra vires under Code 1892, § 3003.-Jackson Electric Ry. & Power Co. v. Adams, Miss., 80 South. Rep. 694.

120. PARENT AND CHILD-Abandonment of Child,—A father who leaves his child, less than one year old, in the custody of its mother, is not guilty of willfully de. serting the child, though he falls to provide for its support.-Rlehte v. Commonwealth, Ky., 64 8. W. Kep. 979.

121. PARTNERSHIP-When Lender to Partnership Be comes a Partner.-Where one loans money to another to be used in his business, the lender to receive part of the net profits, held a partnership.-Rahl v. Parlin & Orendorff Co., Tex., 64 8. W. Rep. 1007.

122. PATENTS-Evidence of Utility.-To entitle evi. dence of the utility of a patented machine and of its

extensive use to consideration on the question of invention, it must clearly show utility superior to that of other like machines and a more extensive use.— Sperry Mfg. Co. v. J. L. Owens Co., U.S. C. O. of App. Eighth Circuit, 111 Fed. Rep. 388.

123. PATENTS-Infringement Where Specifications do not Refer to Feature.-Where a feature of a patented machine is not referred to in the specification or claims, infringement cannot be predicated upon its adoption by another.-Hobbs Mfg. Co. v. Gooding, U.S. C. C. of App., First Circuit, 111 Fed. Rep. 403.

124. PERJURY- Predicating Perjury of Affidavit.Under Pen. Code, art. 203, an affidavit made before a County attorney charging the commission of an ag. gravated assault by a third person may be made the predicate of perjury.-Rambo v. State, Tex., 64 8. W.. Rep. 1039.

125. PLEADING-Facts on Demurrer.-Facts not, al.. leged in the complaint, but relied on by defendant as a defense, will not be considered on appeal from an order overruling a demurrer to the complaint.-Cheek V. Supreme Lodge Knights of Honor, N. Car., 39 S. E. Rep. 832.

126. PLEADING-Waiving Departure.-Going to trial without objection to an alleged departure in a rep. lication constitutes a waiver of such defect.-Blyth v. People, Colo., 66 Pac. Rep. 680.

127. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY-Liability of Creditor for Neglecting to Exhaust Debtor's Security.-Where a creditor who has sufficient security of the debtors to pay the debt divert such security and exhausts security belonging to a surety, such surety may recover for his property so used.-Bruce v. Laing, Tex., 64 S. W. Rep. 1019.

128. QUARANTINE-Request of Sanitary Commission to Sheriff to Quarantine Cattle. A communication to sheriff, informing him that live stock sanitary commission requests him to quarantine certain cattle, held not a complaint, under Gen. St. 1899, § 7091, so as to justify him in seizing such cattle.-Asbell v. Edwards, Kan., 66 Pac. Rep. 641.

129. RAILROADS—Action Under Internal Improvement Act.-Under the internal improvement act the trustee may either purchase and cancel bonds issued by a railroad company with the proceeds from the sale of such road, or incorporate it with the sinking fund.Wilson v. Mitchell, Fla., 30 South. Rep. 703.

130. RAILROADS-Duty of Engineer to Slow up When Aware of Danger.-Duty of engineer to check train in order to avoid injuring child on track held to arise at time when engineer, in exercise of reasonable care, should have first perceived child.-Jeffries v. Seaboard A. L. R. Co., N. Car., 39 S. E. Rep. 836.

181. RAILROAD8-Injury to Party Boarding a Caboose. -Railroad company held not liable for injuries received by decedent, who had boarded an empty ca. boose, awaiting the making up of a train, and who was injured while behind the caboose answering a call of nature.-Dyche v. Vicksburg, S. & P. R. Co., Miss., 30 South. Rep. 711.

132. RECEIVERS-Property Subject to Liens.-Receiver takes property subject to all valid liens existing against it.-Cramer v. Iler, Kan., 66 Pac. Rep. 617.

133. REFORMATION OF INSTRUMENTS-Proof of Mutual Mistake.-In order to reform a written contract, a mutual mistake as to its form as actually signed is necessary.-Gough v. Williamson, N. J., 50 Atl. Rep.

823.

134. RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES-Majority Faction in Church Cannot Transfer Church Property to Another Denomination.-A majority faction in a church, which severs its connection with the denomi. nation by a declaration on its minutes, and which reorganizes along the line of a new church, has no right to property deeded in trust to the old organization.— Mt. Helm Baptist Church v. Jones, Miss., 30 South. Rep. 714.

135. REMOVAL OF CAUSES-Separable Controversy.A stockholder's suit against the corporation and another held to involve a separable controversy as to the latter which entitled it to remove the cause.Lamm v. Parrott Silver & Copper Co., U. 8. C. C., D. Mont., 111 Fed. Rep. 241.

136. REPLEVIN-Damages in Action on Bond. - In ad action on a replevin bond, the measure of damages is the value of the property replevied at the time of the trial and special damages.-Talcott ▼. Rose, Tex., 64 8. W. Rep. 1009.

137. REPLEVIN-Demand Not a Requisite to Recovery. -In an action to recover personalty, the possession of which it is clalmed was obtained by fraud, demand is unnecessary.-Salisbury v. Barton, Kan., 66 Pac. Rep. 618.

138. REVIEW-Dismissal of Writ.-Where, after ap plication for writ of review, the litigation is settled, the writ will be dismissed.-Bosio v. Picton, La., 30 South. Rep. 699.

139. SALES-Liability for Fraudulent Statements to Mercantile Agencies Inducing Credit.—In action to recover good sold by alleged fraudulent statements to mercantile agencies, held such statements and reports were admissible in evidence. -Salisbury v. Barton, Kan., 66 Pac. Rep. 618.

140. SALES-Repudiating Goods After Inspection and Acceptance. Where a purchaser of goods, after a fair opportunity for inspection, unconditionally, ac. cepts them, or deals with them as his own, he cannot repudiate such acceptance and refuse to pay.-Harper v. Baird, Del., 50 Atl. Rep. 326.

141. SHERIFFS AND CONSTABLES—Authority of Probate Judge to Appoint Special Deputy.-Where sheriff is ready to serve process issued by probate judge, and the sheriff's office was in the same building, the probate judge was without authority to appoint a special sheriff to serve the process. · Skinner v. Board of Comrs. of Cowley County, Kan., 66 Pac. Rep. 635.

142. STATUTES - Taking Effect Upen Publication.Under Const. art. 6, § 25, an act held to take effect prior to its publication when it provides that it shall take effect on approval.-State v. Reynolds, Utah, 66 Pac. Rep. 614.

143. SUBROGATION-When Money is Loaned to Pay Off Prior Mortgage.-Persons loaning money on mortgage purporting to be signed by husband and wife, to pay off prior valid mortgage, and so used, held subrogated to the lien of prior mortgagees, where the husband signs the wife's name without her authority.-Zinkeisen v. Lewis, 66 Pac. Rep. 644.

144. SUNDAY-Publication of City Charter on Sunday. -Under Knoxville City Charter (Acts 1885, Sp. Sess., ch. 8) § 28, Knoxville city ordinance held not invalid because published on Sunday.-City of Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co., Tenn., 64 8. W. Rep. 1075.

145. TAXATION-Exemption of Books of Church Pub lishing House.-Under Const. art. 8, § 2, books pub. lished and handled by a certain church publishing house held not exempt from taxation.-Barbee v. City of Dallas, Tex., 64 8. W. Rep. 1018.

146. TAXATION-Exemption of Summer Resort Hotels. -The legislature has the same power to authorize towns to exempt from taxation capital to be invested therein in the erection of summer hotels as it has to authorize the exemption of manufacturing establishments or shipbuilding, as Pub. St. ch. 55, §§ 11, 12.— Opinion of the Justices, N. H., 50 Atl. Rep. 329.

147. TELEGRAPHS AND TELEPHONES-Mental Suffering as an Element of Damages.-Under Shannon's Code. §§ 1837, 1838, an action may be maintained sgainst a telegraph company by the sender of a message for mental anguish suffered by failure to deliver promptly a mes. sage from without the state to a place within the state.-Gray v. Western Union Tel. Co., Tenn., 64 S. W. Rep. 1063.

149. TRADE-MARKS AND TRADE-NAMES — Right to Trade Mark Containing the Word "Patent.”—No right to a trade-mark which includes the word "patent,” and which describes the article as patented, can arise where in fact there has been no patent.-Holzapfel's Compositions Co. v. Rahtjen's American Composition Co., U. 8. S. C., 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 6.

150. TRADE MARKS AND TRADE NAMES—Unfair Trade -Use of Garbled Letter.-The use of a garbled letter of complainant in circulars by a competitor, in such manner as to mislead the public to complainant's inJury, held to constitute unfair competition which entitled complainant to an injunction.- Halstead v. Houston, U. S. C. C., E. D. Pa., 111 Fed. Rep. 376.

151. TRESPASS TO TRY TITLE-Questions Involved.A plea of not guilty in trespass to try title presenta only the question of title and right of possession.— Central City Trust Co. v. Waco Bldg. Assn., Tex., 64 S. W. Rep. 998.

152. TRESPASS TO TRY TITLE-Stale Demand as a Defense. Where both parties in trespass to try title rely on equitable titles, the plea of stale demand is not available as a defense.-Stipe v. Shirley, Tex., 64 8. W. Rep. 1012.

153. TRIAL-Seasonable Objection Must be Made to Improper Remarks of Counsel.-Counsel cannot necessitate a new trial by their own failure to interpose seasonable objection to remarks of adverse counsel; and where, on the first objection, the court excluded the objectionable remarks from the consideration of the jury, there was no reversible error.-Portland Gold Min. Co. v. Flaherty, U. S. C. C. of App., Eighth Cir. cult, 111 Fed. Rep. 312.

154. TRIAL-Submitting Too Many Questions to Jury. -It was error to submit nearly 100 questions to the jury, when all issues of fact could have been submitted in less than a dozen pertinent questions.-Oaks v. West, Tex., 64 S. W. Rep. 1033.

155. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-Bona Fide Purchaser. -Purchaser of an undivided half of land from an owner in common by record title, held a bona fide purchaser.-Schumacher v. Truman, Cal., 66 Pac. Rep. 591.

156. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-Damages for Refusal to Purchase Where Land is Resold on Same Terms.Where the owner sold land on the same terms for which she contracted to sell it to defendent, she was not damaged by defendant's breach of his contract to pur chase.-Monroe v. South, Tex., 64 S. W. Rep. 1014.

157. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-Option Without Con sideration Revocable.-Option to purchase land, given without consideration, held revocable before accept ance thereof.-Brown v. San Francisco Sav. Union, Cal., 66 Pac. Rep. 592.

158. WATERS AND WATER COURSES-Erecting Dam to Float Logs.-Plaintiff, the owner of land on non-na▼ igable stream, held entitled to an injunction restrain ing defendant fram erecting a splash dam for the pur pose of accumulating a large volume of water, in or der that he may float logs when freshets come.-Banks v. Frazier, Ky., 64 S. W. Rep. 983.

159. WITNESSES - Altercation of Showing Bias of Witness. Evidence that there had been an alter cation between a witness and deceased was admissible to show blas of the witness, but the particulars of the altercation should have been excluded.-Strange v. Commonwealth, Ky., 64 S. W. Rep. 980.

160. WITNESSES-Cross-Examination to Show Bias.The rule that a witness may be cross-examined as to collateral matters to show bias does not apply where he witness is a party.-Carr v. Smith, N. Car., 39 8. E. Rep. 881.

Central Law Journal.

opinion as in the other cases on this troublesome political as well as constitutional question. Justice Brown, who delivered the

The Topeka Mail and Breeze has just issued a special edition chronicling in most glorious colors the glories of the state of Kansas. A casual perusal of this edition would lead the unsophisticated to believe that he had stumbled upon a Klondike or a modern Utopia. One very interesting feature, however, is the seven column page devoted to a pictorial and biographical introduction to the leading members of the Topeka bar. Among these, we are gratified to observe that three of our honored subscribers stand well in the lead,-Edwin A. Austin, L. A. Stebbins and Clinton J. Evans. Judge A. L. Reddin, A. F. Williams, Thomas H. Bain and R. B. Welch are also prominent members of the bar of that city who seem to be lacking in only one particular,-THE CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL. reminded in this connection of the recent request of a lawyer, residing not many miles away, not to send the CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL to a certain lawyer in

We are

his town or to induce him to become a subscriber until after a certain case had been heard on appeal. The case involved a very difficult question of law which had been recently annotated by the JOURNAL, and a position taken directly contrary to that of our correspondent, based on two very recent decisions, of which neither of them had any knowledge. In fairness to our correspondent we have not gone out of our way to interfere with the success of the litigation in which he is interested. But a word to the wise is sufficient.

The last of the Insular Tariff cases has been decided. In the recent case of Dooley v. United States, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 62, the Foraker Act, imposing a duty of 15 per cent. of the ordinary tariff rates on all goods imported into Porto Rico from the United States was held constitutional. The validity of this requirement was attacked upon the ground of its violation of Art. 1, § 9, of the constitution declaring that "no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state." There was the same division of

genious argument, which, while apparently sound and logical, leads to conclusions which very many of our wisest counselors believe to be dangerous, and as striking at the intent, if not at the letter, of the constitution. While our sympathies are strongly inclined to this latter view of the question, we are at the same time not unmindful of its political character, and believe its proper settlement is with the people at the polls, and not with the supreme court. The latter are called upon only to say whether proposed legislation of the character here presented, violates the plain wording of the constitution.

Although other points are made in the argument, the main controversy centers around the meaning of the word "export." The majority of the court, in an opinion written by Justice Brown, relying upon a plausible inference from the argument of Justice Miller, in the case of Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 123, held that the word "exported" in sec. 9, art. 1, extended only to the carrying out of goods from the United States to a foreign country. The case of Woodruff v. Parham, supra, which seems to be the only legitimate authority for the court's position on this question had under consideration, clause 2 of section 10: "No state shall, without the consent of congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws." It was held that this referred to foreign commerce only, and "that no intention existed to prohibit, by this clause, the right of one state to tax articles brought into it from another." In this case Justice Miller said: "It is not too much to say that, so far as our research has extended, neither the word 'export,' 'import' or 'impost' is to be found in the discussion on this subject, as they have come down to us from that time, in reference to any other than foreign commerce, without some special form of words to show that foreign commerce is not meant. Whether we look, then, to the terms of the clause of the constitution in question, or to its relation to other parts of that instrument, or to the history of its formation and adop

tion, or to the comments of the eminent men who took part in those transactions, we are forced to the conclusion that no intention existed to prohibit, by this clause" (that no state shall, without the consent of congress, levy any impost or duty upon any export or import), "the right of one state to tax articles brought into it from another."

Justice Brown reasons from this language as follows: "It follows, and is the logical sequence of the case of Woodruff v. Parham, that the word 'export' should be given a correlative meaning, and applied only to goods exported to a foreign country. (Muller v. Baldwin, L. R. 9 Q. B. 457.) If, then, Porto Rico be no longer a foreign country under the Dingley act, as was held by a majority of this court in De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 1, and Dooley v. United States, 182 U. S. 222, we find it impossible to say that goods carried from New York to Porto Rico can be considered as 'exported' from New York within the meaning of that clause of the constitution."

Chief Justice Fuller in voicing the opinion of the minority, admits that the limitation on the power of the states to lay imposts has been properly restricted to foreign commerce, but contends this is, no justification for extending this construction to the clause. prohibiting congress to "lay any tax on articles exported from any state." He offers the following argument: "The power to lay duties in regulation of commerce with foreign nations is relied on as the source of power to pass laws for the protection and encouragement of domestic industries, and except for this clause the same effect would be attributed to the power to regulate commerce among the states. This, however, the clause, literally read, prevents, and to limit its application to foreign commerce, as the power to lay customs duties under the first clause of section 8 has been limited, would defeat the manifest purpose of the constitution by enabling discriminating taxes and duties to be laid against one section of the country as distinguished from another. The prohibition on congress is explicit, and noticeably different from the prohibition on the states. The state is forbidden to lay 'any imposts or duties;' congress is forbidden to lay 'any tax or duty.' The state is forbidden from laying imposts or duties 'on

imports or exports,' that is, articles coming into or going out of the United States. Congress is forbidden to tax 'articles exported from any state.' The plain language of the constitution should not be made 'blank paper by construction,' and its specific mandate ought to be obeyed."

NOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-COMPULSORY EDUCATION AS AN UNAUTHORIZED INVASION OF RIGHTS OF PARENT.-It is quite a reassuring sign of a healthy progress when a state assumes its prerogative to demand the education of the children who are growing up in its midst and who will in the future control its destinies. The right of the parent to its child is not superior to the right of the state. The right of the state is as far superior to that of the parent as the existence of the former transcends that of the individual. An illiterate population strikes at the existence of government. To enforce the education of the child, therefore, would seem to be the most justifiable exercise of the police power of the state. To this effect was the decision in the recent case of State v. Bailey, 61 N. E. Rep. 730, in which the Supreme Court of Indiana upheld the validity of a recent act of that state providing for the compulsory education of children. The court, in support of its decision, offers the following strong argument:

The next question presented is whether the statute is an unauthorized invasion of the natural rights of the appellee as a parent. The natural rights of a parent to the custody and control of his infant child are subordinate to the power of the state, and may be restricted and regulated by municipal laws. One of the most important natural duties of the parent is his obligation to educate his child, and this duty he owes, not to the child only, but to the commonwealth. If he neglects to perform it or willfully refuses to do so, he may be coerced by law to execute such civil obligation. The welfare of the child and the best interests of society require that the state shall exert its sovereign authority to secure to the child the opportunity to acquire an education. Statutes making it compulsory upon the parent, guardian, or other person having the custody and control of children to send them to public or private schools for longer or shorter periods during certain years of the life of such children have not only been upheld as strictly within the constitutional power of the legislature, but have generally been regarded as necessary to carry out the express purposes of the constitution itself. Sections 1-8, art. 8, Const. Ind.; Hoch. Inf. § 79; Fras. Parent & Child, 77; Bennett v. Bennett, 13 N. J. Eq. 114; English v. English, 32 N. J. Eq. 738; In re Bort, 25 Kan. 308, 37 Am. Rep. 255; People v. Ewer, 141 N. Y. 129, 36 N.

* * *

E. Rep. 4, 25 L. R. A. 794, 38 Am. St. Rep. 788; Sheers v. Stein, 75 Wis. 44, 43 N. W. Rep. 728, 5 L. R. A. 781; Lally v. Fitz Henry, 85 Iowa, 49, 51 N. W. Rep. 1155, 16 L. R. A. 681. "The matter of education is deemed a legitimate function of the state, and, with us, is imposed upon the legislature as a duty by imperative provisions of the constitution. The subject has always been regarded as within the purview of legislative authority. How far this inference should extend is a question, not of constitutional power for the courts, but of expediency and propriety, which it is the sole province of the legislature to determine. The judiciary has no authority to interfere with this exercise of legislative judgment, and to do so would be to invade the province which by the constitution is assigned exclusively to the law-making power." State v. Clottu, 33 Ind. 409, 411. To carry out the enlightened and comprehensive system of education enjoined by the constitution of this state, a vast fund, dedicated exclusively to this purpose, has been set apart. Revenues to the amount of more than $2,000,000 annually are distributed among the school corporations of the state. No parent can be said to have the right to deprive his child of the advantages so provided, and to defeat the purposes of such munificent appropriations.

FORECLOSURE FOR NON-PAYMENT OF INTEREST.

The Right in General.-The older mortgages contained no clause empowering the mortgagee to declare the whole debt due upon the non-payment of interest. And while there is some early authority to the effect that foreclosure should be postponed until maturity of the principal, though the interest might be far in arrears,1 it soon became ap

1 Burrowes v. Malloy, 2 Jones & La Touche, 521. "Now, the declared purpose of the mortgage is the securing the payment of the interest, as well as the principal of the bonds, and both interest and princi pal are equally within the positive terms of the condition of the mortgage. Upon sound reason, then, a default in the payment of a half year's interest on the appointed day is as much a breach of the condition of the mortgage as would be a like default in the payment of the principal of the bonds. In support of this view, and of its sequence,-that upon such a failure to pay interest the mortgagee has a right to bring a bill for a foreclosure,-we have decisions of great weight. Gladwyn v. Hitchman, 2 Vern. 135; Burrowes v. Molloy, 2 Jones & La Touche, 521, 526; Edwards v. Martin, 25 Law J. Ch. 284. To deny to a Philadelphia and Reading general mortgage bond. holder, the right to proceed by bill to enforce his mortgage security upon default in the payment of the semi annual interest, might work the greatest injustice; for, by the provisions of the mortgage, a bondholder is precluded from levying upon, taking an execution or selling, under an ordinary judgment

parent that this rule would cause great hardship, especially in the case of long time loans.2 In actions at law, the holder of a note bearing periodical interest was entitled to sue separately for each installment of interest, and such an action would not operate as a bar to subsequent suits for interest or after-maturing principal, and there was no reason why the same course could not be permitted in foreclosure proceedings. The rule came to be adopted, therefore, that while the mortgagee would not be required to wait until the whole debt matured before commencing suit, yet if the interest alone was in default, the decree would be limited to it and the sale confined to so much of the property as would discharge the delinquent interest.3 An exception was made in the case of mortgages on

railways,1

at law for interest, any part of the mortgaged premises. Now, the bonds run until the year 1958. The refore, if a bondholder cannot resort to a bill for foreclosure upon the non payment of interest, he might be, and, unless he could procure the co-operation of the bondholders, representing the requisite amount, surely would be left practically remediless. A construction of the mortgage involving consequences so unreasonable is not to be accepted." Pennsylvania Co. v. Philadelphia, etc. R. Co., 69 Fed. Rep. 482.

2 Illinois: Wehrly v. Morfoot, 103 Ill. 183, 186. Massachusetts: Andover Sav. Bank v. Adams, 1 Allen (Mass.), 28; Sparhawk v. Wills, 6 Gray (Mass.), 163; Cooley v. Rose, 3 Mass. 221; Greenleaf v. Kellogg, 2 Mass. 568. Pennsylvania: Montgomery County Agricultural Society v. Francis, 103 Pa. St. 378, holding also that such an action by a bondholder was not excluded by a clause in the mortgage authorizing the trustee upon default of interest to foreclose both principal and interest.

8 England: Gladwyn v. Hitchman, 2 Vern. 135; Edwards v. Martin, 25 Law J. (N. S.) Ch. 284; Seaton v. Twyford, L. R. 11 Eq. 591. Federal Cases: Howell v. Western R. Co., 94 U. S. 463; Penn. R. R. Co. v. Allegheny Val. R. Co., 48 Fed. Rep. 139; Grape Creek Coal Co. v. Farmers' L. & T. Co., 63 Fed. Rep. 891; New York Security & Trust Co. v. Lincoln St. Ry. Co., 74 Fed. Rep. 67; American Loan & Trust Co. v. Union Depot Co., 80 Fed. Rep. 36; Pennsylvania Co. v. Philadelphia, etc. R. Co., 69 Fed. Rep. 482; Beekman v. Hudson R. W., etc. R. Co., 35 Fed. Rep. 3. Michigan: Dederick v. Barber, 44 Mich. 19. New Jersey: Van Doren v. Dickerson, 33 N. J. Eq. 388; Ackerson v. Lodi Branch R. Co., 31 N. J. Eq. 42; Probasco v. Van Epps (N. J. Eq.), 13 Atl. Rep. 598. New York: Brunckerhoff v. Thallhimer, 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 486; Campbell v. Macomb, 4 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 534. Wisconsin: Scheibe v. Kennedy, 64 Wis. 564. Fennsylvania: West Branch Bank v. Chester, 11 Pa. St. 282.

4"The mortgaged property being from its very character such that a separation of it into its original parts, in order to raise an amount sufficient to pay the interest due, must naturally jeopardize the security for the principal and accruing interest, and thus coming within the contemplation of the statute