14. Consul General Bopp, at San Francisco, Vice Consul General Von Schaick, Baron George Wilhelm von Brincken (an employee of the consulate), Charles C. Crowley, and Mrs. Margaret W. Cornell (secret agents of the German consulate at San Francisco) have been convicted of conspiracy to send agents into Canada to blow up railroad tunnels and bridges, and to wreck vessels sailing from Pacific coast ports with war materials for Russia and Japan.

15. Paul Koenig, head of the secret-service work of the Hamburg-American Line, by direction of his superior officers, largely augmented his organization and under the direction of von Papen, Boy-Ed, and Albert carried on secret work for the German Government. He secured and sent spies to Canada to gather information concerning the Welland Canal, the movements of Canadian troops to England, bribed an employee of a bank for information concerning shipments to the allies, sent spies to Europe on American passports to secure military information, and was involved with Capt. von Papen in plans to place bombs on ships of the allies leaving New York Harbor, etc. Von Papen, Boy-Ed, and Albert had frequent conferences with Koenig in his office, at theirs, and at outside places. Koenig and certain of his associates are under indictment.

16. Capt. von Papen, Capt. Hans Tauscher, Wolf von Igel, and a number of German reservists organized an expedition to go into Canada, destroy the Welland Canal, and endeavor to terrorize Canadians in order to delay the sending of troops from Canada to Europe. Indictments have been returned against these persons. Wolf von Igel furnished Fritzen, one of the conspirators in this case, money on which to flee from New York City. Fritzen is now in jail in New York City.

17. With money furnished by official German representatives in this country, a cargo of arms and ammunition was purchased and shipped on board the schooner Annie Larsen. Through the activities of German official representatives in this country and other Germans a number of Indians were procured to form an expedition to go on the steamship Maverick, meet the Annie Larsen, take over her cargo, and endeavor to bring about a revolution in India. This plan involved the sending of a German officer to drill Indian recruits and the entire plan was managed and directed by Capt. von Papen, Capt. Hanz Tauscher, and other official German representatives in this country.

18. Gustav Stahl, a German reservist, made an affidavit which he admitted was false, regarding the armament of the Lusitania, which affidavit was forwarded to the State Department by Ambassador Bernstorff. He pled guilty to an indictment charging perjury, and was sentenced to the penitentiary. Koenig, herein mentioned, was active in securing this affidavit.

19. The German Embassy organized, directed, and financed the Hans Libeau Employment Agency, through which extended efforts were made to induce employees of manufacturers engaged in supplying various kinds of material to the allies to give up their positions in an effort to interfere with the output of such manufacturers. Von Papen indorsed this organization as a military measure, and it was hoped through its propaganda to cripple munition factories.

20. The German Government has assisted financially a number of newspapers in this country in return for pro-German propaganda.

21. Many facts have been secured indicating that Germans have aided and encouraged financially and otherwise the activities of one or the other factions in

Mexico, the purpose being to keep the United States occupied along its borders and to prevent the exportation of munitions of war to the allies; see, in this connection, the activities of Rintelen, Stallforth, Kopf, the German consul at Chihuahua, KrumHellen, Felix Somerfeld (Villa's representative at New York), Carl Heynen, Gustav Steinberg, and many others.

It will be observed that these interferences with the domestic economy of the United States were at a time when this country was neutral, when the Imperial German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs abounded in expressions of friendship and consideration, and when the Imperial German Ambassador enjoyed the hospitality of a neutral country, whose rights upon the high seas had been systematically violated by the Imperial German Ambassador, members of the official staff, and partisans of Germany in his employ. It is hard to believe that these things are so, yet the Zimmermann letter would lead us to suspect them, if stated on credible authority, and the authority upon which we have them is that of the Government of the United States, in many instances the judgments of courts of the United States in which the transactions had been established by proof and the perpetrators convicted of their commission and sentenced to prison in judicial proceedings in accordance with the laws of the United States. The text of the Zimmermann letter, as contained in the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, is as follows:

Berlin, January 19, 1917

On the first of February we intend to begin submarine warfare unrestricted. In spite of this it is our intention to endeavor to keep neutral the United States of America.

If this attempt is not successful we propose an alliance on the following basis with Mexico: That we shall make war together and together make peace. We shall give general financial support, and it is understood that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in New Mexico, Texas, and Arizona. The details are left to you for settlement.

You are instructed to inform the President of Mexico of the above in the greatest confidence as soon as it is certain there will be an outbreak of war with the United States, and suggest that the President of Mexico on his own initiative should communicate with Japan suggesting adherence at once to this plan; at the same time offer to mediate between Germany and Japan.

Please call to the attention of the President of Mexico that the employment of ruthless submarine warfare now promises to compel England to make peace in a few months.

(Signed) ZIMMERMANN.

It was therefore under the eyes of Congress, as it was in the mind of the President and in the heart of the American people. Without it there were causes of war, with it there was slight chance that war

could be avoided. It is doubtful whether it would have produced war if there had not been other and impelling reasons for the resort to arms. It is doubtful if it can properly be included among the causes of the war, certainly it was not a distinct cause; it was rather the culmination of a series of unfriendly acts and it showed the spirit and purpose with which those acts had been committed. It was rather a matter of aggravation, throwing fuel on the flames, than creating of itself a conflagration.

The President properly stated in his address of April 2d to the Congress that he was assuming a grave responsibility in recommending a declaration of the existence of a state of war against the Imperial German Government, for the day has long since passed, at least in democratic countries, where the head of a state, whether he be monarch or president, can go to war as the king went a-hunting. War may be an imperial, it is no longer a royal, sport, and it never has been and it never will be, it is to be hoped, a presidential one. War is ordinarily declared in a moment of excitement and reason is likely to be swayed by enthusiasm; but we cannot today in democracies justify a declaration of war unless the cause be just, and, however we may deceive ourselves, we cannot deceive posterity, which passes alike upon the acts of autocrat, constitutional monarch, president, and people. We must decide according to our knowledge of present conditions and according to these conditions our actions are to be judged in the first instance, but the future must finally decide the question.

The President has stated the case of the United States against the Imperial Government clearly and in detail. He enumerated the special reasons which, in his opinion, would be a proper cause of armed action. He has searched his own heart and the conscience of the American people, that the motives and objects of the war may not only justify but require in the given circumstances and conditions the declaration of a state of war. It is indeed a grave responsibility which the President assumed in recommending the war, which the Congress assumed in declaring its existence, and which the people of the United States assumed in carrying it on.

We believe that the reasons given are causes, not pretexts, that the motives and purposes are sincere and sufficient; but on all these matters posterity has the final word-for whether we will or no, "Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht."

JAMES BROWN SCOTT.

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE
CENTRAL POWERS

The actual status of the relations between the United States and the Central Powers, so far as we are officially informed, is as follows:

The United States has declared war upon Germany, while Germany has said and done nothing in reply.

Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria have ceased diplomatic relations with this country, which in turn has taken similar action, but no war between them has been declared.

The three Powers just named are in offensive and defensive coöperation with Germany, with whatever consequences that may imply as regards Germany's enemies.

The problem is to determine the nature of our relations with the four states above mentioned.

And first as to Germany.

Article 1 of Hague Convention No. 3, 1907, is as follows:

The contracting Powers recognize that hostilities between them must not commence without previous and explicit warning, in the form either of a reasoned declaration of war or of an ultimatum with conditional declaration of war.

This was ratified by both Germany and the United States. Accordingly, having exhausted all others means of protection, and authorized by Congress, war was declared against the Imperial Government of Germany in these words "a state of war exists." It was, therefore, not a conditional, but an absolute announcement. This was on the 6th of April, 1917. From that day to this, so far as appears, no counter declaration has been made by Germany, nor has any aggressive act taken place up to the time of writing other than further submarine attacks upon American ships of trade and their attempts at defense.

Nevertheless, no one can doubt that war exists, reciprocal war, no matter what formalities Germany may have dispensed with.

Next as to Austria-Hungary. There is here no doubt of an alliance with our enemy Germany, an alliance nominally defensive. Although the exact terms are not accessible, the main provision is well known, namely, that Austria is bound to coöperation in arms with Germany if the latter is attacked by two Powers, meaning France and Russia. Italy was similarly bound, but decided that the war was offensive,

not defensive, and that therefore no casus foederis had arisen. But Austria thought otherwise. The question for us then is, if we, being at war with Germany, are likewise automatically at war with Austria, the ally of Germany, although so far as public official statements show we have merely severed diplomatic relations.

Text-book opinion bearing on this topic is neither plentiful nor uniform.

Bynkershoek thought that "allies form one state" with a confederated belligerent; and Phillimore approves, saying:

This principle, duly considered and applied, furnishes a solution for all questions relating to the position, the duties and the rights of an ally. Thus for instance, the doctrine that all commerce and communication is interdicted with the enemy is enforced, not only against the subjects of the belligerent but also against those of the ally, upon the supposition that the rule was founded on a strong and universal principle which allied states in war had a right to notice and apply mutually to each other's subjects.

On the other hand, Halleck says plainly that "the simple fact of there being an alliance between our enemy and other nations would not justify us in treating such nations as belligerents." He declares further:

A warlike alliance made by a third party before the war with a state, then our friend but now our enemy, will not as a general rule be of itself a sufficient cause for commencing hostilities against such third party; for there may be good reason why he should not regard himself as bound by the obligations of the alliance. It would certainly be very impolitic, as well as improper, for us to treat as a belligerent one who may not be disposed to become our enemy.

To this Creasy adds:

You certainly have a right in such a case to call upon the ally of your opponent to declare whether he means to act against you or not; and if he refuses to give an express renunciation of hostile intentions toward you, you are in every way justified in forthwith treating him as your enemy, unless you consider as above explained, that it is for your interest to forbear from doing so.

Perhaps in the case of our present relations with Austria these two principles will be found reconcilable and can be combined. We should certainly forbid trading with her as akin to trading with an enemy, for to supply her with rubber, copper, flour, let alone munitions of war, is equivalent to supplying Germany with them. On the other hand, we may well await the issue of events before unnecessarily taking on another enemy. If Austrian submarines attack our ships, we shall