sisting of two hundred and ninety-two guns and five hundred and sixty-nine men, making a general total of eighty-seven thousand eight hundred.

Leaving out all commissioned officers, this army represents eightytwo thousand seven hundred and sixty-seven bayonets and sabers. This report does not include the Fifth Iowa cavalry, six hundred strong, lately armed; nor the First Wisconsin cavalry; nor Coburn's brigade of infantry, now arriving; nor the two thousand three hundred and ninety-four convalescents, now on light duty in "Fortress Monroe."

There are detached from this force as follows:

With these posts as they are, and leaving two thousand five hundred efficient men, in addition to the two thousand three hundred and ninety-four convalescents, to hold the works at this place, there will be left sixty-five thousand one hundred and thirty-seven bayonets and sabers to show, against Bragg's forty-one thousand six hundred and eighty.

I beg leave, also, to submit the following considerations:

1. Bragg's army is weaker now than it has been since the battle of Stone river, or is likely to be, at present, while our army has reached its maximum strength, and we have no right to expect reinforcements for several months, if at all.

2.

Whatever be the result at Vicksburg, the determination of its fate will give large reinforcements to Bragg. If Grant is successful, his army will require many weeks to recover from the shock and strain of his late campaign, while Johnston will send back to Bragg a force sufficient to insure the safety of Tennessee. If Grant fails, the same result will inevitably follow, so far as Bragg's army is concerned.

3. No man can predict, with a certainty, the results of any battle, however great the disparity in numbers. Such results are in the hand of God. But, reviewing the question in the light of human calculation, I refuse to entertain a doubt that this army, which in January last defeated Bragg's superior numbers, cannot overwhelm his present greatly inferior forces.

4. The most unfavorable course for us that Bragg could take, would be to fall back without giving us battle; but this would be very disastrous to him. Besides the loss of material of war, and the abandonment of the rich and abundant harvest, now nearly ripe in Central Tennessee, he would lose heavily by desertion. It is well known that a wide-spread dissatisfaction exists among his Kentucky and Tennessce troops. They are already deserting in large numbers. A retreat would greatly increase both the desire and the opportunity for desertion, and would very materially reduce his physical and moral strength. While it would lengthen our communication, it would give us possession of McMinnville, and enable us to threaten Chattanooga and East Tennessee; and it would not be unreasonable to expect an early occupation of the former place.

5. But the chances are more than even that a sudden and rapid movement would compel a general engagement, and the defeat of Bragg would be, in the highest degree, disastrous to the rebellion.

6. The turbulent aspect of politics in the loyal States renders a decisive blow against the enemy, at this time, of the highest importance to the success of the government at the polls, and in the enforcement of the Conscript Act.

7. The government and the War Department believe that this army ought to move upon the enemy. The army desire it, and the country is anxiously hoping for it.

8. Our true objective point is the rebel army, whose last reserves are substantially in the field, and an effective blow will crush the shell, and soon be followed by the collapse of the rebel government.

9. You have, in my judgment, wisely delayed a general movement hitherto, till your army could be massed, and your cavalry could be mounted. Your mobile force can now be concentrated in twenty-four hours, and your cavalry, if not equal in numerical strength to that of the enemy, is greatly superior in efficiency and morale For this rea

son I believe an immediate advance of all our available forces is advisable, and, under the providence of God, will be successful.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Major General ROSECRANS,

J. A. GARFIELD,

Brigadier-General, Chief of Staff.

Commanding Dep't. Cumberland.

That the estimate which this biography has placed upon the character of General Garfield may not seem to be overdrawn, the following testimony given by a writer at Zenia, Ohio, in the autumn of 1862, is inserted in these pages:

'We have known General James A. Garfield for several years, and entertain for him the highest personal regard. He is one of the most eloquent men in Ohio, as well as one of the ripest scholars. Socially and morally he has no superior. He is popular with all, as the attachment of his scholars, as well as his soldiers, for him demonstrates.

In respect to abilities, nature has by no means been unfriendly to him; and he has neither despised nor slighted her gifts. A severe course of mental training, combined with the mental practice obtained by presiding over one of the colleges of Ohio, has fully developed his natural endowments.

Above all these considerations, every one respects General Garfield for his stern, unyielding, uncompromising patriotism. The permanent good of his country, the restoration of its unity, and the perpetuation of the national power and glory through all coming time, are the objects which he keeps steadily in view."

For more than a year after his election to Congress, General Garfield kept the field, and without flinching

endured the severest tests which come to the soldier in war. He lost no time and shirked no hardships. He bravely entered the most dangerous lines of battle when his duty called him there, and the number of men killed at his side, and horses wounded or killed under him, attest his proximity to the enemy.

In General Rosecran's official report of the battle of Chickamauga he bears testimony to General Garfield's soldierly qualities and said:

"To Brigadier-General James A. Garfield, chief of staff. I am especially indebted for the clear and ready manner in which he seized the points of action and movement, and expressed in orders the ideas of the general commanding."

To this testimony the War Department put its seal by issuing to him a commission as major-general dated the day of that great battle.

On December 5th, a few weeks after the battle and after General Rosecrans was relieved, General Garfield resigned his commission and immediately took his seat in Congress. At the time he resigned, he felt that he was needed in Congress; yet, his unwillingness to leave the service, nearly overcome his resolution to take his seat in the House of Representatives, and in November, before he left the army, he wrote to the President that were it not for the strong belief he had that the war would close within a few months, he should remain with the army.

CHAPTER XIV.

SERVICE AS A LEGISLATOR.

- THE

A NEW FIELD. -THE HIGHEST TEST OF HUMAN GREATNESS. AMERICAN CONGRESS.- FREQUENT FAILURES OF NOTED MEN.THE TRIALS OF THAT CRISIS. PLACED ON THE MILITARY COMMITTEE. — THE STYLE OF HIS SPEECHES. HIS INDUSTRY.-HIS REPLY TO MR. LONG. AN IMPROMPTU SPEECH. THE COMPLIMENTS OF OLD MEMBERS.

HITHERTO We have noted the career of a man who, notwithstanding his surprising success, was nevertheless a man among men, finding often his equal in the work which he had chosen. His childhood, youth, and army experience were such as to entitle him to the praise and thanks of the people, but thus far in common with many others.

Thousands of boys have chopped wood, boiled salts, and drove canal horses and mules, and have succeeded in life, notwithstanding such humble beginnings. If it were not so, the history of his career would be a drawback rather than an encouragement to American youths.

But now our record enters upon a higher plain, where the number of remarkable successes is far less and where many prosperous lives find their final level. In the legislative halls of a mighty nation