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entered into a close alliance with France, the terms of which strongly enjoined that it should last for ever; yet these terms were held to be no obstacle to annulling it, without the consent of the other party.

On turning to the Constitution, it causes surprise to find that no prohibition of secession exists in it. Those who framed it were men well versed in public affairs, surrounded by angry passions, employed in the very act of breaking up a Constitution, if, indeed, it may not be said, of seceding from one of the States, for Rhode Island continued to adhere to it. They provided for a State dividing into two or more-for several uniting into one for the admission of States yet to come into existence. Why, then, this remarkable omission? A contingency far more probable than these was that of a State becoming dissatisfied, and desiring to separate. Was such an omission the result of negligence, of inability to foresee so probable an event, or was it the result of design?

It has been contended that it would have been improper to forbid a State to withdraw-that it would have been "futile and undignified" to have added to a law, "And be it further enacted that the said law shall not be violated." But this is just what all law has to do; and that which does it not, is not law. Who had the powers of a lawgiver over independent, sovereign States, entering into a compact of their own free will? And where is the law, either to be violated or obeyed?

There is a provision for a State separating into pieces, and this appears quite as undignified as to provide against a State, whole and intact, separating from the rest. There is provision against the treason of individuals; and if a State can also commit treason, it would be strange law that provided against crime on a small scale, omitting to deal with it when on a large one. The men who framed the Constitution were eminently practical men. It cannot be supposed that they would slight so formidable a danger. Why, then, the omission? For the soundest and wisest reasons, which we have on record from their own lips.

In the first place, had there been inserted in the Constitution a compulsory clause of this nature, it would have been impossible to obtain the ratification of the States. Very difficult, at the present day, would it be to obtain the assent to such a clause even of the Northern States. Theoretically nothing would be easier, but when it came to the point, it would hardly be possible to prevail upon Massachusetts, even at this day, to abandon, for ever, her often-asserted independence and sovereignty, and accept, in reality and truth, that position in which she is. said now to exist-that of the province of a wider power. And if there would now be such practical difficulty, with the State whose present professions are those most favourable to the step, how great would have been the obstacles when all the States were to be included, many hostile to, and jealous of, the rest,

and when the task was regarded, and proved to be, all but impossible, without this further and strong element of repugnance?

In the next place, the framers of the Constitution perceived, that should they forbid the retirement of a State, they must provide means to prevent it; otherwise it would be an idle precept, a mere solicitation to remain. Other questions might be referred to the Supreme Court, but a retiring State withdrew from its jurisdiction. Other forms of delinquency could be visited on individuals, but here was the action of a whole community. Goodwill must have died out before it could occur; argument would be vain; there could be no appeal except to force. But no force was to be created, adequate to an undertaking of this nature. The first act under the Constitution for regulating the military establishment, provided for a standing force of only 1,216 rank and file. True, in case of need this might be increased; but a cardinal principle with the people was to distrust standing armies; a subject on which their feeling was jealous in the extreme. It was impracticable to run counter to this, even so far as to provide the framework of an army equal to such an object. The only possible force would be that of the remaining States, to be employed in coercing those that desired to secede. On such a proposition the views of the two chief framers of the Constitution are on record. In the Convention, on the 31st May, 1787, Madison declared that "the use of

force against a State would be more like a declaration of war, than an infliction of punishment, and would probably be considered by the party attacked, as a dissolution of all previous compacts: a union of States containing such an ingredient seemed to provide for its own destruction." Again, on the 8th June, he observed: "Any government formed on the supposed practicability of using force against the unconstitutional proceedings of the States, would prove as visionary and fallacious as the government of Congress."

Hamilton, in that great authority the "Federalist," after showing the futility of employing force against a State, concludes thus: "When the sword is once drawn the passions of men observe no bounds of moderation. The suggestions of wounded pride, the instigations of resentment, would be apt to carry the States against which the arms of the Union were exerted, to any extreme to avenge the affront, or to avoid the disgrace of submission. The first war of this kind would probably terminate in a dissolution of the Union." In one of the debates in the New York State Convention, Hamilton made use of these words: "To coerce a State would be one of the maddest projects ever devised. No State would ever suffer itself to be used as the instrument of coercing another." His far-seeing description in the "Federalist" is but too applicable to the events of the present day; and remarkable it is that he, the master spirit of the Unionists, should have de

nounced as "madness" that coercion which is adopted by his followers at the present day.

But there was a consideration of still higher import. The Constitution was a voluntary act, framed on the principles of free, mutual assent, and common belief in its advantages. To introduce force as a means of maintaining it, would be repugnant to these principles. It would be a commencement on the voluntary system, to be continued under compulsion. Force is an attribute of monarchy; the throne represents and wields the strength of the nation. Each part is subservient to the whole, and none can revolt without foreknowledge of this force to encounter and overthrow. But the basis of a Federal Republic is the reverse of all this. It stands upon consent, which is the abnegation of force. In place of the submission of part to the whole, the parties are co-equal. Compulsion is not only inapplicable, but opposed to the principle of the system. And the men of that day were too logical to be unaware of this; they declined to incorporate with the structure they were rearing a principle directly antagonistic to it.

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One effect of this omission of any clause forbidding secession is to compel those who deny the right to proceed on a system of inferences. these the most prominent is this: From a portion of a phrase in the preamble to the Constitution they infer, and would have others to infer, that the United States exist under it in the condition

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