CHAPTER V.

CAUSES OF DISRUPTION.--TARIFFS.

THE rebellion of the American colonies against the rule of this country, whatever its real motives, occurred, ostensibly, on a question a question of duties. Thirty years ago, the disruption of the Union, unless it had been maintained by force, would have resulted from a tariff, but for concessions made at the last moment, which averted the event. With these facts in recollection, we shall be disposed to attach very serious importance to this subject. Of all the causes of the convulsion, it has probably had the greatest weight upon the mind of the Southern people, although the other causes we have considered have had much more influence in exciting their feelings.

The following clauses of the Constitution bear upon this subject. Section 8, Art. 1, provides that "all duties, imports, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States." Section 9, Art. 5, ordains that "No tax, or duty, shall be laid upon articles exported from any State. No preference shall be given, by any regulation of commerce or revenue, to the ports of one State, over those of

another." Here it is plainly the object to forbid any course of legislation by means of which a preferential advantage might be given to any section of the country. The obvious spirit of these clauses, is not so much that duties should be uniform in rate, but uniform in effect-that their incidence should bear evenly upon all. It would be idle to dispute that it was intended to prohibit preference to interests, as well as preference to ports. The denial of power to levy an export duty clearly proves this.

At the period when the Constitution was framed, the whole of the States were agricultural, and imported manufactures. Duties levied on imports affected, therefore, all alike. But their position was very different in the direction of export trade. As a natural result of such great diversity of climate and soil, their products, instead of being common to all, were special, and peculiar to certain districts. An export duty upon any article, would have affected the section of the country which produced that commodity, to the exemption of the rest. Thus, if levied upon rice, it would have been a special tax on South Carolina; or if upon tobacco, Virginia would have borne the burthen. Nothing can be clearer than the principle of the Constitution on this point, that all duties shall be so imposed as to affect the respective States equally; that "preference" of any kind should be avoided; and that where the imposition of a duty, as upon exports, would of

necessity be unequal in its effect, the power to impose it under any circumstances should be absolutely, and for ever, barred out. We shall see the respect with which these principles of the Constitution have been treated, and the justice with which they have been carried out.

For many years agriculture continued to be the common interest of all the States, and the earlier tariffs are moderate in the extreme. The prevailing rule was a duty on manufactured goods of 5 to 7 per cent.; the first duty, for instance, on iron, being 5 per cent., a trifle that would hardly be visible to the eye of the Pennsylvanian monopolist of the present day. But the war with this country in 1813 greatly altered the industrial position of the respective States. During its continuance it was impossible to obtain supplies of manufactured goods, for we not only ceased to supply them, but the blockade of the ports which we instituted prevented their access from other countries. This led to a large extension of home manufactures, previously confined, in the main, to the coarser and less valuable class of articles. But this new direction, taken by the industry of the country, was not common to the whole of the States. The Northern States not only took the lead in it, but it became, in their hands, a virtual monopoly. Their climate, coal, free labour, waterpower, and, beyond even these, the energy and inventive genius of the race, formed a combination of the elements of manufacturing power, with

so.

which, in the South, it was impossible to contend. There was neither the ability, nor the desire to do Hence there came to be two distinct interests, manufacturing and agricultural-by no means naturally antagonistic; on the contrary, capable of existing harmoniously, to great mutual advantage. That such should be their relation to each other simply required that the obvious principles of the Constitution should be maintained. The injustice of the Northern monopolists has turned them into bitter opponents.

The return of peace brought the inevitable result of abundant supplies, which poured in with all the force of previous accumulation. Distress followed to the new manufacturing interests, as yet feeble and ill-developed, and there was an apprehension that they would be altogether annihilated. A natural desire existed on all sides to avert this extreme. Under the circumstances of the case, it would be difficult to show that a moderate degree of protection was not fairly permissible, as calculated to produce advantage to the Union as a whole. This view was taken, indeed, by the Southern States. It was generally admitted that the moderate yet important protection which accrued as a natural incident of revenue duties, was beneficial to the country. Nor was there wanting a disposition to go cheerfully beyond this. Calhoun, the ablest statesman of the South, was in favour of a moderate degree of protection, for its own sake. He held that the

special disadvantage endured by the Southern States was counterbalanced by the benefit they enjoyed in sharing the national prosperity. At that period the theory of protection was accepted in all countries, and the belief was universal, that the supremacy of this country in manufactures had resulted from it. There was a natural desire that the country should be freed from the entire dependence on foreign imports, in which it had previously stood; and we find that the South has in no instance objected to a moderate degree of protection, or scrutinized the tariffs narrowly. The objection has been raised against the excess and abuse which soon came into existence. We cannot find that the Southern States in any of the tariff contests commenced their opposition until the system had really degenerated, into the gross favoritism of small, but politically powerful interests at their expense.

The system, once introduced, soon yielded its natural results. Monopoly is one of those good things, of which he who has an inch soon wants an ell. The protectionist of early days was not long in expanding his views, and increasing his demands. And although the evils we have described were far from reaching their present dimensions, still excess in all things, exaggeration, and idolatry of self, were already becoming prominent features of character. When growing general in other directions, they were little likely to be absent, where they coincided with personal