duct of Great Brit ain as to the decla rations of the Congress of Paris. Unfriendly con- with the insurgents was the second step in the joint action which had been agreed upon. For reasons which Her Majesty's Government is in a position to explain, but which can only be conjectured by the United States and by the Tribunal, care appears to have been taken to prevent the knowledge of it from reaching the Government of the United States. On the receipt of the information from Lord Cowley, Lord John Russell prepared at once a draught of instructions to Lord Lyons, the British Minister at Washington, and, on the 16th of May, sent them to Lord Cowley to be submitted to the Emperor's Government.1 On the next day, Lord Cowley replied that he had seen seen M. Thouvenel, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and added: "M. Thouvenel had already written to M. Mercier [the French Minister at Washington] in the same terms as your Lordship proposes to address your instructions to Lord Lyons. I need hardly add that His Excellency concurs entirely in the draught."2 On the 18th of May, Lord John Russell hastened to send his instructions to Lord Lyons. He told him "to encourage the Government" of the United States "in any disposition which they might evince to recognize the Declaration of Paris in 2 Vol. I, page 51. 1 Vol. I, page 50. regard to privateering;" and he added that "Her Majesty's Government do not doubt that they will, without hesitation, recognize the remaining articles of the declaration." He continued: "You will clearly understand that Her Majesty's Government cannot accept the renunciation of privateering on the part of the Government of the United States, if coupled with the condition that they should enforce its renunciation on the Confederate States, either by denying their right to issue letters of marque, or by interfering with the belligerent operations of vessels holding from them such letters of marque;" and he closed by instructing Lord Lyons to take such means as he might judge most expedient to transmit to Her Majesty's Consul at Charleston or New Orleans a copy of a previous dispatch of the same day, in order that it might be communicated to Mr. Jefferson Davis at Montgomery. Lord Lyons had no instructions to show to Mr. Seward the dispatch from which these citations have been made, and it evidently was contemplated that he should not exhibit it. He was, however, to read to him the previous instructions of the same date referred to in that dispatch, and to leave a copy with him, if desired. These previous instructions, numbered 136, may be found on the 107th page of the first of the accom Unfriendly con duct of Great Brit ain as to the decla rations of the Con gress of Paris. Unfriendly con duct of Great Brit ain as to the decla rations of the Congress of Paris. The instructions to Lord Lyons regarded as cause of war. a panying volumes. It was not ony to be shown to Mr. Seward, but a copy of it was to be shown to Mr. Jefferson Davis.1 The attention of the Tribunal of Arbitration is, in this connection, particularly invited to the fact that these instructions, numbered 136, contain nothing indicating a design on the part of the British Government to put itself in communication with the insurgent authorities, nothing to induce Mr. Seward to think that they were other than what, on their face, they purported to be, a communication from the Government of Great Britain to the Government of the United States, through the ordinary diplomatic channel. It is not improbable that the Arbitrators may be might have been of opinion that the use of the British Legation at Washington for such a purpose was an act which the United States would have been justified in regarding as a cause of war. It was, to say the least, an abuse of diplomatic privilege, and a violation, in the person of Her Majesty's principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, of the duties of neutrality which Her Majesty's Government was about to impose upon her subjects. Before relating what Lord Lyons did, under these instructions, it is necessary to pause in order that the Tribunal may be informed what Mr. Seward and Mr. Adams had been doing in the same 1 Vol. I, page 51. matter simultaneously with the proceedings which have been detailed. Former negotiations regarding the Congress of Paris. In the year 1854 the Government of the United States submitted to the principal maritime nations the Declaration of two propositions, soliciting their assent to them as permanent principles of international law. These propositions were, that free ships should make free goods; and that neutral property on board an enemy's vessel should not be subject to confiscation unless contraband of war. Great Britain, being then at war with Russia, did not act upon these propositions; but in the Congress which assembled at Paris when the peace of 1856 was made, Great Britain and the other nations, parties to the Congress, gave their assent to them, and to two other propositions-the abolition of privateering, and the necessity of efficiency to the legalization of a blockade. It was also agreed that the four propositions should be maintained as a whole and indivisible, and that the Powers who might accede to them should accede to them as such.1 Great Britain then joined in inviting the United States to give its adhesion to the four indivisible points. The Washington Cabinet of that day replied that the United States was willing to assent to all the propositions, except the one re 124th Protocol, April 16, 1856, Congress of Paris. Former negotiations regarding the Declaration of the Congress of Paris. lating to privateering, as being, in fact, recognitions of principles which had always been maintained by them; but that they could not consent to abolish privateering without a further agreement to exempt private property from capture on the high seas; and they proposed to amend the declaration of the Congress of Paris in that sense, and offered to give their adhesion to it when so amended. In January, 1857, the proposals of the United States not having been acted upon, their Minister at London was directed to suspend negotiations until the new President, Mr. Buchanan, could examine the subject; and the suspension continued until after Mr. Lincoln was inaugurated. On the 24th April, 1861, less than two months after Mr. Lincoln's accession to power, Mr. Seward resumed the suspended negotiations by instructing Mr. Adams' (similar instructions being given to the Ministers of the United States to the other maritime powers) to give an unqualified assent to the four propositions, and to bring the negotiation to a speedy and satisfactory conclusion. Owing, probably, to the interruption in the communications between Washington and New York when the dispatch of April 24 was written, Mr. Adams does not appear to have been able to 1 Vol. I, page 44. |