Syllabus. actually agreed, in terms, to have that design, and to pursue it by a common means. If it be proved that defendants pursued, by their acts, the same object, often by the same means, one performing one part and another executing another part of the same, so as to complete it, with a view to the attainment of the same object, the jury may be justified in the conclusion that they were engaged in a conspiracy to effect that object. 8. In this case, on the trial of certain county commissioners for a conspiracy to obtain the money of the county by means of false pretences or false and fraudulent bills against the county, the proof showed many cases of commissions charged by the defendants for awarding contracts, and paid to them, which were made up by false bills presented to the county board, and allowed. In some instances the proof failed to show whether false and fraudulent bills were rendered, and in a few the contractors testified that they rendered fair and true bills: Held, that there was no error in allowing the latter transactions to be laid before the jury. In such case it is not essential to the crime that money should have been actually obtained by the false pretences, or that such false pretences should have been used. It is enough if there was a conspiracy to obtain money by false pretences, and it was properly left to the jury to say whether such a conspiracy existed in respect of such transactions. 9. SAME-entering into conspiracy already formed. On the trial under an indictment for a conspiracy, it is not necessary to prove that the conspiracy originated with the defendants, or that they met during the process of its concoction, for the reason that every person entering into a conspiracy or common design already formed, is deemed, in law, a party to all acts done by any of the other parties, before or afterward, in furtherance of the common design. 10. SAME-transaction for the benefit of only a portion of the conspirators. On indictment against members of a county board for a conspiracy to defraud the county by means of false pretences, to-wit, false and fraudulent bills of contractors against the county, the court allowed the People to show that one of the defendants made out a bill for the sale of his own property to the county, in the name of another, upon which he received the price allowed, it not appearing that the other defendants had any profit in the matter: Held, that there was no error in the admission of the evidence, it being immaterial whether the transaction was for the benefit of one or a portion of the defendants, or for the benefit of all. 11. SAME-limitation-when the statute begins to run-in the case of a conspiracy. On the trial of parties for a conspiracy to obtain the money of another by false pretences, an instruction telling the jury that the crime was complete and the offence was then committed when the agreement or confederating was entered into, and that the period of limitation would commence from the time of committing the offence, is calculated to mislead, by causing the jury to understand that the limitation would commence to run from the time defendants first became members of the conspiracy, Syllabus. instead of from the time of the commission of the last overt act in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy. 12. SAME obtaining money by false pretences-by agent from principal. An agent may be guilty of the crime of obtaining money by false pretences from his principal. In such case, the knowledge of the agent that the pretences were false, is not that of the principal. So county commissioners may be guilty of obtaining money from the county by the false pretence of a false and fraudulent bill, although they, individually, know the bill to be false and fraudulent. 13. SAME reasonable doubt-applying the rule to conflict of evidence. There is no error in refusing an instruction for a defendant in a criminal case, which seeks to apply the rule or doctrine of reasonable doubt to the case of conflict of testimony as to the time when the offence was committed. The application of the rule should be invoked upon the question of guilt upon the whole case, or some entire matter of defence or element of the crime. 14. PLEADING AND EVIDENCE-relevancy, under the issue. On the trial of members of a county board for a conspiracy to obtain money of the county by false and fraudulent pretences, evidence of the payment of money by a party, to the defendants, or some of them, for voting that no appeal be taken from a judgment against the county, is not proper, as it has no tendency to show the intention to obtain money from the county. Such evidence shows bribery, only. 15. JURY-discharging a juror-for what cause. The trial court has the discretionary power, in a criminal case, to discharge a juror after he has been accepted and sworn, and this power is not confined to the case of disqualification of the juror. The fact that he is returned as a juror through outside influence, and under suspicious circumstances, is sufficient cause for his discharge. 16. SAME-incompetent juror adjudged competent-peremptory challenges not yet exhausted. Where the prisoner has not exhausted his peremptory challenges, he will not be heard to complain of irregularities that may intervene in the selection of the jury. He can not object unless an objectionable juror is forced on him after the exhaustion of his peremptory challenges. 17. ERROR will not always reverse. A judgment will not be reversed for error which may intervene, if it appears, from the whole record, that such error could not reasonably have affected the result. 18. SAME-assigning for error that which the party himself had sought. A party can not be allowed to conplain of an instruction when he has himself asked one of the same kind, in substance. 19. PRACTICE-improper treatment of a witness, in the mode of his examination. On the trial of county commissioners for conspiracy to obtain county money by the allowance of false and fraudulent bills, a witness who 26-124 ILL. Brief for the Plaintiffs in Error. had had dealings with the board was called by the People, and testified. On cross-examination he was asked, "When did you commence stealing from the county by giving false weights and measures?” and “When did you first commence swindling the county?" The witness had not said he had done either of these things: Held, that the questions were abusive and improper, and rightly excluded by the court. 20. SAME-improper remarks of counsel to jury. The prosecution should never assume or indulge in harshness of bearing or intemperate language against a prisoner on trial. But when such course is provoked by improper remarks on the part of the defence, and the case tried is one that naturally occasions indignation, the judgment will not be reversed on account of some intemperate remarks of counsel for the State. WRIT OF ERROR to the Appellate Court for the First District; -heard in that court on writ of error to the Criminal Court of Cook county; the Hon. EGBERT JAMIESON, Judge, presiding. Mr. ALEXANDER SULLIVAN, and Mr. WILLIAM BROWN, for the plaintiffs in error: The defendants were entitled to be discharged. Rev. Stat. chap. 38, sec. 438. The defendants were not properly on trial for the offence for which judgment was rendered. The judgment was under section 49 of the Criminal Code. After a juror has been accepted and sworn, the court may discharge for cause, only. Stone v. People, 2 Scam. 336; 1 Bishop on Crim. Proc. sec. 932, note 1; sec. 945, note 1; secs. 946, 948; Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295; Commonwealth v. Rogers, 7 Metc. 500; Mosely v. State, Blackf. 593; State v. Cameron, 2 Chand. 172; State v. Groome, 10 Iowa, 308; Commonwealth v. Wade, 17 Pick. 395; Van Blaricum v. People, 16 Ill. 364; Logg v. People, 8 Bradw. 99. That the conduct of the court and counsel for the People was error, see Horne v. State, 1 Kan. 74; Ritzman v. People, 110 Ill. 362; Jackson v. People, 18 Bradw. 512; Austin v. People, 102 id. 261; Baker v. People, 105 id. 452. The objects laid in the indictment as the purpose of the conspiracy, and the means laid in the indictment as the Brief for the Plaintiffs in Error. means to be used by the conspirators, must be proved as laid. Archbold's Crim. Pr. and Pl. 1847; United States v. Mitchell, 1 Hughes, 439; Evans v. People, 90 Ill. 384; United States v. Goldberg, 7 Biss. 175; State v. Tramwell, 2 Ired. 379; Commonwealth v. Kellogg, 7 Cush. 447; 3 Greenleaf on Evidence, sec. 17. This rule protects the accused from conviction on proof of any other offence than that he is called upon to defend. Gutchins v. People, 21 Ill. 641; Kribs v. People, 82 id. 425; Evans v. People, 90 id. 384; Rex v. Timothy, 1 F. & F. 39; Rex v. Barry, 4 id. 389. Knowledge and intent on the part of a person charged, are necessary to make him a conspirator, as well as to make his acts and declarations evidence of the conspiracy. Pollman's case, 2 Campb. 233; Evans v. People, 90 Ill. 384; People v. Powell, 63 N. Y. 88; People v. Mather, 4 Wend. 230; United States v. Goldberg, 7 Biss. 175; United States v. Nunemacher, id. 111. There must be established between the conspirators a union of wills and sentiment, and concert and co-operation in acts. United States v. Goldberg, 7 Biss. 174; Regina v. Murphy, 8 C. & P. 297; Commonwealth v. McLean, 2 Pars. (Pa.) 368; People v. Mather, 4 Wend. 230; Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Metc. 111; Carson on Conspiracy, 123. The acts which are admissible in evidence of conspiracy are those done in pursuance of, to advance the object of, the conspiracy, and done while the conspiracy is in progress, and before completion or abandonment; and the declarations admissible in evidence of a conspiracy are those only which are in themselves acts, or which accompany acts, and are not merely narrative. Carson on Conspiracy, 213-217; State v. Jackson, 29 La. 354; Clinton v. Estes, 20 Ark. 216; State v. Larkins, 49 N. H. 39; Page v. Parker, 40 id. 47; Lynes v. State, 36 Miss. 617; State v. Ross, 29 Mo. 32; State v. Fredericks, 85 id. 145. Brief for the People. If A, B and C engage in one conspiracy, and if C, D and E engage in another, and E, F and G engage in another, then A, B, C, D, E, F and G can not be convicted of one conspiracy on proof of these several conspiracies. O'Connell v. Regina, 11 C. & F. 231; Elliott v. State, 26 Ala. 40; Kelyng's C. C. 24; East's P. C. 97. When the proof of conspiracy is circumstantial, a defendant's connection with it must be established by evidence of his own acts, not those of others. Carson on Conspiracy, 124; Commonwealth v. Judd, 2 Mass. 329; United States v. Goldberg, 7 Biss. 175; 1 East's P. C. 96. The court must be able to say, judicially, that the defendants were not prejudiced by the admission of improper evidence. Miller v. People, 39 Ill. 457; Pollard v. People, 69 id. 151; Holbrook v. Nichol, 36 id. 166; Clark v. Vorce, 19 Wend. 232. The essence of the crime of obtaining money under false pretences is, that the false pretences should be of a past event, or of a fact having a present existence, and not of something to happen in the future, and that the prosecutor believed that the pretence was true, and that, confiding in the truth of the pretence, and by reasons thereof, he parted with his property or his money. State v. Evers, 49 Mo. 542; Cores v. Strain, 10 Mete. 521; State v. Green, 7 Wis. 676; Wharton on Am. Crim. Law, secs. 2087-2118, 2121, 2122. Mr. GEORGE HUNT, Attorney General, Mr. JOEL M. LONGENECKER, States Attorney, and Messrs. STILES & LEWIS, for the People: There was no error in refusing to discharge the defendants. 1 Starr & Curtis' Stat. 868; Brooks v. People, 88 Ill. 327; Gallagher v. People, id. 335. It was within the discretion of the court to discharge the three jurrors after they had been accepted and sworn. Holt v. State, 9 Tex. App. 571; Loggins v. State, 12 id. 65; Spies |