rectitude. Hence bodily death is no punishment of Adam's imputed sin, but a necessity of nature."

"3. Now, as sin itself has no more passed over to Adam's posterity than has the punishment of sin, so every man, in respect to his moral nature, is born in just the same state in which Adam was first created."* The Augustinian theory is as follows:

“1. Adam's sin has been propagated among all men, and will always be propagated, and that by sensual lust in procreation, (concupiscentia,) by which man, in his natural state, is subjected to the devil.

"2. The propagation of Adam's sin among his pos terity is a punishment of the same sin. The sin was the punishment of the sin. The corruption of human nature, in the whole race, was the righteous punish ment of the transgression of the first man, in whom all men already existed.

"3. The other penalties of Adam's sin, bodily death, the toil of labour, the shame of nakedness, sensual lust, pains of parturition, &c., also came upon his posterity; and, moreover, the physical punishment of Adam's sin, just as much as the moral, was a positive penalty.

"4. And as not only Adam's sin as a punishment but also the other penalties came upon his posterity, there hence follows from it the entire moral and physical corruption of human nature. From that source, every man brings into the world a nature already se corrupt, that he is not only more inclined to evil than to good, but he can do nothing but sin, and is, on this

* An Historical Presentation of Augustinism and Pelagianism from the original Sources, by G. F. Wiggers, D. D., Professor of Theology in the University of Rostock. Translated from the German, with notes and additions, by Rev. Ralph Emerson, Professor of Eccl. Hist. in the Theol. Sem., Andover, Mass., pp. 84-86.

account, subject to the righteous sentence of condemnation.

"5. This original sin, however, is nothing substantial, but is a quality of the affections, (affectionalis qualitas,) and a vice indeed, (vitium,) a weakness, (languor.)"*

These are the ultra notions of the two great cham pions in this controversy. It is scarcely necessary in this place to add notes of explanation or caution to the statements. I have introduced them here, to show that the two systems began to diverge upon first principles, and that subsequent and less important differences are to be traced to those which are primary and fundamental.

On the subjects of free will, grace, and keeping the law, opposite views were entertained by the two disputants and their respective adherents. Pelagius maintained that the will is naturally free to do good, and is not at all impaired by the fall; that there are no special influences of the Spirit in regeneration, but all the helps that are necessary in that work is instruction, and that man can by this aid perfectly keep the law. It has often been alleged that Pelagius maintained "that it was not only possible for men to become impeccable in this life; but that several had actually attained that degree of perfection." But this seems to be an inference of his opponents. Professor Wiggers has given us numerous quotations of the language of Pelagius, taken from the Works of Augustine. And though generally it is not certain that a writer does justice to his antagonist in quoting his language, yet it is always fair to conclude that he does not present the doctrines of his opponent in too favourable a light. This certainly * Historical Presentation, &c., p. 88.

+ Collier's Historical Dictionary, art. PELAGIUS.

cannot be concluded in relation to so heated a writer as Augustine.

Pelagius was brought before a council of fourteen bishops belonging to Palestine, at Diospolis, (Lydda,) A.D. 415, to answer to sundry charges. Charge vi. is, "Pelagius has said, that man may be without sin." To this Pelagius responds, "I have indeed said that man may be without sin, and keep God's commandments, if he will. For this ability God has given him. But I have not said that any one can be found, from infancy to old age, who has never sinned; but, being converted from sin, by his own labour and God's grace he can be without sin; still, he is not by this immutable for the future."*

Pelagius was here pressed with the objection, that, according to his system, man could do all that the law required without divine aid, whereas Christ says, "Without me ye can do nothing." To meet this objection he explains himself: "Our being able to do, say, think all good, is the work of Him that has given us this ability, and that aids this ability; but that we do, or speak, or think well, is ours, because we are also able to turn all these to evil." He admits the grace of God in our good exercises, but in a very qualified sense. Under grace he comprehends,

"1. The power of doing good, (possibilitas boni,) and therefore especially free will itself. We distinguish three things,' says he, in the passage above cited on free will, the ability, the willing, and the being, (the posse, velle, and esse.) The ability we place in nature; the willing in the will, the being in the effect. The first, that is, the ability, pertains properly to God, who has conferred it on his creature; the other two, the willing and the being, are to be referred to man, as Historical Presentation, &c., p. 157. + Ibid., p. 179.

they descend from the fountain of the will. Hence, ir. the intention and in the good act, is the praise of man; nay, both of man and of God, who gave the ability for the intention itself and for the act, and who always aids the ability itself by the help of his grace. But that man is able to will and to do, is of God alone.'"* And hence the Carthaginian synod, in their letter to Innocent, say, "Pelagius and Caelestius maintain, that the grace of God must be placed in his having so constituted and endowed the nature of man, that it can fulfil the law of God by its own will."+

"2. Under the term grace, Pelagius included the revelation, the law, and the example of Christ, by which the practice of virtue is made easier for man. In this sense, Pelagius said, (De Lib. Arbitrio, in Augustine's De Gr. Chr. 10,) God works in us to will what is good, to will what is holy, while, by the greatness of future glory and the promise of future rewards, he rouses us, who are devoted to earthly desires and delighting like dumb beasts in the present; while, by the revelation of wisdom, he rouses our stupid will to a longing desire for God; and while he commends to us all that is good.""

Upon this position Augustine makes the following strong animadversions:-"They are most vehemently and strenuously to be resisted, who suppose that, by the mere power of the human will, without God's grace, they can either perfect righteousness, or attain to it by protracted effort. And when they begin to be pressed with the question, How they presume to assert this as taking place without divine aid, they check themselves, nor dare to utter the word, because they see how impious and intolerable it is. But they say, that these * Historical Presentation, pp. 179, 180. + Ibid., p. 180. Ibid., p. 181.

things do not take place without divine aid, inasmuch as God has both created man with free will, and, by giving precepts, teaches him how he ought to live; and in this, certainly, he aids, as he removes ignorance by instruction, so that man may know what he ought to avoid and what to seek in his actions, and thus by free will, which is naturally implanted, entering the way that is pointed out, and by living continently, and justly, and piously, he deserves to attain the blessed and eternal life.' Grace, in this sense, Pelagius regarded as necessary in order to be without sin. 'No man is without sin, who has not attained the know iedge of law.'"*

"3. As already appears from the quotations, Pelagius comprehended likewise under grace, the forgiveness of sins and future salvation. The Pelagian heresy maintains, that the grace of God consists in our being so made as to be able, by our own will, to abstain from sin, and in God's giving us the help of his law and his commands, and in his pardoning the previous sins of those who return to him. In these particulars alone is the grace of God to be placed, and not in the aid to particular acts. For man can be without sin and fulfil God's commands, if he will. De Gest. 35. In his commentary on Rom. v, 6, Pelagius remarks: 'The apostle designs to show, that Christ died for the ungodly in order to commend his grace by the contemplation of beneficence.' 'He confesses,' says Augustine, (De Nat. et Gr. 18,) 'that sins already committed must be divinely expiated, and that prayer must be made to God in order to merit pardon (propter veniam promerendam :) for his much praised power of nature and the will of man, as himself confesses, cannot undo what is already done. In this necessity, therefore,

* Historical Presentation, pp. 181, 182.