he achieved his freedom, and regaining France, commenced that resplendent career of charity by which he is placed among the great names of Christendom. Princes and orators have lavished panegyrics upon this fugitive slave; and the Catholic Church, in homage to his extraordinary virtues, has introduced him into the company of saints.

Less by genius or eminent services, than by sufferings, are the fugitive slaves of our country now commended. For them every sentiment of humanity is aroused:

"Who could refrain

That had a heart to love, and in that heart
Courage to make his love known?"

our age.

nown.

Rude and ignorant they may be; but in their very efforts for Freedom, they claim kindred with all that is noble in the Past. They are among the heroes of Romance has no stories of more thrilling interest than theirs. Classical antiquity has preserved no examples of adventurous trial more worthy of reAmong them are men whose names will be treasured in the annals of their race. By their eloquent voice they have already done much to make their wrongs known, and to secure the respect of the world. History will soon lend them her avenging pen. Proscribed by you during life, they will proscribe you through all time. Sir, already judgment is beginning. A righteous public sentiment palsies your enactment.

And now, sir, let us review the field over which we have passed. We have seen that any compromise, finally closing the discussion of Slavery under the Con

stitution, is tyrannical, absurd and impotent; that as Slavery can exist only by virtue of positive law, and as it has no such positive support in the Constitution, it cannot exist within the National jurisdiction; that the Constitution nowhere recognizes property in man, and that, according to its true interpretation, Freedom and not Slavery is national, while Slavery and not Freedom is sectional; that, in this spirit, the National Government was first organized under Washington, himself an Abolitionist, surrounded by Abolitionists, while the whole country, by its Church, its Colleges, its Literature, and all its best voices, was united against Slavery, and the national flag at that time nowhere within the National Territory covered a single slave; still further, that the National Government is a Government of delegated powers, and as among these there is no power to support Slavery, this institution cannot be national, nor can Congress in any way legislate in its behalf; and, finally, that the establishment of this principle is the true way of peace and safety for the Republic. Considering next the provision for the surrender of fugitives from service, we have seen that it was not one of the original compromises of the Constitution; that it was introduced tardily and with hesitation, and adopted with little discussion, and then and for a long period after was regarded with comparative indifference; that the recent Slave Act, though many times unconstitutional, is especially so on two grounds-first, as a usurpation by Congress of powers not granted by the Constitution, and an infraction of rights secured to the States; and secondly, as a denial of Trial by Jury, in a question of Personal Liberty and a suit at common law; that its glaring unconstitu

tionality finds a prototype in the British Stamp Act, which our fathers refused to obey as unconstitutional on two parallel grounds—first, because it was a usurpation by Parliament of powers not belonging to it under the British Constitution, and an infraction of rights belonging to the Colonies; and secondly, because it was a denial of Trial by Jury in certain cases of property; that as Liberty is far above property, so is the outrage perpetrated by the American Congress far above that perpetrated by the British Parliament; and, finally, that the Slave Act has not that support in the public sentiment of the States where it is to be executed, which is the life of all law, and which prudence and the precept of Washington require.

Sir, thus far I have arrayed the objections to this Act, and the false interpretations out of which it has sprung. But I am asked what I offer as a substitute for the legislation which I denounce. Freely I will answer. It is to be found in a correct appreciation of the provision of the Constitution, under which this discussion occurs. Look at it in the double light of reason and of Freedom, and we cannot mistake the exact extent of its requirements. Here is the provision:

"No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due."

From the very language employed, it is obvious that this is merely a compact between the States, with a prohibition on the States, conferring no power on the

nation. In its natural signification it is a compact. According to the examples of other countries, and the principles of jurisprudence, it is a compact. All arrangements for the extradition of fugitives have been customarily compacts. Except under the express obligations of treaty, no nation is bound to surrender fugitives. Especially has this been the case with fugitives for Freedom. In mediæval Europe, cities refused to recognize this obligation in favor of persons even under the same National Government. In 1531,

while the Netherlands and Spain were united under Charles V., the Supreme Council of Mechlin rejected an application from Spain for the surrender of a fugitive slave. By express compact alone could this be secured. But the provision of the Constitution was borrowed from the Ordinance of the Northwestern Territory, which is expressly declared to be a compact; and this Ordinance, finally drawn by Nathan Dane, was again borrowed in its distinctive features from the early institutions of Massachusetts, among which, as far back as 1643, was a compact of like nature with other New England States. Thus this provision is a compact in language, in nature, in its whole history; as we have already seen it is a compact, according to the intentions of our Fathers and the genius of our institutions.

As a compact, its execution depends absolutely upon the States, without any intervention of the Nation. Each State, in the exercise of its own judgment, will determine for itself the precise extent of the obligations assumed. As a compact in derogation of Freedom, it must be construed strictly in every respect—leaning always in favor of Freedom, and shunning any mean

ing, not clearly necessary, which takes away important personal rights; mindful that the parties to whom it is applicable are regarded as “persons," of course with all the rights of "persons" under the Constitution; especially mindful of the vigorous maxim of the common law, that "he is cruel and impious who does not always favor Freedom;" and also, completely adopting in letter and in spirit, as becomes a just people, the rule of the great Commentator, that "the law is always ready to catch at anything in favor of Liberty." With this key the true interpretation is natural and easy.

Briefly, the States are prohibited from any "law or regulation" by which any "person" escaped from "service or labor" may be discharged therefrom, and on establishment of the claim to such "service or labor," he is to be "delivered up." But the mode by which the claim is to be tried and determined is not specified. All this is obviously within the control of each State. It may be done by virtue of express legislation, in which event any Legislature, justly careful of Personal Liberty, would surround the fugitive with every shield of the law and Constitution. But here a fact, pregnant with Freedom, must be studiously observed. The name Slave that litany of wrong and woe does not appear in the clause. Here is no unambiguous phrase, incapable of a double sense; no "positive" language, applicable only to slaves, and excluding all other classes; no word of that absolute certainty in every particular, which forbids any interpretation except that of Slavery, and makes it impossible to catch at anything in favor of Liberty." Nothing of this kind is here. But passing from this; "cruelly