intent is to obtain that which, in justice and equity, the writer of the letter is not entitled to receive. It does not extend to cases where the person threatened actually owes the writer of the letter the sum claimed by him. To support an indictment under that statute, the end as well as the means employed to obtain it must be wrongful and unlawful.1

Prior and subsequent letters from the prisoner to the party threatened may be given in evidence as explanatory of the meaning and intent of the particular letter on which the indictment is framed.2

8. When a Party may be Punished for a Robbery Committed in Another County.

When property stolen in one county and brought into another shall have been taken by robbery, the offender may he indicted, tried and convicted for such robbery in the county into which the stolen property was brought, in the same manner as if the robbery had been committed in that county.3

9. Principals and Accessories.

If several acting in concert be present at a robbery, all are guilty, as well those who use violence or take the property as those who do not. The same general rules which apply in other cases of principal and accessories apply also in cases of robbery.5 But where a gang of poachers consisting of the prisoners and one Williams attacked a game keeper, beat him and left him senseless on the ground, and then went away, but Williams returned, and whilst the game keeper was insensible took from him his gun, pocket-book and money, it was held that this was robbery in Williams only."

If A, B and C come to commit a robbery, and A stand sentinel at a hedge corner to watch if any person should come, and B and C commit the robbery, it will be robbery in A also, though he was at a distance from them and not within view." If several

Peo. v Griffin, 2 Barb., 427.

22 East P. C., 1110.

2 R. S., 727, § 50.

1 Hawk., ch. 34, § 5.

1 Russ. on Cr., 901.

Rex v. Hawk et al., 3 Car. & A., 392.

1 Hale, 534-537.

persons come to rob a man, and they are all present, and one only actually takes the money, it is robbery in all.

The principal of several persons engaged in one common design, being in the eye of the law present when the fact is committed, has been carried to a considerable extent in the case of robbery.2

XXXVIII. SEDUCTION UNDER PROMISE OF MARRIAGE.

Any man who shall, under promise of marriage, seduce and have illicit connection with any unmarried female of previous chaste character, is liable to be punished as for a felony.3

By the statutory enactment in this offence, it is necessary that the indictment should be found within two years after the commission of the offence, and no conviction can be had on the testimony of the female seduced unsupported by other evidence, and the subsequent marriage of the parties may be plead in bar of a conviction.*

To an indictment for the seduction of an unmarried female under the above act, the defendant interposed a special plea alleging that at the time of the committing of the acts charged, the defendant was, and for five years previous thereto had been a married man, having a living wife and family, with which wife and family he was then living, all of which at the time of the alleged promise and seduction was well known to the said female. A demurrer was interposed to such special plea, and the facts thus set up were held to constitute a good defence to the prosecution, and judgment was given for the defendant.5

By the words "previous chaste character" the statute means personal chastity, actual character, not reputation.

It is sufficient, under the statute, that the defendant effected his object by a conditional promise that, if the illicit connection were permitted, he would marry her. Where the illicit intercourse between the prosecutrix and the defendant, began more than two years before the indictment found, and continued until

' 1 Hawk. P. C., ch. 34, § 5; 1 Hale, 534. 1 Russ. on Cr., 901, and cases cited.

'Laws 1848, ch. 111.; 2 R. S., 664, § 26.

• Id.

Peo. v. Alger, 1 Park., 333.

• Crozier v. Peo., 1 Park., 453; Safford v. Peo., Id., 474; Peo. v. Kenyon, 5 254.

Id.,

within two years, it was held not a case of seduction within two years, and therefore not within the statute. The language of the act "provided that no conviction shall be had under the provisions of the act, on the testimony of the female seduced, unsupported by other testimony," does not mean or render it necessary that such female should be corroborated on every material statement, or on both the seduction and the promise to marry. If it did, the intention and the operation of the law would be defeated, as the seduction can in scarcely any case be proved, except by the testimony of the person injured, while the promise can be proved by either positive or inferential evidence, either by the defendant's own acknowledgments, or by the manner of his treatment, conduct or expressions used. But the corroboration of the woman's testimony must be addressed to the ingredients necessary to constitute a crime. Where she was corroborated as to collateral matters but not as to either the promise or the seduction, it was held that there could be no conviction. In a prosecution under the statute for seduction, there being no evidence of any express promise by the prosecutrix, the judge charged the jury that if they were fully satisfied, from the evidence, that the defendant promised to marry the prosecutrix, if she would have connection with him, and, she believing and confiding in such promise, and intending on her part to accept such offer of marriage, did so, it was a sufficient promise of marriage under the statute; the Court of Appeals held that the charge was unobjectionable, and that it was not necessary that the promise should be a valid and binding one between the parties. The offence consists in seducing and having illicit connection with an unmarried female under promise of marriage. It is enough that a promise is made which is a consideration for, or inducement to, the intercourse. But if the statute required the promise to be a valid one, the charge was correct. A mutual promise on the part of the female seduced, is implied if she yields to the solicitation of the seducer, made under his promise to marry.

XXXIX. SUBSTITUTING CHILD.

Every person to whom an infant under the age of six years shall be confided for nursing, education or any other purpose, who shall, with intent to deceive any parent or guardian of such child, substitute and produce to such parent or guardian another child in the place of the one so confided, is guilty of a felony.1

XL. SUBORNATION OF PERJURY.

Every person who shall unlawfully and corruptly procure any witness by any means whatsoever to commit any willful and corrupt perjury, in any cause, matter or proceeding, in or concerning which such witness shall be legally sworn and examined, shall be adjudged guilty of subornation of perjury.*

To render the offence of subornation of perjury complete, either at common law or on the statute, the false oath must be actually taken, and no abortive attempt to solicit will bring the offender within its penalties.3

The criminal solicitation to commit perjury, though unsuccessful, was a misdemeanor at common law, punishable not only by fine and imprisonment, but by corporal and infamous punishment." And under our statute, as hereafter stated, it is a felony punishable by imprisonment in a State prison.

5

On a trial for subornation of perjury, where the perjurer suborned to swear on the former trial is admitted as a witness and confesses the perjury, it is not necessary either to prove the perjury or subornation by the other witnesses."

Attempts to Induce Perjury.-Every person who shall, by the offer of any valuable consideration, attempt unlawfully and corruptly to procure any other to commit willful and corrupt perjury as a witness in any cause, matter or proceeding in or concerning which such other person might by law be examined as a witness, shall, upon conviction, be punished by imprisonment in a State prison not exceeding five years."

8 Mod., 122; 1 Leach, 455, notes.

• 2 East Rep., 17; 1 Hawk., ch. 19, § 10; 6 East, 464.

XLI. TREASON.

The Revised Statutes declare that the following acts shall constitute treason against the people of this State:

1. Levying war against the people of this State within the State; or,

2. A combination of two or more persons, by force, to usurp the government of this State, or to overturn the same, evidenced by a forcible attempt, made within this State, to accomplish such purpose; or,

3. Adhering to the enemies of this State while separately engaged in war with a foreign enemy, in the cases prescribed in the Constitution of the United States, and giving to such enemies aid and comfort in this State or elsewhere.1

Whenever any person shall be outlawed upon a conviction for treason, the judgment thereupon shall produce a forfeiture to the people of this State during the lifetime of such person, and no longer, of every freehold estate in real property of which such person was seized in his own right at the time of such treason committed, or at any time thereafter, and of all his goods and chattels.2

The following embrace the leading points of what will constitute treason, as decided by the United States courts upon the trial of important cases of treason against the federal govern

ment:

War can be levied only by the employment of actual forces. Men must be openly raised; troops must be embodied; yet neither arms nor the actual application of force to the object are indispensably requisite. But it is high treason to march in arms, with a marshaled and arrayed force, committing acts of violence and devastation, in order to compel the resignation of a public officer, and thereby to render more inoperative and ineffectual an act of Congress. All such who perform any part, however minute or remote from the scene of action, when war is levied, if they are leagued in the general conspiracy, commit treason. But

* U. S. v. Burr, 4 Cr., 470-476, 481-487-488.

U. S. v. Fries, 196; U. S. v. Vigol, 2 Dall., 346; U. S. v. Mitchell, Id., 348-256.

Ballman & S., 4 Cr., 75; U. S. v. Fries, Trial, 167; U. S. v. Burr, 4 Cr.,